

1900 - 1995

POLITICAL THINKING OF THE INDONESIAN CHINESE

NEW EDITION
Updated & Expanded



A SOURCEBOOK

EDITED BY

LEO SURYADINATA



NUS

National University
of Singapore

POLITICAL THINKING OF THE INDONESIAN CHINESE 1900 — 1995

A Sourcebook

(Second Edition)

Edited by

LEO SURYADINATA

*Issued under the auspices of the
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies*



**SINGAPORE UNIVERSITY PRESS
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE**

© 1997 Singapore University Press
10 Kent Ridge Crescent, Singapore 119260

First edition published in 1979.

All rights reserved.

ISBN 9971-69-201-5

Typeset by: Scientifik Graphics
Printed by: Prime Packaging Industries Pte Ltd.

Contents

Preface	xi
Introduction	xiii
 PART I: THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD	
1. Rise of Chinese Nationalism in Indonesia	3
1-1 Phoa Keng Hek and others, Letter to All Chinese from Members of the Executive Committee of the Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan in Batavia (1900)	4
1-2 Hoa Djien (Phoa Keng Hek), Chinese Schools and the Indies Chinese Situation (1907)	8
✓1-3 <i>Sin Po</i> , Overseas Chinese Nationalism and Indonesian Nationalism (1918)	10
1-4 Tjoe Bou San, Fromberg and the Chinese Movement (1921)	16
1-5 Tjoe Bou San, Chinese Interests in the Netherlands Indies (1921)	24
1-6 Kwee Kek Beng, Is There a Need for Participation in Representative Councils? (1926)	29
 2. The Dutch East Indies-Oriented Group	 33
2-1 Kan Hok Hoei, The Chinese in the East Indies: A Peranakan Politician's View (1918)	33
2-2 Kwee Tek Hoay, Is It True There Will Be Dissension Among the Chinese over Participation in the Volksraad? (1927)	40
2-3 K.T.H. (Kwee Tek Hoay), Misleading Clamour (1928)	44
 3. The Indonesia-Oriented Group	 50
3-1 Liem Koen Hian, Three Political Streams in the Peranakan Chinese Community (1932)	50

3-2	Kwee Tek Hoay, <i>The Three Streams</i> (1932)	55
3-3	Kwee Hing Tjiat, <i>The Mature Baba</i> (1934)	61
3-4	Sub-Rosa (Chan Kok Cheng), Mr. Kwee Hing Tjiat and His Hollow Concept (1934)	64
3-5	Ko Kwat Tiong, <i>The Speech by Ko Kwat Tiong on the Soetardjo Petition</i> (1936)	66
4.	Chinese Orientations during the Japanese Occupation	70
4-1	Liem Koen Hian, <i>Ethnic Chinese and Indonesian Citizenship Law</i> (1945)	70
4-2	Oei Tjong Hauw, <i>Ethnic Chinese and Indonesian Citizenship Law</i> (1945)	75
4-3	Oei Tiang Tjoei, <i>Ethnic Chinese and Indonesian Citizenship Law</i> (1945)	78
 PART II: THE POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD		
5.	Overseas Chinese Identity	83
5-1	<i>Xin Bao</i> , Overseas Chinese and the Round Table Conference (1949)	83
5-2	Song Zhongquan, <i>Long Live Sino-Indonesian Friendship</i> (1961)	85
5-3	Song Zhongquan, <i>Ten Years of the Qiao Zong</i> (1962)	87
6.	The Pluralists	91
6-1	Thio Thiam Tjong, <i>The Persatuan Tionghoa in Indonesia</i> (1949)	92
6-2	Khoe Woen Sioe, <i>The Persatuan Tionghoa and Politics</i> (1949)	94
6-3	Yap Thiam Hien, <i>Three Therapies: To Cure the Disease of Racial Discrimination</i> (1960)	98

6-4	Siauw Giok Tjhan, <i>Therapy: Political Manifesto of the Republic of Indonesia</i> (1960)	109
6-5	Siauw Giok Tjhan, <i>BAPERKI, Revolution, and the Chinese Minority</i> (1963)	111
6-6	Siauw Giok Tjhan, <i>The Problems of Assimilation and Indonesian Citizenship</i> (1964)	123
6-7	Yap Thiam Hien, <i>The Chinese Problem and the Attitude of Some Christian Leaders of Chinese Descent</i> (1967)	127
6-8	Kwik Kian Gie, <i>Does a Problem of Assimilation of Pri and Non-Pri Still Exist?</i> (1983)	133
6-9	Kwik Kian Gie, <i>Once More about Assimilation</i> (1984)	138
7.	The Assimilationists	141
7-1	Liem Koen Hian, <i>The Need for a New Political Party</i> (1950)	141
7-2	Lauw Chuan Tho, <i>Why Should the Chung Hwa Hui and Similar Organizations Be Dissolved?</i> (1952)	144
7-3	Ong Hok Ham, <i>The Assimilation of the Peranakans</i> (1960)	150
7-4	Tjung Tin Jan, <i>Indonesia is not America</i> (1960)	155
7-5	<i>Assimilation Charter</i> (1961)	159
7-6	Pek Hien Liang, <i>Name and Identity</i> (1966)	160
7-7	Jahja Wullur (Oey Tjin San), <i>Integration of a Minority into the Majority</i> (1967)	164
7-8	Junus Jahja, <i>Conversion to Islam</i> (1992)	166
 PART III: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS		
8.	Ethnicity and Nation-building	173
8-1	Tjoa Sik Ien, <i>The Peranakan Chinese and Indonesian Citizenship</i> (1947)	174

8-2	Kwee Kek Beng, Terror Replaces Terror (1948)	177
8-3	Abiturient (Goh Tjing Hok), Chinese National Day and Indonesia's Independence (1948)	181
8-4	Tjoa Sik Ien and Siau-w Giok Tjhan, Educational Problems for Children of Peranakan Chinese who are Indonesian Citizens (1949)	184
8-5	Tjoa Tjie Liang, A Homogeneous Nation (1951)	188
8-6	Siau-w Giok Tjhan, National Economic Development (1953)	191
8-7	Soe Hok Djin, Culture as the Tool for Building National Unity (1963)	197
8-8	<i>Shenghuo Zhoubao</i> , Avoid with Determination Big Country Chauvinism (1964)	200
8-9	<i>Shenghuo Zhoubao</i> , On the Revolutionization of Private Enterprises (1965)	201
8-10	Lo S.H. Ginting (Lo Siang Hien), The Transfer of Commercial Firms from Foreigners to Indonesian Nationals (1977)	202
9.	The Indonesian Chinese Problem and Its Solution	206
9-1	Qiu Zhengou (Ch'iu Cheng-ou), The Overseas Chinese Problem and Its Solution (1965)	207
9-2	Lie Tek Tjeng, "The Chinese Problem" within the Framework of Political Stabilization (1966)	211
9-3	Lie Tek Tjeng, On Assimilation (1967)	216
9-4	K. Sindhunatha (Ong Tjong Hai), A Dynamic and Consistent Way to Solve the Chinese Problem in Indonesia through the Historical Perspective (1975)	220
9-5	<i>Na Han</i> , Why do We Publish <i>Na-Han</i> ? (1976)	229
9-6	Lo S.H. Ginting, Paving the Way for a Solution to the Indonesian Chinese Problem (1977)	233

9-7	Christianto Wibisono, Nation-Building is a Long-term Effort (1984)	238
9-8	Harry Tjan Silalahi, Facing the 21st Century (1991)	242
9-9	Junus Jahja, To Promote Cooperation between Muslim and Chinese Businessmen (1992)	244
9-10	The Bali Declaration (1995)	246
	Glossary	248
	List of Chinese Names and Publications	257
	Index	260

Preface to the 1st Edition

The aim of this sourcebook is to introduce English-speaking readers to the political thinking of the Chinese minority in Indonesia as expressed by its leaders.

This volume comprises 50 titles, including articles, talks, speeches, letters, and excerpts from books, by Indonesian Chinese leaders who have been associated with major organizations, and by Chinese individuals who have been significant in the development of Chinese minority thinking in Indonesia. The period covered is from 1900, when the Chinese nationalist movement in Java emerged, to 1977 when a nationwide assimilationist movement was revived.

The majority of these 50 titles are translated from *peranakan* Malay and Indonesian, some from Chinese, and the rest from Dutch. They have been culled from newspapers, periodicals, official publications, books, pamphlets, and memoirs found in various libraries, mainly in Jakarta and Singapore. Most of these items were translated into English by the editor; some were done by friends who were interested in the subject; and two were translated by the author himself. It is worth mentioning that a few items were translated in consultation with some of the authors whom the editor was able to contact.

This sourcebook is divided into three parts. All materials are organized according to topics as well as chronologically. Part I contains materials produced before Indonesia attained independence; Part II consists of those generated after Indonesia declared independence; and Part III, covering the period after Indonesia's independence, deals specifically with the problems of and prospects for the Chinese minority in Indonesia. Each part is divided into several sections and each section has a brief introduction. With each article some information on the author as well as the source is provided. Whenever deemed necessary, notes are also provided. A glossary is included at the back of the book.

Previous studies on the Indonesian Chinese have generally been attempts at interpreting Chinese political thinking. This volume presents the voices of eminent Indonesian Chinese and thus provides useful research material for students of Indonesian or ethnic studies.

A sourcebook of this nature would inevitably be highly selective in its contents. However, given the availability of materials in the region of South-east Asia, the editor believes that the book has included most of the writings that reflect major Indonesian Chinese political thinking in the last seventy-seven years. Readers may argue that some items should have been excluded while others should have been included — the editor welcomes any comments and suggestions.

Apart from thanking some authors who have rendered their assistance, the editor would also like to express his appreciation to the following individuals who have either helped the editor translate some of the articles or made suggestions for improvement: Charles Coppel, Yong Mun Cheong, Sidharta, Jenny Herridge, Lim Joo-Jock, Sharon Siddique, Jim Schiller, and M. Rajaretnam. The editor is grateful to the Director of the Institute, Professor K.S. Sandhu, for allowing him the time and the facilities to complete this project. He also wishes to especially thank Mrs. Marian Pan, of the Singapore University Press, for her patience and assistance. The abovementioned individuals are of course not responsible for any shortcomings in this book. The editor himself takes full responsibility for them.

Leo Suryadinata
1978

A Note to the 2nd Edition

The first edition was published in 1979 and was out of print after a few years.

Seventeen years later, there is still a demand for this book. However, I have decided to up-date the sourcebook to include the post 1977 development up to 1995. The year 1995 is significant as it was the year of the Bali Declaration when the Chinese tycoons were asked to help solve the Indonesian economic problem. In all, seven new articles have been added, bringing the total number of articles to fifty-seven in this updated volume.

L.S.
June 1996

Introduction

The Chinese minority in Indonesia, numbering approximately 6 million, represents 3 per cent of the Indonesian population. It is characterized by heterogeneity and change. Culturally, the Chinese in Indonesia can be divided into Indonesian-speaking *peranakans* and Chinese-speaking *totoks*, with the former numerically larger. In religion they are divided into Christians, Buddhists, Confucianists, Tridharma,* Muslims, and followers of other organized religions; legally they are classified as Indonesian citizens (*Warganegara Indonesia* or W.N.I.) and aliens (*Warganegara Asing* or W.N.A.). The aliens can be further divided into the nationals of the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) and the so-called stateless Chinese (that is, nationals of Taiwan or those who dissociate themselves from the P.R.C. and Taiwan). The Indonesian Chinese are either pro-Jakarta, pro-Beijing, pro-Taipei, or uncommitted in political orientation. This diverse minority group can be identified as a group in so far as they have or have had Chinese surnames. Even those who have already Indonesianized their names frequently consider themselves as members of the *peranakan Tionghoa* or *keturunan Tionghoa*, which is in fact a subdivision of the Indonesian Chinese society.

The presence of this Chinese minority is felt in Indonesia, because of its trading and other economic activities, its association with what is perceived to be foreign culture, and its ethnic connection with China. There is no doubt that the Chinese minority exercises an influence beyond its numerical strength, but is still far from controlling the economy of the country. However, because of the economic, cultural and political problems posed by this minority, the "Chinese problem" has become the subject of many studies. The major aim in this study is to present a sourcebook on the political thinking of the Indonesian Chinese in the period 1900–1995.

The Chinese in Indonesia, like other modern men, are political in the sense that they are concerned with the authoritative allocation of values in one way or another. However, only a few of them have been *actively* involved in Indonesia's political struggle, and these few politically active Chinese leaders have expressed their thoughts on various socio-political problems.

The Chinese in Indonesia have been involved in local politics since the Dutch colonial period. The Chinese rebellion against the Dutch in Batavia (Jakarta) in 1740 and the establishment of a small Chinese kingdom called *Lanfang Gongheguo* in Kalimantan in 1777 are two well-known examples. However, these political activities were traditional in terms of leadership, organization, and ideology. Unfortunately the political thinking of these Chinese prior to the twentieth century seems not to have been well docu-

* Tridharma, or "three religions", is a combination of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism, known also as *Sam Kauw* (*Sanjiao*).

mented. Lack of time and resources has forced the editor to confine the present study to modern Indonesian Chinese political thinking which dates from the emergence of the Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan (T.H.H.K., or the Chinese Organization) in 1900.

The central feature of modern Chinese political thinking in Indonesia revolves around the problems of national identity, including political and cultural identity. Other elements involve the question of ethnic relations between the Chinese and the Dutch, as well as between Chinese and Indonesians, Chinese economic position, relations with foreign powers, particularly with China, and various other issues.

Chinese National Identity

The Chinese in the Dutch East Indies were separated from the two racial groups, namely, the Dutch and the indigenous Indonesians. Culturally, however, the Chinese had not been consciously cultivating their identity. It was not until towards the end of the nineteenth century that there was a revival of Chinese cultural nationalism marked by the publication of Chinese literature in *peranakan Malay*, which was further manifested in the emergence of the T.H.H.K. in Jakarta at the turn of the twentieth century.

The rise of Chinese cultural nationalism was closely connected with internal conditions in the Indies as well as the spread of Chinese nationalism originating in China. The Indies Chinese who had been exposed to Western (Dutch) education continued to receive an inferior social and legal status in the Indies. They were resentful about this and were further irked by Dutch discriminatory policies against the Chinese (for example, the zoning and pass system.*) In addition, Chinese leaders were unhappy with their social customs which they considered to be backward and harmful. Intending to reform their own customs and to give Chinese children a better education, Indies Chinese leaders established the T.H.H.K. to promote Confucianism and, later, Chinese schools with a modern curriculum. Chinese culture had provided some kind of new identity for the Chinese in the Indies and they began to reorient themselves towards China.

Political identification with China, however, emerged clearly after the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912. Two points can be used as evidence to substantiate this. First, it was only in 1917 that the Indies Chinese at the Semarang Conference expressed explicitly that they did not want to get involved in local politics because they wanted to remain Chinese nationals. Second, although the Dutch nationality law, which made all Indies-born Chinese Dutch subjects, was promulgated in 1910, it was only in 1918 that the Indies Chinese initiated a campaign against the law on the ground that they wanted to remain Chinese nationals.

* Towards the end of the 19th century, the Dutch authorities required the Chinese to live in specific areas (zoning system) and they could only travel out of the areas after obtaining permits (pass system). Both regulations were abolished in the 1910s.

The champion of this Chinese political nationalism was a *peranakan* Chinese newspaper, *Sin Po*, first published in Jakarta in 1910. It became a political force only after the 1917 Semarang Conference.

The *Sin Po* group, represented by Tjoe Bou San, Kwee Hing Tjiat, and later Kwee Kek Beng, advocated Chinese political nationalism. It urged the Indies Chinese to repudiate Dutch nationality,* to stay away from local political institutions but to actively participate in politics in China. Like the uncooperative Indonesian nationalists, *Sin Po* nationalists did not intend to cooperate with the Dutch. Nevertheless, they wanted equality with the Dutch before the law. They demanded Chinese education for Indies Chinese children although many of them had received a Dutch education. In response to this challenge, Dutch authorities introduced policies aimed at preventing the *resinification* of the *peranakan* Chinese. Besides the Dutch nationality law, the Dutch also introduced Dutch schools for the Chinese, and involved the Chinese in local political institutions. The Dutch intended to create an “*Indiër*” identity which was similar to the concept of Dutch “nationality”; but according to this concept, each racial group could maintain its own racial identity.

“*Indiër*” Identity

A group of Dutch-educated *peranakan* professionals and *peranakan* businessmen began to advocate this vague concept. In 1928, this group established a political organization, the Chung Hwa Hui, which advocated the acceptance of Dutch nationality and active participation in local political institutions, including the Volksraad (People’s Council). Its leaders favoured Dutch education instead of Chinese education because they saw it as a means to prosper in a colonial society. Although some of the leaders sympathized with the Indonesian nationalist goal, that is, the creation of an independent Indonesia, the dominant group led by H.H. Kan supported the Dutch colonial government. It is worth noting that the Chung Hwa Hui wanted to retain Chinese identity within the Dutch East Indies society. This identity, however, was not that of a *totok* Chinese. In fact, the Chung Hwa Hui did not advocate “*totok* Chinese culture” but a *peranakan* Chinese culture with a Dutch flavour. The medium of communication that they used was either Dutch or Bahasa Melayu Tionghoa (that is, *peranakan* Malay). Like the *Sin Po* group, leaders of the Chung Hwa Hui were not satisfied with the inferior legal status of the Indies Chinese. They called for a legal status that would place the Chinese on equality with the Europeans (Dutch) as well as with the Japanese who were considered Europeans for legal purposes. The Chinese, however, did not succeed because Dutch authorities feared that such a move might stir up resentment among indigenous Indonesians and cause chaos in the colonial society.

* Strictly speaking it should be called “Dutch subjectship” (*Nederlandsch Onderdaanschap*) rather than “Dutch nationality”. But for aesthetic reasons, the term “nationality” has been used. For a discussion on the law, see Leo Suryadinata, *Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java, 1917–42* (Singapore, 1976), pp. 29–32.

Indonesian Political Identity

The unsympathetic attitude of the dominant group in the Chung Hwa Hui towards the Indonesian nationalists, coupled with their pro-Dutch stand, annoyed some Indies Chinese. In 1932, peranakan journalists such as Liem Koen Hian and peranakan lawyers such as Ko Kwat Tiong and Ko Tjay Sing established another political party, the Partai Tionghoa Indonesia (P.T.I.), which directly challenged the Chung Hwa Hui. The P.T.I. urged the Indies Chinese to identify themselves with Indonesians and accept the latter's goal of creating a self-governing and eventually independent Indonesia through constitutional means. Although politically the P.T.I. identified with the Indonesian nationalists, its stand on the position of the Indies Chinese within Indonesia was not entirely clear. Liem Koen Hian in fact advocated only political assimilation in the sense that the peranakan Chinese should consider themselves as *Indonesier* and accordingly take up Indonesian citizenship when the time came. He argued that peranakan Chinese were more Indonesian than Chinese and therefore should be separated from their totok counterparts. He further argued that the total assimilation of the peranakan Chinese into the Indonesian communities would come in due course. Liem Koen Hian did not endorse the T.H.H.K. type schools for Chinese children but favoured a unified school in which Dutch was used as the medium of instruction. He did not say explicitly that the Chinese language should be taught in these schools. On the legal status of the Indies Chinese, Liem Koen Hian and his P.T.I. wanted the Chinese to be regarded as equal with other racial groups, including Dutch and indigenous Indonesians.

Ko Kwat Tiong (and the *Djawa Tengah Review* group as well)* held somewhat different views on the position of the Chinese in the Indonesian society. He maintained that the "Chineseness" of the peranakans could be preserved by studying Chinese classics. While approving the existence of Chinese-medium schools in the Indies, Ko Kwat Tiong disapproved of the separation of the peranakan from the totok Chinese. In other words, the group led by Ko Kwat Tiong within the P.T.I. advocated a higher degree of pluralism within Indonesian society.

The P.T.I. group did not advocate the complete assimilation of the Indies Chinese into Indonesian society, which would involve drastic changes such as transforming Chinese names into "Indonesian" names, intermarrying with Indonesians, embracing Islam, and being absorbed completely into the indigenous communities. However, Kwee Hing Tjiat, the ex-*Sin Po* man who was exiled in China for more than ten years and who eventually returned to Indonesia in 1934, saw complete assimilation into the indigenous society (in this case, the Javanese society) as the only legitimate identity for the peranakan Chinese in the Indies. (Strangely enough, Kwee Hing Tjiat who was the advocate of complete assimilation ideas during the pre-war period was never recognized as such by post-war assimilationists.)

* *Djawa Tengah Review* was a journal published in Semarang, which had links with the Semarang P.T.I.

Indonesian National Identity

Complete assimilation of the Chinese into the indigenous population never emerged as a major trend in Indonesian political thinking before the Second World War. The reasons were complex. Apart from the Dutch policy of cultivating a plural society in which each ethnic/racial group would maintain its separate identity, another factor was the nature of the Indonesian nationalist struggle. The Indonesian nationalists concentrated their efforts on achieving political independence for Indonesia. Their major target was therefore the Dutch rather than the Chinese. At that point in time the Indonesian nationalists were not yet concerned with the building of an Indonesian nation which would be a "synthesis" of various indigenous ethnic groups. In addition, the Indonesian nationalist movement, having emerged after overseas Chinese nationalism in Java, understandably tended to exclude the Chinese from the movement.

The Japanese who occupied Indonesia treated the Chinese community as distinct from the Indonesians, thereby indirectly reasserting the Chinese identity among the *peranakans*. None the less, some *peranakan* leaders still advocated Indonesian political identity for the *peranakan* Chinese.

With the independence of Indonesia and the departure of the Dutch in 1949, the Indonesian nationalists began to be concerned with their national identity. While Indonesia was looking for a new identity, the various ethnic groups still remained as realities. The Indonesian Chinese remained divided in their views over their position and identity in the new-born Indonesia. Some continued to express their reluctance to become Indonesians, others were ready to accept Indonesian citizenship. Most of the *peranakan* Chinese eventually became Indonesian nationals.

National and Ethnic Identity

The organization after the Second World War which claimed to look after the interests of the Indonesian Chinese was the Persatuan Tionghoa (P.T.) formed in 1948. In 1950 the name of the P.T. was changed to the Partai Demokrat Tionghoa Indonesia (P.D.T.I.). As a party of local Chinese businessmen, professionals, and white-collar workers, the P.D.T.I. insisted on maintaining a separate Chinese identity within the Indonesian nation. While accepting Indonesian nationality, the party insisted on the rights of the Chinese minority to maintain its separate Chinese political party. This group, represented by Thio Thiam Tjong, was opposed by another group led by Tan Bwan An, a lawyer who saw the dissolution of Indonesian Chinese parties as a solution to the "Indonesian Chinese problem" in an independent Indonesia.

However, the advocacy of the maintenance of a separate Chinese, later *peranakan* Chinese, identity within the Indonesian nation was continued by a major socio-political organization BAPERKI (Indonesian Citizenship Consultative Body). Although the organization, formed in 1954, tended to stress the importance of nationality and dropped the term "Chinese" in its name, BAPERKI was predominantly an Indonesian Chinese organization.

It identified itself with Indonesia, but the identification was primarily political and legal rather than cultural. "Indonesian", for many BAPERKI leaders, was a political concept. A Chinese could be an Indonesian provided he lived in Indonesia and had Indonesian citizenship. Complete cultural identification with the indigenous Indonesian population was not a necessity. In fact it advocated the preservation of Chinese social and cultural institutions in Indonesia. These social and cultural institutions, as proved later, were of a *peranakan* Chinese nature rather than those Chinese institutions of other Southeast Asian countries or of China. Although BAPERKI ran the Indonesian school systems from the primary to tertiary school level, and adopted Indonesian rather than Chinese as the medium of instruction, it never rejected the Chinese language as a subject. Because of pressure from indigenous Indonesian nationalists who saw nation-building as most urgent, BAPERKI leaders such as Siauw Giok Tjhan in the later stage (for instance, during the period of Guided Democracy) also advocated integration with Indonesia in the sense that the local Chinese should participate actively in the political process and integrate themselves in what some BAPERKI leaders saw as the progressive political forces. Complete assimilation or disappearance of the Indonesian Chinese from Indonesia was considered possible only in the Indonesian socialist state of the future. However, it was understood that this could not be realized in a short period.

In the perception of this group of BAPERKI leaders, the disappearance of *peranakan* Chinese in Indonesia would mean two things: the disappearance of other Indonesian ethnic groups (or *suku*) and the emergence of a new cohesive Indonesian nation different from the present Indonesian *suku*. However, BAPERKI leaders such as Siauw Giok Tjhan were of the view that in the foreseeable future, the existence of the *peranakan* Chinese as an Indonesian *suku* should be accepted. Another group in BAPERKI who also favoured pluralism was represented by Yap Thiam Hien, a leading Christian lawyer. Like Siauw, Yap saw local Chinese who possessed Indonesian citizenship and who had lived in Indonesia as Indonesian. However, Siauw favoured "integration" of the local Chinese into Indonesian left-wing politics, while Yap stressed Chinese dissociation from radical or left-wing politics. In addition, he disagreed with Siauw's view on the disappearance of the *peranakan* Chinese as a group in the future because he believed that all races were creations of God and should remain that way. Instead of eradicating ethnic Chinese in Indonesia by assimilating them into an indigenous population, he urged indigenous Indonesians to respect other races. As a lawyer, he tended to identify the Indonesian Chinese from a legal rather than a cultural or political point of view.

Indigenous Identity

BAPERKI's concept of pluralism was challenged by a group of Indonesian Chinese which was associated with Christian groups and/or the Indonesian military. These *peranakans*, then represented by Tjung Tin Jan and Lauw

Chuan Tho, wanted complete assimilation of the Indonesian Chinese into the indigenous Indonesian population. In the absence of a standard Indonesian nation, this group vaguely argued that the Chinese should be assimilated into the existing Indonesian *suku* in the same geographical areas by Indonesianizing their names, intermarrying with indigenous Indonesians, and by dissolving existing BAPERKI schools whose student composition was largely Chinese. Some of these assimilationists later joined the government-sponsored Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa (or L.P.K.B., the Institute for Promotion of National Unity) and proposed complete identification with indigenous Indonesians. But it did not advocate the conversion of Chinese to Islam because many of them were Christians. None the less, it is quite clear that the L.P.K.B. wanted Indonesian Chinese to abandon their "Chineseness". Indirectly it saw *peranakan* Chinese as non-Indonesian or semi-Indonesian. While BAPERKI was dominated by politically leftist groups, the L.P.K.B. held rightist political views. Both perceived the eventual disappearance of the Chinese in Indonesia, but the former saw it taking place in the distant future when an Indonesian socialist state was created, while the latter wanted to make it an immediate reality.

In recent years, Kwik Kian Gie, an economist and a politician, argued that in fact, in the New Order Indonesia, the problem of assimilation of indigenous and non-indigenous (Chinese) no longer exists. Both indigenous and ethnic Chinese have been assimilated (integrated) and the problem is a mere creation of those assimilationists.

Islamic Identity

As mentioned earlier, during the Suharto era, the assimilationist group has been gaining influence. Nevertheless, within the assimilationist group, there is a development of a new group represented by Junus Jahja (alias Lauw Chuan Tho). In 1979 he began to advocate the conversion of ethnic Chinese to Islam as the solution to the Chinese problem. He maintained that the majority of the Indonesian population were Muslim; once the Chinese were converted to Islam, there would be no more Chinese problem as the Chinese would be accepted by the indigenous population, and racial issues could be solved through religious solidarity. However, he did not address the problem of ethnic pluralism nor different Islamic sects within the Indonesian Muslim population and their impact on the ethnic Chinese.

Separate Identity

The view of the L.P.K.B. prevailed among many Indonesians and also among *peranakan* Chinese after the fall of Sukarno and the emergence of Suharto. Many Chinese leaders responded to the name-changing regulation and accepted symbolic identification as members of an Indonesian nation.

However there was a small group in exile which advocated a separate "national identity" for the Chinese in Indonesia. This Communist-inspired radical group, with its headquarters in Holland, published a journal entitled

Na Han (since 1976) advocating “Yinhua nationalism”. It deviated from the view of BAPERKI. While BAPERKI considered the Chinese in Indonesia as a *suku*, similar to other Indonesian *suku* (such as Javanese, Sundanese, Ambonese, etc.), which were also constituents of the Indonesian nation, the *Na Han* group rejects the existence of such a nation. It maintained that there were many nations (*bangsa*), not ethnic groups (*suku*), in Nusantara (the term used by this group to refer to the Republic of Indonesia) and each nation deserved to have an equal status and rights for “national independence”. It argued that one nation, that is, the Javanese, has dominated other nations in Nusantara, including the Yinhua nation (an abbreviation of a Mandarin term “Yindunxiya Huazu” used by the *Na Han* group to refer to the Chinese in Indonesia). Therefore the *Na Han* group urged other minority nations in Nusantara to fight against the Javanese through armed struggle in order to achieve “national self-determination”, but not to build an Indonesian nation, because in the view of the *Na Han* group a “unitary nation-state” is bourgeois and oppressive.

The *Na Han* group kept referring to Indonesia as either *Hindia* (East Indies) or Nusantara and refused to use the term “Indonesia” because, in its view, the term was a creation of the “reactionary bourgeoisie”. Nonetheless, the boundaries of Nusantara that the group referred to was actually the Republic of Indonesia rather than a new territorial unit. The very term “Yinhua” refers to the Chinese (*hua*) from or in Indonesia (Yin or Yindunxiya) excluding other “Overseas Chinese”.

It is quite apparent that by using a pure Chinese term “Yinhua”, this group intended to make the Indonesian Chinese more “Chinese”. Indeed, the *Na Han* group emphasized the Yinhua links with the P.R.C. Besides, the *Na Han* group neither differentiated Indonesian Chinese in terms of their nationality nor their cultural background. It assumed that the Chinese in Indonesia were basically a homogeneous group which should struggle to maintain its “national identity”. Not surprisingly, the group had no appeal to the Chinese beyond its very small group overseas and eventually disappeared.

Economic Status of the Indonesian Chinese

The Indonesian Chinese problem is not confined to political, cultural, and national identity. The economic status of the Chinese minority is also an important element in the “Chinese problem”. Most Chinese leaders agreed that during the colonial period, because of deliberate Dutch policies, the Chinese in Indonesia had served as “middlemen” between the Dutch and the indigenous population. In Java they were limited to trading activity. The Chinese increasingly dominated the trading sector. However, with the influx of Chinese immigrants in the first three decades of the twentieth century, *peranakan* Chinese businessmen began to be pushed aside by their *totok* counterparts. Many *peranakans* were forced to take up white-collar jobs and other professions. But the distributive trading sector was still in the hands of the Chinese throughout the colonial period, especially in the twentieth

century. The Chinese had no major challengers in the trading sector because the Indonesian middle class was still small. It was only after Indonesia's independence was attained that the Indonesian middle class began to expand. It was then that the indigenous Indonesians, especially the Outer Islanders, attempted to take over the trading sector from the Chinese.

The Indonesian Chinese leaders had different possible solutions to this "economic problem". BAPERKI leaders such as Siauwi Giok Tjhan argued that this was a socio-economic problem and therefore could only be solved when there was a social revolution restructuring the society. Meanwhile, Indonesian nationals of Chinese descent should receive equal treatment.

Chinese leaders associated with the L.P.K.B. group wanted to have genuine co-operation between Chinese businessmen and indigenous partners so that a harmonious ethnic relationship could be achieved and at the same time the economic status of the indigenous Indonesians in the trading sector could be enhanced. Pro-Taiwan Chinese accepted this as part of the solution, but in addition they saw the evils of Communism as the root of ethnic tension. In fact, they did not really address themselves to the solution of the economic problem in Indonesia. However, pro-Beijing Chinese advocated that the Chinese move away from the commercial sector into the industrial sector to help Indonesians develop economically, as a partial solution to the Chinese economic problem in Indonesia. At the same time, these leaders also argued that the capital of the Indonesian Chinese should be considered as national capital which, by law, could not be transferred overseas and hence was "progressive".

The assimilationist group advocated the formation of "partnership" between indigenous and ethnic Chinese businessmen. Junus Jahja, for instance, promoted cooperation and even partnership between Muslim indigenous groups and Chinese groups so that they would be able to share economic benefits and narrow the gaps between the indigenous and ethnic Chinese population. Indirectly, the assimilationist group also agreed that cultural/religious assimilation was insufficient for creating national solidarity.

In recent years, it has become clear that the economic position of the Chinese has become the real issue of the so-called Chinese problem. The Chinese were summoned to sell their company shares to the co-operatives controlled by the indigenous population and to form partnership with indigenous businessmen. In response to the government pressure, the Bali Declaration was made by the tycoons, of whom the majority were ethnic Chinese. In the declaration, it was clear the whole focus was the equitable distribution of economic pies among ethnic groups, as if this was the solution to the "Chinese problem".

Conclusion

The problem of the Chinese in Indonesia is complex. Prior to the Second World War it was related to the problem of political identity, that is, Chinese nationality, Dutch "subjectship", and Indonesian "nationality". It later assumed cultural as well as economic dimensions. Some Chinese identified themselves

with overseas Chinese, some with "Yinhua" and others with Indonesian Chinese or *peranakan* Chinese. There were also leaders who wanted to be considered fully Indonesian, that is, to be absorbed into the Indonesian population (including the conversion to Islam). It seems that the last two views continue to compete with each other for supporters.

Apart from the identity question, Indonesian Chinese ties with foreign powers, especially China, were also seen as a problem. The Indonesian Chinese were again divided into three groups. The first wanted to maintain both political and cultural ties with China; the second wished to maintain only the cultural and not political ties; and the last intended to cut off both cultural and political ties with China. The second and the third views seem to have been gaining ground in Indonesia.

The economic position of the Chinese *vis-à-vis* indigenous Indonesians is another problem. Indigenous Indonesians considered the Chinese to have been dominating Indonesia's economy, but the Chinese perceived their economic status rather differently. While most Chinese leaders did not deny that the Chinese in Indonesia were strong in trade, banking and manufacturing, they did not think that they dominated the Indonesian economy. Admitting the disparity between the Chinese and the Indonesian masses, they have suggested several "solutions", all of which rejected racial discrimination as a means of solving the economic problem.

Indonesian Chinese leaders have not been unified in suggesting solutions to these problems. One group advocated political integration or political assimilation, while other groups favoured complete assimilation as the answer. There was also a group which attempted to glorify Chinese ethnic identity. There is yet another group which advocated Chinese conversion to Islam. However, none is without shortcomings, as each view failed to take into account the heterogeneous nature of the Chinese minority and the complexity of Indonesian national and international systems. The Chinese minority problem is therefore extremely complicated. It is part of the larger human problem in the modern world which needs to be approached with more reason than emotion.

Editor and Translator

Leo Suryadinata, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore.

Translators

Charles A. Coppel, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor in the Department of History, the University of Melbourne. He was a Fellow-in-Residence at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIAS, 1995–96) when he translated the two articles by Kwik Kian Gie in this volume.

Yong Mun Cheong, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor in the Department of History, National University of Singapore.

Jim Schiller, Ph.D., teaches at the Flinders University of South Australia. He was a graduate student when doing the translation for this volume.

Jenny Herridge received a B.A. Honours degree from the Australian National University, Canberra and was a post-graduate student in the Malay Studies Department, the University of Singapore (1976).

Derwin Pereira is Visiting Fellow, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, Indonesia.

PART I

THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD



Bima

1

Rise of Chinese Nationalism

The origins of Chinese nationalism in Indonesia were marked by the establishment in 1900 of a Chinese socio-religious organization known as the Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan (T.H.H.K.). In the same year Phoa Keng Hek, the President of the T.H.H.K., sent a letter to the Chinese community explaining the importance of Confucianism and the reasons for establishing the T.H.H.K. (1-1). At the same time, he and his executive committee members also urged the Chinese to support a T.H.H.K. Chinese school which they planned to establish. For the first time, there was a conscious effort to orient the Indies Chinese towards China. Seven years later, Phoa Keng Hek retold the story of the establishment of the T.H.H.K. school and the difficult position of the Indies Chinese under Dutch rule, arguing that the Chinese and English languages rather than Dutch were more useful for the Indies Chinese in making a better living (1-2).

However, it was *Sin Po*, a *peranakan* daily newspaper, not the T.H.H.K., which soon became the champion of Chinese nationalism. In 1918, there was a major racial conflict between local Chinese and indigenous Indonesians in Kudus. *Sin Po* commented on the incident, analysing the relationships between overseas Chinese nationalists and Indonesian nationalists, implying that they should work for the common good to improve the living conditions of the two races, because in the view of *Sin Po*, the majority of the Chinese, like the majority of Indonesians, were basically poor. Nevertheless, *Sin Po* admitted that there was a conflict potential between local Chinese traders and indigenous traders who constituted a minority in their respective community (1-3).

Several years later, the Editor-in-Chief of *Sin Po*, Tjoe Bou San, writing under his own name in an article in *Sin Po*, expressed views which did not coincide with the sentiments *Sin Po* displayed during the 1918 Kudus Incident. Tjoe maintained that Chinese interests in the Indies were unique and did not coincide with those of the Dutch and the Indonesians (1-5). Apparently he considered that Chinese identity was a more important issue than racial co-operation. For this reason, he disagreed with a leading judicial officer, Fromberg, who advocated the concept of "common interest" in the Dutch East Indies. During 1918-19 Tjoe also staged a campaign against the Dutch nationality law which forced all Indies-born Chinese to become Dutch subjects. He insisted that the Indies Chinese should remain Chinese nationals (1-4).

Sin Po preached that the Chinese in Indonesia should remain aliens, receive Chinese education, and stay away from local political institutions. Kwee Kek Beng, the Editor-in-Chief of *Sin Po* after Tjoe Bou San, argued that representative councils (such as the Volksraad) were advisory in nature and that it was not only useless for the Chinese to participate but also harmful because it would cause a split within the Chinese community (1-6).

1-1

Phoa Keng Hek (1857—1937), born in Bogor, was the son of a Dutch-appointed Chinese Officer. He received his education at a Hokkien school, a Dutch mission school, and the E.L.S. In 1900 he and other ethnic-conscious peranakans formed the T.H.H.K. of which he served as the president up to 1923. The following is a letter written in 1900 and signed by him as the T.H.H.K. president and other executive members. This is an important document marking the emergence of Chinese cultural nationalism. It reveals that peranakan Chinese leaders intended to use Chinese cultural identity to improve their situation in the Indies, and a Chinese school was crucial for such an identity. The description of the establishment of the first T.H.H.K. school was very detailed. The reproduction of the original letter in bahasa Indonesia can be found in Nio Joe Lan, ed., *Riwayat 40 Tahun dari Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan, 1900—1939* (Batavia, 1940), pp. 201—3.

Letter to all Chinese from Members of the Executive Committee of the Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan in Batavia (1900)

There must be many Chinese who have heard or understood that the teaching of the prophet (*nabi*) Confucius is not only beautiful but also good. Not only we the Chinese say so — which sounds like blowing one's own trumpet — this is also the opinion of many Europeans who are well known as civilized people.

A European who is well versed in Chinese classics has translated *Ta Hsüeh*, *Chung Yung*, *Siang Beng* [?] and *He Beng* [?] into Dutch. He argues that since the invention of the printing technique, there has probably been no other work which is as beautiful as that of Confucius. The gentleman also says:

The teaching of Confucius is not only good but also profound and sacred. . . . a number of priests in the last two hundred years have come to China. They felt compelled to praise the teaching. If 2,400 years later Confucius and his books continue to be appreciated in China, this is due to the fact that those books are really beautiful.

Mr. De Lanessan, a Frenchman who knows the Chinese people well, maintains:

If a person really follows the teaching of Confucius and that of his student Mencius, he will be highly regarded not only in China but also in the European continent.

Although Confucius lived in the ancient time — about [two] thousand years ago, and the present era is known as the “bright era”, men of virtue in this era still describe the works of Confucius as a beautiful garden where man can pick any flowers he likes.

The above shows that the teaching of Confucius is very good. Although there are many Chinese who already know the teaching, there are many more who do not know it, especially those who live in this land [Java].

If a person is exposed to good teaching, his thinking, custom, heart, and behaviour will probably be good. It is not impossible that he will practise what he has been taught. Probably, with this good teaching, his mind will become clear. He will remember not to do wrong but to do good deeds; he will not think of tricking others, but will always resist evil desires; he will never be rude so as to avoid criticism of his behaviour. He will never be arrogant, he will have a sense of justice and generosity. He will detest injustice; his behaviour will never be degrading or bad; he will know how to behave properly. In short, a person who has been well educated, would be a well-behaved man, a well-mannered man. He can look after his own affairs and maintain his dignity, and live honourably. His parents will not have cause to be disgraced.

We are of course only human beings; we cannot remain good forever.

But the fact is this:

A person without good education can commit crimes and misbehave. Having committed a crime or done evil, he would not feel any guilt. He would continue to misbehave.

A person who receives a good education will, firstly, be less prone to wrongdoing or to misbehaviour. Secondly, even if he consciously commits a crime and misbehaves, he will probably repent. And if his relatives or friends remind him of his crime or bad conduct, he will feel shame. He will therefore control his own behaviour. It is unlikely that he will be tempted to do wrong again.

With these two things in mind, would the readers think for a while: Is it necessary for a person to receive a good education? A proverb says: “It is better to leave your child with wisdom rather than great wealth.”

There is a good and beautiful teaching offered by our own prophet. Why do we not find a way to realize it?

A large number of Chinese here do not know the wonderful teaching of Confucius. Therefore we, twenty people, have agreed to establish an association named “Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan”.

The aims of this association are stated in its constitution which was endorsed by His Excellency the Governor-General in his decree of No. 15 issued on 3 July 1900. The regulations governing its members will also be submitted to the Governor-General for approval.

Let us now explain the objectives and aspirations of this association.

To begin with, this association hopes to reduce the heavy burden imposed on the Chinese by the existing funeral and wedding customs. We will try our best to simplify these customs in accordance with the judgement and decision of the members. These matters will be discussed at a future congress.

We also hope to achieve the following:

1. To improve Chinese customs so that they will be in accordance with the teaching of Confucius. Wherever possible, what can be practised by the Chinese here will be decided at (a subsequent) congress or congresses.
2. To enrich our knowledge of [Chinese classical] literature and language, we will establish schools.

A school for boys will first be established, in which the students will learn the Chinese language and written characters in accordance with the new system used in China and Japan, that is, a new teaching method, so that the students will very quickly improve. Apart from the Chinese language and characters, the students will study Chinese tradition, arithmetic, geography, and other useful subjects.

Later a school for girls will also be founded, in which they will study Malay in romanized script. Some Chinese characters, Chinese tradition, arithmetic, geography, and other useful subjects will also be taught to them.

If this association develops as expected, we will also establish a boys' school in which Dutch and English will be taught.

The first school mentioned above will be established when the association has seven hundred members. In that school, there will be a school principal and several teachers. The principal will be in charge of teaching the subjects and explaining the [Chinese] tradition and customs.

The number of teachers will depend on the number of the students: each teacher should teach twenty-five students. But when the number of students is ten more than the stated number, an extra teacher will be employed. For instance, if there are fifty students, two teachers will be hired; if there are sixty students, there will be three teachers; if there are eighty-five students, there will be four teachers, and so forth.

A student who goes to this school is required to pay (a fee) ranging from 2.50 guilders to 10 guilders per month in accordance with his parents' wealth as judged by the Executive Committee [of the Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan].

A rough estimate of the budget is as follows:

Salary of the school principal:	f. 1,500 per year
Salary of two teachers:	f. 1,200 per year
Maintenance fees and rent for the school building:	f. 800 per year
Expenditure of the association:	f. 1,500 per year
Total	f. 5,000 per year

Income of the association:

membership due (f. 6 × 700 members)	= f. 4,200
school fees paid by the students (f. 30 × 50 students)	= f. 1,500
	f. 5,700

If there are 60 students, we will have an extra
 income from the school fees (f. 30 × 10) = f. 300
 but we have to employ one more teacher = f. 600

(Note: "f." stands for guilder.)

This will result in a f. 300 loss which can [still] be matched by the surplus of the money shown above.

Other matters relating to the school will be determined later. This association hopes, when its membership reaches 1,200, that it will be able to open a school for girls.

Once every few days, which will be decided by the Executive Committee, the abovementioned school principal will speak, to all members in this association building, on the teaching and regulations preached by the prophet Confucius. Non-members are also welcome if seats are available.

This association hopes that it will be able to get a school principal who can speak Hokkien.

The principal's lecture will be written in both Chinese characters and in Malay, using romanized script. It will be printed and sold or distributed among members without charge, according to the Executive Committee's decision.

The association will gradually buy various books to be kept in the association building, and these will be made available to all members.

Let us also mention here that, up to this moment, this association has almost one hundred members, of whom some are totok Hakka and peranakan Hakka, others totok Hokkien and peranakan Hokkien. We even have a person from Macao helping our association. Our Chinese leader, Mr. Majoor Tio Tek Ho, is the patron of our association.* It is clear that various ethnic

* During the Dutch rule, the Chinese community was "administered" by Dutch-appointed Chinese headmen who were usually given honorary military rank. Majoor

groups among the Chinese have reached agreement on [the establishment] of this association.

All Chinese readers who are willing to help improve this association are invited to become members.

Let us speak frankly. Those who want to get involved in this association are bound to lose money. However, if the readers are open-minded and are willing to do good deeds, they will not mind losing some money in order to improve our situation.

With best wishes,

Members of the Executive Committee of the Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan: Phoa Keng Hek (President); Khoe A Fan and Ang Sioe Tjiang (Vice-Presidents); Kapitein Oeij Giok Koen, Oeij Giok Ie, Tan Kong Tiat, Lie Hin Liam, Nio Hoeij Oen, Phoa Lip Tjaij, Khouw Kim An, Tan Tian Seng, Ouw Tiauw Soeij, Ouw Sian Tjeng, Oen A Tjoeng, and Lie Kim Hok (Commissioners); Khoe Siau Eng (Adviser); Tan Kim San and Khoe Hiong Pin (Secretaries); Khouw Lam Tjiang and Tjoa Yoe Tek (Treasurers)

1-2

Phoa Keng Hek (1857—1937), the President of the T.H.H.K., using "Hoa Djien" ("a Chinese") as a pen-name, sent a series of letters to the Editor-in-Chief of a leading *peranakan* paper, *Perniagaan*, criticizing Indies Government policy towards the Chinese. This letter concentrates on Chinese schools for Indies Chinese, indicating the importance of these schools for the Chinese minority to preserve both a Chinese identity and livelihood. It also touches on the Indies Chinese situation which bred Chinese nationalist feelings. It was reproduced in *Moestika Romans* 9, no. 101 (May 1938): 194—96.

(Major) was the highest rank given. The system, known as "Chinese Officieren System", was abolished in the 1920s.

Chinese Schools and the Indies Chinese Situation (1907)

In the last ten years, the relationship between the Dutch East Indies and other areas such as Singapore has become closer. Many Chinese from those areas visited the Indies and became friendly with the Chinese here.

This is also the case with the Chinese in the Indies. They went overseas and discovered that at those places, for instance, in Singapore, Penang, and especially China and Japan, Chinese characters are still widely used. The situation is different from that in the Indies where the knowledge of Chinese has almost disappeared.

The Chinese here have then learned that with the knowledge of Chinese, the Chinese outside the Indies live comfortably and have a greater opportunity to make a better living.

From 1900 onwards, the Chinese in Batavia (Jakarta) got the idea to establish the Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan [T.H.H.K.] with the intention of setting up a Chinese school once the association had enough money. However, the objective was achieved very slowly. The money raised through donations not only was insufficient for establishing a school, it was not even enough for the daily expenses. But members of the T.H.H.K. were determined to have a school. They made arrangements to borrow money from rich Chinese who were willing on one condition: that the loan was without interest and need not be repaid if the T.H.H.K. could not afford to do so. A bond of 40,000 guilders was issued and many bought the bonds. To start a school, 8,000 guilders were needed. It was with this money that a school was immediately established in the association house located in Patekoan.

The first Mandarin (kuo-yü) teacher to arrive in Batavia was Mr. Low Koei Hong who came from Singapore with the kind assistance of Dr. Liem Boen Keng.* The T.H.H.K. was the first school which introduced the "new method" This new method was easy for the pupils to comprehend. In the past, a Chinese course would take a teacher four to five years to explain; with this new method it needed only less than a year.

The Chinese Council (*Raad Tjina*) † confirmed the advantage of this new method. It therefore dissolved the Gie-O, a kind of old Chinese school, and dismissed all its teachers. As for the operation fund for the Gie-O, the Council decided to give it to the T.H.H.K. on one condition: that the T.H.H.K. should also take in poor children who need not pay any tuition fee. Now there are about 100 poor pupils studying in the T.H.H.K. without paying a cent; while in the Gie-O, there were over ten such pupils. Therefore the Council would not regret its former decision.

Seeing this, all Chinese became more active in developing the Chinese language. The T.H.H.K. expanded, and the number of pupils increased. Many

* According to another source, Low Koei Hong (Lu Kui-fang) was originally an overseas Chinese living in Japan. Liem Boen Keng (Lin Wen-ch'ing, 1869–1957), a physician, was the president of the Straits Chinese Association in British Malaya.

† Sometimes the Chinese Council was called Kong Koan (Kung Kuan).

Chinese from other cities came to Batavia to learn about the T.H.H.K. school and presently there are over forty associations which run such schools.

Not long after the establishment of the T.H.H.K. school, the English school in Batavia which was under the management of Mr. Lie Teng Hwi* and Mr. Richard [?] was merged into the T.H.H.K. school. These two English teachers joined the T.H.H.K. to serve as teachers, assisted by a number of assistant teachers.

The Chinese in the Indies have opened their eyes. They know that the Chinese and English languages are widely used outside the Indies. It is not surprising that nowadays the Indies Chinese are more interested in teaching their children the two languages than the Dutch language, although they are still under Dutch rule. Moreover, the Chinese have realized that if they are literate in Chinese and English, they can just take a two or three-day voyage (Java-Singapore) into a wider world where they can move freely.

With the knowledge [of Chinese and English], the Chinese here feel that the Indies is too small for them, because they are only allowed to live in a certain part of the town. If they wish to travel from one town to another, they have to obtain passes. I do not have to elaborate on this because it has been widely discussed in the newspapers.†

Because of the difficulty in acquiring a travel pass, some people travel without it. This of course violates the law. It would be unfortunate if a traveller was caught without a pass by the police. He would be prosecuted and fined in his hometown. He would be "escorted" from the place where he was arrested to his hometown, not because the police were so concerned with his safety or that he might lose his way, but because he would be handcuffed just like a robber, a murderer, or a criminal.

_____ . . . _____

1-3

Sin Po was a Jakarta daily newspaper which became the champion of Chinese nationalism in the Dutch East Indies in the 1910s and after. It published articles commenting on the racial conflict which took place in October 1918 in Kudus, Central Java, where Chinese houses were burnt down and eleven Chinese were killed. Both *peranakan* and indigenous newspapers reported and commented on the incident. *Sin Po*, a left-wing Chinese nationalist daily, engaged in a polemic with left-wing Indonesian leaders, namely,

* Also known as Lee Teng Hui (Li Teng-hui, 1872–1947). He resigned in 1903 and went to China. He later served as the Chancellor of Fu-tan University (Shanghai).

† These were the notorious "zoning and pass systems" (see p. xii).

Darsono and Semaoen, who were later known as leaders of the P.K.I. The following article is one of these, first published on 21 November 1918 with the title "Sedikit Perkatahan boeat Toean Darsono" (Darsono was then a major S.I., and later P.K.I., leader). The article has been re-titled by the editor.

Overseas Chinese Nationalism and Indonesian Nationalism (1918)

Today on the first page [of *Sin Po*] we published the whole of Mr. Darsono's article entitled "Koedoes" [Kudus]. Considering the way in which it was written, it is clear that he was searching for the truth; considering the content of the article, it cannot be denied that the article deserves the attention of all Chinese.

However, we would like to comment on what was discussed by Mr. Darsono.

He analysed the relationships between indigenes (*Boemipoetra*) and Chinese from an indigenous point of view. Let us offer him a Chinese point of view!

We are going to present three problems here to Mr. Darsono:

- (1) the Kudus turbulence and indigenous leaders;
- (2) the Chinese movement and the Sarekat Islam [Islamic Union, hereafter S.I.];
- (3) the Chinese and the indigenes.

Mr. Darsono has attempted in his article to seek the truth. We hope that this article of ours will also be read by him without bias. Only in this manner can people reach the middle way acceptable to both sides, without any ill-feeling.

The Kudus Turbulence and Indigenous Leaders

As we have said earlier, the Kudus Turbulence [initiated] by the indigenes will not generate Chinese hatred towards the indigenous population, provided that those who are in the wrong are punished commensurate with their mistakes. This will satisfy the Chinese. [However] the blind defence undertaken by the indigenous leaders for uncivilized acts committed by individuals of their own race has drawn the attention of all Chinese. Because of this we are also forced to put forward our view on the matter.

[Chinese] people are surprised to see the attitude of prominent leaders (Mr. Semaoen* and others) who have been engaging in debate, committing libel and using all kinds of excuses to defend the righteousness of their race up to the very last detail. People then begin to think: Ho, ho! Today this happens in Kudus, tomorrow or the day after tomorrow this will happen to us here!

Can we draw any other conclusion?

* Semaoen, a leader of the S.I., was later a prominent leader of the P.K.I.

By defending this uncivilized act, the indigenous leaders have (indirectly) admitted that the rivalry was not between the Chinese businessmen and rich *hadjis* (who instigated the indigenous population) in Kudus but between the indigenous population and the Chinese in general.

Can we interpret it differently?

Leaders represent the spirit of their people. If the leaders think that way, the situation would certainly prove to be so. Therefore the Chinese can and will open their eyes wide. We have to be awakened, otherwise we will suffer from the killing and looting!

If the Chinese are already conscious and thinking in that direction, this is the fault of Mr. Semaoen and other people who aired [similar views in] the same tone. People cannot put the blame on the Dutch newspapers as intended by Mr. Darsono.

Those Dutch newspapers are already well known [for their anti-Chinese attitude], especially the *Soerabajaasch Handelsblad*. But one cannot say that a leader such as Mr. Semaoen has been caught in the trend and behaved like them. But even if this is the case, his behaviour cannot be justified. He no longer deserves to be a leader.

In fairness, if Dutch newspapers abused the indigenous population and the S.I., the Chinese would have been provoked and angered against the indigenous population, because it was the Chinese who became the victims [of the Kudus incident]. The Chinese leaders should not have remained cool. Nevertheless, it was the indigenous leaders who reacted [against the Chinese] with libel and so forth. This was not directed at the Dutch newspapers but at the Chinese, at the average Chinese.

In our opinion, if this behaviour can be justified, there can be no wrongdoing on earth. We do not know what Mr. Darsono's view is [on this matter].

We can also say, if the Kudus incident had a protracted aftermath, that this is due to the fault of the indigenous leaders who attempted to defend their race without reviewing the situation from all aspects.

Mr. Semaoen intimidated and insulted the Chinese whose number is far smaller than that of the indigenous population. We were really astonished when we learned his view.

How could a leader think that way?

The Chinese are weak, indeed they are weak — this cannot be denied. But if the indigenous people intend to behave like the group in Kudus did, [they would prove themselves to be even weaker]. This we think can be easily understood by anyone who is a leader.

This [problem] can also be easily understood by all indigenous leaders — that the solution of the present problem is up to the indigenes themselves.

The Chinese do not wish to create hostility against the indigenes. The Chinese know their place: they are here as guests, therefore they never impede the struggle of the indigenous people for independence. But it was the indigenes who attacked the Chinese in Kudus, and it was the indigenous leaders involved in that incident who slandered and insulted the average

Chinese. Therefore, if Mr. Darsono wants to resolve completely the dispute — as he had indicated in his writing — we do not see any difficulty at all. As soon as the indigenous leaders change their [attitude and] behaviour then Mr. Darsono will see that everything will be all right, because the Chinese do not want hostility and have no reason to be hostile to the indigenous population.

The Chinese Movement and the Sarekat Islam

The Dutch Government introduced various acts biased against the Chinese. The right of the Chinese as residents is not recognized. There have been numerous unlawful actions against the Chinese, which resulted in the rise of the Chinese movement in the Indies.

The Chinese want equality!

Seeing this, the indigenous population became aware of the situation. This also resulted in the emergence of the movement and the formation of the S.I.

The indigenous population want equality and independence [too].

Viewing the matter from this angle, it is clear that the Chinese movement and the S.I. movement share one thing in common: to obtain human rights which so far have been denied them by the Dutch law in the Indies!

At the moment the Chinese movement has manifested itself in the formation of schools and commercial organizations; while the indigenous movement manifested itself through religion. Apart from that, the goal of the Chinese movement is to obtain a certain status as residents in the Indies, but the goal of the indigenous population is much broader, that is, to obtain a [predominating] position as the indigenous people of this country.

These two aims are different, of course, but this difference should not generate mutual-elimination between the two sides, because although they are different there is no conflict between one and the other. Both want progress and to achieve respective goals without harming the other side.

The Chinese want flexibility in law, just as the indigenous people do. The indigenous people want to be independent — this is not in conflict with the Chinese interest.

The S.I. presently is not united. Each S.I. stands by itself and acts according to what the individual branch leaders feel is best for the organization. Because each S.I. has its own legal status, major leaders of the S.I. are powerless to unite all the organizations.

In this lies the weakness of the S.I. The leaders with good understanding [of the problems] have no power to control the direction of the S.I. For this reason, they have to influence the S.I. [piecemeal] on a place-to-place basis.

At the present moment it seems that there are not many indigenous leaders who are courageous enough to take the responsibility as leaders. They only want influence, to be loved, and to forget the possible consequences. This is why Mr. Semaoen has defended the behaviour of the indigenes in Kudus.

Yes, we understand this. That is why we blame Mr. Semaoen who has closed his eyes, firstly, on the matter of justice and, secondly, for his personal reasons in blindly defending his race.

How correct are the words of Mr. Baars* in *Soeara Rahajat* (extracted from *Warna Warta*, 18 November):

Killing, arson and looting should be condemned strongly by the leaders who want to show their people what is right and what is wrong. To be brave because of righteousness, you should be [also] courageous enough to criticize the wrongdoings of your own race. Do not become the slave of the majority in order to be liked by the people, but use your judgement sincerely and pass your judgement without giving special preference to anybody.

The words of Mr. Baars indeed contain the truth. "To show to your race what is right and what is wrong; to be brave enough to criticize the wrongdoings of your race." This is a broad-minded statement which should bear good fruit in the future. In practice, this is very difficult. However, as long as there is hope, man can achieve his goal. On the contrary, if a person behaves like Mr. Semaoen, we can be sure even now that man cannot attain his worthy objectives.

The Kudus incident should therefore be used by the indigenous leaders as a [constant] reminder in their future actions. Now they have proof of how people can lose their direction. In future the leaders have to be more cautious in managing their movement.

It is not too late yet. If the indigenous leaders are serious about their movement, everything will be sound again.

The great goal of the S.I., which we mentioned earlier, is not in conflict with the Chinese interests. Therefore there is really no reason why the two movements cannot develop hand in hand, especially if we remember that in the matter of relaxing the law both the Chinese and the indigenous people share a common interest.

The Chinese and the Indigenes

It can be said that the livelihood of the Chinese in the Indies is wholly dependent on the Chinese themselves. From historical times to the present, China has never had the opportunity [strength?] to give protection to its nationals abroad.

While China has not been able to protect [its nationals], the government here has refused to recognize the rights of the Chinese as residents of this colony. In all matters they have been placed at a disadvantage. Therefore it is easy to understand why it was the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies who love China and their [Chinese] nationality most [among all the overseas Chinese].

* A Dutch socialist who was the founder of the I.S.D.V., an organization which later (1920) changed its name to the P.K.I.

Furthermore, in recent years we have heard that the indigenous Indonesians feel unhappy about the Chinese because they, the indigenes, consider us as "blood suckers" [exploiters] and so forth. This has united the Chinese here. External pressure always make people realize the necessity of uniting.

What Mr. Darsono said about the great love of the Indies Chinese for China and their nationality is true. This consciousness, however, is not the "fault" of the Chinese. It is because they were pushed from both sides [the Dutch and the indigenes]. They were forced into this kind of situation.

However, the fact that the Chinese love their nationality does not mean that they hate other races. Their love does not aim at eradicating other racial groups.

The Chinese have their associations. These work for the interest of the Chinese, and this interest does not come into conflict with the interest of other groups. In this matter, no one can put the blame on the Chinese.

Mr. Darsono said that the Chinese are unable to unite with other races. He used the example of the strike of *De Nieuwe Courant* printing press [in Cirebon] organized by the indigenous workers to back his point. The Chinese workers [refused to join the strike] and "behaved like cowards". This resulted in the failure of the strike.

What Mr. Darsono said about the matter was largely true. The behaviour of the Chinese workers in Cirebon should be criticized, because it showed that they did not have any feeling for the other group. We have never defended this kind of behaviour, although this was done by the Chinese themselves. On the contrary, since these people are Chinese, they will have more opportunity to hear our strong criticism.

The behaviour of the Chinese in Cirebon was wrong; there is no doubt about it. However we feel that this kind of mistake may be forgiven.

The indigenous population should remember that the workers in Cirebon were never asked by the indigenous workers to join the union. Therefore they did not know the real situation; they did not know the actual [details of the] dispute between the indigenous workers and the *De Nieuwe Courant* printing press. They therefore behaved like any individual who works as a labourer, that is, seeking better work wherever available. Even the indigenous population will not behave differently under such circumstances.

Thus, what should be regretted here is the lack of communication between labourers of various races. This cannot be solved by saying that the Chinese workers are cowards!

Labour associations here have complained to us about the [lack of] unity between labourers [of various races] in the Indies. As a result of this disunity, it is impossible to manage things properly in order to get the maximum result. It was not only the indigenous workers in Surabaya who encountered obstacles. Even the Chinese workers here would have the same problem if they staged a strike. Today if the Chinese workers walked out, the next day the indigenous Indonesians, the Indians, or the Europeans would immediately fill the positions. This happens because there is no union; we should not put the blame on the individuals concerned.

Mr. Darsono himself also gave another evidence, that is, the strike of *De Indië* printing press in Semarang. The Chinese workers were united with the indigenous workers, which resulted in the victory and security of the strikers.

From this it is clear that if the indigenes intend to launch that kind of movement, it is necessary for them to associate with other races, especially with the Chinese who are the largest alien minority in the Indies. The indigenes, however, should point out clearly that they are only hostile to capitalism and not to the Chinese as a race. In this case, we do not see any reason why the Chinese workers would not co-operate with the indigenous workers, because the Chinese today are also groaning under the oppression of capitalism.

Thus, we hope Mr. Darsono can now understand our position.

Sin Po does not side with the capitalists, provided the indigenous workers [stage their movement] without making racial differences. The movement staged by the indigenous capitalists who incited the foolish indigenes in order to achieve their aim of eliminating the Chinese capitalists, as manifested in the Kudus incident, is the sort of thing we oppose.

Sin Po is the defender of the Chinese, but it definitely does not hate foreign races. Therefore, if the Chinese are slandered for weak reasons, as was done by Mr. Semaoen, *Sin Po* will not remain silent, because *Sin Po* will not tolerate the same kind of behaviour from members of its own race. *Sin Po* would blame the Chinese [equally] if they behaved like the indigenes in Kudus. Our attitude will definitely be different from that of Mr. Semaoen who blindly justified the actions of his race.

Mr. Darsono, we hope with these few words you will understand us!

_____ . . . _____

14

Tjoe Bou San (1891—1925), born in Jakarta, received some Dutch education. Largely through self-education he was able to read and write Malay, English, and probably Chinese. He was associated with a Chinese revolutionary association in Jakarta while he was an editor of some local Malay weeklies. In 1917 he went to China for a short while to work as a *Sin Po* correspondent, and from 1918 he served as the Editor-in-Chief of that newspaper. In 1919 he launched a campaign against the Dutch Nationality Law. The following essay was written as an article for *Sin Po* of 16 July 1921 to discuss the *praeadvies* of P.H. Fromberg (a Dutch Judicial official in the Indies Administration) about the law and the Indies Chinese. Tjoe, as a Chinese nationalist, was of the view that the

Indies Chinese should not be forced to become Dutch subjects because they had different interests from the Dutch and they were the nationals of China. He accused Fromberg (1857—1924) of seeing the interests of the Indies Chinese from a Dutch point of view.

Fromberg and the Chinese Movement (1921)

There is a connection between the name of Mr. P.H. Fromberg and the Chinese movement in the Netherlands Indies, since he has often made his voice heard in the Tweede Kamer in the Netherlands concerning the badness of the situation of the Chinese. This connection became even closer after the publication of his *De Chineesche Beweging op Java*.^{*} In this publication he gave voice to the thoughts which he expressed in a lecture in the Netherlands, a lecture which the European editor of *Sin Po*, Kwee Hing Tjiat, found it necessary to translate into Malay so that the readers of this newspaper could know what it contained. Similarly, in the case of his "Concerning Nederlandsch Onderdaanschap (the status of a Dutch subject)", although it appeared to be directed at a general issue, anyone who reads it with a little care can sense that it was written with the object of giving the Dutch Government directions as to *how it should act towards the Chinese movement which was fighting against the Nederlandsch Onderdaanschap*. For this reason I felt it was most important to publish a translation of it, just as I now feel it is important to discuss the contents of that essay.

Anyone who has read his book *De Chineesche Beweging op Java* must admit that Mr. Fromberg is a Dutchman who is able to pass fair judgement about the situation of the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies. On the other hand, his talk about the Chinese movement — referred to above — regretfully could not meet with my entire agreement, as I said at the time. And after reading his latest *praeadvies* about the Nederlandsch Onderdaanschap, I was forced to doubt its honesty; to doubt whether the judgements put forward there were made fairly after taking into account the interests of the Dutch government and the interests of the Chinese, rather than simply putting forward the interests of the Dutch government; to doubt whether the words he expressed were weighed in advance, so that he could express them even if he were in the position of a Chinese, and not only as a Dutchman!

In discussing Nederlandsch Onderdaanschap in his book *De Chineesche Beweging op Java*, he said (*inter alia*):

. . . those clamorous voices which said that China by its law based on descent had acted progressively to determine its nationality — these

* "The Chinese Movement in Java", a well-known booklet first published in 1911. Fromberg maintained that the rise of the Pan-Chinese Movement in Java at the beginning of the 20th century was primarily a result of Dutch discriminatory policy towards the Indies Chinese. Fromberg was sympathetic to the peranakan Chinese, especially to those who received Dutch education.

were what forced the Dutch government to settle the *Nederlandsch Onderdaanschap* quickly.

Thus it was that the law of 10 February 1910 (Ned. Stbl. No. 55) was soon born.

That law sharpened the knife on both sides. On the one side, the definition of who was a Dutch subject was made so wide that as far as possible the hole could be plugged within the country so that the foreign consuls could not interfere to offer protection. On the other side, the right to get protection from one's own consul in other countries was restricted by regulations in such a way that the nationality could be lost immediately and without being aware of it

. . . There are usually grounds to protect one's own subjects in a foreign country if the treatment they receive in that country is unequal and worse than that of the people of that country. The Chinese in Java are given the very worst end of the stick in the discriminatory laws which are in force there, particularly the extraordinary decrees affecting their freedom of movement. Seen from this angle, too, there is no question for China as to whether the course taken by the Dutch nationality law takes the Chinese more or less out of the protection of the Consul. This is even more the case because many Indonesian Chinese (*Indo-Tionghoa*) are confused by the announcement that they are Dutch subjects, thinking that this heralds the beginning of a new era for them.

So it is easy to understand why relations between China and the Netherlands over the consular treaty have not always been conducted smoothly. This can be seen in the reports in the newspapers very recently that China in this regard has become the weaker party because it is bound by the treaty and by the international rule that an independent country is free to order its nationality laws as it thinks fit.

Now, in his *praedvies* concerning the *Nederlandsch Onderdaanschap*, he also says in respect of that matter:

Thus the drawing of the *peranakan* Chinese into the bonds of *Nederlandsch Onderdaanschap* has taken place with the full assistance of the Chinese government, which strongly desires to remove the possibility of conflicts of nationality.

That law was for the purpose of relations with other countries, to make it clear who, as our subjects, had the right to obtain the protection of our Consuls there.

Dutchmen are those who are domiciled in the Netherlands. They are *Nederlanders*, and all *Nederlanders*, as members of the *Nederlandsch Staatsverband*, are Dutch subjects. On the other hand, not all Dutch subjects are *Nederlanders*.

Thus the *Nederlandsch Onderdaanschap* is a *supernationality*, which unites *Nederlanders* (including Indo-Europeans, as descendants of *Nederlanders*), Indonesian Chinese, Indonesian Arabs, Javanese, Suma-

trans, Ambonese, Minahasans, and so forth, binding them into a single *staatsverband* and giving them a single status internationally, whilst their nationality itself is not recognized as a political union.

When he gave his speech in the Netherlands, he said:

Minister Pleyte called van Kol's speech an aggressive one. He recalled the changes which had been made recently for the benefit of the Chinese and added with pride: "that in practice the rights of the Chinese are already really the same as those of Dutchmen". This is quite untrue and van Kol challenged him pointedly at once to express it in the *grondwet* (fundamental law) of the Indies, as had been done in the case of the Japanese. Pleyte kept silent in answer to this reply. And that is precisely the main issue, the aspect of nationality. Apparently Pleyte is unable to separate the Chinese as human beings from the Chinese as members of the great Republic of China.

As human beings, the Chinese can feel thankful for the relaxations which have been made recently, but as nationals, as Chinese nationals, they feel themselves to be placed below the Europeans, Americans, or Japanese by being pushed into one group with the Natives. Consequently they feel they have been placed in an inferior category

Now, in his *praeadvies* concerning *Nederlandsch Onderdaanschap*, on the same matter again, he appeals:

There is no way which can be opened to give an opportunity to those who have already become Dutch subjects, if the law is changed, to return to the earlier situation and to elect to become aliens.

There are no grounds for that, because now many rights have been given to the status of a Dutch subject and this will in the future become a full citizenship (*staatsburgerschap*). So it is no longer possible to eliminate an injustice and to respect the freedom of individuals but only to proceed to a certain level — not if that freedom can turn into complaints or if the exercise of the freedom becomes the cause of protests about things which for a large majority have become valueless — rather, action should be directed towards the final remnants of legal discrimination, which people are busily getting rid of but cannot complete simply with one blow.

Does anything further need to be explained about the existence of a difference between what Mr. Fromberg said then and now?

People used to think after reading his book *De Chineesche Beweging op Java* that he would defend justice; now he himself says that an injustice cannot be eliminated.

Previously he pointed out in emphatic terms the defects of *Nederlandsch Onderdaanschap*, which he compared to a knife sharpened on both sides, drawing as many Chinese as possible into subjection within the country and, as far as possible, removing protection from those who are acknowledged Dutch subjects when they are in foreign countries. Now, when the *Volksraad* has been attached to *Nederlandsch Onderdaanschap*, a council which has no

power at all but simply the right to give advice, useful for popular leaders to vent their anger, a council which has no proper means of election and in which the Chinese representatives are dependent upon the generosity and will of the Government, now Mr. Fromberg can talk about all the rights which have been attached to *Nederlandsch Onderdaanschap*, as if those rights are so many that it would be quite reasonable to pay for them with a compulsory militia.

Previously he pointed out that China had reason to feel unhappy, with the result that the matter of the consular treaty could not always proceed smoothly because of the Netherlands' requiring *peranakan* Chinese to become Dutch subjects. Now Mr. Fromberg says that it was China itself which really helped the Netherlands take that step because China was so keen to eliminate conflicts of nationality.

And, clearest of all, Mr. Fromberg feels that there is nothing to stop him saying that protests directed against the *final remnants* of legal discrimination have lost their value, because now there have been so many changes made for the benefit of the Chinese and people are busily finishing the job. He says this now, when the Chinese cannot have freedom in their own homes because the police can at any time come and make a search at will; when the Chinese can at any moment be taken into preventive detention at will if someone has some bad opinion of them or has received an anonymous letter; when Chinese coolies can be shot like dogs and no action at all is taken against those who should be held responsible for it!

Ha, if people want to talk they can talk on endlessly. They can say what they like, just as Mr. Fromberg can say that he wrote the book *De Chineesch Beweging op Java* in 1911, and now it is 1921, after many changes have been made for the benefit of the Chinese, after many rights have been attached to *Nederlandsch Onderdaanschap*, so that when the Chinese still wish to attack this law, it is because of their misdirected feelings of Chinese nationalism. And if one answers this by pointing out some very strange discriminations in the laws, back comes the reply that these cannot be put right with simply one blow. In the end this phrase "with one blow" could mean five years, it could also mean fifty years. In that way, the problem will become increasingly complicated.

But if the problem is correctly presented and a fair consideration given to it, then people can take the shorter path.

And if it is discussed in this way, there would be no doubt that the Chinese really do have an interest in freeing themselves from the bonds of *Nederlandsch Onderdaanschap*, an interest which can be justified quite reasonably.

The Chinese mixed with but could not become one with the Natives. In this regard the Dutch government has given much assistance with its segregationist laws such as the *wijkenstelsel* [zoning system] and so on. One could write a whole book to discuss whether this action on the part of the Dutch government should be regretted or praised by the Chinese.

But it is undeniable that in this connection the Chinese do have their own interest. The Chinese of the Netherlands Indies need to get a footing in their nationality.

For the Chinese there is, on the one hand, China, their country of origin, and, on the other, the Netherlands Indies, the country in which they have lived for generations.

In China they have equal rights with the people there, although China is now weak and unable to defend their interests abroad.

In the Netherlands Indies they are oppressed by discriminatory laws. Anything which might be quite pleasant is not shared with the Chinese. The Chinese are equated in status with the natives who are in subjection; people can be taken to the Landraad to face inferior judges; they are "provided" with jails which cannot fail to destroy and degrade their character as human beings; they are placed under preventive regulations by which their freedom can be violated at any moment; they are put in a situation in which they are no longer masters of their own homes because at any time the police can conduct a raid on the basis of nothing but an anonymous letter. On the other hand, when it comes to the rights of the natives, the Chinese are taken out of that group and placed with the Europeans; they do not get the same land rights as the natives. In short, Dutch laws are distorted in such a way that the Chinese position in the Netherlands Indies is very much degraded.

It was in this state of affairs that the *Nederlandsch Onderdaanschap* was enacted, that the propaganda about forming a militia was made in 1916,* that the *Volksraad* was formed in 1918, and then the militia issue was raised again.

How should the Chinese regard all this?

From the point of view of morality, it is certainly true as Oey Tjiang Shin has written,† that the "the Chinese should be ashamed to become subjects of another people, to desert China which is now in a state of weakness and must overcome many difficulties to regain its full sovereignty".

From the spiritual point of view, there is nothing which could be more damaging to the spirit of the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies than to accept being made Dutch subjects and to accept compulsory militia duties whilst their position is thoroughly degraded. By doing so the Chinese would be like slaves who, without any sense of their own value, are always ready to take up arms to defend the rights of their masters.

In all decency, it must be said that the Chinese would be caught in an impossible situation if they accept being made Dutch subjects, because once they take that course and commit themselves to living and dying in the Indies, their ties with China would become increasingly broken while they would still be unable to become one with the people here.

* During the Second World War, there was a suggestion that a militia would be introduced to the Indies to defend the colony against a possible invasion by an outside power (probably Japan). But it never materialized.

† No information is available on Oey Tjiang Shin.

And if one looks at it purely from the material point of view, as Dr. Jap Hong Tjoen and his comrades do,* can one reach any different answer?

The principal indication that a person is a part of the people of a country is not his obligation to do militia duty — as the propagandists seem to want to make people believe by saying that the Netherlands Indies could be in danger of attack from outside at any time — but that he has the right to own land in that country, a right denied to aliens.

The position of the Chinese, by contrast, is more or less that of aliens because they do not have the right to land — the mark of the people of the Netherlands Indies. It is the Natives who have that right. Thus the Natives are happy to accept militia duty since they would feel that if the Indies were plundered by another nation the progress which they have made would be set back. The Dutch too are happy to accept militia duty, to defend their sovereign rights in the Indies. But the Chinese — what have they to defend that they should feel happy to take up arms to protect the Indies from foreign attack?

By raising this issue, I do not mean to say that the Chinese are very keen to possess the right to land in the Indies, and that once they have the right they would want to be Dutch subjects and take on militia obligations. This is not at all what I mean. I have never said this. I have always simply urged people to fight the *Nederlandsch Onderdaanschap* and have defended the movement against it, because I believe that once one wants to remain Chinese, one must be satisfied with having the right to land in China. I only wanted to point out that those “many rights”, which Mr. Fromberg is so proud of that he never tires of mentioning them again and again in his speech in the Netherlands and in his *præadvies* about the *Nederlandsch Onderdaanschap*, only seem to have substance from the outside but are utterly hollow within.

My statement above, that by not having the right to land the Chinese in the Indies have more or less become aliens, does not imply that they ought not to be genuine aliens so that they have no association with the Parliament and thus do not have to take up arms to fight — without having a single piece of land to defend. If other aliens can entrust their affairs to parliamentary representatives in the belief that they will not later take an attitude antagonistic to aliens because the Indies has previously opened its doors, this does not mean that the Chinese must be so terribly afraid. This is the more so at present when there are only discussions about the *Volksraad*, which only has the power to give advice and in which the Chinese representatives are dependent upon the generosity and will of the Government; the more so when discussions are to be held about regional councils (*gewestelyke raad*); the more so when discussions are to be held about municipal councils

* Jap (Yap) Hong Tjoen, a *peranakan* Chinese, was once the president of the *Chung Hwa Hui-Netherlands*. He obtained a doctoral degree in medicine, specializing in eye diseases. He was an advocate of Dutch education and Dutch nationality for Indies-born Chinese.

(gemeenteraad) where the Chinese, as taxpayers not as Dutch subjects, can already have the right to become members. If the electoral regulations in the Indies can be perfected, the present Volksraad can be turned into a valuable Parliament; so too with the right to hold civil office, to become a judge or a notary; so too with the right to become a member of a political organization; so too with the right to elect and be elected to the States-General, the Provincial States, and municipal councils in the Netherlands; so too with the right not to be deported from the Indies.

Thus it can no longer be denied that the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies really do have an interest in staying Chinese, and in escaping from the *Nederlandsch Onderdaanschap*. So that whether we look at it from the point of view of morality, spirituality, decency, or material interest, *Nederlandsch Onderdaanschap* has no beneficial aspect.

What the Chinese need is not those hollow rights stressed by Mr. Fromberg. The Chinese need that equality before the law which other foreigners, like the English, the Japanese, and so on, already have. Isn't it very odd if it is thought that with all those hollow rights the Chinese must be happy to be Dutch subjects and to be subject to militia duty, whilst they still do not enjoy those rights enjoyed only by foreigners, the rights to be masters in their own homes, and the right not to have their freedom violated by the slander of an anonymous letter?

And even if those rights are obtained, as has already been said, it would not put the Chinese any further into the position of aliens. So why should they feel happy to buy them by sacrificing their own nationality, their right to be united with the other sons of China?

The set-up of administration in the Indies is in such a state that it is difficult to remedy it as a whole. On the one hand, the Dutch have sovereign rights and they want to remain at the head of this colony. On the other hand, the natives have rights as the indigenous people. The Chinese are now to be shoved in between these two and with the proviso: they may not be *Nederlanders* because that would violate the rights of the Dutch, and neither may they be natives because the rights of the indigenous people may not be sullied. What rights as subjects are there left for the Chinese, apart from the hollow rights by which they are forced to do militia duty because that is the obligation of other subjects?

Chinese nationality is in truth a right of the Chinese, because within it sovereignty and the rights of the natives in China are joined as one. So if the Dutch now have really stopped carrying out a policy of imperialism and really wish to lead the Indies not to defend their own sovereignty but for the good of the Indies themselves, and to take note of the destiny of a group of its people which numbers about a million, then let the Chinese right to Chinese nationality, which they already had before the enactment of the *Nederlandsch Onderdaanschap* law, be recognized and then give their descendants the right of option or repudiation.

Convoluted discussions like those of Mr. Fromberg will not bring [the Chinese] people into the group he desires. And a matter which presses hard on everyday life will not be resolved by talk.

Of course, the Dutch have no need at all to pay attention to the interests of the Chinese, since the administration is in their hands. They can change the *Nederlandsch Onderdaanschap* as Mr. Fromberg proposes, that is, not to recognize the right of the Chinese to the Chinese nationality which they had before the enactment of the *Nederlandsch Onderdaanschap* and to restrict the right of repudiation to the children of totok Chinese who were born after 10 February 1910. Yes, they can even keep the *Nederlandsch Onderdaanschap* in force as it is now, that is, draw in everyone who is born in the Indies without exception — but let it be known from this point, let it be known by the entire world, that in this case the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies feel that they have been treated unfairly, and that they feel they have been violated!

The Chinese will find their own way to gain their interests. The Chinese will ask China for assistance to settle the matter.

If this should fail once, the Chinese will wait for another occasion. The Chinese will wait patiently and keep trying.

If what Mr. Fromberg says does happen, that China itself is in agreement with the Netherlands because of its desire to be free of conflicts of nationality, then that will not be the end of the matter.

The Chinese will curse the day their ancestors arrived in the Indies!

— Translated by Charles Coppel —

1-5

Tjoe Bou San, the Editor-in-Chief and director of *Sin Po*, published an article on 24 August 1921 entitled “Kepentingan Tionghoa di Hindia Olanda”, maintaining that there were no general interests in the Indies but group interests. The following is the English translation of the first half of that article.

Chinese Interests in the Netherlands Indies (1921)

If we are to consider Chinese interests in the Netherlands Indies, we must first know precisely what the word “interests” means.

To speak of the interests of the Chinese cannot just mean the interests of a few individuals but those of all the Chinese. We can never ask whether A or B is going to gain or lose by something. Those are merely the interests of individuals. But one must ask whether one thing or another will be of

benefit or loss for the Chinese people, whether it will be to their advantage or a calamity for them. Only in this way can we discuss the interests of the Chinese without going too far astray.

Further, it must be understood that the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies form a separate group. They are separated from the natives, from the Dutch, from the Indo-Dutch, and from the other groups of aliens. This is because the colonial policy pursued here has always separated each group from the rest. So anyone who wishes to consider the interests of the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies must know also that those interests are the interests of a group.

At this point one must be able to see that the interests of an individual differ greatly from those of a group. Individuals have authority in respect of their own interests, but they do not have authority in respect of the interests of their group.

An individual may sacrifice his own interests. Not only will no one object to that, but people will call such a person a philanthropist. This is because the loss which he suffers affects only him. But a person may not sacrifice the interests of his group. If he does that, not only will he not be called a philanthropist but he will also be attacked from various sides. This is because the loss suffered falls on many people.

There is another even more important reason for this distinction.

If one person has dealings with another, they can get to know each other. In their association with each other, the heart plays the most important part. So if an individual sacrifices his interests for another, the sacrifice will lead to friendship. When A feels that B has made a concession, it is only right that he too should make some concession in another matter.

When a group has dealings with another group, the two groups do not get to know each other. They each appoint representatives to defend their respective interests. A representative does the work, but his work is supervised by the members of his group. He has authority to make decisions, but he has no authority to make decisions which harm his group. In their association with each other, what one sees is victory or defeat. So if one group sacrifices its interests to another group, it is not friendship which arises out of the sacrifice but oppression. Group A will not regard Group B as having made a concession, it will count itself fortunate to have scored a defeat over B. And the oppression will be carried out ruthlessly, because it is the way of group representatives to continually gain victories for their group and thus make their position become ever more glorious.

So anyone who wants to discuss the interests of the Chinese must set aside anything which is not a general interest of the Chinese, even if it might affect the interests of a few people who may also be counted as Chinese. Furthermore, if that matter is in conflict with the interests of the Chinese, then it must be opposed. And anyone who wants to discuss the interests of the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies must limit his vision to one issue: how can one find a way so that the energies of the Chinese which are expended can be useful for the Chinese people?

Nothing may be sacrificed if it is simply for the interests of another group.

What I am saying may make unpleasant hearing for those who like to hear words of morality, especially those kinds of Chinese who like to use "kokati" [ku tzu-chi, selfish] whenever they point out the undesirability of those words. To put aside anything which is not for the general interest, to guard against anything being sacrificed for the interests of another group, sounds as if one is interested only in oneself. It cannot be denied that this is the case. But in this era — when the material civilization of the West has become so advanced — and here, apart from the groups created by colonial policy, there also exist groups of organizations, so that anyone who does not advance his own interests will be forced to work for those of others — people can do nothing else.

So it's along the lines discussed above that I now want to talk about the interests of the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies.

As a group, the Chinese are in a difficult position. Separated from all the other groups, the Chinese must rely on their own combined strength which numbers hundreds of thousands of people. Behind the Dutch is the Netherlands, which holds sovereignty over the Indies. Behind the natives, there are thirty million people who are strong not only because of their large numbers but also because their position in the Indies is firmly based on the fact that they are the indigenous people whose rights are undeniable. What is there behind the Chinese for them to lean on, if they want to continue to live and die in the Indies as a minority?

The Chinese cannot hope that they will be able to make their voice heard in the enactment of laws in the Indies so that whatever is consonant with their interests is inserted in those laws, even if the present Volksraad is changed into a real Parliament, because they are outnumbered by the natives and their influence is less than that of the Dutch. Apart from that, group interests in the Indies are national interests, which if they come into conflict with one another will be terrible, because national differences have reached a state which can make people blind to the truth. We can get a clear picture of the matter from the birth of Zionism. Everywhere the Jews were unable to get a satisfactory resolution of their position as members of a state. So finally the idea was born of establishing a Jewish State in Palestine, so that all Jews could be united in one governmental structure. Similarly the Chinese will never be able to get a satisfactory resolution within the governmental structure in the Indies by which various nations are to be united.

So if they are to live and die in the Indies without coming to disaster in the end, the Chinese must be able to dissolve their group to become one with the others. If it could really reach that stage, certainly all the difficult problems would be thereby resolved.

But how could this be done, even if the Chinese wanted to take that course?

The line which separates the nations because of the colonial policies carried out in the Indies has been made so thick that the thickest fortress

wall is thin by comparison. A fortress wall, however thick it may be with a steel coating, can still be broken down with a few dozen well-aimed gun shots. But the wall which separates the nations here has not been able to be broken down by intermingling and living together for centuries.

And that kind of policy is still firmly adhered to, if it is not to be said to have been deliberately shaved to make it work more smoothly. If this is not so, what meaning should be given to the establishment of E.L.S., H.I.S., H.C.S. rather than simply establishing general primary schools, what meaning should be given to the establishment of teacher training schools for European children, for native children, and for Chinese children rather than simply establishing general teacher training schools.

Sitting together at the same school desk can make people know and trust one another. If teachers from various nations are trained to teach children from various nations, that intermixing of nations will surely teach them to respect each other.

But this is not what is being done. The Dutch government wants to continue with its policy of separating the nations in the Indies into different groups. So the Chinese group cannot hope that they will become one with the others.

What other way can they take to get a satisfactory *modus vivendi* in the Indies?

Amongst the Dutch one often hears talk about association (*associatie*).

By this they mean that individual groups must remain as groups whilst they all co-operate as one association.

The Volksraad was established and it is said that it will be changed into a proper Parliament. There is to be a wide electoral franchise. In this way it is thought that the foundations of association will be laid.

Let us cast our eyes a little further, to see whether it is true that this will enable the Chinese to unite with the others.

In the Volksraad people distinguish two blocs. One bloc is the native group. In the other bloc are lumped all the other groups. According to this analysis, the native group has its own special position; the Chinese group, as well as the other groups, are lumped together with the Dutch group. It is not determined how many seats are to be provided for the Chinese representatives, as if to say that it does not matter whether Chinese interests are represented by Chinese or Dutch representatives.

Can this bring about a satisfactory resolution of the Chinese position in the Indies?

In the matter of fighting for equality of rights under the law — that is, in the matter of gaining the kinds of courts, imprisonment, and the like which are at present confined to the European and Japanese groups — Chinese interests and native interests are the same. On the other hand, in economic matters Chinese interests and native interests are not the same. The Chinese group has taken a middle position, with the Dutch group at the top and the native group in the lowest position. If the native group, in order to progress

economically, regards the Chinese group as its enemy, as is often said and sometimes evidenced in deeds, it does not follow that Chinese interests in this matter are identical with those of the Dutch.

Once nations are segregated into groups, there is no way to link them in one governmental structure in accordance with their respective interests other than to give an equal number of votes to each group. Only in this way will one group not have its interests "squeezed" by another. As things are, it cannot be said how many cases of violation will occur under that blanket of association, for example, if the decision were taken to subject all groups of the people to militia duty whilst the Chinese group has no interest at all in that and yet could not prevent it happening because they would be outnumbered in the Volksraad.

A group can indeed co-operate with another group. But this co-operation can go no further than was achieved by England, France, and Russia when they formed an alliance to overthrow the militarism of Germany and Austria-Hungary. So too the Chinese can co-operate with the natives in seeking equality of rights before the law in the Indies. However we can no longer talk about co-operation when people want to take it to the stage that the Chinese are to be drawn into militia duty when at this moment there is no one who can show what kind of interest the Chinese have in the Indies which would require them to shoulder a rifle. Nor can one any longer talk of co-operation if in the matter of the right of equality before the law the Chinese group must wrestle with the Dutch group. And because association as the Dutch intend it is not an association which means co-operation but association in the sense that the Chinese group must always place all its interests in the hands of the Dutch group to be looked after in the way they think best — as expounded above — then it is clear that the Chinese group will not be able to get a satisfactory resolution of their position in the Indies from that kind of association.

Unable to be one with other groups because the colonial policies carried out here prevent it, unable to take part in the governmental structure of the Indies without placing all their interests in the hands of other groups to be looked after as they desire — the interests of the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies lie in escaping from the bonds of the government in this colony, from the bonds of the *Nederlandsch Onderdaanschap*, and then in becoming one with the great Chinese people, bound to China, where a Chinese receives equal status.

— Translated by Charles Coppel —

1-6

Kwee Kek Beng (1900—75), born in Jakarta, was educated at a Dutch Teachers Training School for the Chinese. In 1925 he became the Editor-in-Chief of *Sin Po* and retained the position until 1947. As an advocate of Chinese nationalism in the Indies, he wrote the following paper in 1926 for the Chung Hwa Congress. The original was in Dutch, but since the editor could not get the original, the English translation was based on the Malay version published in *Djawa Tengah*, 22—23 March 1927. There are many odd sentences which have been liberally translated into English.

Is There a Need for Participation in Representative Councils? (1926)

Does the Chinese community need to send representatives to various councils [in the Indies]? If there is a definite answer [to this question] then people do not have to write working papers for this congress at all.

To make a correct decision [on this matter], it is necessary [first of all] to give opportunity to people to express their agreement or disagreement. This is the only way to let people understand the situation. One does not necessarily arrive at an answer which pleases the Chinese community, but at least it can draw people nearer to the solution.

In 1917 when the Chinese discussed the above question in a conference (in Semarang), there was a heated debate. The resolution then was not to appoint Chinese representatives to the much-hated Volksraad (see Kwee Hing Tjiat, *Doea Kapala Batoe*, 1921, p. 75). Nevertheless, this resolution could not stop a few Chinese individuals from serving as members of the Volksraad.

Conflicts between those supporting and those opposing the resolution occurred. Frequently there were news about mutual hatred between these two groups. Each group gave reasons for its position.

Those supporting the resolution accused those against it of being “chauvinistic” and “separatist”, as if the opposers did not want to work for the progress of “Indonesia” because they had adopted an attitude similar to the [Indonesian] non-cooperative group in politics by refusing to co-operate with [the government] not only in political affairs but also in other neutral fields.* In the opinion of the supporters of the resolution, serious efforts to improve Indonesia could only be made provided the Chinese participated in representative councils.

Those opposing the resolution argued that they wanted to remain Chinese citizens. Their first task was to establish closer links with China. They opposed the Dutch nationality law which is [regarded as] a political weapon in the hands of the Dutch colonial government to isolate the Indonesian

* There were co-operative and non-cooperative groups in the pre-war Indonesian nationalist movement.

Chinese from China. The purpose of the Dutch was to destroy their Chinese national identity.

The agents of the Dutch tried their best to separate the Indonesian Chinese from their fatherland. Obviously this gave rise to a feeling of bitterness and suspicion among the [local] Chinese.

P.H. Fromberg [correctly] maintained that the Dutch nationality law (1910) was issued suddenly [see his *De Chineesche Beweging op Java*, (Amsterdam, 1911, p. 47)] due partly to [the intention] of preventing improved relations between peranakan Chinese and China. There was intimidation with punishment against those who participated in the parliamentary elections of foreign countries [read: China]. The Dutch wanted to cut off the "parliamentary" ties between the Indies Chinese and China (see P.H. Fromberg's selected writings, Leiden, 1926, especially page 735).*

This unfriendly attitude towards Chinese nationals was also shown in the following: there was a circular sent to principals of various H.C.S. (Dutch Chinese Schools) instructing them not to pay any attention to events in China. Disrespect was shown towards Chinese National Day by not closing the schools on that day. This can also be considered as having a similar motivation, that is, of hostility to Chinese nationals.

Obviously, using both direct and indirect methods, the government intended to isolate the peranakan Chinese from their motherland. It is therefore understandable if the Chinese consider wide acceptance of the Dutch nationality law as a means to encourage the Chinese to deviate from their national objective. (The Dutch nationality law distinguishes China-born Chinese from Indonesian-born Chinese.)

Because there is an unbreakable link between membership in the Volksraad and the Dutch Nationality Law, those opposing the resolution began to oppose both participation in the Volksraad and the Dutch nationality law.

Those who favoured participation in the Volksraad were, however, still rather unhappy with the Dutch Nationality Law. This was because the law which should apply equally to everybody born here actually differentiates between Europeans and Japanese on the one hand, and indigenous people and the Chinese on the other.

Those who agreed with participation [in Indies political institutions] maintained that one can still remain Chinese while having Dutch nationality. They further pointed out that to participate in the Volksraad means to accept Dutch nationality. But people can also see it from a different angle and maintain that participation in the Volksraad is useless.

The group who opposed participation considered the Volksraad as a "shadow" parliament which is actually a tool to deceive the public. *The Times* (of London) of 23 August 1926 published an article entitled "Dutch Colonial Policy" which is worth citing because this was written by a third

* The original title was *Verspreide Geschriften* published in Leiden in 1926. It was compiled by the Chung Hwa Hui-Netherlands.

party which did not have any vested interest [in the present political system]. Among other things, this English newspaper said:

It is clear, however, that self-government in Java and Madura is little more than a name. For in the scheme of administration the native merely figures when all is said and done, either as an "adviser" or as a link for executive purposes. And however well he be represented in the Volksraad, it must be borne in mind that the body is purely and simply an assemblage for the interchange of ideas between governed and Government, and regarded by the latter chiefly as a convenient medium for the expression and elaboration of its own views.

The Volksraad is a place where leaders of the [Indonesian nationalist] movement merely talk and swim along with the current. This of course does not do harm to the political engineers. The Volksraad is a representative council which is in fact distrusted by the indigenous population. For the Chinese to participate in that council and to make speeches is [therefore] quite meaningless. As evidence, one can point out that in these years the Chinese members in the Volksraad have achieved very little. What they obtained were promises from the government, for instance, a promise to give equal rights and status to the Chinese as to Europeans.

People who favoured participation used this promise as a reason to take part in representative councils. However, they argued that the insignificant results were due to the fact that the [Chinese members of the Volksraad] were considered as representing themselves rather than the Chinese community. As a result, their words did not receive significant attention. This would change, they argued, if they had the backing of one million Indonesian Chinese.

Those people who disagreed with Chinese participation in the representative councils did not accept this argument easily. On the contrary, they advised other Chinese not to be bullied in political affairs. They pointed to various tactics and deceptions applied by the authorities to the Chinese community. However, those who favoured participation maintained that "there are indeed not many Chinese members in the provincial councils, but they have played a major role because they influence decisions favouring the Chinese community".

If the Chinese minority really played the decision-making role, as told by the people who intend to bully us, we should ask why were the Chinese assigned this role. Why did not the Dutch themselves play this role?

If fact, these people are dishonest. If differentiation of skin colour in law is not eliminated, people will continue to think that the talk about equal opportunities in jobs and equality before the law is only a show.

In the conclusion, I like to point out one thing: highly educated Chinese today are looking for a new foundation for a political movement. Perhaps it is wrong strategy at this particular moment to talk about whether or not the Chinese should participate in the Volksraad.

As a political means to achieve the objective of unifying the Chinese, to participate in the Volksraad or not is not important. It is because it is difficult for the Chinese to be unified. In order to have a unified political foundation, one has to reach a consensus, to work for a common interest. Of course, one should not work for difference which would result in a split. For this reason, it is perhaps better to leave this rather unimportant matter as it is now.

A finical attitude would generate conflict, when at this moment unity is the most important.

A broad-minded attitude would bring unity to the unification movement.

A wide political foundation should first be obtained for the [common] interest of the Chinese people here, [debate about] differences in policy will appear later when there is really a need for it.

2

The Dutch East Indies-Oriented Group

Unlike the *Sin Po* Group, some Dutch-educated and wealthy Chinese were in favour of Dutch rule and Dutch nationality law. They favoured participation in local political institutions and Dutch education while improving the economic position of the Chinese. Kan Hok Hoei, the most outspoken Dutch-educated Chinese who was appointed as member of the Volksraad representing the Indies Chinese, argued that the Chinese in the Indies were happy with Dutch rule and wanted to remain Dutch nationals (2-1). However, he maintained that the Indies Chinese wished to have equal legal status with the Dutch and the Japanese. The climax of this Indies-oriented movement was the opening of the Chung Hwa Congress in 1927 and the formation of the Chung Hwa Hui (C.H.H.) in the Dutch East Indies in the following year when Kan Hok Hoei was elected President.

The Indies-oriented movement of the C.H.H. received some support from *peranakan* intellectuals. Kwee Tek Hoay, the Editor-in-Chief of *Panorama* and an activist in the early Chinese movement, argued that participation in the Volksraad was useful and the involvement in local political institutions would not split the Indies Chinese because the Chinese were not a homogeneous group in the first place (2-2). He criticized the *Sin Po* group for misleading the Indies Chinese by directing Indies Chinese orientation towards China (2-3).

_____ . . _____

2-1

Kan Hok Hoei (1881–1951), born in Jakarta, received a Dutch secondary education. As a landlord and a leading businessman, in 1918 he was appointed by the Governor-General as a representative of the Chinese in the Volksraad. In 1928 he was elected as the President of the Chung Hwa Hui and held the position until the dissolution of the organization in 1942. The following is his speech delivered at the Volksraad on 19 June 1918. The original was published in the *Verslag der Handelingen van den Volksraad, 1918–1919* (pp. 120–24). The title is provided by the editor.

The Chinese in the Dutch East Indies: A Peranakan Politician's View (1918)

Mr. Chairman! Before I discuss the present policy of the government with respect to the inhabitants of Chinese descent in the Netherlands Indies who are ranked as Foreign Orientals,* a topic upon which I have asked you to allow me to comment on, permit me to note in the form of a synopsis various aspects, albeit briefly, of the settlement of the Chinese in these regions.

I wish therefore to solicit from you gentlemen a little of your time and also your attention.

According to historians, the first signs of the arrival of the Chinese in Sumatra and Java were already known in the beginning of the ninth century. However I shall not trace the subject so far back in time and shall not also take as the point of departure the year 1278 in which year, if we can believe Valentijn,† the Chinese arrived at Sumatra and Java with intentions of conquest, but shall begin with the arrival of the Dutch at Java. This took place in 1596 at which time the Dutch at Bantam came across a Chinese settlement complete with its own quarters surrounded by a strong stockade. They were traders from South China who had established themselves there and had brought prosperity to the place by their trade in silk, pottery, and all kinds of Chinese articles together with their purchase of paper and other native products. Since many years past, according to Groeneveldt,‡ the Chinese were also always received as welcomed guests by the population upon their arrival both at Batavia and Bantam as well as at Soerabaja, Toeban, and Grisse (Gresik) because wherever they settled and lived, they brought prosperity. From a barren beach, Grisse became a prosperous port with the settlement of the Chinese. Many other examples can be quoted.

The Dutch, the best merchants of Europe, cannot but give the Chinese settlements their due for the beneficial and great influence exercised on the economic progress of this country and its people.

Governor-General Coen also had recourse to all measures to get as many Chinese as possible into the city of Jacatra. It was a continual struggle between Coen and the Pangeran of Bantam to wheedle from each other this so popular work force. The use of violence was not denied, and Chinese from junks were taken away with the aim of populating Batavia, Amboina (Ambon), and Banda. However they were not treated as prisoners but, as was said, were allowed "to enjoy frankly and freely the commodities of the

* During Dutch colonial rule, the Indies population was divided into three groups with different social status and rights: Europeans (read: Dutch), Foreign Orientals (Chinese, Arabs, etc.), and indigenes (Indonesians).

† Francois Valentijn, *Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indien* (n.p., 1724).

‡ W.P. Groeneveldt, *Verhandelingen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen* [Notes on the Malay Archipelago and Malacca compiled from Chinese Sources] vol. 39 (1880). Republished in 1960 in Jakarta under the title *Historical Notes on Indonesia and Malaya Compiled from Chinese Sources* (Djakarta, 1960).

country alongside the citizens and could reside locally as free men without any molestation". Batavia also has profited from the settlement of Chinese inside the walls. In his work *De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch Gezag in Oost-Indië* [The Rise of the Netherlands Authority in the East Indies], De Jonge argued that "both by their labour as well as by their contribution, the Chinese have contributed in an important degree to the establishment of the city of Batavia". And just as grateful was G.G. Brouwer who acknowledged in one of his letters that he was impressed upon by the Directors in Holland to deal in a friendly manner especially with the Chinese.

Since that time, Mr. Chairman, the Chinese, faithful to their natural gifts, have been the middlemen for the economic development of these regions and appear thus far to be a necessary factor for the prosperity of the population. And still today, nowadays, the Chinese remain in the Archipelago as the *trait d'union* between exporter and producer, the middlemen between importer and exporter.

In the course of centuries, they have done well. Presently, thanks to their unwearying diligence, great thriftiness, and energy, many well-established Chinese families are found who spend their income in this country for the benefit of the Indies society. Which reasonable and unprejudiced man shall and can count it as a reproach? Apart from that, the middleman trade is almost entirely in the hands of the Chinese; these are also the importers of the very indispensable staple food, rice, which was also distributed by them among the population.

The government has to thank the organizational talent of the Chinese for the millions and millions raised by the various leases in the course of the years before the institution of the state monopoly, which money was used for various projects whose benefits were enjoyed by everyone. The fishing industry at Bagan Si Api-Api, from which the government in 1914 was able to collect one million guilders from various taxes as against a total expenditure of not even fl. 7000 was due to Chinese initiative, daring, and perseverance. And last but not least, Mr. Chairman, the hundred million flowing thus far into the Indies treasury from the tin industry on the island of Banka — even this income — so indispensable for the Indies economy, would be lost to a great extent if not for the famous *ausdauer*, the sense of duty and the frugality of the Chinese mine workers.

Mr. Chairman, I have tried to give a brief sketch of the important position the Chinese population group occupies in our society from the establishment of the Netherlands authority in Indië [and] what contribution they have made towards the development of the economy in Insulinde. Together with this I only want to show that besides the "jus civitatis" acquired through residence, the Chinese are entitled to other rights in order to lay claim to a liberal and good treatment from the government, in keeping with the role which they have played in the Indies society and still play, [and] in keeping also with the higher stage of civilization which they as a people (*Volk*) can boast. In the light of this, what was and is their position?

Mr. Chairman, it is known to you how the pass system had encumbered the Chinese in their movements until recently; how justly they complained against the arbitrary jurisdiction exemplified in the police court; how the Chinese, including the best among them, were turned away like lepers from European districts. It is also generally known how difficult it was for the Chinese and their children to enjoy public education. Mr. Chairman, is it surprising that this industrious group is therefore grieved, and the injustice done to them is more deeply and intensely felt and realized by the Chinese whose culture is the highest and oldest in East Asia. Is it not obvious that the Chinese were forced in looking for protection and justice which had been denied to them, that they even had to put their hands to the plough to provide education, which was such a bitterly felt need, for their children? Is it surprising that their eyes were directed at China, with which country they were joined by blood ties, or that they imparted Chinese education in the schools that they set up, no matter how inadequate it had to be? Furthermore, is it not logical that as a result of the catalogue of shortcomings of the government here, the tie between them and the new fatherland becomes looser with the years instead of closer and stronger? Then, Mr. Chairman, then and only then would people realize, would people consider undesirable, the situation that is shaped by their own shortsightedness; then the so-called Chinese question would push itself to the fore, a question that has inspired so many pens both here as well as in Holland, a question that was considered to be so important that the Metropolitan Government sent Mr. Oudendijk to the East Indies for an investigation. Then the words of appreciation of the seventeen gentlemen in 1617 would come to mind — that “the Chinese are an industrious and diligent people”; then would people recognize the correctness of the words of [B.] Hoetink in his book *Het Eerste Hoofd der Chineezen te Batavia* [The First Chief of the Chinese in Batavia]* who said that “under a just and capable administration, the sons of the Middle Kingdom are always and everywhere peaceful and trusted subjects, and that rulers like Coen and his immediate successors have experienced and appreciated this”.

Since then another course has been adopted, another policy followed with regard to the Chinese. This [next] course was not changed in good time so that when in May 1911 the Minister of Foreign Affairs informed China verbally that with respect to the inhabitants of Netherlands Indies of Chinese origin, the Law of Netherlands Subjects of February 1910 would be applied, as was the case with respect to the other nationalities, the greatest grievances of the Chinese population here were still not removed. This fault was eagerly employed in order to sow still more dissatisfaction among the Chinese inhabitants.

Mr. Chairman, since then changes have been implemented which accommodated partially the just and fair desires of the Chinese.

* First published in *Bijdragen tot de Taal- Land-en Volkenkunde (BKI)*, vol. 73 (1917).

The pass system was repealed [and] the much hated police court was abolished, thanks to the Volksraad members who were zealous [in fighting for that]. Tribute and gratitude are also due to those who, motivated individually by their sense of fairness, had pleaded verbally or in writing for a fairer treatment of the Chinese in the Indies. Particularly, the first among such individuals was Mr. Fromberg, a man familiar with the issues and recognized as a capable lawyer, who had so often dispelled the misunderstandings and misconceptions about us and had stressed that which was all too often forgotten — that we do not belong to a subject race or nation.

Through the establishment of many schools spread over the entire archipelago on which hundreds of thousands of guilders were spent, paid for both by the rich and poor among us, we have shown by our actions that our call for education was not empty words but a manifestation of the natural drive for development inherent in a population that is culturally advanced.

Then some attention in the education field has begun to be bestowed on us. During the administration of the Governor-General van Heutz, the then Director of Education, Mr. Pott, drafted a plan for the establishment of the Dutch-Chinese schools (Hollandsch-Chineesche Scholen). Although these schools still presently do not meet the demands in an important degree, they have amply demonstrated the desire for advancement of the Chinese youth, a desire for advancement the existence of which was previously denied by the government [and] not taken seriously as it should be.

Recently they have recognized this, fortunately, and as already mentioned, much has been done to accommodate our justified grievances. The present government, especially, has shown a serious will to round off as much as possible the sharp edges that must necessarily cleave to a dualistic system, to recommend a milder application, if it is not possible to immediately change, the existing regulations that have caused annoyance in order to make them more tolerable. Herein thanks must be expressed towards Mr. Mouw, the acting Adviser for Chinese Affairs who has contributed towards the improvements of the Chinese in Netherlands Indies, who showed that he had a warm heart for the interests of this population group and, Mr. Chairman, on many occasions, tried to implement the so-called association policy with conviction, not in theory but in practice.

In the explanatory memorandum of the budget of 1919, the introduction of a certain unification of taxes was proposed. Thus, ultimately, an end shall be made to the extremely unfair regulation, to the indefensible and untenable situation in which unequal and unfair levying of taxes are applied by one and the same government of its subjects on the basis of racial differences. Mr. Chairman, I know that this change has already been long considered but the justifiable stand of the government was opposed by many Regional Administrative heads and that, principally because of the shortsightedness and conservativeness of these gentlemen, a new regulation was not submitted much earlier. There is no need to discuss further the unfairness of the present situation.

Mr. Chairman, the facts speak for themselves. A European with a yearly income of 900 guilders only pays a tax of 15 guilders as against roughly 40 guilders for each native or others of equal status, including the Chinese. Moreover, from the amount due the European can deduct a certain sum if he has children and has to pay a life insurance premium. This [concession] is not granted to other classes of people. At the examination of the budget at the committee level, I have expressed my astonishment that the so-called estate duties valid for the Europeans shall be promulgated without at the same time being applied to natives and Chinese. In the Preliminary Report, it has already been mentioned how the present law of transferring of real estate by inheritance can give rise to unfairness. The answer by the government has only satisfied me partially.

It is true that I have remarked that the unfairness of the existing situation has been recognized and that change shall be attempted, but I cannot subscribe to the view that there are insurmountable difficulties in that regard. In practice these difficulties can be entirely overcome and if the Chinese succession is not so uncertain, these difficulties are not so insurmountable. I therefore propose strongly to urge the government to review this fiscal provision of the law. Mr. Chairman, there is still one other grouse which, owing to its practical necessity, can still give rise to discontent — and that is the district [zoning] system. You know that a native or Chinese cannot live in an European district without permission. Indeed it is true that permission is given to the person possessing a pass, but I cannot understand why this provision which gives rise to bickering has not been withdrawn long ago. It is even obviously untrue that only persons of a certain standing can justify the luxury to be able to live in a European district. What then is the reason that the offending prohibition is maintained to this day? Mr. Chairman, I hope an end is made to the existence of this grouse as soon as possible.

Another point to which I want to direct the attention of the government and to press for changes is the formula for the franchise in the municipalities. It has aroused resentment among the Chinese that as a criterion of intellectual development, a certain knowledge of the Dutch language is expected. With the setting up of this requirement, the former government must be blamed entirely for not only ignoring the fact that so few among us have command over this language but also for having no desire to understand that the level of the intellectual development of a taxpayer cannot simply and solely be measured by the expected mouthful of Dutch that he can rattle off. For example, is it not strange that it can be supposed that a Chinese wholesaler would not understand the purport of the franchise because he speaks no Dutch? It appears to me that an immediate change in the election ordinance is therefore very desirable. Mr. Chairman! I say that our group is very thankful for all that has been done in the last years especially under the administration of the present Governor-General who above all has always shown clearly that he has an open ear and eye for the

interests of all the population groups in the archipelago who have been entrusted to his care, for which respectful, grateful tribute is due. Our group is very thankful for all the improvements in the position of the Chinese thus far, but entire satisfaction can only come with complete legal equality with Europeans. It is known that efforts have been made in this direction. Already regulations concerning the Civil and Business rights of the Chinese have been called for and announced but not implemented. The legislator has inserted the so-called Adoption law in the new regulations of the Civil Rights of the Europeans. In this respect, I would like the government to consider putting to use the specifically Chinese law affecting the customs and practices of the Chinese and not to take as its basis a European principle. Further, a more accurate wording is desirable. For example, it must be no more liable to doubt whether a father may adopt his child born out of wedlock. The issue still appears to be uncertain in the article in question. Also I wish to press for greater relaxation in the temporary provisions. In short, with respect to Chinese customs, there should be a more thorough investigation before anything is embodied in the law. I do not need to declare that the implementation of these new regulations is awaited longingly by the Chinese....

Although the list of the "desiderata" is not entirely perfect, although the Chinese population group, as I have said just now, is still not completely satisfied, a large proportion of this group nevertheless values the steps taken to improve its position in society.

I am not speaking here for that proportion of the group that only has gall for the best goals of the government, who are grumblers, who under a slogan that is in vogue fails to appreciate against their better judgement the presently fair gesture of the government with respect to the Chinese. This is a category of people that is also found in free America and Australia, an opposition group that sometimes indeed desires to do more evil than good. No, Mr. Chairman. I speak for the great majority of the Chinese inhabitants who still hold high in honour the national, traditional virtue and gratitude, who do not take blindly the rights that have been secured to be able to move freely, a freedom that is so necessary for an industrious trading population group. I speak for those who cannot remain indifferent to the relatively great legal security enjoyed here and also for the security of lives and goods that was an answer to reasonable demands, who can value the advantages that Chinese children can presently enjoy, cheap and sound education which would equip them with the qualifications that are required in order to fill the various government positions open to them, and in that way to earn a living. I speak here of that vast majority, the practical and soberly thinking part of this industrious group who, like the Canadians of French descent, the Americans of German, Irish, and Italian blood, keeps its cool and fully realizes that the link with the former fatherland does not need to be broken in order to protect its own real interests in the country whose welfare is so closely tied to its own existence. Without having to renounce one's race, without having to be unfaithful to what has been called by an English

writer "the religion of the seed", each must consider it a duty to oneself and towards his fellow inhabitants to give his best for the progress of the country and for the improvement of the people, to whom also the Chinese are thankfully indebted; at all times to exercise influence, no matter how weak it is, over the course of affairs, which would be decisive for his own interests. Mr. Chairman, we [my colleagues and I] thought that we must accept the appointment as members of this honourable institution (that is, the Volksraad). We do not want to be guilty of the cowardly act of refusing a position because of fear to criticize, a position which is the only way indicated by duty and conscience. Gentlemen, we sit here in your midst not because we are so confident of our own abilities in getting that which is desired by our blood-brothers through our eloquence, but because we have the inner conviction that the present government is indeed well disposed towards us, and the initial steps already taken for the improvement of our position in accommodation to our desires will be followed by others till the last. We are also convinced and fully confident that the present Governor-General will be able to unite through his wise administration into one entity the heterogeneous components out of which the population of Insulinde is constituted, taking into consideration the special interests and rights of groups, so that they can co-operate harmoniously for the progress of these islands in all respects. We are also confident that it will not be the fault of your Excellency the Governor-General Graaf van Limburg Stirum if the Supreme Government and States General [in the Netherlands] do not realize that the value of satisfying the desires of our group will be entirely governed by the choice of the correct moment.

Mr. Chairman. It is in this strong conviction, in that unshaken confidence, that I, in the name of the group to which we belong here, finally express the wish that the Netherlands Government, which has brought order and peace, safety and legal security, development, progress, and civilization here, will continue to rule in the Indies so that at least the supreme leadership of the administration over these regions will remain in the hands of the present governors, so that the people can be spared the unknown, perhaps hard hand of a new master, so that we then can be certain that we all would not have to undergo the chance of bearing the heavy and oppressive yoke of a future tyrant.

— Translated by Yong Mun Cheong —

2-2

Kwee Tek Hoay (1886—1952), born in Bogor, was educated in a traditional school but was also fluent in English and Malay. Apart

from writing for the local newspapers, he was involved in the T.H.H.K. movement and became the president of the T.H.H.K. Bogor for more than twenty years. As a major pre-war *peranakan* writer, he published numerous works on various aspects of the Chinese community in Indonesia. The following was published in *Madjallah Panorama*, 30 April 1927, pp. 1—3, refuting *Sin Po's* view on non-participation in the Volksraad (1-6).

Is It True There Will Be Dissension Among the Chinese Over Participation in the Volksraad? (1927)

One of the reasons for not taking part in the Volksraad (People's Council) is the concern that it will create conflict to the effect that there will arise dissension in the Chinese group, whereas there should be unity.

Mr. Kwee Kek Beng gave such a reason in his working paper. Such a reason has also been submitted in the Chung Hwa Congress. Mr. Ko Tjay Sing,* who spoke in the name of the Ta Hsioh Sing Hwe (University Students' Association), said:

We are of the opinion that the question as to whether it is necessary or not to take part in representative bodies must be left out of the discussion, because the pros and cons of the matter have provoked a political struggle, whereas we should strive for concord. Furthermore such dissension may culminate in a division between the totok and the *peranakan*, which means weakening the Chinese group.

It seems that the above "reason" has been used in a very acrid manner that made the Chinese fear to approach the representative councils. Who would not tremble, who would not be terrified and shudder; just thinking about taking part in the representative councils the Chinese populace here would split into two parties, half of it the "totoks" and the other half the "peranakans", hating one another, strangling one another?

So cruel! Sinful! Those people are wicked — those who would go so far to see their own people undergo such a misfortune!

There is no other single condemnation, no other derision or abuse acrid enough for men who would like to see and promote such an awful happening!

But, just a moment please, my friend!

It is easy to say, as the Malay saying goes: the tongue is boneless. It is also easy to write, because the paper we write on never protests against what we want to write on it. But let's use our common sense and think further: for what reason do you assume thus?

Almost all municipal and regency councils have Chinese members. In the provincial council and Volksraad too you have Chinese members.

* Ko Tjay Sing, (b. 1903) then a law school student, later became a lawyer and established the P.T.I. Semarang Branch together with Ko Kwat Tiong.

Has anybody discovered that those members have intentionally supported regulations which suppressed their own people? Have they ever taken a stance that has annoyed the totok Chinese?

If we have able representatives in the municipal councils who can put pressure in each of their local municipal councils to improve the condition of the roads in the Chinese quarters and publicize among the Chinese how to improve the Chinese administration of burial grounds, facilitate municipal and other taxes, to have market-places where Chinese usually trade administered in a better way [and] the levy eased — the benefit derived therefrom can be enjoyed by all Chinese, totok and peranakan.

[If this happens,] we would like to see who the totok Chinese are who are not so happy and for that reason keep away from the Chinese political party that has representatives [in the various councils].

Those Chinese will feel happier. They will also become closer instead of splitting, because they feel that their interests are being protected by the political party which has Chinese representatives in those councils where they can voice freely all their wishes or complaints!

Where are the factors that lead to a split, isolation, and dissension?

Such is the situation in the Volksraad. Although up to now the Chinese members in the Volksraad are not supported by any party, there is no evidence that they only look after the interests of the peranakan and ignore those of the totok. Among the legislation passed by the Volksraad, there is none that is merely for the benefit of the peranakan! The totok Chinese always derive some benefit.

In his working paper, Dr. Han Tiauw Tjong* submits the following six points:

- (1) the appointment of women doctors for the inspection of the medical health of Chinese women who arrived here, after complaints had been made about malpractices involving newly arrived Chinese women (those who get most benefit from this are the totok Chinese);
- (2) the establishment of H.C.S. for girls (totok Chinese girls can also enter the school);
- (3) investigation into the treatment of journalists in Glodok prison† (this includes totok Chinese journalists too);
- (4) points that should be observed when doing house search (houses of totok Chinese are included);
- (5) expansion of the cinema committee to include one Chinese member (this will be advantageous to importers of Chinese films from China, all of whom are totok Chinese — with this arrangement, the film

* Han Tiauw Tjong (1894—1940) received his Ph.D. in Engineering in 1922. He was appointed as a Volksraad member in 1924 and reappointed in 1927. He was a founder of the C.H.H. (1928).

† Glodok, also known as Pancoran, the Chinatown in Jakarta.

industry in China also obtains benefits which are by no means small);

- (6) presumably, the number of H.C.S. will increase as a result of the discussions in the Volksraad (children of totok Chinese can also join the H.C.S.).

To these six benefits can be added several more which so far have not materialized, such as the teaching of Mandarin (Tjeng Im) in H.C.S. which has been accepted in the Volksraad but has been ignored by the government. If this plan is also implemented, the action in the Volksraad will not have caused a split but, on the contrary, the peranakan Chinese will come closer to the totok because they become more united through knowledge of their own [Chinese] characters and language.

So if we look at the working of the Volksraad in the past there are indications that the work of the Chinese members in the Council have not been solely to look after the interests of the peranakan only. Why then are people suddenly afraid that if we take part in the representative councils, the totok and peranakan will split?

The totok Chinese too consider it important and have much interest in the working of the Volksraad, and this can be seen during the recent election of the Chinese members, where there were totok leaders from several groups in Batavia praising the candidates to the council. We truly believe that those political groups to be established, when they do exist, will get the support of the totok Chinese although they are not Dutch subjects and have no voice in the municipal council elections.

So the reason put forward by *Sin Po*, that is, by taking part in the councils the peranakan Chinese "are digging another chasm which will isolate the totok Chinese in political affairs" is not only empty words but also misleading, with bad purpose and foul intention.

Sin Po wants to play on the sentiment of the Chinese and their national consciousness which would perpetuate the split between the peranakan and the totok.

Do think well, reader. If now, due to pressure by all the Chinese members, all H.C.S. schools run by the municipality or the government teach Chinese culture and Mandarin, would not the relationship between the peranakan, the totok, and their country become closer? On the other hand, if all the Chinese members, according to the wish of *Sin Po*, keep away from the municipality and from the Volksraad that in political affairs all would say "I don't care, I do not want to get involved", that Mandarin or Chinese culture shall never be taught, would not the tens of thousands of children in H.C.S. become more isolated from the totok and their own country?

Is that not a very sinful thing to do?

Sin Po is not covering up the chasm that divides the peranakan Chinese from the totok but they are pushing the peranakan into the depths of the chasm.

2-3

Kwee Tek Hoay (1886—1952), a leading writer and community leader, examined two misleading proposals: Indies Chinese should work in China, and their fate depended on China. The article was published in *Madjalah Panorama*, no. 73 (5 May 1928), pp. 952—54, and no. 74 (12 May 1928), pp. 981—82.

Misleading Clamour (1928)

1. *Overseas Chinese must work in China*

A decade or two ago, when the nationalist spirit of the Hoa Kiauw (overseas Chinese) here was ablaze, there was repeated clamouring that the Overseas Chinese should put their capital to work in China, into mining, establishing factories, and other enterprises which would further develop the country. That movement had reached its peak when Tuchen from Chekiang wanted to give some land on the bay of San-men-wan where Overseas Chinese could settle and be given full authority to organize their own government, police, and so forth there.

Many Hoakiau who were enthusiastic (*djiatsiem*) and whose hearts were patriotic (*aykok*) were attracted to the movement. We know that in Batavia several wealthy men decided to transfer their capital to China, including the late Kapitein Lie Hin Liam.* But most of them, after trying it for a while, were compelled to change their plans, whilst some others, who tried to carry on their business or import goods from China to Indonesia, were forced to close down at great loss.

Even though so many failures were evident, the clamour that the Hoakiau should return to China to carry on business in their fatherland was not silenced, it seems, but was simply repeated again and again. The cause of this was not just that clamouring of this kind was in accord with Chinese sentiment. In particular, it was because most of the clamourers (*toekang-toekang bertreak*) and the public who listened to them did not know a thing about the obstacles and difficulties which had cropped up and which forced Kapitein Lie Hin Liam (who was so enthusiastic) to abandon his project and return to Java. At that time, too, the line of newspapers differed greatly from the present. It was regarded as one of the greatest sins to reveal all the corruption and badness of one's own fatherland and people, so that each competed with the other to describe what was most attractive and best. A frank and full discussion about the real situation, such as we have conducted in the matter of the *Yi Yung Thoan*,† was almost completely absent, despite the fact that there were many people about who had told queer and strange stories about the confusion there. The difficulty was that many continued

* A totok Chinese who was one of the founders of the T.H.H.K. (Jakarta) and Siang Hwee (Jakarta).

† Voluntary Brigade, a student group in China which consisted of the Overseas Chinese during the Northern Expedition (1927).

to believe that the Hoakiauws would find it more profitable to carry on their business in China than in Indonesia.

In fact, it must be understood at once that the objects of the suggestion to transfer and invest capital in China were only wealthy men like the late Majoor Oei Tiong Ham, Oey Tjoe, and the like, whose capital ran to millions. For Hoakiauws whose capital was small, especially the peranakans who could not speak or write Chinese and who were not familiar with the situation and customs there, that suggestion was very dangerous and misleading. This was even more the case for peranakan labourers, for whom it was just as difficult to seek a livelihood in China as it would be to try their fortunes in Bombay, Mecca, or Cuba. Peranakan Chinese labourers from Java are rarely able to seek their livelihood even in the Straits, though many people there speak Malay.

Some people argue that if the English, Americans, and other foreigners can live in China, why cannot the peranakan Chinese do so? That's true, but most of these white men who stay in China are from the educated class and are supported by big companies or business concerns, so that they are certain in advance about their livelihood. Such people can live in New Guinea, not to mention China. If white labourers, such as clerks, sailors, and so on, come to China, they can all work or get a livelihood from their own people. Any nation can go and stay in any corner of the world if they can get that kind of support. But just tell an Englishman, American, or Japanese to go to the interior of China where no foreigners live, without enough money to live and without knowing any Chinese language. Would such a person have the courage to seek work or open a shop there? Most would surely not.

We can see, then, how empty and misleading was that clamouring: By using the word 'Hoakiauws', no distinction is made between labourer and capitalist, between stallholder and factory-owner, between totok and peranakan, or between those who can speak and write Chinese and those who can only speak Malay. People paid no attention to all these distinctions and did not want to think about them; so long as they could be labelled Hoakiauws, it was thought that they must return to their fatherland to try to seek their livelihood there.

This appalling suggestion not only could cause many people sorrow and disappointment but it could also prove disastrous for China and lower the standing of the Chinese people. From time immemorial, there has been no nation in the world which has achieved greatness and glory whose entire people has been confined within its own borders. Greeks, Romans, Phoenicians, and other nations in famous ancient times always tried to look for colonial territory and to establish colonies in every corner of the earth which they could reach. The reason they did so was not only to increase their influence among other nations but also to promote and increase trade in their fatherland so that its economy would be strong.

Not long ago we read a cabled report that, according to the most recent estimate, the population of China had increased by fifty million. This means

that in a short time the population of China has increased so much that the increase exceeded the entire population of Indonesia. And we must not forget that in some parts of China, especially in the fertile lands of the Yangtze valley, the population is even denser than in Java. Whereas in Java the average population density is 226 per square mile, in Anwei it is 362, in Chekiang 601, in Kiangsu 875, in Shantung 552, in Honan 454, and Hopei 380. The average population density of China, including Manchuria and Kansu which are still empty, is 238 people per square mile. In a situation like that, an attempt to tell Chinese who live abroad to return to China not only makes things difficult for the people concerned — it is also disastrous for China, millions of whose inhabitants almost every year are in danger of starvation because the majority of them only live from hand to mouth.

People who are genuinely patriotic (*aykok*) — that is, not simply wanting to play on public sentiment — should not urge the Hoakiau to work in China; on the contrary, they should encourage the inhabitants of the overcrowded provinces to seek their livelihood abroad. Without living in China, a person can still make himself useful to that country, provided that his situation abroad is already secure. There is no need to be troubled by whether the Hoakiau by going abroad would become Dutchmen, Englishmen, Japanese, or Americans. If his heart remains Chinese, his thoughts and sympathies will remain with his fatherland. If he has enough, China will be content, for this would be better and would raise the standing of the Chinese people more than if the population of China were increased still further by a million Hoakiau from Indonesia living in starvation!

Peranakan Hoakiau! Be wary of those agitators who want to lead us to disaster by urging us to return to China. Look at the recently announced figures of the numbers of Chinese immigrants to Java which are continually on the increase and now total forty to fifty thousand. Isn't it just too ridiculous to urge the peranakan Chinese to return to China?

For too long the peranakan Chinese have given their attention to people who have been used to voicing this kind of clamour just to play on public sentiment, to seek popularity. The time has now come to put a stop to this act, to end it once and for all! Any person is at liberty to go to any country to seek his livelihood reasonably. Indeed, there is nothing wrong if a Hoakiau wants to work in China, but let's not fool ourselves by saying that, if we want to act patriotically, the Hoakiau must return to China!

Remember, a Peranakan Chinese of Trinidad who cannot read Chinese like Eugene Chen is worth more than a million indigenous inhabitants of China of the calibre of a Chang Tso Lin!*

2. *The fate of the Overseas Chinese depends on China*

In various religious beliefs many people believe that salvation both in this world and the next can be attained if they place complete faith in Buddha,

* A warlord who collaborated with the Japanese in Manchuria.

Christ, Mohammed, or various Toapekong.* When a sinner shows his repentance and places his faith in Christ, he can go directly to heaven. Many Muslims also believe that a person who sacrifices his life in a war against the infidel can directly enter paradise. Amongst those who worship there is a strong belief that whoever uses his wealth to glorify the Toapekong, for example, by offering "big prayers", repairing a damaged temple, establishing a new temple, or donating decorations or furnishing to the Toapekong, will earn blessings.

In truth the salvation or damnation of a man depends upon his own deeds. The Prophets and also the holy men whose statues are worshipped only point the way, give a good example or model of how man must perfect his life in order to attain salvation. A gambler who stakes a large sum of money every day has a good chance of losing his wealth even if he conscientiously provides for the building of the Toapekong or goes to church every week without fail. This is because the destiny of every man is in his own hands. His salvation or damnation in no way depends upon outside support or influence.

A person can still attain salvation without knowing Buddha, Christ, or Mohammed provided that he follows a way of life which accords with truth. All that effort to bribe or give an inducement to the Toapekong by presenting gifts, offering "big prayers", and so on, so that one may gain manifold blessings and good fortune is of no avail. The blessing of eternal salvation can only be gained by striving for it within oneself. As long as men are unaware that they should remedy the faults and defects within themselves, their worship of and belief in Prophets or *Walis*† will make little alteration in their situation.

As in the case of inner, religious problems, so too in the case of worldly problems which affect our lives. Whether we here are respected or insulted depends on our own skill in accommodating ourselves in a group of various races. If our education is so poor that we are left far behind in everything by the Dutch and the natives; if our economic position is so bad that we can do no more than be stallholders and small retailers; if our connection with China is limited to clamouring "*Aytjiong-Aykok*" and "One hundred per cent full 'Taytionghoa'!",‡ and if most of our traders are just going to be cart-horses for European banks and firms on whose credit our own businesses are dependent — then if our situation remains like that, even if China's navy was as strong as the English or American navy and its army no different from that of France or Japan, our situation here would be little changed.

Let us suppose that in China there was a stable government with authority throughout China, with a well-ordered administration, which had eliminated all the unequal treaties with foreign countries. With all that, our situation here would certainly remain unaltered so long as we ourselves made no effort

* Toapekong (or Da bo gong), a general name for Chinese deities.

† Muslim saints.

‡ Taytionghoa (or Ta Chung-hua), Great China.

to improve our economy. By eliminating the unequal treaties the nationalist government wants the foreigners resident in China to submit to Chinese law and not be masters in someone else's country. China itself certainly does not want to do to other countries what it dislikes foreigners doing in China. So China will not press the Indonesian government asking for greater rights for the Chinese than for the natives, with whom the Chinese mingle in their everyday life. Such an attitude would very easily bring to the surface the seeds of hatred between Chinese and natives, a thing which the Chinese government must prevent if it wants Chinese who come to Indonesia to continue to be received in a friendly way. In whatever way it may use its influence, power, and policies, there is no use in hoping that China will be able to improve the situation of the Hoakiauws here, if doing so would conflict with justice and injure the natives. The Nationalist government in China is too honest to seek profit for its people by threats and duress, which would be more deleterious than beneficial.

Perhaps people will say that the dependence of the Hoakiauws on China is not a matter of political influence using Chinese guns and warships but rather one of support in matters of education and of progress in culture and economy which will in time produce a healthy climate for all Hoakiauws. But it must not be forgotten that in a very short time, despite incessant confusion and war throughout the country, the population of China has grown by *fifty million*. The economic problems faced by the Chinese government are so great, perhaps no less than those of Japan, that they can't simply be solved overnight. Where there are so many great and important domestic problems which must be given continuous attention, it is quite out of the question for us to expect China to give frequent attention to our fate here which, generally speaking, is far better than that of most of the population of China. The size of China's population which is growing very rapidly has caused a very serious problem, namely, to check the rise of starvation which is the seed of all the chaos caused by the population density. If we remember how in England and the United States, renowned as the two wealthiest countries in the world, there are now millions of people unemployed who must be cared for by the State, it can soon be understood how futile it is to hope that, when China is at peace and progressing, we Hoakiauws will share the warmer climate. On the contrary, for many years to come, China will still need the aid and support of the Hoakiauws in many matters. So the Hoakiauws must not hope for support from China to improve their lot, but must even be prepared to lighten the weighty burden of the Chinese government.

It is very true, as *Soeara Publiek** says, that if we want to show our patriotism, we must not depend on or expect help from China but we must know how to organize ourselves to improve our own position in this country,

* The name of a peranakan daily newspaper in Surabaya. When Liem Koen Hian assumed the editorship in the 1920s, the daily became Indies-oriented.

because when our position is strong we can then make ourselves useful in helping China.

The Hoakiau should be ashamed if even in the case of education alone we must hope for assistance and support from China, because in China itself there are so many children who have never been to school so that ninety per cent of the population cannot read or write. For the Hoakiau who want to remain in Indonesia, education which is organized as in China is certainly rather inappropriate, and thus in the matter of education the Hoakiau must organize themselves here rather than seeking it in China.

As for cultural and economic ties, if people want them they can begin now without waiting for China to become strong and developed. If at this stage all the Hoakiau can do is to talk and if they cannot make any satisfactory ties, I fear that those aspirations are no more than empty talk.

For these reasons I consider that it is unjustified for people to think that the fate of the Hoakiau depends upon China, because it all depends upon our position here.

— Translated by Charles Coppel —

3

The Indonesia-Oriented Group

A group of pro-Indonesian Chinese attempted to draw their counterparts closer to the Indonesian nationalists and supported self-government for Indonesia (3-5). This group was represented by Liem Koen Hian, a *peranakan* journalist, and Ko Kwat Tiong, a *peranakan* lawyer. Both men and other pro-Indonesian *peranakans* in 1932 established the Partai Tionghoa Indonesia (P.T.I.) advocating Indonesian nationalism for the Indies Chinese (3-1). Liem Koen Hian, the first President of the party, analysed the existing three political streams (the *Sin Po* group, the C.H.H., and the P.T.I.) in the Indies, arguing that his stream was most realistic and was for the benefit of the *peranakan* Chinese who were by law Dutch subjects. Indonesia, in the view of Liem Koen Hian, was the homeland and the country of the *peranakan* Chinese. While advocating an Indonesian political identity, Liem Koen Hian did not urge complete absorption of the *peranakan* Chinese into the Indonesian population, although he hinted that when the time came the process could not be stopped.

However, Kwee Hing Tjiat, the ex-*Sin Po* man who was disillusioned with China, began to advocate complete assimilation of the Indies Chinese into the Indonesian (read: Javanese) population (3-3). One can argue that Kwee Hing Tjiat was the "father" of the assimilation idea. But many *peranakans* were critical of his concept. Chan Kok Cheng, a leading journalist, responded negatively to Kwee's idea (3-4), Kwee Tek Hoay, another leading journalist who was sympathetic to the C.H.H., analysed three major political streams in the Chinese community in the 1930s. Giving credit to the P.T.I., Kwee Tek Hoay argued that the C.H.H.'s ideas were still the most suitable for the majority of the Chinese in Indonesia (3-2).

3-1

Liem Koen Hian (1896–1952), born in Banjarmasin, received Dutch primary education through self-study. He managed to pass the qualifying examination for the Law School in Jakarta. He was first a Chinese nationalist, but after being influenced by Indonesian nationalism, he became an Indonesian nationalist. He was the founder of the P.T.I. and served as its first president in 1932.

The following is an excerpt from his talk delivered in Surabaya in August 1932 before the formation of the P.T.I. The talk was published in *Sin Tit Po*, 25–26 August 1932.

Three Political Streams in the Peranakan Chinese Community (1932)

Now we talk about the second stream, that is, the Indonesian stream which I have developed and for that reason it has been closely linked with my name.

This political stream advocates that peranakan Chinese here are *Indonesiërs* and should become *Indonesiërs* [Dutch term for “Indonesian”].

This necessity is not determined by me but by the situation and the requirement for survival.

Peranakan Chinese are not guests. They are part of the people in this country, [that is], part of the Indonesian nation (Bangsa Indonesia).

Ladies and gentlemen, guests stay only for a short while, then they have to leave. Totok Chinese and totok Dutch who live here will stay as long as they can still make profits. They are guests of this country. But we peranakan, as peranakan Dutch who have lived here for many generations, for a hundred years, and who have died and have been buried in this land, are not guests. If we insist on calling ourselves guests, then we would become shameless guests because we are taking advantage of the hospitality of the host.

For this reason, for the second political stream, there is no problem of whose guests we are.

For the second political stream, the only problem is whose side we are on, that is, to side with the rulers or the ruled.

In fact, this is no longer a problem, or should not become a problem, because for us, peranakan Chinese, it is natural that we side with the Indonesian nation, because our mothers are from this race.

For peranakan Dutch, there is a problem to choose between the ruler race or the ruled race, because their fathers came from the ruler race while their mothers were from the ruled.

However, there is no such problem with us because we do not have any blood ties with the ruler race.

In fact, we only have an unconditional obligation to side with our mother's race. And because of our mothers, we are not here as guests but are a part of the Indonesian people who are the real host.

People may say that although we have Indonesian blood from our mother's line, this does not make us Indonesian, that is, an indigenous Indonesian, in the sense of a Javanese, a Madurese, or an Ambonese. It is therefore impossible for us to claim that we are *Indonesiërs*.

It is true, ladies and gentlemen, that peranakan Chinese are not indigenous Indonesians. It is as true as saying that they are not indigenous Chinese.

But what is an Indonesian?

My enemies said that to become an Indonesian means to be converted to Islam.

This is a wrong and foolish idea which has been put forward purposely or otherwise.

Firstly, it is wrong and foolish because an Indonesian, even if he is an indigenous Indonesian, is not required to become a Muslim. The fact is that there are many Indonesians who are Christians.

If the Indonesian people at this moment came to rule this country, I believe that this government would not require all its citizens to become Muslim, because a modern state recognizes a separation of religion and government, which means the government no longer involves itself in the religious matters of its citizens. People are free to choose their religions according to their individual wishes.

This principle can be seen in all countries in the West, in China and Japan. Even in . . . Turkey, a modern Islamic state which is still independent, this is also the case.

The government of Turkey is no longer involved in its citizens' religious affairs. A citizen of Turkey is free to choose his own religion.

Secondly, it is wrong and stupid for my enemies to say that the term "Indonesian" means an indigenous Indonesian who feels that he is the son of this country and is ready to fulfil all obligations for this country.

The term "Indonesian" can mean an indigenous Indonesian, which is an ethnological concept, but it can also mean citizens of this country in a political sense. As for the term "*Nederlander*" it can mean a totok Dutchman or a totok German, a totok Englishman or [even] a totok Chinese. . . . Therefore, it is not extraordinary if the term Indonesian means not only indigenous Indonesians but also those who are citizens (*ra'jat*) of Indonesia.

One might argue that as long as Indonesia is not yet independent, there will be neither Indonesian citizenship nor the Indonesian in the political sense.

This view of course is correct. If there is any fallacy in the stream [that I advocate], it is that it attaches a political concept to "Indonesian" ahead of the development of this country.

However, it is better not to call it a fallacy, I think it is more appropriate to call it a prediction. We do not only look into the present but also the future.

Because, ladies and gentlemen, I believe that in the near future the political concept will emerge and Indonesian citizenship will be available for not only indigenous Indonesians but also *peranakan* Chinese, *peranakan* Dutch, and *peranakan* Arabs.

On the contrary, instead of branding the ability to look into the future as fallacious, I think it is better to label it as wisdom.

Before the law gives political concept to the term "Indonesiër", I can only use the term to refer to persons who have the feelings, thinking, and behaviour of indigenous Indonesian people.

A *peranakan*, no matter what his racial origin is, if he feels and thinks like an indigenous Indonesian and is prepared to fulfil his obligations towards this country and loves this country as his motherland, that kind of *peranakan*, ladies and gentlemen, in my view, can indeed call himself an Indonesian.

The term "Indonesian" that I have used in developing my stream is a term used in a wider sense which sooner or later will prevail.

If I say that *peranakan* Chinese were determined by the situation and necessity to become Indonesians for survival, I use the term "Indonesian" in this wider sense. It has nothing to do with religion or assimilation (*pengleboeran*) as indicated by Mr. Phoa Liong Gie.*

I never spoke of nor intended to talk about whether it is possible for *peranakans* to be assimilated into the indigenous Indonesian population. I am of the opinion that assimilation is a process which has to be left to time and circumstances, without human intervention, in the sense that we can speed it up or slow it down. This process will emerge by itself, which is impossible to be stopped, when the time is ripe.

But what we can do to accelerate it is to promote such consciousness among *peranakan* Chinese that they are Indonesian in the widest sense of the word. They are required by the circumstances [to become Indonesian] because they are *peranakan* Chinese, that they are more *peranakan* than Chinese, that is, they are more Indonesian in a narrow sense than Chinese. Although they are descendants of the two races, they are more Indonesian than Chinese because they continue to reside in Indonesia, live and think like indigenous Indonesians. They speak the Indonesian language. They are no longer like indigenous Chinese.

The *peranakan* Chinese are further required to have this consciousness by the fact that they reside and make a living for generations [in this land] and have also been buried here.

Because of our mother's blood and our livelihood, we *peranakan* Chinese must feel united with indigenous Indonesians, must feel and think like indigenous Indonesians, and must be willing to fulfil our obligations as indigenous Indonesians do. When we acknowledge this country as our motherland, feel and think like indigenous Indonesians, and perform our duty to both the country and the indigenous people who are our mothers' race, then we are already Indonesian in the wider sense of the word as I explained earlier.

I believe this will happen to *peranakan* Chinese in the future.

Dr. Kwa Tjoan Sioe† in his talk noted that although those in the first stream [the Chinese Nationalist Stream] consider themselves guests in this

* Phoa Liong Gie (b. 1904), then a young lawyer who was a leading member of the C.H.H. prior to his open conflict with Kan Hok Hoei (the president of the C.H.H.) in 1934.

† Kwa Tjoan Sioe (1893–1948), a left-wing physician who was sympathetic to *Sin Po* and was critical of the C.H.H. He was believed to be a member of Comintern before the Second World War.

country, their sympathy is directed by [the teaching of] Dr. Sun Yat Sen, that is, towards the indigenous Indonesians who are fellow Asians. The followers of this stream objected to identifying themselves with the indigenes because of the fact that the indigenous Indonesians are still "the defeated people" (*bangsa taloe kan*), and hence this creates dilemma for peranakan Chinese. In other words, if the Indonesian people are no longer "the defeated people", this objection will disappear. The dilemma will also disappear.

Also the Chung Hwa Hui—Java [C.H.H.] stream, [the third stream], as explained by Mr. Phoa in his talk, promised to co-operate with indigenous Indonesians, but the time has not yet come for that kind of co-operation.

The two streams, that is, the first and the third streams, would like to wait before changing their views to become the second stream, which is my Indonesia-oriented stream.

Initially, not a single peranakan Chinese newspaper did not abuse me — this does not include abuses at home or in their rooms. However, at the present time, in public places there are already people who respect this second stream, that is, the Indonesian orientation.

Compared to the initial period, the second stream has now had a significant victory, both morally and practically. The practical victory is that there is an increasing number of peranakan Chinese who understand and agree with this stream.

Before long, this second stream would become predominant in the peranakan Chinese community.

This cannot be otherwise, because behind the second stream there is the Truth which cannot be denied forever. This truth is that the peranakan Chinese here are not guests but Indonesians who are required by the circumstances and by livelihood to love this country and to be prepared to fulfil their obligations towards this country and its indigenous population of which peranakan Chinese are a part.

This consciousness is natural indeed. What could be more natural than a person loving the country with which he has been familiar since he was born, where he grew up, and in which he will be buried. What is more natural than a person loving a nation with which he has blood ties and shares similar feelings and thoughts, people with whom he socializes every day and shares a similar attitude towards life and . . . from whom he earns his livelihood.

This is a natural consciousness which is now still latent because it has been put to sleep.

This is the intention of the second stream, the Indonesia-oriented stream, which is to arouse the sleeping consciousness in the hearts of peranakan Chinese.

Once this consciousness is awakened, peranakan Chinese here will automatically feel themselves *Indonesiërs* and will become *Indonesiër*.

. To those who now abuse me, I would like to say:

Wait and see!
History is a world court.
And World History will show that I am right.

3-2

Kwee Tek Hoay (1886—1952), a leading *peranakan* writer and community leader, presented an in-depth analysis of the strength and short-comings of the three political streams in Indonesian Chinese society. The article was first published in *Djawa Tengah*, 1—4 October 1932.

The Three Streams (1932)

In recent months there has been much talk of the problem of the three streams in the Chinese community, that is, three directions concerning the status of ethnic Chinese who live in this Dutch colony. These three streams in brief are as follows:

1. [The first stream advocates that the Chinese should] stick to Chinese nationality, remain as Chinese nationals, and reject Dutch nationality. [They should] attempt to establish closer ties between ethnic Chinese here and their motherland, and make all Chinese here *totoks* and unify their fate with China.
2. [The second stream advocates that the Chinese should] remain ethnic Chinese but request equality in law as Indonesians which would provide them with all the rights, privileges, obligations, and responsibilities. [They should] attempt to develop this country which they consider as their motherland, and unify their fate with the Indonesian population.
3. [The third stream advocates that the Chinese should] remain ethnic Chinese by maintaining cultural relations with China while accepting Netherlands citizenship which cannot be repudiated. [They should] co-operate with the government and other groups for the prosperity of this country and at the same time to strengthen the position of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia.

I

The first stream, consisting of Chinese nationalists, is represented by *Sin Po*; the second stream, by Mr. Liem Koen Hian, and the third stream, by the Chung Hwa Hui (hereafter, the C.H.H.). The C.H.H. has to be placed number two because it is between the two extreme ideas of *Sin Po* and of Mr. Liem Koen Hian. The C.H.H. can be said to be the party in the middle, which has adopted a position between the two opposing views.

True, the C.H.H. does not get along with the two other groups, but in several fields it could co-operate with the nationalists or with Mr. Liem Koen Hian's group. For instance, in the field of political involvement, the C.H.H. is in agreement with the party of Mr. Liem Koen Hian, but in the effort to preserve Chinese culture and foster close cultural ties with China, the C.H.H. is closer to the nationalist group.

What I have read of the discussion on the strength and weakness of the three streams has so far been crude and misleading, because almost all of the arguments put forward in these months have been either critical or complimentary of one stream and based on a wrong and misleading assumption — it is not known whether this was done on purpose — that is, people base their arguments on the assumption that the Chinese in Indonesia consist of *one* group which shares the same interest and desires. This is entirely wrong. An attempt to solve the Chinese problem in Indonesia on this basis is the same as someone trying to treat goats as dogs or chickens as ducks.

The Chinese in Indonesia comprise various groups with differing aims and interests. In general people divide them into two groups: totoks and peranakans. The totok group can also be divided into two sub-groups, one group consisting of people who want to live and die in Indonesia because they are tied to their wives and properties, and the other group consisting of persons who consider this country a foreign soil where they simply come to work and make money. After they [accumulate] enough money they leave the country for their homeland.

The peranakans in general intend to stay here for the rest of their lives, but even this group can be divided into three sub-groups, that is, the Netherlands-oriented group, the China-oriented group, and the Indonesia-oriented group. The first sub-group consists of Dutch-educated intellectuals who want to see ethnic Chinese obtain rights and treatment identical to Europeans; the second sub-group consists of first- or second-generation peranakans who received their education at T.H.H.K. schools. The third sub-group consists of poor peranakan Chinese who have Indonesian mothers. They have lived in villages for a long time, their thinking and customs are 75 per cent Indonesian and only 25 per cent Chinese.

I do not know what the situation is in other places. But in West Java, including Buitenzorg (Bogor, in the district of Leuwiliang, Paroeng, Tjibinong, and Tjibaroesa), Mr. Cornelis (Jatinegara, especially the Bekasi area), and most part of Tangerang, there are tens of thousands (one estimate is 30,000) of Chinese farmers whose way of life is identical to that of the indigenous Indonesians. Their characteristics are ninety per cent Indonesian and only ten per cent Chinese. They mix with Indonesians as if they mix among themselves. There are many Chinese women who married Indonesians without feeling inferior or having a sense of stigma. [Chinese] men and women work in the gardens or in the rice-fields just like indigenous Indonesians. Their dress and behaviour cannot be differentiated from the indigenous Indonesian population. The only "Chineseness" that they continue

to possess is in the field of religion. For instance, the preservation of their ancestor's ashes, their well-known devotion to new year celebration. On their doors or windows they stick red paper with Chinese characters which they purchase every year before the Chinese New Year, although this old custom is no longer observed in major cities. None the less, in other matters they are not different from Indonesian farmers. Few of these people are literate, even those who are considered well-to-do.

When I was managing a sago factory, there were a number of Chinese farmers from Paroeng area (Tjiseeng village) who came with their wives and children to look for jobs. They were paid 40 to 50 cents a day while women were paid 15 to 25 cents a day. They never refused to carry things on their shoulders. They were willing to push carriages, to dry sago, and to do other jobs usually done by ordinary labourers (*koeli*). They did not feel superior to Indonesian labourers.

These Chinese farmers lived on private land. According to the story that I am familiar with, from the olden days they had obtained permission from the landlords to farm the land just as the natives did. Their right to work on the land continued [to be recognized]. Now private lands are being repurchased by the government but their right to farm will still be recognized by the government. If I am not mistaken, their right has been discussed in the Volksraad. Therefore the situation which was contained in the idea of Mr. Liem Koen Hian can already be seen among tens of thousands of the Chinese in West Java.

These Chinese farmers did not know what the Republic of China was. Many of them had never heard of Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Ching-wei, or Sun Fo in their lives. And now if these tens of thousands of Chinese farmers were instructed to follow the *Sin Po*'s idea of repudiating "Dutch nationality", this would be the same as asking them to die sooner! If they were encouraged to be "close to China", this would be as foolish as a person wanting to make birds live in the water rather than in the trees.

For these *peranakan* Chinese who are seventy-five or ninety per cent Indonesian, the direction of Mr. Liem Koen Hian is most suitable, while the nationalist idea put forward by *Sin Po* is not only useless to these people but also dangerous and disastrous.

II

Now I would like to discuss the second group, that is, the Chinese who came to Indonesia as guests. They consider this country a foreign land in which they have no interest other than making money. Once they are successful financially, they return to their ancestral land together with their wives and children.

This group has been growing larger, and these new guests are comprised of not only members of the lower class in their own country but also those of the middle class who are literate and well-mannered. They either have the money to be used as capital, or they have the support of their families who

are already established here. Members of the poor group now seldom enter Indonesia (except as contracted labourers) because each is required to pay an "immigration fee" amounting to 150 guilders.

The totok Chinese from this group — although their bodies are here, their hearts are still in China. They pay special attention to what is happening in their ancestral land. When they read newspapers, they pay attention to the news on China, and consider what happens in Indonesia to be of secondary importance.

They live a thrifty life in order to save money for their families who are still in China. Whenever they are lucky and receive good fortune, they send part of their wealth to build houses, to buy farmland, or to start a business in China.

Presently, a large number of T.H.H.K. schools have either ceased operation or are half-dead, except for a few in major cities where both Mandarin and Dutch or English are taught. With the set-back of the formerly peranakan-run T.H.H.K. schools, in many places numerous Chinese-medium schools with different names have now been established (for instance, Peng Bin Hak Hauw). These [new] schools were set up and run by totoks. A number of T.H.H.K. schools in small towns have now been given up by peranakans and have been taken over by totoks. We need not be surprised because most students of these schools are totok children. Totoks have an interest in giving their children a Chinese-language education, it is understandable that these Chinese schools are kept alive. However, when the totoks feel that they are strong enough, they set up their own schools so that they no longer have to send their children to T.H.H.K. schools. This can be seen from the developments in Batavia [Jakarta], Bandung, and Buitenzorg [Bogor].

Although there are Chinese-medium schools where totoks live, some of them are dissatisfied with these schools. They therefore send their children to China for education. Receiving a higher education is not their only purpose — their sons are sent to China also to marry girls from China. If their sons marry here, they make sure that they have totoks' daughters who are educated in Chinese schools. Because of the development of transportation (it now takes only six days from Batavia to Hong Kong) and inexpensive ship fare, their relationship with China has now become closer. China is no longer a distant country as commonly perceived by many people.

All these factors make it possible for totoks to maintain their orientation that is, to become "guests" in Indonesia and to refuse to get involved in politics and other matters, as long as they can make money. They do not care what will happen to the Chinese here in the future. The news of the bandits' attack on their village in China is more upsetting than the eruption of Mount Merapi or activities of Mount Selamat. The resignation of Wang Ching-wei is more important to them than the change of the Governor-General or the emergence of a cabinet crisis in the Netherlands.

Everyone will be able to understand without difficulty that this segment of ethnic Chinese, even though they were born in Indonesia, will not think

that they can adopt the ideas of Mr. Liem Koen Hian, that is, to acquire Indonesian rights and share the responsibilities with Indonesians. Perhaps it is much easier to prohibit ducklings from getting into the water than asking these totoks to stop moving closer to China. For them, the orientation of *Sin Po* is very appropriate. As long as there is such a group in Indonesia, even when *Sin Po* loses in its debates with other newspapers because of being less reasonable, it does not need to worry about lack of supporters.

The analysis presented above shows how different these two groups of ethnic Chinese are, that is, the Chinese farmers in West Java who are ninety-five per cent Indonesian and the totoks who are still one hundred per cent Chinese. Any effort to make them adopt one orientation is bound to fail. I therefore think that it is very immature, misleading, and incorrect when we discuss the shortcomings or strengths of these three political orientations without paying attention to different interests and without looking at these obvious facts.

Although totok Chinese who consider themselves guests are not large in number, those who follow *Sin Po*'s orientation [among the totoks] are still the largest in proportion. This is why the orientation of Mr. Liem Koen Hian has been readily misinterpreted as "becoming barbarian" (Djip-hoan),* because to become Indonesian is generally considered to be converted to Islam, to change names, and to wear native dress.

People do not agree with the middle way taken by the C.H.H. either because people are prejudiced or adopt an "anti-" attitude without reasons. The misunderstanding is deep, and to eradicate this the C.H.H. has to work patiently, diligently, and actively, not just through propaganda, debates, or writing in the newspapers but through *deeds* as well. Many Dutch-educated peranakan Chinese who do not think of living in China have sided with *Sin Po* simply because they disagree with some executive members of the C.H.H. Therefore, leaders of this organization have to continually work hard in years to come if they want their orientation to be accepted. It is insufficient just to shout or praise their own political stream if the public does not understand it, because the public has not seen any clear evidence that the C.H.H. is truly working for the interest of the [average] Chinese.

III

Now I would like to talk [more] about the C.H.H. which used to be called the third stream.

Between the two extreme orientations — the orientation of Mr. Liem Koen Hian and that of *Sin Po* — there is the C.H.H. which could be more successful than others because it is more suitable for the majority of the Chinese population here.

The failure of peranakans to be assimilated into the totok community through T.H.H.K. schools caused peranakan children to enter H.C.S. study-

* "Djip-hoan (ju-fan)", a Hokkien term referring to a civilized Chinese turned uncivilized southern barbarian.

ing Dutch. With the opening of all high institutions here to all races, the Chinese have been able to enjoy the fruits of studying the Dutch language.

Those graduates from the K.W.S., P.H.S., T.H.S., R.H.S., and medical schools, together with those studying in the Netherlands, will live in this country working either in the government or private sectors. For this group [of Chinese], whose number is increasing, to accept Dutch nationality is no longer a problem. It has become an undeniable fact and a necessity for survival, because a large number of them hope that they will be able to work for the government to obtain the rights which are only given to Dutch subjects.

There is a large number of primary and secondary school graduates (MULO, H.C.S.) who also work as clerks and others in government offices. At the present moment, because of the economic crisis, everything is being tightened. As a result, there are many Dutch-school graduates, just like those T.H.H.K. graduates, who are unemployed. But the situation will improve some day. This will mean the elimination of the dream: "to get close to China" and "to repudiate Dutch nationality".

The loudest nationalistic voice usually comes from the students of Chinese schools (*haktong*) and those studying in China. But as time elapses this group will become smaller. Their voice will no longer be heard when they see that their exhortation is unpopular. It is possible that they will be tired of themselves and join the larger group.

Apart from that, some people do like the Nationalist stream because since the First World War nationalism has become a strong force. Newspapers which follow this development approved of nationalism. The Canton army marching to the north [Pefahchun = Pei-fa chun] was also named the Nationalist Army. Therefore, the nationalist movement has become a "fashion" or a novelty enjoyed by many people. The most obvious manifestation in Indonesia is the abortive attempt to repudiate Dutch nationality law and the statement of "wanting to become Chinese citizens" followed by the decision of "not getting involved in politics".

The trend has lost its momentum over time because though one may have an unrealistic dream, once he awakes he has to face reality. Presently there are still people who are proud of being "nationalists", their voice however is no longer as strong as before. On the contrary, due to the difficulty of making a living, a very large number of peranakan Chinese nationalists began to realize the importance of protecting their interests in the country where they live without too much reliance on China.

The longer it is, the more people will understand this. If we want to continue living in this country, peranakan Chinese have to make an effort to improve their lot and protect their interests. Peranakan Chinese who are conscious of their situation represent a force, and it is up to the executive members of the C.H.H. whether to welcome and use it.

Besides, there is a very large number of peranakan and totok Chinese in this country who do not care about any movement. They merely follow the

desire of the majority. This group, which has no political orientation or political thinking, does not want to take the trouble to decide which orientation is better. But one day they will be able to give major support to the C.H.H. and adopt its orientation as they did to the nationalist stream. This will happen when they see the wind changing direction and when the C.H.H. has done something which is really advantageous to them.

From this observation I can see that there are two extreme groups which cannot be changed entirely: one is to remain Chinese (*bangsa Tionghoa*) and move close to China; the other is oriented towards Indonesia. In the middle there are a number of groups comprising the largest number of Chinese who have not yet decided on their orientation. These people want to remain ethnic Chinese. However, the *peranakans* are not able to compete with indigenous (*priboemi*) Indonesians as farmers, and they are also pushed aside by the *totok* in small business (for instance, small grocery and handicraft); therefore they badly need guidance in order to live a decent life. The help of the C.H.H. would be very useful.

If the C.H.H. can prove that their idea of fostering close *cultural* ties with China is not only a lullaby for *putting children to sleep*, I believe that the middle-group *totoks* who want to stay in this country and the *peranakans* who still fanatically retain Chinese nationalism will eventually change their minds. They will not suspect the C.H.H. any more.

In short, the third orientation represented by the C.H.H. is most suitable for those belonging to the middle group, that is, those who neither want to "return to China" (*Poelang Tongsan*) nor to "become southern barbarians". If they do not give their sympathy or support to the C.H.H., this means that there is something to be corrected in the leadership of the C.H.H.

None the less, we should not hope that we can make all the groups of different interests adopt one orientation. The three streams serve different groups and it is better to allow them to follow their own ways.

3-3

Kwee Hing Tjiat (1891—1939), born in Surabaya, was educated at a Dutch school. From 1916 to 1918 he served as the Editor-in-Chief of *Sin Po* which he used as the mouthpiece of Chinese nationalism. In 1923, he was barred from returning to Indonesia and had to stay in China for about ten years. In 1934 he was allowed to return to Indonesia and served as the Editor-in-Chief of *Mata Hari*. He then abandoned his nationalist view and advocated the concept of sons of Indonesia. The following article was first published in *Mata Hari*, 1 August 1934.

The Mature Baba (1934)

From everything that the Babas (that is, peranakan Chinese) are doing and their way of life, from the conflict reflected in the names and principles of the P.T.I. and the C.H.H., from the contradiction between what is said by the peranakan group and what they really think in their hearts — from all this can be seen the dualism, the strong conflict, that exists in the minds of the Babas.

This mental confusion, this dualism in the Baba character, has grounded the Baba movement even before it had started.

Dr. Lim Boon Keng reproached Kang Yu Wei* for having led astray the Baba movement in the direction of China — something that has caused considerable harm to the Babas.

Even Ku Hung Ming had flayed Kang Yu Wei for this;† but if we think carefully we will come to the conclusion that the Baba movement was predestined to fail, for I myself believe that even without Kang Yu Wei the Baba would have gone astray in the direction of China anyhow, even though the fact that it went in that direction has surprised many outsiders, including the late Mr. Fromberg, the well-known lawyer, because apparently there is no justification for that.

The mind of the Babas is so muddled and full of conflict, that not only their friends, like Mr. Fromberg, but they themselves do not know what to do.

And so they became followers of such people as Kang Yu Wei, because their ideas are easiest to understand and the most suitable for the generally weak-charactered Baba.

The attitude of the French is: "I am here and will stay here", but for our dear Mr. Baba it is the other way around: he is already grateful if he is able to abscond to China without being pursued by the police or the Tax Office.

That is what the "Chinese nationalism" of the Babas in general amounts to.

But do not think that the only thing a Baba can do is to take to his heels, for, as soon as he comes to his senses, he is also able to stop and return, like Frederick the Great.

Now the time has come to do so, and the Babas want to take their places as Sons of Indonesia and are also prepared to assume all their responsibilities, together with all of those who revere Indonesia as their Mother and the Dutch Government as their Guardian.

The Babas did not choose their place; they have been predestined to occupy their place by virtue of their sacred right to their birth-place.

The political status of the Babas as Sons of Indonesia is based not only on a moral right which will cure all their confusion and dualism but on vital economic interests as well.

* Kang Yu-wei was a Confucianist who initiated the Hundred Days Reform of 1898. When the reform failed, he fled China to Southeast Asia.

† Ku Hung Ming was a well-known Chinese scholar in the early twentieth century.

Any Baba movement will be able to make headway only after the political status of the Baba in Indonesia has been defined, determined, and made the foundation of their lives.

Without this foundation the economy of the Babas will break down, and with it all their undertakings.

Some indigenous Indonesian newspapers agreed with Kwee's vague concept of "Sons of Indonesia" but more were against the idea, especially on the possibility of Babas acquiring land as "Sons of Indonesia". In *Mata Hari*, Kwee responded to the Indonesian press with special reference to *Bahagia*, explaining what he really meant by "Sons of Indonesia". The following excerpt was translated from *Djawa Tengah Review* (August 1934, p. 613) which reprinted Kwee's articles.

Before I write further, I would like to say that apart from the four Indonesian leaders [Soedarjo Tjokrosisworo, Dr. Soetomo, Mr. Singgih, and Dr. Satiman], Dr. Tjipto Mangoenkoesomo has also stated, twenty-five years ago, that Babas were "Sons of Indonesia". I also believe that three Indonesian leaders, namely, Drs. Hatta, Ir. Soekarno, and Mr. Sartono, mentioned by *Bahagia* would agree with my orientation, because Babas have the right to become "Sons of Indonesia" based on law of nature. This right cannot be denied. Even American law which oppresses the coloured eventually has to recognize the fact that Asians born in the United States are "Sons of America". How could the Asians want to exclude their fellow Asians who even possess fifty per cent Indonesian blood? They are more unfair than the Americans. However, I value too much Indonesian civilization and Indonesian people. I do not believe that the view of *Bahagia* is that of Great Indonesia.

As to the rights of land, I am of the view that this is an agricultural problem. I also agree that the ownership of land for the [indigenous] Indonesian population be guarded vigorously. But if there is still vacant land in Borneo (Kalimantan), it is safer to give them to the Babas rather than the Japanese. . . . If the Babas, for instance, could defend Borneo against foreign invaders, Java and other islands would be safer. Don't forget, in the Babas there are drops of blood of Prince Diponegoro* and Genghis Khan.

I also feel that within one generation or thirty years, with the exception of a few bawling Chinese who should be kicked out, Babas would be assimilated into the [indigenous] Indonesian population, just like the case of [the local Chinese] in the Philippines, Thailand, and other places.

* Diponegoro was a Javanese prince who led his people to wage a war against the Dutch from 1825 to 1830.

3-4

Sub-Rosa was the pen-name of K.C. Chan (Chan Kok Cheng, 1893—1971) who was the Editor-in-Chief of *Djawa Tengah Review* (Semarang) in the thirties. As a member of the P.T.I. Semarang Branch, he was sympathetic to the Indonesian nationalist goals. However, unlike Liem Koen Hian who perceived the possibility of local Chinese assimilation into the Indonesian population, Chan believed that the Indonesian Chinese would remain culturally Chinese in the future. Understandably, he was critical of Kwee Hing Tjiat's idea of complete assimilation and his pro-Dutch attitude. He wrote a long article in his *Djawa Tengah Review* (August 1934, pp. 605—8) under the title "Apa Gerakan Tionghoa Maoe Djadi Boetek Kombali Kerna Satoe Haloean Kosong?" [Is the Chinese Movement To Be Misled Again because of a Hollow Concept?] The following is a partial translation of that article with a new title.

Mr Kwee Hing Tjiat and His Hollow Concept (1934)

Mr. Kwee Hing Tjiat seems now to want to change everything. He has presented his "concept" which is a mixture of that of Mr. Liem Koen Hian and of the C.H.H. His concept has confused both the Chinese and Indonesian communities. They do not know which direction Mr. Kwee wants to go, except that he wants to assimilate the Chinese into the Indonesian population. He wants the Chinese to forget their ethnic identity (*kebangsaan*) and to cut off their ties with China. Therefore a lot of people are of the view that perhaps Mr. Kwee Hing Tjiat is "crazy".

Was it his bitter experience in China that caused him to lose his nerve and to go out of his mind?

Let us ignore this. I do not want to think that way yet.

Let us then briefly and objectively examine his concept while ignoring his abuses of the Chinese community.

Under the title "The Mature Baba" in the first issue of *Mata Hari*, after stating that the spirit of Babas is "rotten" and Kang Yu Wei has misled the Baba movement towards China, Mr. Kwee Hing Tjiat put forward his concept.

A) "Now the time has come to do so, and the Babas want to take their places as Sons of Indonesia and are also prepared to assume all their responsibilities, together with all of those who revere Indonesia as their Mother and the Dutch Government as their Guardian."

B) "The political status of the Babas as Sons of Indonesia is based not only on a moral right which will cure all their confusion and dualism but on vital economic interests as well."

C) "Any Baba movement will be able to make headway only after the political status of the Babas in Indonesia has been defined, determined, and made the foundation of their lives.

Without this foundation, the economy of the Babas will break down and with it all their undertakings."

Thus the concept of Kwee Hing Tjiat is aimed primarily at protecting the Chinese economy in Indonesia.

To protect the Chinese economy, according to Mr. Kwee Hing Tjiat, *peranakan* Chinese (Babas) should take the position as "Sons of Indonesia". In what sense? Complete assimilation, that is, the Chinese become [indigenous] Indonesians, as was explained by his later writings which can be found in the "Topics" column in this issue [of *Djawa Tengah Review*].

Is it true that to protect the *peranakan* economy or security in Indonesia, the only way is to assimilate the Chinese to [indigenous] Indonesians? Mr. Kwee Hing Tjiat did not want to take the trouble to study [the problem] He is only interested in . . . complete assimilation.

He did not want to bother about whether or not [indigenous] Indonesians were willing to accept the Chinese without suspicion. He did not care about the Chinese nationalist sentiment as well as the Indonesian nationalist feelings which are now very strong.

He only wanted the *peranakan* Chinese to be absorbed into the Indonesian population. Not surprisingly many people consider Mr. Kwee Hing Tjiat "out of his mind".

In the "Topics" column of this month, we quoted voices of the Indonesian press which showed that the assimilation of the Chinese into the Indonesian population is not as easy as Mr. Kwee Hing Tjiat asserted.

I am not one who is "crazy" about China, as shown in my previous writing. I pay attention to the interests of the *peranakan* Chinese in Indonesia. However, I know that as long as China is in existence, it is still on the world map, and the Chinese are still considered a nation, the national [ethnic?] sentiment of the *peranakan* Chinese will not disappear. In fact, assimilation is no longer necessary because the situation has now changed.

Five hundred or three hundred years ago, there were a few nations which were assimilated into other nations. I know that World History has shown this. However, what could happen three or five hundred years ago will not occur at the present time or in the future.

If Mr. Kwee Hing Tjiat were able to eliminate all modern ships, cables, and radios which connect China and Indonesia within ten odd days and burn down all T.H.H.K. schools in Indonesia, as well as transform the Chinese community completely and extinguish the nationalistic sentiments of the Indonesian people, then Mr. Kwee Hing Tjiat might be able to assimilate the *peranakan* Chinese into the Indonesian [population].

[Of course, it is impossible.] Therefore the concept of making the *peranakan* Chinese "Sons of Indonesia" is Utopian. It cannot be realized.

Assimilation is unnecessary. This is not the best and safest way to protect the *peranakan* Chinese interests as proposed by Mr. Kwee Hing Tjiat. His concept can generate misunderstanding between the Chinese and Indonesian peoples as expressed in the Indonesian press.

The best and safest way to protect the interests of the Chinese here, at least those who belong to the labouring class (*Kaoem Gerobak*), is the concept proposed by the P.T.I. I have analysed this elsewhere and it is already well known.

To show how confusing the concept of Mr. Kwee Hing Tjiat is, let me quote again:

"... the Babas want to take their places as Sons of Indonesia and are also prepared to assume all their responsibilities, together with all of those who revere Indonesia as their Mother and the Dutch Government as their Guardian."

This is quite similar to [the stand of] the C.H.H. But the C.H.H. emphasizes "the Chinese interest" which does not coincide with the "Sons of Indonesia" concept proposed by Mr. Kwee Hing Tjiat. The idea of becoming "Sons of Indonesia" with the Dutch Government as the Guardian is obviously in conflict with the idea of the majority of the Indonesian nationalists. This also deviates from the P.T.I. because the P.T.I. does not ask the local Chinese to be assimilated into the Indonesian population, but urged both the *peranakan* and *totok* Chinese to co-operate with the Indonesians in various fields, so that there will be understanding and mutual respect; hence the security and prosperity of Indonesia and its populations can be ensured.

Thus, what does Mr. Kwee Hing Tjiat's concept really mean?

Up to now, people have not yet been able to guess.

Up to this moment, he is still not able to present convincing reasons acceptable to the majority of the population, both Chinese and Indonesians. Therefore, what I can see is simply a hollow concept.

The only "tangible" thing is his abuse directed at the Chinese who do not want to become "Sons of Indonesia".

What are those "responsibilities" of the "Mature Babas" mentioned by Mr. Kwee Hing Tjiat? He does not make it clear either. Perhaps he does not know what he is talking about.

The concept of "the Mature Babas" only confuses the situation. As I see it, it will create confusion among the P.T.I. followers. Leaders of the P.T.I. therefore have to be cautious!

_____ . . _____

3-5

Ko Kwat Tiong (1896—1970), born in Semarang, received a law degree from a Dutch university. He first joined the C.H.H. but

quickly became disillusioned with the organization. In 1933 he and Liem Koen Hian established the P.T.I. Semarang branch. In the following year he was elected president of the P.T.I. central board. From 1935 to 1939 he was elected a Volksraad member representing the P.T.I. The following was his speech in the Volksraad, published in *Verslag der Handelingen van den Volksraad 1936—1937*, pp. 1547—48 supporting the Soetardjo Petition for self-government. Ko was a member of the Soetardjo Petition Committee who argued that in an autonomous East Indies the rights of a minority would be protected and the interests of a minority should not be used as a reason for opposing self-government for Indonesia.

The Speech by Ko Kwat Tjong on the Soetardjo Petition (1936)

Mr. Chairman! In the Report of the Committee, the fear was expressed — and my honourable fellow members, Messrs. Roep and Sosrohadikoesoemo, have touched upon this question — that the interests of the minority groups would be jeopardized by making the Netherlands Indies autonomous. I cannot share this fear. Indeed, the autonomy that was demanded was only intended to establish a freer relationship between the two territories of the Netherlands state, the Kingdom in Europe on the one hand and Nederlands Indies on the other; while over and above them, the supreme authority of the Kingdom remains. In my opinion, as long as this authority is maintained, the minority groups need not be apprehensive of the supremacy of other groups which, because of their numbers, will be able to impose their will against the dictates of justice and fairness on those who are numerically fewer.

(Mr. Soeroso: This would happen without a supreme authority.)

The conference which was demanded by the initiators of the petition shall still be able to draft such measures that would enable the rights of the minorities in an autonomous Indies to be properly guaranteed. For example, it could be stipulated that in the representative bodies, as is the case now, a certain number of seats be reserved for representatives of the minority groups. It could be stipulated too that an appeal might be made to the supreme authority if the guaranteed rights of the minority groups were violated. These are some examples. Many others can still be added. The conference is to examine all those matters.

It only remains to pose as the *sine qua non* of the minority groups that they would be properly represented in the conference that is required, in order that they would be able to defend their own interests properly in the drafting of the new arrangements and that these would not be deliberated upon without them. With respect to this question, I wish to point out that even the initiators of the petition are of the opinion that all population groups including the minority groups should be represented at the conference.

(Mr. Sosrohadikoesoemo: Do you mean a representation of all seventy population groups?)

But apart from the constitutional guarantees which the minority groups can demand and get, I want to make the observation that contradiction of interests is widely found where human beings live. This contradiction of interests can be seen also in the normal daily lives of people, but we cannot say that this contradiction of interests will necessarily lead to conflicts. The consciousness that a struggle of all against all means the individual's own destruction teaches people to live in peace with each other, making mutual concessions to one another, even though their interests are divergent. As with the lives of individuals, the same can be said of the lives of groups of individuals in a particular country.

There is no homogeneity of population in any country of the world. Everywhere human groups are found and though they may not all be racial groupings they may still be groupings of an economic or religious character which are not of equal strength. But can we say that in all these countries a continual conflict of group against group, of the displacement of a weaker group by a stronger one is the norm? Egoistic inclinations are often held in check by the consciousness that suppression of another group can sometimes mean the death of one's own group because no group can point towards clear-cut interests of its own, but on the contrary the interests of the various groups are woven together. Above all, the consciousness that continual mutual strife can make the country weak with regards to foreign aggression will result in peaceful co-operation of the groups everywhere else and also here in these regions.

And if this consciousness is still not found in some groups because — just to use the words of our honourable fellow member Notosoetarso in his speech given yesterday — the people are inclined to do evil rather than good, then there is still in the last instance the authority of the Kingdom, the authority of the [supreme] Netherlands state, which must not be identified with the authority of the Netherlands as a part of the Kingdom, that can make a ruling between both [groups].

(Mr. Sosrohadikoesoemo: Then there is not much autonomy.)

I shall give a reply to this yet.

In our constitutional law, there is still no organ that is given this supreme constitutional authority but the notion is already found in the ideas of many. Our honourable fellow member, De Hoog, called it an Imperial Council (*Rijksraad*). This Imperial Council consisting of representatives of the various parts of the Kingdom, and in the first place meant as an organ to resolve conflicts between the various parts, can also be the body to which conflicts between the population groups of one part are referred for resolution.

But it may be objected that this principle might prejudice the character of autonomy.

I think not.

In many independent states, small groups of a certain nationality still live among other bigger and stronger groups of another nationality. Also in those places, the so-called rights of the minority, guaranteed rights of the small minority groups, are known and an appeal can be made to the League of Nations if these rights are violated.

(Mr. Sosrohadikoesoemo: We can see the results of that in the case of Ethiopia.)

Just as the independent character of these states can least be doubted simply because the League of Nations mediates in certain instances on behalf of the minorities, so also it cannot be said that by conceding the right to the Imperial Council to make an arrangement between the conflicting parties, there is therefore no more an autonomous Indies.

It is not my intention to elaborate on the details of this principle. It appears to me sufficient just to touch upon this point in order to show that even in the autonomous Indies, as we have understood it, the minority groups need not be entirely without rights.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that with these few words, the fear of the racial and also religious minority groups that there is no proper consideration of their interests shall be removed. Whatever other objections might be raised against the petition that is submitted, the question of the minority groups should be no reason for expressing opposition to the proposal.

Mr. Chairman! In his speech delivered yesterday regarding our petition, our honourable fellow member Wirjopranoto asked us, the signatories, to consult our supporters and to exchange ideas with them concerning the proposal that was submitted. Only in that way can the proposal be said to have been supported by a big group of inhabitants "locally".

As far as I am concerned, I can say that what is demanded by the initiators [of the petition] is entirely agreed upon by the association which I represent and which strives for the autonomy of Netherlands Indies.

Mr. Wirjopranoto further found it incorrect of the signatories to base the petition for the autonomy that is desired on article 1 of the constitution. According to Professor Huart, that article should not [be interpreted to] have such significance. I would however wish to remark that as opposed to the opinion of Huart, there are other views of at least as great authorities of the Netherlands constitution as Van Vollenhoven, Kleintjes, Eigeman, who believe that article 1, instead of being only of geographical significance, positively defines the political status of the different parts of the Kingdom. In the matter of the constitution, a different interpretation of an article is conceivable and the signatories of this proposal can appeal with just as much right, to the interpretation of Van Vollenhoven, Kleintjes, Krabbe and Eigeman from whom support is found, as Mr. Wirjopranoto in referring to the opposing view of Huart.

Chinese Orientations during the Japanese Occupation

On the eve of Indonesia's independence, the Chinese in Indonesia continued to be divided in their orientations. Thus, pro-Indonesian, pro-Chinese, and pro-Japanese views existed side by side. Liem Koen Hian, the P.T.I. leader, in his speech made at the Plenary Meeting of the Committee for the Investigation of Indonesian Independence (11 July 1945) urged the Committee to declare Indonesian-born Chinese as Indonesian citizens in the future Indonesian constitution, on the grounds that these Chinese considered Indonesia as their homeland and continued to live in Indonesia (4-1). However, Oei Tjong Hauw, the ex-C.H.H. leader, maintained that in the future constitution all Indonesian Chinese should be declared citizens of China, although they would continue to live in Indonesia. In his view, the Chinese in Indonesia would like to identify themselves with China (4-2). Oei Tiang Tjoei, the Editor of a pro-Japanese *peranakan* newspaper, argued that the local Chinese should be allowed to choose between Indonesian and Chinese citizenship (4-3).

4-1

The following speech of Liem Koen Hian (1896—1952) was published in *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*, vol. 1, ed. Muhammad Yamin (Djakarta: Jajasan Prapanca, 1959), pp. 218—23. The title is the editor's.

Ethnic Chinese and Indonesian Citizenship Law (1945)

Honourable Chairman! Ladies and Gentlemen! It has been decided what form the Indonesian State will take, and what territory it will cover.

Now what remains to be discussed is the most important thing: who the citizens or nationals of the Independent State of Indonesia will be. There are some points relating to this matter which I would like to clarify, Mr. Chairman. In a previous session of the Committee for Investigation [of Indonesian Independence], when I explained my position in this matter, my friend the honourable member Mr. Soekarno attacked my position and, among other things, referred to the position taken by Dr. Sun Yat Sen. I admit that there was a great deal of truth in what was said by the honour-

able member and also much that was right in the position taken by Dr. Sun Yat Sen, but this will not change my position. In all matters, the circumstances in which such matters have arisen, or the circumstances in which an idea was born, should be taken into consideration.

Dr. Sun Yat Sen was speaking about the importance to the Chinese of nationalism or nationalistic feelings because at that time the Chinese were opposed to each other in their opinions; therefore they looked very weak in facing the penetration of China by Western imperialism. It was for this reason that Dr. Sun Yat Sen felt it necessary to stimulate nationalism in China.

But we, Chinese and people of Chinese descent who are living abroad, are in a different situation, and our situation cannot be compared with the one I was referring to. And because of this, our position too must be different. We must uphold the principle which has been highly valued by the Chinese *literati* and the Chinese people in China for thousands of years, namely, that for the Chinese there is no such thing as "race". For us, people of Chinese descent living outside China, this is not difficult. We work for the country where we were born and bred.

Mr. Chairman! In advancing our movement, the P.T.I. (Indonesian Chinese Party), which I started about fifteen years ago, we had to deal with all kinds of opposition.

For more than ten years now there have been polemics, both oral and written, in which frequently the question was asked: what about the National Government of China? I ask my past and present opponents: what is meant by the expression "Chinese race"? According to Chinese history, the Chinese race no longer exists. It is possible that at the beginning of Chinese history there was a small group of human beings who could call themselves Chinese, but during the thousands of years of Chinese history the various races in China have intermarried with the indigenous Chinese so that it can no longer be said that the Chinese are racially pure.

An ethnologist, a totok Chinese, has written a book in which he states that intermarriage between the indigenous Chinese and the various races on the periphery of China has taken place to such an extent that today it is impossible to say what the characteristics of the so-called Chinese are. The facial features, physical appearance, and skull measurements of the Northern Chinese are very different from those of the Southern Chinese. Their skin colour is so varied that some of them are yellow-skinned, while others are dark-skinned and still others fair-skinned. Therefore the question of what the so-called Chinese race is cannot be answered. It is impossible to determine what Chinese blood is. So far, science has not been able to determine what characteristics of one's blood makes one a Chinese, an Indonesian, or a Japanese. At most there are Chinese in the cultural sense. But if we use the word "Chinese" in the cultural sense we have come back to the sense in which I used the word on the previous occasion. What is referred to as "Chinese" in the cultural sense is a people who do not discriminate between

racess, a people whose purpose in life is to unite all human beings throughout the world. In the cultural sense I still call myself a Chinese, and in this cultural sense perhaps there are Chinese. However, even this cultural sense of the word can no longer be applied to the peranakan Chinese in Java.

About ten years ago a sociologist, who was a professor at Chung Hui [Ch'ing Hua?] University in Peiping [Peking], made a visit to Java. After he had made a tour of several places in Java and the outer islands, I met him in Jakarta and he engaged me in a conversation touching on the problem of the peranakan Chinese. I said that the peranakan Chinese can no longer be considered Chinese; he agreed and did so on the basis of the cultural sense of the word. In the cultural sense, Mr. Chairman, the peranakan Chinese in Java are no longer Chinese. Therefore, if we, in Java in particular and in Indonesia in general, are asked of what race we are, my answer is that in the cultural sense we are not Chinese; it is possible that even in the political sense we are no longer Chinese, for we live in a foreign country and are subject to a foreign government. In European languages a semantic distinction is made between "Natie" [Nation] and "Volk" [People], but this semantic distinction is not a uniform one. In Germany and in the Netherlands "Nation" is used to refer to a group of people with a common language and common customs — in short, with a common culture. They may live dispersed in different countries and under different governments.

"People" refers to a group of people with different cultures but who are bound together under one government. In France and Britain it is the other way round.

There "Nation" means the opposite of what it means in Germany and in the Netherlands. For us, peranakan Chinese in Indonesia in general and in Java in particular, the question now is: what is our nationality? In the cultural sense we are no longer Chinese, nor are we Chinese in the political sense. In the past, during the period of Dutch rule, we were labelled "Dutch subjects". That is why on the previous occasion I said that I was a human being, and when I was asked to clarify myself by the Honourable Member and the Honourable Chairman, I repeated what I said because, up to that moment, I was not yet able to adopt any label. Is it not true that everybody is primarily a human being and only secondarily has to have a distinctive label, so that there are human beings labelled Japanese, human beings labelled Chinese, and so on?

Up to that time the peranakan Chinese had not been able to adopt a label because officially there was no such label as "Indonesian" yet. However, with the birth of the Indonesian nation and with the existence of the clause on citizenship, we are now able to adopt that label. It is only now that we can say that there are people labelled "Indonesian". Mr. Chairman, now I would like to discuss the subject of citizenship in an Independent Indonesia. I think I may assume that my friends the honourable members have, for a long time, been familiar with the aims of the party of which I was the leader, the P.T.I. For us there are no problems any more. We are people of this

country. We are prepared, to our ability, to contribute to the greatness of this country. Now the only remaining problem is that of the peranakan Chinese who are not united in the P.T.I. To them I wish to say something. In the past the number of official members of the P.T.I. was very small. There were various reasons for this small membership: among other things, people were afraid of the former government. The Dutch Government did not like to see the Chinese and Indonesians unite. Therefore, as much as possible it obstructed the activities of the P.T.I. It is true that according to the law there could not be any kind of obstruction, that such a party could not be obstructed; but the government tried in many ways to obstruct it. For instance, in several towns, not just in small towns but also in big cities such as Semarang, the Chairman of the P.T.I. and other members of the executive committee were summoned by the [Dutch] Political Information Service (P.I.D.). When they arrived at the office they were informed that nothing was required, that it was just a summons. Because of the frequent summonses people were annoyed, and in small towns people even became afraid and said that if one became a member of the P.T.I., the difficulty was that one was not allowed to do anything. It was for this reason that, mainly in small towns, many existing branches were subsequently dissolved, but meanwhile a very large majority of the peranakan Chinese in Java became more and more imbued with the spirit [of the Party]. This can be proved by the results we achieved in elections. For instance, in 1934 our Party for the first time took part in the Surabaya municipal elections. If our official membership figures were something to go by, not even one of our candidates could have been elected. But what was the outcome? All five seats reserved for the Foreign Oriental group in Surabaya were won by our party. For the first time in the history of elections in the Dutch East Indies up to that moment the number of Chinese voters in Surabaya turned out to be the largest, it was more than one thousand; nothing like this had ever happened anywhere in the Dutch East Indies. Not long thereafter, elections were held for the Volksraad (People's Council). Considering the number of official members of the P.T.I. outside of Surabaya, there was no hope for even one of our candidates to become a member of the Volksraad. But what was the outcome? We were victorious in the elections for the Volksraad too! Subsequently, we also won seats in the elections for the East Java Provincial Council: And in 1938 it was only because a change had been made in the election rules, referred to as "proportional representation", that we were not able to win [all] the seats reserved for our group. We only managed to win three of the five reserved seats. However, had the election rules not been changed, on the basis of the votes cast we should have been able to win three more of the reserved seats. What is the significance of this for us? Mr. Chairman, all this proved to us that in their hearts a very large majority of the peranakan Chinese in Java approved of the aims of the P.T.I. The only thing was that most of them did not dare to express their approval openly, and only during elections did their approval become apparent. This was

only the first time that I was given the opportunity, but to our regret we did not visit many places; I had a chance to visit only Bandung, Surabaya, and Malang, where I organized Social Gatherings (*kondankai*) with the local Chinese youth. It is my great pleasure to be able to report here that not only in Bandung but also in Malang and Surabaya have we been able to get their full approval, and what is more, in Malang and Surabaya the leaders present at the social gatherings requested at the end of the meeting that it be conveyed to the Committee for the Investigation [of Indonesian Independence] that, if there is such a possibility, it would be best to simply declare all the Chinese in Java to be Indonesian citizens. Those who object may express their objection. Why did they make this request? Because those leaders think that for too long most of the Chinese in Java have never thought about politics; they have never thought about it because they have been warned not to meddle in politics because it would get them into trouble. You see, the Indonesian leaders were arrested and sent to Digul.* For this reason, Mr. Chairman, not only the ordinary men amongst us but perhaps even most of our intellectuals are afraid of speaking out, afraid of even touching on political matters. I can give you a typical example of this. When I was a student, the Chinese Students' Association organized a dinner one day to celebrate the Fifteenth Night of Chinese New Year. Our host at the dinner that night, a student of the Medical College, opened the get-together by reminding his fellow students of their obligation to work also for the benefit of this country, where all of us not only were born and bred but also received our education so that we have become what we are now. Then I asked to be allowed to make a speech. I made the speech and said that I was very glad to hear him make the speech and therefore I expressed my hope that my fellow students would take note of what he had said so that from then on we would be able to really work for our country. The reaction to my speech, Mr. Chairman, was that they cancelled my membership: I was not billed for my membership dues and did not receive any invitations any more. My only conclusion was that my membership had been cancelled. This, gentlemen, happened among people who would soon be called intellectuals, who in a few years would be considered leaders of the Chinese community in this country. If even our intellectuals were so afraid, are you surprised, gentlemen, that the so-called common people are even more afraid of politics? This is why most of us have never thought about political matters, never dared to think about politics. And if today they are made to choose, asked to make a choice whether or not they wish to become Indonesians, they will all be confused. Guided by this fact, the leaders of the Chinese communities in Malang and Surabaya requested me to convey to the Committee for the Investigation [of Indonesian Independence] that when the time comes to draft the Indonesian Constitution, all Chinese be simply declared Indonesian citizens. Although not straightforwardly, Mr. Chairman, similar ideas were also expressed in Bandung: when I recently met with the Chair-

* Digul is a remote place in the Dutch New Guinea (now Irian Jaya).

man of the Priangan Province Federation of Chinese Associations (Priangan Syuu Kakyō Sokai), he too conveyed to me a request similar to those made in Malang and Surabaya. I have made this rather long speech in order to convey the requests made by those members, and I hope that when the committee which is going to draft the Constitution of Independent Indonesia comes to the clause on Indonesian citizenship, it will take these requests into consideration.

Thank you.

4-2

Oei Tjong Hauw (1905—51), son of the “Sugar King” Oei Tiong Ham of Semarang, was educated at the H.B.S. In 1927 he helped to found the C.H.H. and served as its executive committee member. During the Japanese occupation, he was appointed a member of Tjuo Sangi In representing Central Java and a member of B.P.K.I. The following speech was published in *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*, vol. 1, ed. Muhammad Yamin, pp. 243—46. The title is the editor’s.

Ethnic Chinese and Indonesian Citizenship Law (1945)

Most Honourable Chairman. Now that the Committee for Investigation [of Indonesian Independence] has decided on the form of Government, namely, a Republic, and determined the territory of the Republic of Indonesia, the moment has come for us to discuss the Constitution which will be drafted by the committee to be formed. During the first session, and also during this one, the word “sovereignty” has been heard frequently. We have heard from the honourable member Mr. Muhammad Yamin* how we can establish a state, but in fact, Mr. Chairman, sovereignty is vested in the governmental bodies, not just in the central government but also in the regional governments. Therefore I consider as very important the regulations according to which the people will elect their representatives who will serve as their delegates in the governmental bodies.

If these regulations are not strictly adhered to, there is a possibility, and even a great probability, that what was brought up by the honourable member, Mr. K.H. Dewantara,† at the eighth session of the Central Con-

* Muh. Yamin (1903—62) was a poet, historian, lawyer, and nationalist leader. He served as a member of the Volksraad from 1939 to 1942 and Minister of Justice, Education, and Information after Indonesia attained independence.

† K.H. Dewantara (1889—1959), also known as Soewardi Soerjadiningrat, developed the Indonesian national education system in Java called Taman Siswa.

sultative Council (Chuuoo Sangiin) will happen, namely, that the representatives are not really representatives of the people, so that every time the honourable gentlemen make speeches they only arouse general ridicule. Previously, at the first session, I submitted an election system. Whether to elect or to be elected one has to be, say, between twenty-five and thirty years of age, and must have passed the secondary school examination, or whatever the conditions — this is in fact a rather difficult matter, considering the educational level of the ordinary people.

Therefore, if for instance we use secondary school education as the lower limit, it is quite possible that the majority of the people will not be able to express their opinions, and the representatives elected in this way will not be accepted by the people as their representatives. I hope that the Sub-Committee to be formed will give the most careful consideration to this matter. Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to discuss the question of citizenship.

First of all I would like to thank the honourable member Mr. Wongsonegoro, who proved to me what his feelings are with regard to the population group to which I belong. It is very significant, Mr. Chairman, that among the Chinese living in Indonesia there are still many who want to retain their citizenship, that is, their Chinese citizenship, after the abolition of Dutch citizenship.

Since, in Indonesian leadership circles, the opinion has been frequently voiced that the Chinese do not want to become Indonesian citizens because they look down on such citizenship, I deem it very necessary, Mr. Chairman, that I say something here to clarify matters.

Actually, at the first session I have already expressed the hope that the honourable members of this assembly will not forget that there is a national movement afoot, not only in Indonesia but all over Asia, and therefore also in China.

Never before have Chinese national sentiments reached such a high pitch as after the outbreak of the Great East Asian War. Let us not forget that even before the Great East Asian War, there existed in Indonesia a Chinese movement which was called "De Chineesche Beweging" (Chinese Movement) by the now defunct Dutch Government.

At that time, I can still remember, the Chinese were against becoming Dutch nationals because it did not give them equal rights. We were called "Nederlandsche Onderdanen van uitheemschen oorsprong" [Dutch Subjects of Foreign Origin]. However, even at that time we had proof that it is not the people themselves who decide what their nationality will be, even though at the time the Chinese population were against becoming Dutch nationals and had sent a delegation to China. At that time, as a result of negotiations between the Chinese and Dutch Governments — that is, inter-governmental negotiations — we were, as before, considered Dutch nationals, that is, what I referred to in foreign terminology as "Nederlandsche Onderdanen van uitheemschen oorsprong".

We accepted the decision made by the Chinese Government! To this day nothing has changed, and the main point is, gentlemen, that for the majority of the Chinese population it is simply a matter of "nationalistic feelings"! Contrary to what has been put forward frequently by influential people, we Chinese will never obstruct the establishment of an Independent Indonesia or look down on the Indonesian people. It is simply not true. Should there arise disagreement between the Indonesians and the Chinese, I hope that you, gentlemen, will not forget what was said by Mr. Yap Tjwan Bing* at the Eighth Session of the Central Consultative Council (Chuuoo Sangiin): "If an individual does something wrong, do not blame the national group to which he belongs." It is that individual who should be blamed, and not his national group. We are not ashamed of our nationality. No matter how low China's status is, we wish to be put on record as Chinese; but we do not forget what the government of this country has done for us. After the Great East Asian War is over, we Asians will have equal status; whether we are Burmese, Filipinos, Japanese, or whatever, we are all Asians, and all of us must be free and share our prosperity. This is the position taken by the Chinese. I thought it desirable to explain all this to you, gentlemen, so that there will be no misunderstanding on your part. Although we opt for Chinese citizenship, we are, gentlemen, fully prepared, to our ability, to aid the Indonesian people in establishing an independent Indonesia. As a people which is also struggling to attain full independence, we certainly will not obstruct, but on the contrary use all our strength to aid, the Indonesian people in establishing an independent Indonesia.

Just as we respect your nationalistic feelings, gentlemen, I implore you to respect the nationalistic feelings of my group. I am sure that my view, which I put forward at the first session, will be included in the Draft Constitution, namely, Mr. Chairman, that an independent country has, according to international practice, the right to decide who will be its citizens. The citizenship of an independent country is not something that is offered to people for their approval. An independent country must decide its citizenship by law.

Whether it is accepted or not is not the concern of the state. This is my position in the matter of citizenship. I hope that my contribution will be considered sufficient.

_____ . . . _____

* Yap Tjwan Bing (1910—88) received his degree in Pharmacy from the Amsterdam University. He was involved in the Indonesian independence movement and later joined the P.N.I.

4-3

Oei Tiang Tjoei (b. 1893), born in Jakarta, served as director of *Hong Po* from 1939 to 1942. In 1941 he was arrested by the Dutch for his pro-Japanese activities. During the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, he was appointed a member of the Tjuo Sangi In representing the Chinese of West Java and a member of B.P.K.I. He was also President of the Huaqiao Zonghui. The following speech was published in *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*, vol. 1, ed. Muhammad Yamin, pp. 242—43. The title has been added by the editor.

Ethnic Chinese and Indonesian Citizenship Law (1945)

Honourable Chairman, most respected members of the Assembly. The imminent birth of the Republic of Indonesia is due to the Grace of God and, as a member of the small Chinese minority group, I also trust that the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia will, and must, be made as perfect as possible and as fair as possible for all the people who will be living in this country. As a matter of fact, I would like very much to say something to clarify the question of nationality. I, too, know and am convinced that we peranakan Chinese, who in most cases have made our home here, who live here, were born here, and will be buried here, are indeed prepared to make our contribution to the movement to establish the Republic of Indonesia. In this connection I also believe that, whatever system will be adopted, the Committee for the Preparation of the Constitution will surely see to it that it will be as fair and as perfect as possible, in accordance with international practice. And as a Chinese who *has* made his home here, I will have to take into account also those who will come after me, for I have already decided for myself that I will devote my energies in the interests of the Republic of Indonesia. However, so far, nobody has made a decision or taken up a position, no matter on which side he stands; therefore I implore this assembly to see to it that the utmost care will be exercised in deciding what will be written into this Constitution for the Indonesian people, that everything will be decided upon with the greatest impartiality, and that everybody will be given an opportunity to make his choice freely and voluntarily.

It is also desirable — supposing that all the people of Chinese descent are first given the status of Indonesian citizens — that each of them be given an opportunity to subsequently express their opinion voluntarily, should they have a different opinion.

I wish to stress the fact that the Republic of Indonesia has come into being by the Will of Allah. I compare this with the histories of some large countries which, when they were established as republics, experienced all kinds of difficulties; and I especially refer to China, to the time when we Chinese wanted to start an independence movement. Not only did we get no help at all from the people of other nationalities who lived there; on the

contrary, huge obstacles were put in our way, we were played off against each other, so that during the Boxer Rebellion from 1880 to 1884 our movement suffered greatly from all kinds of difficulties.* The terrible difficulties suffered during that time, and also those being experienced in the present war in China, have all been instigated by people of other nationalities who were hindering China's progress. Because it was impossible to overcome these obstacles, another war is raging now.

Although most of them have lived for centuries in this archipelago, the Chinese still have nationalistic feelings — but such is human nature. The only reason I say this is that nationalism is an instinct for survival as a nation. Without it there will be danger and the nation will cease to exist as a nation, and its history will come to an end. World history shows that nationalism is a most powerful moving force which can be mobilized to attain progress. For example, we have only to look at the histories of the great countries and the national movement in Indonesia. If we ourselves do not want to be a nation, of course we will have no strength at all, and there will be no unity. We admit that, in the case of those Chinese who have been here for several generations and who have intermarried [with the local population], racial mixture has taken place, but on the other hand we must also look at other nations. Racial mixture is not found among the Chinese only. We can find Japanese with blue eyes. Therefore, being of mixed blood does not degrade a nation. We will not give up the nationality we were born with. We trust that you, Mr. Chairman, will in all fairness take this into consideration, so that in the matter of our national status in the Republic of Indonesia the utmost care will be exercised, everything will be taken into account, and the greatness impartiality observed, in accordance with international rules. Only if this is done will we be able to unite and make our contribution in the interests of Greater East Asia and realize our aims as well.

This is all I have to say.

* The Boxer Rebellion took place in 1900.

PART II

THE POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD



Gatutkatja

5

Overseas Chinese Identity

When Indonesia achieved its political independence from the Dutch, Chinese nationalist feelings among Chinese-educated Indonesian Chinese were still strong. *Xin Bao*, the Chinese edition of *Sin Po*, in its editorial before the opening of the Round Table Conference (1949) between the Dutch and Indonesians, urged the two governments to grant Indonesian Chinese a minority place within independent Indonesia (5-1). At that time, *Xin Bao* still considered Indonesian Chinese as a homogeneous group and referred to them as Huaqiao (overseas Chinese) instead of Hua-ren or Huazu (ethnic Chinese). Song Zhongquan, the President of a left-wing overseas Chinese organization Qiao Zong (Jakarta) believed that the Chinese could remain as foreigners in Indonesia while cooperating with the Indonesian population (5-2). He also foresaw that relations between the P.R.C. and Indonesia would improve, and disputes between the two countries could be settled in a brotherly manner (5-3).

----- . . -----

5-1

Xin Bao was the Chinese edition of *Sin Po*, but it was run by totoks and represented the view of a large segment of the Chinese-speaking community. The following was its editorial published on 5 August 1949, urging the Dutch and the Indonesians to respect the Chinese minority position.

Overseas Chinese and the Round Table Conference (1949)

The situation in Indonesia has changed drastically; the Republican Government has returned to its capital in Yogyakarta and internal conferences among Indonesians have succeeded without much difficulty. The truce agreement between the Netherlands and the Republic was formally announced the night before last. The prerequisite for calling the Round Table Conference*

* The Round Table Conference was held towards the end of 1949 and led to the formation of the Federal Republic of Indonesia (R.I.S.) The agreement was abrogated by Indonesia in 1953.

at the Hague has been met. Members of the Indonesian Committee, representatives of Federal States and those of the Republic will all soon fly to the Netherlands. Within these two months, the focus of the Indonesian problem will be shifted to the Hague.

The purpose of the Round Table Conference is to discuss various problems following the transfer of sovereignty by the Dutch to Indonesians. The calling of such a conference indicates the complexity of the Indonesian problem. Apart from two opposing parties from Indonesia, there is an international representative — the Indonesian Committee; aside from the two nations which are directly involved, there are also representatives of the third nation — overseas Chinese [*huaqiao*] and Arabs. These special elements were absent in the independence movements in India, the Philippines, and Burma.

The list of overseas Chinese representatives has not been formally released. These representatives consist of individuals elected by the Republic and other states respectively. When they were elected, the authorities seemed not to have consulted the opinions of the overseas Chinese. These representatives were selected on their own merits. They will follow other representatives to the West. We feel there is a need for us to say a few words to them.

First of all, we have to stress a point to them, that is, to hope that they would be fully aware that they represent the stand of overseas Chinese. Although they were respectively elected by the Republic and Federal States, they would speak as representatives of overseas Chinese. The interests of overseas Chinese in the Republican and Federal areas correspond. Therefore there should not be differences in opinion. When encountering purely internal problems of the Indonesian nation over which the representatives of the Republic and Federal States are in dispute, the representatives of overseas Chinese should adopt a stand as overseas Chinese. They have to be sincere and cautious while at the same time trying to keep their distance and not get involved in that [Indonesian political] dispute or show preference for any one group.

What should be the position of the overseas Chinese concerning the Indonesian problem? Both local-born and China-born Chinese generally have a similar position — that is, while sympathizing with Indonesian national independence and nation-building, the Chinese would strive for the rights of a minority group. Naturally they are also determined to fulfil their obligations. Today the Netherlands is far-sighted because it gives up its hundred years of colonial rule over Indonesia and assists Indonesian national independence. We the Chinese who sojourn in this country as guests are also very happy to welcome the birth of this new state.

We the overseas Chinese have lived in this land for a long time, and have contributed to the prosperity and the development of Indonesia. We are willing to fulfil our obligations as local residents, but at the same time we strive for reasonable treatment in the economic, political, cultural, and educational fields. We are opposed to inhuman discrimination. The position and existence of the overseas Chinese should not be eradicated. In short, we hope

that overseas Chinese representatives elected by the Republic and Federal States will unite to insist on their overseas Chinese stand and to strive for overseas Chinese status. We wish the representatives success.

5-2

Song Zhongquan (1905—62), born in Meixian (China), received a Chinese university education in Nanking. He was appointed as the Editor-in-Chief of *Xin Bao* soon after the Second World War. In 1960 he served as the principal of the T.H.H.K. school (Jakarta) and president of Qiao Zong, a major left-wing Chinese organization in Jakarta. The following article was published in *Yindunixiya Xuexi*, no. 4 (1961), p. 1. Song considered himself a Chinese national and saw the Chinese problem in Indonesia from the P.R.C. point of view. He believed that with the improved Sino-Indonesian relations, the Chinese problem would be solved. He also asserted that the overseas Chinese had made a positive contribution to Indonesia and this contribution had to be recognized.

Long Live Sino-Indonesian Friendship (1961)

There has been a long and enduring friendship between the peoples of China and Indonesia. As early as during the Han dynasty, the peoples of both countries had already been interacting. If we solely rely on recorded history, that is, the arrival of a monk named Fa Hsien in A.D. 414 at Java, this friendship has been 1,500 years old. In those years, the economic interaction between the two countries was vigorous. However, this friendly relationship was destroyed following the coming of colonial powers. [Only after the Second World War], New China succeeded in liberating itself and became a Giant in the Far East, while Indonesia has also liberated herself from the iron-grip of the Dutch colonialist. Due to their similar tragic colonial experience in the past, China and Indonesia are determined to resist imperialism and colonialism. The two countries want to heal their wounds inflicted by colonial rule, and to develop their respective countries in a peaceful atmosphere.

Accordingly, the two countries want to be friendly and oppose wars of aggression. Based on the principle of anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, and territorial integrity, the two countries have supported each other in their struggle to liberate their respective territory, that is, the Taiwan of China and the West Irian of Indonesia. In addition, the two countries have given their support to the independence movement of the peoples in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. On many important international problems, China and

Indonesia have also similar views. They have common interests and naturally their friendship is growing.

The present international situation favours the East rather than the West. Imperialism and colonialism are still struggling before their death. The peoples of Asia and Africa have been seriously poisoned by imperialism and colonialism, therefore they need to unite closely. China has a population of 800 million; while Indonesia has a population of 86 million. The latter is situated between the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, and is important economically [and strategically]. Better co-operation between China and Indonesia is beneficial to the peace of Asia and the world. This is also the hope of the people of the two countries. Since the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and Indonesia, friendly relations between the two countries have been improving. It is indeed encouraging. In the past few years, national leaders of the two countries paid mutual visits, and economic and cultural delegations [followed]. It is important to note that a number of workers in the fields of education, science, and the arts visited the respective countries too and exchanged their views. The friendly relations between the two countries are growing. This time, the visit of Premier Chen Yi and the signing of the three important documents [Treaty of Friendship, Treaty of Cultural Co-operation, and the Joint-Communique between China and Indonesia] has opened a wider road for better development of Sino-Indonesian friendly relations.

Naturally, there is still the overseas Chinese problem which is a historical legacy. The imperialist and the enemy of peace have attempted numerous times to provoke and split Sino-Indonesian relations by using the overseas Chinese problem. And indeed, there was minor friction between China and Indonesia over the problem of the overseas Chinese. But as President Sukarno said, "this is only a minor disease on the skin, and is not a serious one which would get inside the body". The Chinese problem can be solved through friendly negotiations. China and Indonesia have signed a dual nationality agreement amicably which is now being implemented. The dual nationality problem, which is an important part of the overseas Chinese problem, has been met with a correct and reasonable solution. The overseas Chinese have lived side by side with Indonesians for a long time. They are in fact brothers and sisters. The overseas Chinese have worked days and nights tirelessly. Some of them have worked in mines; some have worked as traders promoting the flow of materials between urban and rural areas. Some have established schools and contributed to the welfare of various communities. To a certain extent, they have made positive contributions to the prosperity and economic development of Indonesia. Although there are persons with ill intentions trying to discredit the overseas Chinese in general because of the misbehaviour of an extremely small number of the overseas Chinese, the [positive] contribution made by the overseas Chinese in the field of economy cannot be denied. Only after understanding the positive aspect of the overseas Chinese and recognizing it can be the final and overall solution of the over-

seas Chinese problem based on Sino-Indonesian friendly relations, brotherly and sincere negotiations, be achieved. For the sake of Sino-Indonesian long-term interests, for the sake of Asian and world peace and the solidarity of anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist forces, the peoples of China and Indonesia should continue to remain friendly generation after generation. Let us proclaim:

Long Live Sino-Indonesian Friendship!

5-3

Song Zhongquan (1905—62) was the president of Qiao Zong, a major totok organization in Jakarta. The article was published in *Yindunixiya Xuexi*, no. 5 (1962), p. 4. The article is an interpretation of a pro-Beijing leader on the history of a major totok organization and its contributions to both Indonesian and Chinese communities. He saw the meeting of political interests between China and Indonesia maintaining that the future of the Overseas Chinese was linked with the development of Sino-Indonesian relations.

Ten Years of the Qiao Zong (1962)

Since its formation on 27 April 1952, the Yacheng Zhonghua Qiaotuan Zonghui (Qiao Zong) or the General Organization of Overseas Chinese Association* in Jakarta has been in existence for ten years. In fact, the history of the Qiao Zong is more than ten years' old. It can be traced to the formation of the "Committee for Celebrating the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between China and Indonesia".

In April 1950 when Sino-Indonesian diplomatic ties were established, patriotic overseas Chinese decided to celebrate the occasion and hence formed the abovementioned committee. Progressive overseas Chinese associations were then organized. From that time on, there has been a unified centralized organization. This happened ten years ago, but it is still fresh in our memory. On 1 May 1951, the Taman Sari square was full of red flags and was packed with [patriotic] overseas Chinese from all walks of life. They enthusiastically celebrated the establishment of Sino-Indonesian diplomatic relations. Their hearts were with Beijing. This was the first major rally held by the overseas Chinese in Jakarta which indicated the support of the overseas Chinese to Sino-Indonesian diplomatic ties. After this May 1st rally, in order to unite more overseas Chinese, the "Committee for Celebrating Establishment of

* Qiao Zong was dissolved after the 1965 abortive Coup.

Sino-Indonesian Relations" was reorganized into the "Association for Fostering Overseas Chinese Unity" (Huaqiao tuanjie cujinhui). It was hoped that through this Association, the solidarity of the overseas Chinese in Jakarta could be achieved. But at that time, there was still a handful of [K.M.T.] elements who were afraid of seeing the light and who still wanted to be the enemy of New China. These people who still cherished the dream of "Reconquering Mainland" dominated the Zhonghua Zonghui (the General Chinese Association). They refused to co-operate with the Association in fostering unity among the overseas Chinese. Therefore the Association did not achieve what it expected, that is, to form a unified centralized organization for all overseas Chinese. As a result, a new organization called the Qiao Zong was established on 27 April 1952.

This year, the Qiao Zong is celebrating its tenth anniversary. On the eve of the anniversary, the former deputy president of the Qiao Zong, Mr Zhang Guoji,* sent a message from Beijing congratulating the achievements of the Qiao Zong over the last ten years. As to how much the Qiao Zong has achieved in the last ten years, our fellow overseas Chinese would be able to make their own evaluation. None the less, at least one thing can be said — that the Qiao Zong has undergone ten extraordinary years. When the Qiao Zong was formed, it experienced internal and external difficulties. There was not enough money to cover expenses and there was a lack of staff members as well. It did not have a building of its own. It had to borrow other facilities to carry out its work and to hold meetings. In those days, only small associations joined the Qiao Zong. However, the Qiao Zong represented a new emerging force, a progressive force. It was bound to grow and become strong. This is the law of nature. In ten years' time, the Qiao Zong has grown from nothing to something, from small to big. Today this is the only unifying body of the overseas Chinese in Jakarta. Of course, this is partly the result of favourable circumstances, but this is also partly the result of the efforts made by the workers of the Qiao Zong in these years and the support of the large overseas Chinese community.

The Qiao Zong is the solidarity banner of the overseas Chinese. Its aims can be seen from Article 3 of its constitution. It intends to achieve the following three objectives:

1. to unite the overseas Chinese, to protect their legitimate interests and to develop social welfare programmes;
2. to assist the development of commerce, industry, education, culture, and sports among the overseas Chinese;
3. to foster friendly relations between Chinese and Indonesians and promote cultural exchange.

* Zhang was the principal of a large Chinese high school in Jakarta. He later went to China and was elected member of the Fourth Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (1964).

The first target, that is, to unite the overseas Chinese, was and still is the task of the Qiao Zong. It is hoped that the overseas Chinese, regardless of their class and provincial origin, will come together under the leadership of the Qiao Zong. However, we have the principle for unity, that is, we have to unite under the five-star red banner [the P.R.C. flag]. It is never too late to become a patriot, provided the person would stand under the five-star banner. In the last ten years, the Qiao Zong has worked diligently and tirelessly. It intends to win the trust of the overseas Chinese by doing good deeds. It urges fellow overseas Chinese to understand the motherland, to orient themselves towards the motherland and to achieve the unity of patriotic overseas Chinese. The Qiao Zong has served the interests of the overseas Chinese. In the last ten years, apart from leading the overseas Chinese in the fields of industry, commerce, education, and culture, it particularly encouraged the overseas Chinese to help each other in accordance with our tradition and to promote better social welfare. The Qiao Zong has sponsored "Teachers' Training Courses" and Teachers' Training Classes to generate Chinese school teachers. It has also sponsored various sports festivals to foster the development of sports. For a long time, it has also conducted dancing classes to enrich the cultural life of the overseas Chinese. The year before last, the Qiao Zong also assisted the repatriation of the Chinese who had suffered here to China. All of them got a place in the motherland and live happily after. Last year, the Qiao Zong also helped the Jakarta Chinese who held dual nationality to adopt a nationality of their own choice. This year, the Qiao Zong has expanded its medical services and established the Pingan Yiyuan (the Selamat Hospital) and is prepared to make more efforts to help our business community to set up factories in order to advance Indonesian economic development. These are the more important contributions made by the Qiao Zong [in relation] to the welfare of the overseas Chinese

The Qiao Zong is concerned with the overseas Chinese. It is equally concerned with Indonesia. Our national leaders have told us to respect local customs to obey the law of the land, and to be friendly with the local population. In the last ten years, the Qiao Zong has emphasized these points. Its major purpose was to foster friendly relations between the Chinese and Indonesians. The Qiao Zong has frequently explained Indonesian laws and regulations to the Chinese communities and conveyed the opinions of the overseas Chinese to the [Indonesian] government. It has served as a bridge between the overseas Chinese on the one hand and the government on the other. The Qiao Zong has also urged the overseas Chinese to promote Indonesian economic development and to contribute to Indonesian prosperity. In addition, whenever possible, the Qiao Zong has always helped to promote social welfare of the Indonesian people. For instance, it raised funds for the victims of floods, fires, and other natural disasters. It has also contributed money to the Indonesian Red Cross. We live here as sojourners and our lot is inseparable from Indonesia, just like blood and flesh. We have common interests and hence Sino-Indonesian friendly relations have a solid foundation.

Today, all the people in Indonesia are staging a struggle to liberate West Irian. President Sukarno has stated solemnly again and again that Indonesia will liberate West Irian this year. West Irian is part of the sacred Indonesian territory, just as Taiwan is an inseparable part of China. Indonesian and China are supporting each other in liberating West Irian and Taiwan. We also completely support Indonesia's liberation of West Irian. The Qiao Zong in the past had sponsored various cultural shows to raise money for the "Liberating West Irian Fund". This year, when the Qiao Zong is celebrating its tenth anniversary, it also uses the opportunity to organize cultural shows to raise funds for the Indonesian Red Cross, indirectly contributing to the liberation of West Irian and expressing the sincere desire of the overseas Chinese to support the government and people of Indonesia in their struggle to liberate West Irian.

Today, the domestic and international situations are in our favour. In the last thirteen years, New China under the leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong has scored significant achievements in the political, economic, and cultural fronts. There has been a remarkable development both in agriculture and industry. The prestige of China is also remarkably high. The overseas Chinese understand their motherland better and hence love their motherland more. In international politics, this is the era in which the East Wind is defeating the West Wind. The force of Peace is growing. The national independence movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have reached their peak while imperialism is decaying. We are advancing every day. Under these favourable circumstances, Sino-Indonesian relations are becoming better and more stable. Ten years have gone for the Qiao Zong, and now we look back in order to look forward. Our future tasks will be greater and more difficult. How can we do better in the future? The following is our answer:

Let us hail the five-star flag to foster unity among patriotic overseas Chinese;

Let us support Indonesian development to foster friendly relations between China and Indonesia.

6

The Pluralists

After Indonesia's independence, there were Chinese who identified with China both politically and culturally. However, there were also a large number of *peranakan* Chinese who identified themselves politically with Indonesia — but culturally they wanted to remain Indonesian Chinese. These Chinese were first concentrated in the Persatuan Tionghoa (formed in 1948) which later (in 1950) changed its name to the Partai Demokrasi Tionghoa Indonesia (P.D.T.I.). Thio Thiam Tjong, an ex-C.H.H. leader who was also the President of the Persatuan Tionghoa, maintained that the Indonesian Chinese while taking Indonesian nationality could still maintain their cultural identity (6-1). However, he opposed various kinds of extremist ideologies including military and proletarian dictatorship. Khoe Woen Sioe, a *peranakan* journalist who was the secretary of the Persatuan Tionghoa (and later of the P.D.T.I.) argued the importance of the local Chinese involving themselves in politics because this was a weapon to defend the Chinese interest as a minority group (6-2). However, the P.D.T.I. was later replaced by BAPERKI (1954) which still pursued a similar line in terms of defending Chinese minority interests, but its political view was gradually leaning towards the left (6-4, 6-5). The President of BAPERKI was Siauw Giok Tjhan who had been the Director of *Harian Rakjat*, the P.K.I. newspaper. Siauw maintained that Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent were already Indonesians; therefore, they neither had to change their Chinese names into Indonesian names nor intermarry with indigenous Indonesians. Moreover, they did not have to be converted to other religions which were regarded as “Indonesian”. In other words, Indonesian Chinese (*peranakan* Chinese) should be recognized as an Indonesian *suku* (6-5, 6-6). Siauw disapproved of *forced* assimilation of Indonesian Chinese into the indigenous population; neither did he agree with racial discrimination. Admitting the existence of racial and ethnic conflicts in Indonesia, he proposed that the solution was through a socialist revolution rather than the assimilation process (6-4, 6-5).

Another ex-BAPERKI leader who is a Christian lawyer, Yap Thiam Hien, also advocated ethnic pluralism in Indonesian society (6-3). Like Siauw, he disagreed with the assimilationist solution to the Chinese problem but, unlike Siauw, he did not think that a Socialist Revolution would solve the problem. He then proposed his Christian formula for the solution, which included “heart-cleansing” and “believing in Jesus Christ” in addition to the enforcement of anti-racial discrimination laws (6-7). Kwik Kian Gie, an economist who later joined the PDI, argued that assimilation (*pembauran*) had been achieved. However, he maintained that the continued division of the *pri* and

non-*pri* within Indonesia was mainly the creation of some assimilationist leaders (6-8). In another article, he acknowledged that the tension between *pri* and non-*pri* was there but this existed in any society. He maintained that the problem should be seen in a proper perspective. In fact, his idea of "assimilation" is closer to that of "integration" (6-9).

6-1

Thio Thiam Tjong (1896—1969) born in Semarang, was educated at the Delft Technical College in Holland. In 1928 he served as a member of the C.H.H. central board. From 1930 to 1934 he was elected chairman of Siang Boe. Interned during the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, he served as personal adviser to van Mook, the Lieutenant Governor-General of the Dutch Indies. After the Japanese surrender in 1948 Thio established the Persatuan Tionghoa (PT) which was later changed to the P.D.T.I. The following was a preface to *Sinar*, published on 15 March 1949. This clearly shows that the PT was increasingly concerned with the status and group interests of the Chinese minority in a sovereign Indonesia.

The Persatuan Tionghoa in Indonesia (1949)

With the publication of *Sinar*, the Chinese Union (Persatuan Tionghoa) now has a tool which [fulfils] a real need for giving information on its principles and objectives to the public in general and the Chinese community in Indonesia in particular. I am happy to use this opportunity which has been given to me by the editors of *Sinar* to explain our stand in the form of a preface.

On Citizenship of the Federal States of Indonesia

Once an independent and sovereign Federal Republic of Indonesia is formed, to fulfil the requirement of international relations, this new country has to determine clearly who will be its nationals. In the very near future, we have to choose between accepting or rejecting the citizenship of the Federal States of Indonesia.

The Chinese Union is of the opinion that the majority of our groups were born and have their roots in Indonesia, have continued and will continue to live and work in this country for the rest of their lives. For practical, moral, and material reasons, they have no other alternative but to accept the citizenship of the Federal States of Indonesia. This citizenship will give rights and obligations to every citizen regardless of one's national (racial) origin, culture, and religion.

To accept the citizenship of the Federal States of Indonesia does not mean abandoning one's ethnic identity (*kebangsaan sendiri*). Because in a democratic and modern country, which is also the view of the indigenous Indonesian population (see the brochure published by the Indonesian Ministry of Information entitled *Minorities in the Republic of Indonesia*), minority groups are permitted to retain their cultures and religions.

On Relations with Other Groups

The Chinese Union in both its constitution and official statements has expressed its willingness to co-operate with other groups for the public interest, for the improvement and prosperity of the Federal States of Indonesia.

The condition for such co-operation is not based on any one political ideology. We are prepared to co-operate with any groups regardless of its political ideology — whether it is the Republican or the Federalist, the Republican Federalist or the Federalist Republican, provided its objectives are constructive. Although our attitude towards other groups and parties is based on passive-neutral and non-intervention principles, in practice it is a kind of active-neutrality and intervention. This means that we want to have a hand in the matters relating to the interest of the Federal States of Indonesia and at the same time we are ready to work with other groups in achieving the objectives agreed upon by our party.

Considering the misery and losses suffered in terms of both lives and property of the Indonesian people in general and the Chinese population in particular, we bluntly have stated that we disagree with the use of armed violence, the scorched earth policy, and other such means of achieving one's goal, because innocent people are directly affected by these inhuman methods.

The Chinese Union will adopt the principles of freedom, independence, and independent action in dealing with other groups and parties. It will not be tied to any other group.

On Relations with Other Chinese Organizations

The Chinese Union is of the opinion that politics is only a means to an end. We are trying to gain seats in various representative councils and positions in the government, not that we like to play politics, but we want to defend the economic and social interests of our [Chinese] group. For this reason, it is important for the Chinese Union to co-operate with other Chinese organizations which are concerned with the economic and social problems [of the Chinese population here].

At the Central Board Meeting of the Chinese Union, 18—20 February 1949, a resolution passed was to establish Contact Committees in various places, consisting of our representatives and the representatives of other Chinese economic and social organizations such as the Chung Hua Shang Hui, the Chung Hwa Tsung Hui, the Sin Ming Hui, the Lao Kung Hui* and others.

* Chung Hua Shang Hui (Chinese Chamber of Commerce), Chung Hwa Tsung Hui (General Chinese Association), Sin Ming Hui (a peranakan-dominated association established after the Second World War which changed its name to Tjandranaya in 1963), Lao Kung Hui (a Chinese trade union).

On Relations with Other Countries

Of Indonesia's neighbouring countries, China is the largest. Although China has been weakened and torn by serious civil war, we believe that in the future China will play the most important role in the Asian continent. With a population of 460 million, China is a potentially large market which is in proximity [to Indonesia]. Considering the unfavourable international political situation, we have to take heed of the proverb: "A good neighbour is more beneficial than a good friend who is far away".

For this reason, an independent and sovereign Federal States of Indonesia has to cultivate friendly relations with China. The citizens of the Federal States of Indonesia, especially of Chinese descent, have the duty to promote such a relationship.

On Our Society in General

The Chinese Union is of the opinion that democracy in the true sense of the word is "one for all and all for one". The minority group should obey the decision of the majority group. Members of the minority group have to be prepared, if needed, to sacrifice their lives for the public interest.

On the other hand, the majority group which has a greater voice and controls the other groups must pay attention to the interests of the minority groups. They have to guarantee both the survival and the development of these minorities.

The Chinese Union does not approve of any kind of totalitarianism and dictatorship, whether it is in the form of personal dictatorship (fascism) or group dictatorship (the proletariat, the capitalists, or the military).

The Chinese Union will always try to improve the social condition of the people, to enhance the living standards of the workers, because it is fully aware that only through this [improvement of] the economic situation can the whole of society be improved.

Conclusion

Our society at this moment is like a ship at night floating in the open ocean where the wind is extremely strong, and hidden rocks are everywhere.

Hopefully, *Sinar* can give the [necessary] light so that the ship can be saved from difficulty and danger and find its way to [its objective which is] a Federal Republic of Indonesia characterized by permanency, independence, sovereignty, security, orderliness, and prosperity.

_____ . . . _____

6-2

Khoe Woen Sioe (1905—66), born in Jakarta, was educated at two Dutch schools. He first worked for *Sin Po*, later with *Keng Po*, and

eventually took over the directorship of the latter newspaper. In 1946 he served as the president of the Sin Ming Hui. Also in the same year he published *Star Weekly*, an influential *peranakan* journal. Later he revived the *Keng Po*. He was active in the formation of the Persatuan Tionghoa and became the editor of its journal *Sinar*. The following was from *Sinar*, 15 March 1949. It explains the stand and objectives of the party and ventures to predict the future of the Chinese minority in a newly independent Indonesia. The title has been added by the editor.

The Persatuan Tionghoa and Politics (1949)

When I am out recruiting members for the Persatuan Tionghoa (Chinese Union) people often have questions to which I reply according to my own conviction. Some of those questions are listed below.

Question:

Why is your party called the Persatuan Tionghoa? There are many groups [of Chinese] who remain outside of the party. The chairman of the C.H.T.H. in Malang has said the name is inappropriate, don't you agree.?

Answer:

When a baby is born its parents do not know what the baby will be like when it is grown up. So they look for beautiful names that correspond with their hopes for the child.

Some children are given the name "Hokkie Bagoes" ("good luck") — when they grow up their luck is very bad. Some are called "Tiang Penoenjang" ("Pillar of Support") — but when they grow up they have to be supported by other family members.

As for the name "Persatuan Tionghoa", we hope that the party will be supported in its political activities by all the Chinese people. It is true that at the moment there are many groups remaining outside of the "Persatuan Tionghoa", but if the party can find active members and honest and wise leaders who are not seeking their own interests then we hope that over time we can unite all the Chinese political activists.

Question:

Is the Persatuan Tionghoa's aim only to win seats in parliament and other representative bodies?

Answer:

That is not our goal. Our aim is to look after the interests and position of the Chinese who live in this country, both *totok* and *peranakan*. To do this we need to be able to negotiate and our voice must be heard in representative institutions, because in the future Federal Republic of Indonesia it will be those representative bodies that will decide government policy. How much

strength we will have in those representative bodies will depend upon our future popularity. If our representatives can win the public's trust then we will be stronger. Conversely, without public trust our representatives will gain no voice.

Question:

If it should win a lot of seats in parliament what will the representatives of Persatuan Tionghoa be able to do for the benefit of society? In the past Chinese representatives were of no use.

Answer:

Until Indonesia gains its independence it is a colonized country. In a colony political and economic policies are decided by the motherland, the colonizer. Therefore in the past Indonesia had only a Volksraad which was able to give advice but could not make binding decisions. In 1937 Soetardjo put forward in the Volksraad the famous Soetardjo Petition which called for educating Indonesia so that it could have economic and political independence in ten years. But unfortunately at that time in Holland there were too many Colijns and Welters, so the policy was frustrated.

Now the situation is different. Holland desires to grant political independence. I do not know when this will actually happen, but I do not think it will be long. When this happens Indonesia will be transformed from a colony into an independent country. But political independence without economic independence has no meaning for the Indonesians because in economic affairs they will continue to be dependent on foreigners, Dutch and Chinese. So Indonesia demands economic independence as well. But economic independence is more difficult to achieve than political independence, because big business is presently in the hands of the Dutch and medium-size enterprises are in the hands of the Chinese who employ their own people. Indonesians have no experience or capital. So in order to give economic independence to the Indonesians the government of an independent Federal Republic of Indonesia must lead and give support. And this can only be done with what is called a guided economy. Because if free competition is allowed it will certainly be the Indonesians who will not be able to compete and improve their position. So it seems likely that the government will nationalize some large businesses in which Indonesians will be placed to gain management experience. Furthermore, Indonesians can be sent overseas to study commerce and industry after they have been trained for this in schools. Small traders will be given assistance and support, loans, for example, with the establishment of co-operatives, etc, as has occurred in Republican controlled areas. Chinese buyers will not be able to work. Also large- and medium-size enterprises can be compelled to employ some Indonesian staff so that they can learn. Many steps can be taken in economic circles to train Indonesians to replace some or most Dutch and Chinese industrialists, planters, and traders. We cannot say how many years this will take. It could be thirty years or it could be fifty years. But this sort of process

is also visible in the Philippines, a country which is politically but not economically independent. In the Philippines today the government is preoccupied with working towards economic independence, which means replacing the whites in industry and replacing the Chinese in commerce.

It is here where danger lies for the Chinese. There are very few Chinese farmers. Most of us trade with or work for European firms. The Indonesians are aiming for our commercial position. In the same way the large European firms are being eyed by the Indonesians. In the next few years there will certainly be no major changes in the economy. But how about twenty years or so after Indonesia gains its political independence?

We must therefore be on our guard so that in the process of economic change we are not too pressed. At least we must have an opportunity to make a decent living.

And all of the regulations to move Indonesians towards economic independence must be made via parliament. Here you can see how important it is that we have representatives in parliament struggling to defend our position.

Question:

But if we gained only a few seats in parliament, how can we look after our interests?

Answer:

Of course we didn't gain many seats. Even together with the Dutch representatives we do not have a majority. But if we present reasonable objections, then perhaps the sense of justice of the Indonesian members will be moved. At least we can fight it out there. If we follow the right tactics we might be able to find Indonesian friends to support us. It is possible that we will not be successful in everything but can obtain satisfactory results in most things. We need not hope for a hundred per cent success; if we get thirty per cent we would be fortunate.

Of course we must also work outside of parliament to increase our knowledge, be aware of ourselves, and create goodwill, etc. The struggle in parliament is only one weapon, but that weapon should not be thrown away.

Question:

If China is strong, won't it mean that we will be respected and China will be able to protect our interests?

Answer:

If China is strong it may not be imperialistic because that age is past. The English have left India although more than a few English interests have suffered as a result. If China does become imperialistic it will be crushed by other countries, just like Germany in the past, and Russia will shortly be in the same position too. But if China is strong that is of some use to us too, at least if China is interested in our fate. If we return home to China or study

Chinese we can get special facilities. Our interest will increase and more attention will be paid to our voice in parliament. But China cannot meddle in domestic affairs here. China cannot send warships if the Indonesian leaders do not want to employ Chinese or if the products of Indonesian plantations and Indonesian industry are not sold through Chinese merchants. Or if the Indonesian banks provide large-scale assistance for Indonesian traders so they can compete with us. Or if the government issued regulations and the quota system which damages us. Only if we were massacred would China probably send warships, if it were strong.

On the other hand, we should not forget that we have, right up to the present, cordial relations with China. Each year a number of new Chinese immigrants enter the country, many of whom are related to Indonesian *peranakan* Chinese. Since the war broke out this immigration has ceased and we doubt whether it will ever be on a large scale again. Probably teachers or trade representatives will be able to come in, but their numbers will not be large. So in time, say in about fifty years, the relations between our descendants and China will not be very close. This sort of thing is already evident in the Philippines and in the United States, one could say anywhere where Chinese immigration has ceased. In the Philippines assimilation has occurred. In America assimilation is obstructed by the white people's tendency to look down upon coloured people.

So we hope China will be strong. If it is strong it will be of some benefit to us. But let us not hinge our fate on China's strength or weakness.

— . . —

6-3

Yap Thiam Hien (1913–89), born in Banda Aceh, was educated at the Law School in Jakarta and at the University of Leiden from which he obtained a law degree. He was well known in his profession. During the Sukarno era, he served as a defence council of Liem Koe Nio, a pro-K.M.T. millionaire, and after the fall of Sukarno, he defended Dr. Soebandrio, the right-hand man of Sukarno. As a Christian, he was outspoken and active in preaching what he believed were Christian values. He was also a former leader of BAPERKI, a major Indonesian Chinese organization, but did not share the view of the BAPERKI's chairman, Siauw Giok Tjhan, on the problem of the Indonesian Chinese. The following were his letters on the Chinese minority published in *Star Weekly*, 16 April, 30 April, and 21 May 1960. He criticized both the "Communist formula" proposed by Siauw Giok Tjhan and the "Assimilationist formula" suggested by the "Ten People", and put forward his "Christian formula" for the solution of the Chinese problem.

Three Therapies: To Cure the Disease of Racial Discrimination (1960)

Therapy I: The Therapy of Siauw Giok Tjhan

Among the ranks of Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent who are settled in their choice, that is, of Indonesian citizenship, are to be found two schools of thought.

One of these two viewpoints will be examined below. The other viewpoint will be looked at some other time.

The main elements of the viewpoint of the first school of thought are as follows:

The structure of Indonesian society is still feudal, colonial, and capitalistic. This is the basic disease of our society which causes other diseases like boils on the skin.

Racial discrimination is like a boil on the skin of the body of society. Racial discrimination is a symptom of the basic disease. It is not in itself the basic disease.

Treating only the boil will not cure the body of society of the basic disease. The cure will only be temporary. The basic disease must be eradicated.

The assimilation or fusion of the minority with the majority cannot in the short term eliminate racial discrimination and cure the basic disease.

Assimilation is not necessary. The minority can continue living on the basis of the Pancasila, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity), Democracy, and Basic Human Rights.

The Chinese minority is one of the limbs of the body of Indonesian society. The colonial government, with its policy of "divide and favour" cut that limb from the body of Indonesian society. The Chinese minority limb and the body of Indonesian society must be made whole again. This is called integration, that is, the wholeness of the nation. Integration is more precise than assimilation. But integration too cannot cure the basic disease. It is only a medicine which prevents the boils from spreading all over the exterior of the body.

The correct method of treatment is a radical operation (that is, right to the roots) with the removal of the diseased heart, liver, and lungs and their replacement with new ones.

In political language: destroy the feudal-colonial-capitalistic structure of society right to its foundations and rebuild a new society. What sort of society? One whose structure and direction permits all ethnic minorities to live together in harmony, peace, and tranquillity without prejudice as to origin and without the fear of being cast aside because of origin. What society is that? None other than: *Communist Society*. Look at Russia and China as living examples.

. . . .

This school of thought is represented by the majority of those who are now in control of BAPERKI under the leadership of Siauw Giok Tjhan. (Please

study the speeches, writings, and interviews of Siauw Giok Tjhan from 1957 to 13 March this year.)

We will call this kind of treatment "Communist therapy" or the therapy of Siauw Giok Tjhan.

. . . .

What is the value of Siauw Giok Tjhan's therapy?

We repeat: According to the therapy of Siauw Giok Tjhan, racial discrimination can only disappear from Indonesian society if and when the present structure of Indonesian society has been destroyed and transformed into a Communist society.

Therefore: Whether or not racial discrimination disappears depends on whether or not the efforts of the (Communists are successful in transforming Indonesian society into a Communist one, and when.

So that the evaluation of Siauw Giok Tjhan's therapy is in fact the evaluation, or more accurately the forecasting, of whether and when the Communists will succeed in taking control of the Indonesian society and state.

And it is quite certain that such a forecast is very difficult indeed.

. . . .

We note that Indonesia has some 80 million inhabitants, of whom the majority, about 72 million, are Muslim, and about 2 million are Christian. Hindus, Buddhists, and [other] non-Communists together total about 1 million. It can be said, therefore, that non-Communists total 75 million or approximately 94 per cent of the entire Indonesian population, including Muslims and Christians who are devout and anti-Communist.

Without taking lightly the strength of Communism in Indonesia, it can perhaps be forecast that efforts to transform Indonesian society into a Communist one will succeed as has been stated, yet it will also take "a not inconsiderable period of time".

The criticism by Siauw Giok Tjhan that "voluntary-active-free-and-total assimilation" cannot solve the minority problem "in the short term" is therefore also applicable to his own therapy.

The same also applies to "integration". Integration is a process which can take ten, a hundred, or a thousand years.

But the concept "integration" still needs more concrete explanation as well, so that the differences can be recognized between it and [the concept of] total assimilation without any kind of compulsion — which is rejected by Siauw Giok Tjhan as a quick way of eliminating racial discrimination.

Does the therapy of Siauw Giok Tjhan possess any positive elements? Certainly it does. The therapy aims at fixing the problem of the Chinese minority. Note: It is not the minority that he wants to fix but their problem. He wishes to protect the Chinese minority while integrating them into the body of Indonesian society. And this attitude is based on the Fundamental Principles of the State, Pancasila, and on the principle of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (Unity in Diversity).

Our conclusions are:

1. Although the therapy of Siauw Giok Tjhan contains elements that are certainly positive and constructive, it does not provide a solution to the problem of the Chinese minority in the short term.
2. To accept Siauw Giok Tjhan's therapy and to fight for it means fighting to abolish racial discrimination, but it also means fighting for a Communist society.

Therapy II: Ten People's Therapy

The second school of thought put forward by ten of its proponents is argued as follows:*

"The minority problems can only be solved by voluntary assimilation in all spheres in a free and active manner."

Is this proposition correct?

In our opinion it is not.

The minority problem can be solved by total, active, and voluntary assimilation. This is correct.

But the minority problem can also be solved by other means.

For example, by means of:

- (1) laws which prohibit and punish with a jail sentence each act which gives special rights to one ethnic or racial group or which carries out or promotes discrimination against one ethnic or racial group;
- (2) public education in the broad meaning of nationality, about Basic Human Rights and democratic principles, about the evils of discrimination, concerning the truth/fact that national unity and allegiance need not necessarily be threatened by the presence of a minority.
- (3) policies which create and protect good inter-ethnic and inter-racial group relations.

And so on.

Let us say, for the sake of argument, that the theory of these ten people is true — nevertheless whether the desired assimilation can be carried out in the present situation and atmosphere must be greatly doubted.

Why?

1. Assimilation is a two-way process. Although, for example, the minority wishes to assimilate with the majority, their assimilation cannot take place if the majority refuses. Facts indicate that there is presently a section of the "dominant group" which clearly does not want the minority to participate in all aspects of the life of society and the state.

* On 26 March 1960 in *Star Weekly*, ten leading peranakan Chinese proposed voluntary assimilation as the solution to the Chinese minority problem in Indonesia. These ten leaders were Tjung Tin Jan (lawyer), Injo Beng Goat (newspaper editor), Tjia Dji Siong, Drs. Lo Siang Hien (university lecturer), Tan Bian Seng (engineer), Ong Hok Ham (university student), Lauwchuantho (economist), Tantekhian, Kwee Hwat Djien (pharmacist), and Auwjong Peng Koen (newspaper editor).

The present situation and atmosphere is not fertile for assimilation. Discriminatory regulations and practices have actually created the minority and have reinforced "minority consciousness".

Our objection to this therapy is that this therapy in fact desires to standardize the culture of ethnic groups and racial groups by standardizing their special characteristics. In an environment where a misguided nationalism is pursued, this holds the danger of extremism forcing a "uniformity" as was practised by Hitler's Germany and by totalitarian regimes.

Accordingly, it must be doubted whether in a situation and environment in which there already exist pressures from a dominant group, which are difficult to avoid, one can still talk about "voluntary" and "free".

1. The theory of this group is not correct, because the solving of the minority problem can also be carried out by means other than assimilation.
2. This therapy can only be carried out if the circumstances and environment in society and the state are already "preconditioned" in favour of assimilation.

Is there a third therapy?

There certainly is and it will be analysed on another occasion.

Therapy III

A disease can never be properly "treated" if its true causes are not discovered beforehand.

In our opinion, neglecting to investigate and discover the real causes for the existence of the minority and its problems is one of the reasons why the Communist therapy and the therapy of the ten are not correct.

But before offering our therapy as one of the ways to solve this serious minority problem, we will first attempt to determine our diagnosis for the minority and its problem. What is the minority in fact and what really are its problems?

Minority

Louis Wirth in an article entitled "The Problem of Minority Groups"* gave the following definition (translation and enumeration by the writer):

- (1) A minority is a group of people who,
- (2) because of physical or cultural features,
- (3) are isolated from other people in the society in which they live,
- (4) are to be given different and unequal treatment,
- (5) until, because of that, they come to regard themselves as the target for collective discrimination.

* Louis Wirth, "The Problem of Minority Groups", *The Science of Man in the World Crisis*, ed. Ralph Linton (New York, 1952), p. 347.

- (6) In a society in which there is a minority, there will also be an associated "dominant group" which has higher social position as well as special rights.
- (7) To be grouped within the minority itself means not participating fully in the life of society.

Combined with the formulation of the Sub-Commission of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights* which explained that the term minority is normally used for citizens of a state, then it can be summarized that a minority is a group of citizens of a state who have been segregated, excluded, and discriminated against [(3), (4), (7)] by their fellow citizens who have special rights and a higher social, political, and economic position (6) so that this group creates within itself a specific set of feelings (5). They are treated in this manner because they differ physically or culturally from other citizens. Among these feelings are those of being treated unfairly, not being appreciated, not being trusted, being isolated and maltreated; in short, feelings borne by a person cast aside. Wirth says:

One cannot long discriminate against a people without generating in them a sense of isolation or persecution and without giving them a conception of themselves as being more different from others than in fact they are.

(Wirth, *ibid.*, p. 348).

Feelings of being cast aside become the basis for a set of various kinds of attitudes and behaviour which not infrequently conflict with each other, for example, the attitude of submitting-opposing, being filial-nonfilial, coming close-drawing away, and so on; in short, the attitude and behaviour of a castout [stepson].

We call these feelings and attitudes, along with the ill-treatment, a minority complex. And because the complex becomes a problem for the minority itself, we can call it a minority problem in the narrow sense. Minority status carries a minority complex. So if we talk about the minority, we had better not forget the two sides of the problem.

There are various kinds of minority, for example, minority language, religion, ethnicity, and race. But they all have the status and the complex mentioned above. There are less Hindu-Balinese and Christians in Indonesian than there are Muslims. But these groups will only become a [religious] minority if they are isolated, excluded, and discriminated against by a dominant group. They are not a minority at the moment. It is not the number, therefore, but the treatment which determines minority status. A large group can have minority status as was the case with the Indonesian people during the colonial period when a small number of Dutch held the position of "dominant group".

* Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities: Definition and Clarification of Minorities.

Dominant Group

The dominant group is a group of citizens which has special rights and higher, stronger, more powerful "social status". The words of Wirth mentioned above can perhaps be used *mutatis mutandis* with regard to the dominant group: "One cannot long discriminate against a people without generating in oneself a sense of guilt and at the same time creating in oneself a conception of being *God*."

It can be said that dominant-group status also carries a dominant-group complex, which can be typified as an attitude of playing the judge-executioner himself, an attitude of knowing no wrong, an attitude of not wanting to retreat, not to be on the sidelines and/or to wait one's turn. The conflict between feelings of guilt and being God forms the basis of the dominant-group complex which is also reflected in the dominant group's attitude and behaviour.

As fellow citizens, the two groups must have relations with each other. And they influence each other. The dominant group excludes, the minority isolates itself. The dominant group discriminates, the minority group becomes consolidated. Acts of discrimination and exclusion give rise to protest or opposition in all kinds of ways and forms which sometimes are no longer recognized as protest or opposition, for example, running away, changing one's name, smuggling oneself into the dominant group through a physical change (passing the colour bar). The minority reaction is countered with counteraction and so on and so forth until it can reach breaking-point as it has done recently in the United States and South Africa.

The Minority Problem

This interrelating and inter-influencing between the status and complex of the minority and status and complex of the dominant group is, in our opinion, the minority problem in the real sense.

Because of this, it is not possible to find the ideal solution if the problem is only looked at from one angle and if one only looks to correct it from one aspect.

Of Whose Making?

We should not hesitate to expose those who have turned a group of citizens into a minority. It is none other than the dominant group who because of their position have the opportunity and the power to do so.

The term "dominant group" was not chosen randomly by sociologists.

If, therefore, Drs. Lauwchuantho states that we are overturning "cause and effect", it is perhaps caused by "ignorance" or "worries", or both, on the part of Mr. Lauwchuantho. But these are certainly the facts which have been discovered in scholars' field-work and which have been formulated in definitions such as those of Louis Wirth mentioned above.

To repeat: A minority is the creation of a dominant group. This is also the case in Indonesia. Firstly the colonialists as the dominant group separated the

"Chinese who are Foreign Orientals and Dutch subjects" from the other "Dutch subjects" and excluded them from agriculture, the civil service schooling, and "social intercourse", as well as discriminating against them through "the pass system and zoning system", [and through restrictions on aliens and other such regulations. Certainly, during this period the Indonesian people also became a minority. Now the colonial period is over, and Indonesia is independent and sovereign. We longed and hoped that with Independence and Sovereignty all minority status would also be abolished. But nearly all the discriminatory colonial laws still remain. Assaatism and Kensiism have even come into being and this, in a paradoxical way, has resulted in the Ali-Baba system. The pass system has been revised under the S.T.K.I. (Surat Tanda Kewarganegaraan Indonesia — Indonesian Citizenship Card), a proof of citizenship. Discrimination in the fields of education, the economy, and the civil service still exists as has been explained clearly by A. Soemandar.

There are different people in the dominant group but its status and complex is still the same.

And the Chinese minority still exists.

It is certainly true that there have been Ministers who did not agree with the idea of minorities. It is also true that in very recent times there has been a lot of noise made about the principles of democracy. The minority problem cannot, however, be solved just with words. John Dollard said:

No individual can be expected to change his attitude toward an ethnic group unless at the same time the group to which he belongs and is responsible simultaneously changes its attitude. . . . He would be promptly isolated . . . *

Isn't that fear of "isolation" the reason why words are not accompanied by action?

The form, means, gradation, quantum, quality, or motive of discrimination is not the question nor does it reduce the fact of discrimination. Apart from that, allowing discrimination is also a "prejudice" according to Arnold Rose: "We use the term prejudice to refer to a set of attitudes which cause support or justify discrimination."†

The Sub-Commission finished off its memorandum with a paragraph which opened with the words:

The claim of any minority to application of the principle of non discrimination cannot be questioned since this principle is proclaimed unequivocally in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Differences

Cultural or physical differences are the reason a group of citizens is turned into a minority.

* John Dollard, "The Acquisition of New Social Habits", *The Science of Man in the World Crisis*, ed. Ralph Linton (New York, 1952), p. 459.

† Arnold M. Rose, *The Roots of Prejudice* (Paris: UNESCO, 1952).

The United States has made the Negroes into a minority because they are black. This discrimination has caused antagonism and ultimately "non-violent-action" to be part of the American Negro. The Negroes, Indians, and so on, are subject to apartheid, are discriminated against, and are ill-treated by the dominant group in South Africa. Anti-racial attitudes there have recently resulted in the detention and killing of several hundred negroes and whites, while the leader of the dominant group, Verwoerd, was almost killed.

Discrimination on the basis of physical appearance is called racial discrimination or racism.

Hitler and the Nazis liquidated millions of Jews because they were "different" in matters of religion, culture, and in their physical appearance.

Stalin and his comrades liquidated goodness knows how many Russian citizens because they were "different" in their ideology. This is cultural discrimination in the broad sense. And all these dominant groups each have their own "grounds of justification", but it is precisely their "justification" which demonstrates their "prejudice".

It is not at all surprising, therefore, if the ten people and their friends see the differences as a source of conflict, a "powderkeg", and as an obstacle to nation-building, which for these reasons must be abolished.

Is this interpretation correct? It certainly isn't. We will take several examples:

1. Switzerland has French, German, and Italian ethnic communities, each with its own culture and language, which form one integrated and harmonious nation. Moreover it is of such a kind that in two world wars in which the three respective countries were involved in all-out conflict, the Swiss nation of French, German, and Italian origin remained united and was able to stay neutral.
2. Hawaii has succeeded in building a harmonious alliance from the indigenes, Japanese, Chinese, Filipino, and white ethnic groups, without eliminating the differing characteristics of each group.
3. And, "honour to whom honour is due", China and Russia who, following an excellent system, have, according to Wirth, succeeded in getting all their ethnic communities to co-exist and unite.

Differences in origin or culture *don't* and don't need to become obstacles to the process of nation-building. Indonesia too, can build all its ethnic and racial groups into one nation — an Indonesia which is integrated and united through the realization of the slogan *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (Unity in Diversity). *This is our conviction.*

Apart from the fact that their theory is not correct, the "necessity" of the proposal of those ten people is not clear.

The ten do not hesitate to put forward their therapy concerning the Chinese minority: The minority had better merge itself into the "dominant group" to "escape" from its minority status and to accelerate the process of nation-building. The dominant group becomes the "recipient".

But what about the other ethnic groups? Who among them must be taken as recipient? What are the requirements for becoming a "culture-recipient"? The size of the ethnic group? Or whether one culture is "good", "not so good", or "bad", compared to other cultures? If that is the case, who is competent to be the judge?

Was the element of judgement actually not contained in the proposal of the ten?

Claude Levi-Strauss said,

The more we claim to discriminate between cultures and customs as good and bad, the more completely *do we identify ourselves with those we would condemn*. By refusing to consider as human those who seem to us to be the most "savage" or "barbarous" of their representatives, *we merely adopt one of their own characteristic attitudes. The barbarian is, first and foremost, the man who believes in barbarism.**

It seems that it is not proper for those of us who are not competent to answer the question of Levi-Strauss: "What are we to understand by 'different cultures'?" But it will be very worthwhile if we all consider his words:

We have sought, on the contrary, to show that the true contribution of a culture consists not in the list of inventions which it has personally produced, but in its difference from others. The sense of gratitude and respect which each single member of a given culture can and should feel towards all others can only be based on the conviction that the other cultures differ from his own in countless ways, even if the ultimate essence of these differences eludes him or if, in spite of his best efforts, he can reach no more than an imperfect understanding of them.†

Although we appreciate and respect the aim and purpose (a homogeneous nation) of the ten people and of all their supporters and admirers, nevertheless and for precisely the same ideal, we have no option but to point out the deficiencies and weaknesses of their therapy. The elimination of physical and/or cultural differences means a levelling. They wish to "standardize" all the different physical shapes, features, skin-colour, and the like, so that differences are no longer apparent. This proposal reminds us of Aldous Huxley's "Brave New World", in which the leaders of the new world created with their technology, a kind of man based on one single model, without the slightest differences even as to the ability to perform tasks at a low, medium, and high level. They were created without the ability to think. They were "the uniform citizens of that New World". The book was a criticism of the arranged matching and marriage by Hitler to create "Aryans of Pure Race" and of Stalin's policy of uniformity.

Once the principle of eliminating differences in physical appearance, custom, and tradition has been accepted, why not also accept the abolition of

* Claude Levi-Strauss, "Race and History", in *The Race Question in Modern Science* (Paris: UNESCO, 1956), p. 129.

† Ibid., p. 158.

differences in opinion, ideology, and religion? Don't differences in this sphere contain greater possibilities and potential for conflict, antagonism, or discrimination to the extent that they hinder the process of building an integrated and homogeneous nation?

The ten people and their colleagues certainly do not interpret "homogeneous" as uniform, but one doubts whether they are fully aware of the consequences of their principles and attitudes. Who does not want to take responsibility for the significance of the ideas and words of Mr. Lauwchuantho, me or you? In particular, the purpose is not to frighten people but just to try to make him and his friends aware and convinced of the danger of the principle of levelling which only differs from uniformity in its degree. Mr. Lauwchuantho and friends, who together with us are on the opposite side to totalitarianism, should perhaps take care that they don't end up proposing something which will lead in an unwanted direction as a result of a want of care and through thinking about problems which have more than one aspect.

Assimilation

Heaven be praised when we all acknowledge and agree that assimilation is a two-way process. Although for Mr. Lauwchuantho this fact is as large as a cow, we are still concerned whether it is only the cow that he sees. It will not be possible for the assimilation of the minority with the "dominant group" to take place if only the minority desires it and their desire is rejected by the "dominant group". And if we suggest without hesitation that at this time there is a section of the "dominant group" which opposes the assimilation of the Chinese minority, then this is because it is a well-known fact.

To this day Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent still experience "restriction of employment opportunities, lack of access to facilities that are meant to serve the population in general, the presence of bias and antagonism in law enforcement officials, and many other manifestations of prejudice." (Arnold Rose, *ibid.*) Can "discrimination and exclusion" be regarded as signs that the proposal of Mr. Lauwchuantho and friends is accepted? If there is no discrimination based on physical and cultural differences then in itself there will no longer be a minority and "dominant group". And if there is no longer any minority and dominant group, won't the problem have been solved? And if this is our conclusion, isn't it true that the diagnosis and therapy of our friends is incorrect?

We do not oppose assimilation *per se*. We are only trying to explain that assimilation as one means of solving the present minority problem is not correct — because discrimination has already aggravated relations between groups, and bad interrelations are not a fitting ground and climate for assimilation to grow and thrive.

That the assimilation of individuals has occurred, is occurring, and will occur "in spite of everything" cannot be denied. But that is "the psychological and sociological exception proving the rule". In this respect, it is best to be reminded that usually "biological assimilation" is not included in the definition of assimilation:

Assimilation is a process whereby individuals or groups once dissimilar become similar; that is, become identified in their interest and outlook . . . in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups and, by sharing their experiences and history, are incorporated with them in a cultural life. (W.F. Ogburn and M.F. Nimkoff, *A Handbook of Sociology* [London, 1947], p. 261).

To return to our discussion, we can confirm that the minority problem is not caused by "production-relations" [read: control of capital goods] nor by physical and/or cultural differences. The problem lies in "human relations", that is, the relations between the "dominant" group and the minority. Inter-relations are poisoned by "prejudice" — prejudice, which according to Arnold Rose "practically always involves discrimination which means mistreatment of people without their having done anything to merit such treatment."

And as the "causes" of this prejudice, Rose mentions (1) personal success (material and non-material) on the part of those who hold the prejudices, (2) ignorance concerning the group against which the prejudices are held, and (3) racism or superiority complex.

In fact, the minority problem is a problem of man himself, "The Problem of Man", that is, how man regards and treats his fellow man.

Our diagnosis: Man's soul is sick. It is not the structure of society which is wrong, not the physical and cultural differences which are wrong, but man himself who is wrong.

Because of that I propose a therapy:

- (1) not "brain-washing" but "heart-cleansing";
- (2) not a change in the structure and society but a change in human attitudes from being materialistic and self-centred to being Christian-centred;
- (3) not the elimination of physical and cultural differences but the elimination of prejudice, egoism and hypocrisy;
- (4) not a "dominant group" but a serving-elite;
- (5) not the retooling of man but the rebirth of man in Jesus Christ, and the other ways that we put forward earlier in "Therapy II".

— Translated by Jenny Herridge —

_____ . . . _____

6-4

Siauw Giok Tjhan (1914—81), born in Surabaya, was probably educated in a local Dutch school. He was a journalist before the Second World War. After the war he participated in the Indonesian independence movement. In 1947 he was appointed Minister without Portfolio for Peranakan Affairs. From 1950 to 1953 he served as the director of *Harian Rakjat*, the official organ of the P.K.I. In 1954 he participated in the formation of BAPERKI and was elected

chairman of its central board. He retained the position until 1965 when BAPERKI was banned. The following was a letter published in *Star Weekly*, 23 April 1960, in response to Yap Thiam Hien's criticism (6-3). He denied that his "formula" was that of a Communist but of President Sukarno. In fact, he increasingly used Sukarno as a source of political legitimacy.

Therapy: Political Manifesto of the Republic of Indonesia (1960)

Reading Yap Thiam Hien's analysis entitled "Three Therapies" on how to cure the disease of racial discrimination, one cannot avoid getting the impression that Mr. Yap is a close follower of McCarthyism which even in the United States is reviled by every democrat and every devotee/fighter for the implementation of basic human rights.

In evaluating Yap Thiam Hien's analysis we should note the following facts:

1. The just and prosperous society which I have proposed we should strive to establish more quickly is the just and prosperous society which establishment was proposed by Soekarno in order to bring an end to the system of man exploiting man. The just and prosperous society was also named the socialist society *a la* Indonesia by President Soekarno.
2. President Soekarno's thoughts on the establishment of a just and prosperous society were explained in his speech on 17 August 1959 entitled "The Rediscovery of the Indonesian Revolution", which was later issued as the Political Manifesto of the Republic of Indonesia. It has now been ratified as the broad outlines of the direction of the State which must be obeyed by every citizen of the Indonesian Republic.
3. After the Indonesian Political Manifesto was ratified as the broad outlines of the direction of the State, the fact was discovered that the supporters of the Manifesto were not limited only to Communists or to those who in the eyes of Mr. Yap are Communists but included every citizen who wished to see the acceleration of the realization of the spirit of the 17 August 1945 proclamation. In this connection, it should be noted that the detailed formulation of the Political Manifesto which was unanimously agreed upon in a meeting of the Supreme Advisory Council (D.P.A.) was subsequently agreed to by PARKINDO and Partai Katholik figures as well as also being agreed to by Monseigneur Padmasapoetra (Catholic representative), by representatives from Muslim parties such as N.U., P.S.I.I., PERTI and by Mr. Sugriwa as representative of the Hindu religion in Bali.*

* PARKINDO (Indonesian Christian Party) and Partai Katholik (Indonesian Catholic Party) and three other parties in 1973 fused to form the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesia Democratic Party).

The N.U. (Muslim Scholars Party), P.S.I.I. (Indonesian Islamic Union Party), PERTI (Islamic Educational Movement Party), and PARMUSI (Indonesian Muslim Party) in 1973 fused to form the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (Development Unity Party).

4. If it is borne in mind that there is widespread support for the Political Manifesto and also that the formation of the National Front will achieve the fulfilment of the national resolve which is to speed up the creation of a just and prosperous society in accordance with the spirit of the proclamation of 17 August 1945, then it can be concluded that the creation of this just and prosperous society can be carried out in a shorter period than estimated. The opposition described by Mr. Yap only occurs in his own mind because non-Communist Indonesian citizens apparently do not oppose it, and in fact up till now have shown their willingness to form a just and prosperous society as was demonstrated in their declaration of support for the Political Manifesto.
5. Certainly up till now no sociologists have been able to deny that the settlement of the minorities in the Soviet Union and the P.R.C. has attained an ideal level. Not a few anti-Communist scholars from the United States have been forced to admit this fact.
6. A plenary conference of BAPERKI which has just taken place in Batu* also supported the view that the formation of a just and prosperous society as outlined in the Political Manifesto would guarantee a wise solution for small groups and the elimination of racially discriminatory practices because, as was explained by President Soekarno, the formation of a just and prosperous society will bring to an end the system of man exploiting man and will end attempts to find excuses (justifications) to suppress the groups against whom they wish to discriminate.

Accept my thoughts therefore that the way to solve the problem of minority groups means to actively participate in fighting for the implementation of the Indonesian Political Manifesto which has already been declared to be the broad outlines of the direction of the State which every Indonesian citizen is obliged to obey.

6-5

The following is an excerpt of Siauw Giok Tjhan's report released after the BAPERKI congress in Semarang in 1963. The original title was *Madju Terus, Pantang Mundur* (Djarkarta, 1963?). The title has been added by the editor. Siauw in this report quoted Sukarno's speeches extensively giving the impression that he was a follower of Sukarno and had the Sukarno's backing. Indeed, BAPERKI increasingly depended on Sukarno for its political survival.

* Batu — a town in East Java.

BAPERKI, Revolution, and the Chinese Minority (1963)

I

This plenary conference which was begun on 26 December 1963 in Semarang is the first plenary conference since the Eighth National Congress in Jakarta last March.

As the first plenary conference after a congress, the task of this plenary conference is first of all to examine the plans and the programme of action being carried out by the Standing Executive Committee.

The Eighth National Congress of BAPERKI which took place in Jakarta in the middle of March 1963 represents one step in an important struggle for BAPERKI as a mass organization and a tool of the revolution. The importance of the Eighth National Congress is due to several things, among them:

1. The willingness of President Soekarno, Head of State, Commander-in-Chief, and Great Leader of the Indonesian Revolution, to give some words of advice at the opening reception for the Eighth National Congress and to emphasize within this address BAPERKI's reason for existence as a mass organization and a tool of the revolution.
2. The representatives of the branches that attended the Eighth National Congress included practically all the ethnic groups (*suku*) in our homeland. Besides those who are called *peranakan* Chinese, there were those who are labelled "native" (*asli*) from many of the ethnic groups around Indonesia as well as other *peranakan* groups such as Europeans, Arabs, and Indians. The range of the branch representatives in that Congress clearly belies the belief of many people that BAPERKI is racially exclusive. The accusation that BAPERKI is racially exclusive is evidently based on the excuse that BAPERKI is led by an executive committee which is chaired by someone who is not considered "native". If this judgement is correct the accusation that BAPERKI is racially exclusive is based upon a racist point of view which is dangerous and anti-Pantja Sila. The composition of the branches' representation at the Eighth National Congress provides clear evidence that BAPERKI's development is loyal to its founding principles. As we all know we founded BAPERKI because we rejected the idea that citizenship problems are the concern of the ethnic groups involved. We are of the opinion that citizenship problems are national problems and their solution must be struggled for by an organization of national character. This point of view which resulted in the creation of BAPERKI, is evidently the same one which caused the dissolution of such political organizations based upon a single ethnic group as P.D.T.I., PERWITT, PERWANITT,* etc.

* The P.D.T.I. (Partai Demokrat Tionghoa Indonesia), PERWITT (Persatuan Warga Indonesia Turunan Tionghoa), PERWANITT (Persatuan Warga Negara Indonesia Turunan Tionghoa), and other ethnic Chinese organizations were dissolved to give way to the formation of the BAPERKI (Badan Permusjawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia) on 13 March 1954. The BAPERKI was banned after the 1965 Coup.

3. The decision to "NASAKOM-ize" the leadership of BAPERKI from the Central Committee to the branches. This is a consequence of BAPERKI's position which was formulated in the Fourth Congress in Surabaya. The position is that the struggle to solve the citizenship problem cannot be separated from the struggle to foster a Pantja Sila society which implements the fundamentals of the Pantja Sila in the affairs of daily life. In that decision of the BAPERKI Congress in Surabaya, we stressed that to struggle to foster a Pantja Sila society means to struggle to solve the citizenship problem, eradicate the practice of racial discrimination, and ensure that everyone can fully enjoy the happiness of a life free from any variety of racial prejudice. Political developments have necessitated the Presidential decree of 5 July 1959 which reinstituted the 1945 Constitution and made it possible to use MANIPOL which contains all of the President's instructions of 17 August 1959 as the broad outlines of state policy. Thus the conception of a Pantja Sila society was refined to mean an Indonesian socialist society free from the exploitation of man by man, in which unemployment becomes unknown, as a result of the implementation of the Message of the Suffering of the People (AMPERA). These developments caused BAPERKI in its Seventh Congress in Semarang to stress that the struggle to solve the citizenship problem is inherent in the struggle to develop an Indonesian socialist society. Thus the view is confirmed that we need to focus all our attention and our capabilities on facilitating the development of an Indonesian socialist society. Political developments in Indonesia have resulted in a concept which has been advanced by people such as Ruslan Abdulgani, the Minister of Information and Chairman of the Indoctrination Committee. Based upon Lenin's declaration that socialism in Russia meant electrification and rule by the dictatorship of the proletariat, Ruslan Abdulgani* declared that Indonesian socialism means electrification and national revolutionary *gotong-royong* rule with NASAKOM as its core. In this matter it is fitting to note the statements of President Soekarno in his Instructions to the National Front on 13 February 1963 in which, among other things, he said:

- a. I read there: To agree to Pantja Sila means to agree to NASAKOM. Unite, People of Indonesia, Unite! If you agree with Pantja Sila you must accept NASAKOM too!
- b. Because Indonesian unity cannot be implemented without NASAKOM as its core!

At a reception for the Indonesian Women's Congress on 19 May 1963 President Soekarno declared:

As I said in my speech to parliament, socialism must be fostered, socialism must be organized, socialism must be struggled for with all our energy and all our potential under the leadership of one government. Make NASAKOM the base: only then can socialism be brought about.

* Ruslan Abdulgani, then the Minister of Information and spokesman of Sukarno.

The decision to "NASAKOM-ize" the leadership of BAPERKI represents a decision to accept the consequence of a point of view, that is, that the solution to citizenship problems is guaranteed by the establishment of an Indonesian socialist society and in order to achieve an Indonesian socialist society we need national unity with NASAKOM as its core and the presence of *gotong-royong* power centred on NASAKOM.

The impact of that glorious Eighth National Congress on the development of BAPERKI as a mass organization has evidently been very great as can be seen from the following facts.

1. A number of branches which had been dormant or not very active have been awakened and are now engaged in activities dealing with organizational consolidation in accordance with the decision of the Congress and struggling to implement the decisions of the Congress.
2. In Sumatra and Central Java a number of new branches have been formed so that the number of branches continues to increase.
3. The process of NASAKOM-izing the leadership of BAPERKI has ended forever the mistaken view that BAPERKI is an organization for only one ethnic group. NASAKOM-izing the leadership results in an increase in the activity to NASAKOM-ize as well as the organizational body of BAPERKI, so that the number of members from ethnic groups which are called "native" can be seen to be increasing in a very heartening manner. It is hoped that by the next Congress the mass membership and supporters of BAPERKI will multiply and will create a harmonious unity organized around NASAKOM as a force for the realization of national unity with NASAKOM as its core, as is desired by President Soekarno.
4. A greater felt need to increase the number of cadres who are able to harmonize the opinions of the mass members and supporters of BAPERKI so that there is clearly visible a firm resolve to proceed "Ever onward, never retreating!", following the Pantja Sila path with MANIPOL as our compass, crushing counter-revolutions, destroying neocolonialism, resolving to develop an Indonesian socialist society after successfully developing a national democratic society as a preparatory stage.
5. Many cadres and BAPERKI members who have increased their political consciousness and have been able to choose an ideology which agrees with their view of life have joined revolutionary political party organizations in order to actively struggle for their ideals as well as intensify efforts to speed up the process of national integration with NASAKOM as its core. In this way the excesses of the period of irregularity before 5 July 1959 have ended. In those days one got the impression that there was a kind of disease owing to which people chose parties in order to facilitate efforts to obtain licences or facilities for material gain. Beside many BAPERKI cadres who have joined political parties, we see, as a result of the decision of the Eighth National Congress of BAPERKI, that university and secondary school students in BAPERKI schools have

flocked to join mass student organizations that are faithful to the flame of revolution of 17 August 1945, and are actively struggling for national unity with NASAKOM as its core and for a *gotong-royong* government based on NASAKOM. All these developments confirm the success of the leadership of BAPERKI in uniting its mass membership and supporters within the revolutionary popular line in order to facilitate the fulfilment of the revolution, the achievement of a just and prosperous society which knows neither the exploitation of man by man nor unemployment.

Efforts to integrate the mass membership and supporters of BAPERKI into the popular revolutionary line are felt to have been made easier by the decision of the BAPERKI Congress to NASAKOM-ize BAPERKI's leadership. This decision has enriched the body of BAPERKI with good cadres from NASAKOM parties who in a consistent fashion accept unconditionally the need for national unity with NASAKOM as its core, so that they honestly and consistently struggle for its realization. This has had a good effect on efforts to increase the number of cadres and to strengthen the firm resolve among the members of BAPERKI to proceed: Ever onward, never retreating! by following the Pantja Sila path with MANIPOL as a compass, crushing counter-revolution in all its forms destroying neocolonialism in any shape it takes and fostering an Indonesian socialist society by completing the formation of a national-democratic society as a preparatory stage. The spread of this firm resolve has resulted in a growing willingness on the part of BAPERKI's mass membership to become activists or supporters of political parties who clearly and consistently struggle for the realization of a NASAKOM core and the development of an Indonesian socialist society.

These developments do not deviate from BAPERKI's struggle line, but rather they are in accordance with the ideas which ten years ago caused us to found BAPERKI and to give it the form it has now as a mass organization without racial or ideological barriers, active in the struggle to realize harmonious national unity, and capable of moulding an Indonesian socialist society.

In order to evaluate the developments described above, it is best to examine the emphasis in the Preamble and Statutes of BAPERKI, which among other things stipulate the following points.

1. BAPERKI struggles for the development of a completely united nation based on Pantja Sila nationalism or *gotong-royong* nationalism. The development of the nation based on Pantja Sila or *gotong-royong* nationalism can only succeed with the completion of structural change in Indonesian society, that is, with the achievement and strengthening of an Indonesian socialism in which there is no oppression of man by man.
2. Thus in accordance with its character BAPERKI has organized itself as a mass organization which is not based on a particular political ideology and which respects all religions and beliefs practised by the Indonesian people.

3. This organization is an association of Indonesian citizens who, although they may each have their (own political points of view, all believe that discrimination against fellow citizens based only on ancestry or religion damages the national interest and the fulfilment of the Indonesian revolution.
4. This organization is of the opinion that the solidarity of the Indonesian people is the most important condition for national welfare. Therefore society and the government are truly obliged to strengthen national integration and solidarity.
5. This organization accepts and defends Pantja Sila as the foundation of the nation and actively struggles for the implementation of the 1959 Political Manifesto of the Republic of Indonesia and has the following goals:
 - (a) to strive for the implementation of national aspirations, that is, to make every citizen a genuine Indonesian citizen, a defender of the Pantja Sila as the foundation of the nation, and an active participant in the Indonesian revolution,
 - (b) to strive for the implementation of democratic principles and fundamental human rights in a way that is beneficial to the implementation of the Message of the People's Sufferings.
 - (c) to strive for the realization of equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities for progress for every citizen regardless of his ethnic group, culture, customs, or religion as a guarantee of the implementation of the 1959 Political Manifesto of the Republic of Indonesia.

With the conviction that developments are in agreement with our thinking when we formed BAPERKI, it is appropriate to say: Ever onward, never retreat!

II

The progress and expansion of BAPERKI in accordance with the ideas that led to its formation are certainly pleasing.

Why? Because that progress confirms the progress of the Indonesian revolution. It is not possible that BAPERKI could have developed as it has if the revolutionary forces had not expanded. If reactionary forces and counter-revolutionary forces advance, then of course the instruments that foster reactionary and counter-revolutionary forces are advancing too.

Tools of the revolution can only make good progress if revolutionary and progressive forces make clear gains. As this is rather obvious I feel that there is no one with a contrary opinion on the matter.

In relation to this, it would be good to heed what was stressed by President Soekarno in his address of 17 August, "The Resounding Echo of the Indonesian Revolution" (GESURI). In this "GESURI" address President Soekarno affirmed, among other things, that:

We are truly a nation in revolution — because of this we are aware of the law of Revolution which is that you have friends and face enemies; if we were a satellite nation, if we had the spirit of a slave, a goat or a duck — undoubtedly we would have no enemies, undoubtedly we would not be undermined, we would not be subverted, but on the other hand we would be stepped on as before, gagged, dictated to, and ordered to follow along.

But once again I say that we are not that kind of nation. That is why we are undermined, subverted, spied upon, and nibbled at in all kinds of ways.

The foreign subversion at the time of the P.R.R.I. and Permesta rebellions is still fresh in our mind. They operated from bases outside the country all around us. Some from Malaya, some from Singapore, some from Taiwan, some from South Korea, and some from foreign bases in the Philippines. In short, all the foreign bases around Indonesia were used as bases for subversion against Indonesia. Are not these facts sufficient reason for us to be wary of the fusion of some of the states around us? All the more if we know that this fusion is a foreign project — not a project that originated from the people of those states themselves.

In another section of the “GESURI” speech President Soekarno asked:

And what is the attitude of the enemy towards our accomplishments in security? West Irian we have recovered, security we have attained — of the government’s “Three Programmes” only the basic necessities programme still needs to be accomplished — what is the attitude of the enemy towards security?

In this area too they are not discouraged. The reactionaries and counter-revolutionaries are indeed tough. Or more precisely: the reactionaries and counter-revolutionaries are certainly obstinate! They have their ways of disturbing the peace. From large- and small-scale subversion in the form of rebellions or economic gangsterism to agitating for the burning of cars or shops, breaking windows — to murder attempts — to a whispering campaign against Bung Karno himself — all these things they do.

Because of their annoyance at seeing the obstinancy of the reactionaries and counterrevolutionaries, our friends urge the Supreme Commander to re-institute Martial Law (S.D.B.), I answer: No!

The Supreme Commander will not re-institute Martial Law and, God willing, he will without hesitation give the order that the counter-revolutionaries have their necks broken.

The points emphasized by President Soekarno in his “GESURI” speech should be heeded because they explain that we still live in an age of revolution, so we are affected by the law of revolutionaries and counter-line between friend and foe; because the reactionaries and counter-revolutionaries are obstinate, because they are shrewd, we must always heighten national revo-

lutionary vigilance. We must always know who are the friends and who are the enemies of the revolution so that we do not mistakenly embrace enemies and strike friends, so that we are capable of assembling a force which in any circumstance can break the necks of the enemies of the revolution and completely smash counter-revolutionary forces.

In order to protect and strengthen national revolutionary vigilance so that we can break the necks of the enemies of the revolution and completely destroy the counter-revolutionary forces, we need to have a clear picture of our revolution and of what constitutes counter-revolutionary action.

In relation to this matter it is well to take note of what was said by President Soekarno in his address on the Seventeenth Annual Police Day on 1 July 1963:

Is our revolution a revolution without a goal, without a plan, without foundation, a revolution which floats in the air, a day-dream revolution left hanging in mid-air? No! It is precisely because our revolution has a foundation, a goal, and a plan that our revolution really is a revolution. Not something made up in the night by someone who couldn't sleep, as Marx said. No!

Our revolution has the Pantjasila as its foundation. That is the firm foundation of the Indonesian revolution.

Our revolution has a clear framework, a clear aim, to build a unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia which has sovereignty from Sabang to Merauke, to bring about a just and prosperous society within that state without, as I have repeatedly said, the exploitation of man by man. A just and prosperous society, a peaceful, orderly, and prosperous society. And thirdly, to make Indonesia a part of a new world, friendly to all nations, friendly to all the world's faiths, in a world of eternal and everlasting peace.

The framework of the Indonesian revolution is clear and firm, its foundation is clear and firm, its course is clear and resolute as in the course of the Soviet revolution, that is, Marxism-Leninism. The course of the Indonesian revolution is also firm and clear, MANIPOL and its summation USDEK.

And just as each deviation from the goal of the French revolution, which was to establish Civilian Democracy, was labelled counter-revolution and every deviation from the goals of the Soviet revolution are stamped counter-revolutionary, in Indonesia every action which deviates from the Pantjasila, or from MANIPOL-USDEK or from the three aims of the Indonesian revolution is labelled counter-revolutionary.

And it is the responsibility of every Indonesian to eliminate entirely all counter-revolutionary actions. Every member of the armed forces, that is, the army, the navy, the air force, the police force, has the responsibility to eliminate all counter-revolutionary activity!

In that Police Day address President Soekarno also said:

No revolution can succeed if it tolerates counter-revolutionary actions. The French revolution could not have achieved its aims if it had tolerated

counter-revolutionary activity. The Soviet revolution could not have fulfilled its task if it had tolerated counter-revolutionary activity. The Indonesian revolution will not be able to carry out its task of fulfilling the revolution if the Indonesian revolution tolerates counter-revolutionary activity!

These affirmations of President Soekarno are stated here for the purpose of eliminating any doubt about the need to act firmly, without compromise, against the counter-revolutionaries — all the more since we have seen, between the Eighth National Congress and this conference, that the reactionaries are indeed obstinate and sly and that counter-revolutionary activity often changes its form without changing its target.

It would be well to recall some of the forms of activity in the citizenship field which damage the implementation of the goals of the revolution.

First of all there is the *benteng* group of importers operating under the subterfuge of protecting the so-called native (*asli*) group and providing opportunities for them to become importers.

This “benteng importer” movement began about the time of the implementation of the Round Table (K.M.B.) agreement on 27 December 1949 by the Department of Economic Affairs headed by Van Hoogstraten and was continued by the Hatta cabinet, the first cabinet of the Federal Republic of Indonesia (R.I.S.).

This movement has split apart rather than united all of the revolutionary forces, while what we are obliged to do to guarantee the success of the revolution is to unite and strengthen the unity of all the revolutionary forces.

This movement also results in a weakening of the national potential to speed up the liquidation of foreign monopoly capital power in the field of commerce, which in practice has the effect of aiding the foreign monopoly capitalists to defend their vested interests.

This “benteng importer” movement cannot be continued as the number of importers has increased considerably while the amount of foreign exchange available for import needs cannot be expanded significantly. This is especially so as a result of foreign monopoly’s international policy of increasing the price of industrial goods which are exported to the developing nations while decreasing the price of raw materials which they require. Consequently, the amount of foreign exchange available for imports must be continually reduced.

We have noticed, as well, the emergence of what has become known as the “Assaat” movement,* which is of the opinion that as long as the national economy is not in the hands of those labelled “native” it is not possible to make it healthy. This racist point of view is further expanded by efforts to revise the citizenship regulations in order to make citizenship more difficult to acquire, beginning by cancelling the citizenship of those who received their Indonesian citizenship on the basis of regulations enacted at the beginning

* The Assaat Movement was a movement aimed at upgrading the economic status of the indigenous population at the expense of the Indonesian Chinese during the 1950s. Assaat was a lawyer and politician turned businessman.

of the revolution. These changes are proposed from the racist point of view that a citizen's patriotism, loyalty, and love of his country are determined by his descent.

The way that the reactionaries and counter-revolutionaries disguise their evil intentions is very crafty, so that to oppose them requires courage and a spirit of living dangerously.

BAPERKI, assisted by progressive organizations, has unyieldingly opposed the Assaat movement and explained that it damages the development of the revolution, delays the struggle to implement the ideals of the revolution and of the "Message of the People's Suffering". But as we see, because of its progressive attitude BAPERKI is stamped "left-wing" or "Communist" since the major organizations which agree with BAPERKI that the Assaat movement is damaging to the Indonesian revolution are the progressive organisations and the Indonesian Communist Party.

People finally opened their eyes and realized that they had fallen into a trap and into the embrace of the reactionaries and counter-revolutionaries when political developments forced Assaat and his friends to reveal themselves by choosing the side of the P.R.R.I. and Permesta rebels.

But as Bung Karno* said, the reactionaries and counter-revolutionaries are stubborn, crafty, and sly.

Counter-revolutionary and reactionary activity in the citizenship field then appeared in a new and different form which could lead astray those who were unwary.

In a revolutionary stage requiring awareness and consciousness that all of our attention and efforts needs to be poured out, directed, and concentrated on easing the process of transition to an Indonesian socialist society, there emerged what is known as the "total assimilation" movement.

As is known, the so-called total assimilation movement in its literature and efforts emphasizes proposals and pressures for changing names and for mixed marriages, as if name-changing and mixed marriages are the most important things in nation-building rather than directing the whole national capability towards the facilitating of the transition to an Indonesian socialist society. Later that movement proposed "obligatory voluntary participation" in order to achieve what is called "economic assimilation" in the implementation of "total assimilation".

This movement caused confusion and did not help efforts to mobilize funds and forces to expedite the development of a national-democratic society as a preparatory stage for developing a socialist society. What is more, the proposal for "obligatory voluntary participation" caused uncertainty about whether savings should be invested, as well as a reduction in the capital invested in existing enterprises which were considered likely targets for "obligatory voluntary participation".

† Bung Karno, an intimate form of address referring to Sukarno.

The movement was accompanied by subtle pressure — by pointing out odd conditions and defects that were an inheritance of the colonial period, among other things by pointing out differences in social-economic levels, thus giving the false picture that these oddities inherited from the colonial period could only be eradicated by “name-changing”, “mixed marriages”, and “obligatory voluntary participation” as part of a process of what is called “total assimilation”.

Because those who firmly opposed this movement were BAPERKI and other progressive organizations and progressive parties like P.K.I., PARTINDO, PERTI, etc, it becomes clearer that at its core this movement is dominated by “left phobia” and “Communist phobia”, and carried out by reactionary and counter-revolutionary elements.

In relation to this it is well to remember that the racist activity, which was begun in May in Tjirebon and spread to Tegal, Bandung, Tjiandjur, Sukabumi, Garut, Tasikmalaja, and a few other small towns in West Java, certainly could not have resulted in such extensive damage if there had not been any psychological preparation to rouse the masses. Of course, it is very interesting that the excuse used by its ringleaders to ignite this racist movement does not differ in practice from the excuses used by the leaders of what is called the “total assimilation” movement.

For them it was certainly very unpleasant and a severe blow when President Soekarno categorized these racist activities as counter-revolutionary activities which need to be crushed completely!

In his address to the opening session of the M.P.R.S., on 15 May 1963, Bung Karno firmly criticized this racist activity as accursed counter-revolutionary actions which must be crushed. This categorization was repeated even more resolutely in his address at the reception of the Indonesian Women's Congress on 19 May 1963 and again in his address to a public meeting in Bandung on National Awakening Day, 20 May 1963.

Bung Karno's damnation of the counter-revolutionary racists' activities as counter-revolutionary activity which must be completely eliminated was put this way in his address to the Indonesian Women's Congress on 19 May 1963:

The first time they tried it with politics, the second time by saying that “Sukarno is a love hunter, a lecherous man”, the third time they tried assassination, now this fourth time they have tried to incite the people with counter-revolutionary agitation. They are looking for a cause which will anger the people. Oh the availability of food and clothing, oh the people's displeasure with Chinese Indonesians. This can be twisted to prove the Indonesian people's displeasure with Soekarno's policies, especially because Soekarno's policy of late has been in agreement with R.R.T. [the People's Republic of China]. Ah, now it has to be shown that the Indonesian people are not happy with the Chinese, that the Indonesian people hate the Chinese. These recent events have been provoked in that way, by saying: Oh, the Chinese live luxuriously, Oh, the Chinese live like this, Oh, the Chinese live like that.

Then Bung Karno went on to state:

I do not deny that among the Chinese there are sometimes occurrences or statements which are not for native Indonesians — if I may use the word native — to hear.

But this matter must not be twisted by the counter-revolutionaries. Do not let us get stirred up by counter-revolutionary provocation!

Because there are those supporters of the racists who throw out the view that racist counter-revolutionary activity facilitates the development of a socialist society, Bung Karno has put forward something from the revolutionary experience of Europe where there was a group labelled by Marx as nihilist-terrorist. These people believed that socialism could be achieved by simply murdering capitalists. If there were no capitalist left, then of course a socialist society would be achieved. Marx clearly stated that this was a mistaken view. Socialism can only be brought about by changing the structures of society stage by stage, and with unity of the workers of the whole world, as Bung Karno explained:

As I said in my speech to parliament, socialism must be fostered, socialism must be organized, socialism must be struggled for with all of our energy and all of our potential under the leadership of one government. Make NASAKOM the core: only then can socialism be brought about. Not by burning cars, not by burning trucks, not by throwing stones at windows, not by breaking shop windows on Jalan Braga or on streets in Sukabumi or Bogor, no! And remember, you racists, you ruin the good name of the Republic of Indonesia with those kinds of actions!

So, in other words, we are clearly not going to be able to bring about socialism in Indonesia by “name-changing”, “mixed marriages”, “obligatory voluntary participation”, or with what is presented as “total assimilation”. Rather socialism will be brought about by struggle, by our own sweat and toil to increase our national production, with the mobilization of all potential to change our social structure stage by stage into a national democratic society as a preparatory stage towards the development of a socialist society without poverty, the oppression of man by man or unemployment.

The racists received a series of set-backs recently when President Soekarno decided to allow a Chinese language paper to recommence publishing as a device for mobilizing funds and forces to crush the neo-colonial project, Malaysia, and then appointed, as part of a cabinet regrouping, our deputy chairman, Oei Tjoe Tat,* as Minister of State assisting the cabinet presidium.

The appointment of Oei Tjoe Tat as minister of state clearly demonstrates the policy of Bung Karno as Great Leader of the Revolution, a policy that does not conform with the rumours and “subtle coercion” evident in an effort to

* Oei Tjoe Tat (1922–96), a lawyer, was appointed as Minister without Portfolio attached to the Cabinet Presidium in December 1963. He was a leader of both BAPERKI and PARTINDO and was arrested after the 1965 Coup. He was released in 1978.

have Chinese sportsmen change their names. Those rumours and pressures for changing names are based on the fact that the statutes allow people to change their names.

I say "subtle coercion" because according to reports there are some committees which explain to some sportsmen that changing their names is a condition for becoming a member of the Indonesian contingent. Of course there are some Chinese athletes who give in but there are others who do not yield because they do not believe that rumours and "subtle pressure" represent the official position of the government and of the Republic of Indonesia which is based on the Pantjasila.

Although it was proved later that Chinese athletes like Tan Yoe Hock, Liem Tjeng Kiang, etc., strengthened the Indonesian teams at the Asian Games and, more recently, at the successful GANEFO [Games of New Emerging Forces] arts and sports festival, and no more reports have been heard of proposals or "subtle coercion" for name-changing, there are still obstinate people who endeavour to depict proposals and "subtle pressure" for name-changing as the official policy of the government and the Republic of Indonesia. The appointment of Oei Tjoe Tat as a minister provides the clearest possible evidence that proposals, let alone "subtle coercion", to change names are certainly not national policy which is based on the Pantja Sila. We should all pay careful attention to this matter!

These things are said here not because we oppose the actions of people who voluntarily, out of sincere desire to change the name given to them by their parents, take new names. What is opposed here is the propaganda which tries to give the false impression that changing names is a condition for being accepted as a government employee, a student at a state university, and so on.

While feeling proud and happy that the appointment of Oei Tjoe Tat as a minister of state is evidence that BAPERKI's struggle line is correct, we cannot afford to be negligent. Quite the contrary: we must continually increase our national revolutionary vigilance in the struggle to prevent and eliminate deviations in the endeavour to crush counter-revolution in every form. We must remember that the counter-revolutionaries are obstinate!

— . . —

6-6

The following is the first part of a written interview between the reporter of *Zhongcheng Bao* (Chinese edition of *Warta Bhakti*) and Siau-w Giok Tjhan on the eve of the Indonesian independence day 1964. Since Siau-w did not write Chinese, the original was likely to

be in Indonesian. But *Warta Bhakti* did not have its Indonesian version, therefore this translation has to rely on the Chinese version, published in *Zhongcheng Bao* on 16 August 1964 under the title: "To Participate in the Indonesian Revolution to Realize the Idea of the August Revolution." The article shows that Siau-w has increasingly identified with the P.K.I. It is also significant that Soekarno then had labelled *peranakan* as one of the Indonesian *suku* which gave the BAPERKI a strong justification that there was no need for the *peranakan* Chinese to discard their identity prior to the dissolution of other Indonesian *suku*.

The Problems of Assimilation and Indonesian Citizenship (1964)

Question:

Recently the L.P.K.B. held a discussion on the problem of "assimilation" and "integration" at the P.W.I. Press House. What is your view on the problem? What is your opinion on the progress of the citizenship problem?

Answer:

I completely agree with the views expressed by the Editor-in-Chief of *Harian Rakjat*, Njoto, in that discussion. We have to use the revolutionary dialectic method to understand the term used by President Sukarno in his speech of 15 July 1963. To understand the problem more clearly, it is useful to pay attention to what Njoto said. He said that when he exchanged views with President Sukarno on the terms "assimilation" and "integration", President Sukarno maintained that he did not see any difference between those two terms. The President was of the view that to develop our national solidarity and unity, the most significant thing was that this should be based on equal rights among various ethnic groups (*suku*), including the *peranakan* group (*pu-tzu*, that is, *suku*).

At the same time, we should also pay attention to what Lenin said which was based on the experience of human social history. He argued that after the completion of the World Revolution, the assimilation of various nations (into one new group) will naturally take place. But if we talk about the "assimilation" problem before the completion of the World Revolution, this shows that the advocates of this idea are not only hypocritical but also "intellectual *arnachists*". They should also be called "modern intellectual feudalists". In fact, "assimilation" is a historical process which should not be raised as a problem. If it takes place naturally, it will bear healthy fruit. But if it is unnatural or done by force, it will bear bad fruit.

Presently, there are people who are patent medicine sellers, naturally they utilize — more correctly, they abuse — the existing racial discrimination and violence to propagate their "prescription", that is, "total assimilation". They falsely argue that total assimilation will be very effective in preventing such

incidents from happening again. This kind of propaganda has obviously the following motives: to shift the attention of the Indonesians of foreign origin, especially of Chinese origin, [from the more fundamental problem] to “name-changing” and “intermarriage”, to co-operate with the “indigenous Indonesians” in various enterprises (more correctly, to enter into joint partnerships in business). This would create a fantasy in the mind of Indonesians of Chinese origin that the unreasonable phenomena in the society will be solved. Through this means, they can divorce themselves from completing the socialist revolution initiated by the Indonesian People. Those who advocate “total assimilation” have shifted the attention of Indonesians of Chinese origin from the problem of revolution to other problems. As a matter of fact, as Indonesian citizens who accept *Pantja Sila* and who intend to implement the MANIPOL [Political Manifesto] our task is to arouse the consciousness, understanding, desire, and courage [of our fellow citizens] to participate in the revolution and be actively involved in completing a socialist revolution to realize a society in which there is no exploitation of man by man.

Therefore, instead of wasting time, energy, and money to propagate “name changing”, “intermarriage”, “co-operation with ‘indigenous Indonesians’ in business”, it is better to educate the people to make them realize the following: the elimination of the racial discriminatory action and racial prejudice cannot be separated from the realization of the goal of the Revolution of 17 August 1945.

The existence of the abnormal citizenship problem is a result of a class society where different economic classes generate desires for suppression. We can see this point from the tragic experience of the American Negroes. One hundred years ago, the American President Lincoln liberated the Negroes who were in slavery and made them American citizens with equal rights. But the fact remains that the American Negroes presently do not enjoy equal rights. They are still ruthlessly discriminated against and suppressed.

The struggle experienced by the American Negro cannot be separated from the struggle of American progressive classes in eradicating a society where there is human exploitation, that is, the struggle cannot be divorced from the struggle of making a capitalist society into a socialist one.

Let us pay some attention to the recent racial violence in Singapore. The racial violence in Singapore — similar to the situation in the United States — happened when the revolutionary force was weakening and the reactionary force was becoming strong and restless. Therefore, to prevent the recurrence of racial violence, the only way is to expand and strengthen the revolutionary force, so that the reactionaries — even if they are restless — will not be able to do anything. This is not through “total assimilation” such as “name changing”, “intermarriage”, “co-operation with ‘indigenous Indonesians’ in business”, etc.

Based on this fact, all Indonesian citizens — both “indigenous” and of “foreign descent” — have to strengthen the revolutionary force so that there

will be a society with no human exploitation, no discrimination, no unemployment, no poverty, and no racial prejudice.

We believe that the solution to the citizenship problem cannot be separated from the revolutionary struggle of realizing a socialist society. Therefore, we come to the conclusion that Indonesian citizens, especially those of foreign descent, must join the Indonesian people's revolutionary front to achieve the goals stated in the "Message of the People's Suffering".

To answer the citizenship problem is in fact to talk about the process of the Indonesian revolution.

Since President Sukarno declared the adoption of the 1945 Constitution (on 5 July 1959) and announced "The Rediscovery of Our Revolution" (now it has been called the Political Manifesto), we have made a lot of significant achievements in the political field. Initially, people felt that there was no follow-up after the First Afro-Asian Conference, but after 5 July 1959 many unlawful activities were discovered and stopped. The GANEFO [Games of New Emerging Forces] were held successfully, the Afro-Asian solidarity based on anti-imperialism was consolidated. This has resulted in the need to hold another (the second) Afro-Asian Conference. None the less, the development in the economic field has been far behind the political development.

Recently our experience has proven that the warning of President Sukarno is indeed correct: We have to be more determined to carry out our economic policy of self-reliance.

Regarding the citizenship question in a narrow sense, this can be pointed out: from the legal point of view, because of the implementation of dual nationality treaty regulations, the dual nationality problem of Indonesians of Chinese descent can therefore be said to have been solved. However, if seen from the technical and social point of view this problem is not yet solved. The measures guaranteeing equal rights among citizens have not yet been taken properly. For example, those regulations and ministerial decrees issued before 5 July 1959, which contain racial discrimination, are not yet abolished. These regulations and decrees are in fact neither in accordance with the political development after 5 July 1959 nor with the resolutions of the People's Consultative Assembly (M.P.R.S.) and the Economic Declaration. Apart from this, because of lack of housing, excuses for racial hatred re-emerged. This is due to the fact that Government Servants now have the privilege to purchase houses which were previously owned by the Dutch. But these houses are now being rented by Indonesians of Chinese descent or alien Chinese. Of course they would only move out if they were given houses comparable to the ones they are occupying.

These unreasonable social and economic phenomena would have an unhealthy effect on the political development. Therefore, in order to consolidate the political achievement, it is important to eradicate these unreasonable social and economic phenomena.

6-7

Yap Thiam Hien (1913–89), a leading lawyer and church activist, published the following article in *Sinar Harapan* (25–27 January 1967), in response to various articles written by Christian *peranakans* on the problem of the Chinese minority after the 1965 coup (7-5, 7-6, and 7-7). It appears that Yap still held his pre-1965 view on the Chinese minority: pluralism in Indonesia.

**The Chinese Problem and the Attitude of
Some Christian Leaders of Chinese Descent (1967)**

I

Since about the middle of 1966, *Sinar Harapan* (hereafter, *S.H.*) has been publishing writings on the problems for the Chinese of assimilation, integration, and name-changing, and some of these writings are by Christian leaders of Chinese descent.

In the year just past, on 16 and 18 July 1966, articles entitled “Name and Identity” written by Pek Hien Liang appeared in *S.H.*, Mr. Pek is an exponent from the Jakarta Diocese leadership of the West Java G.K.I. (the Indonesian Christian Church) which in June 1966 decided — not through the Church’s *way of proceeding* — to fight for and propagandize in favour of name-changing, both inside and outside of church gatherings (*jema’ah*). These articles form a kind of explanation of the reasons which he says have become the basis for the decision by the Christian leaders of Chinese origin.

Then one can read the article by Mrs. T.O. Ihromi *S.H.* titled “Assimilation Must Be Made a Success” (*SH* 14 and 17 November 1966) which is a clear and responsible analysis of the concept of assimilation.

In the new year, *S.H.* offered us the essay by a Christian Doctor, Dr. Oey Yan Hong, entitled “The Integration of the Minority with the Majority Must Take Place in Accordance with the Laws of Nature” (*S.H.* 4 and 7 January 1967).

This article received replies of support, the first from Lukito Handojo S. TH (if I am not mistaken, his name was previously Ds. Lie King Han S. TH., priest and secretary of the Synod of the Jakarta Diocese of the West Java G.K.I.) with an article headed “Integration and Its Challenges” (*S.H.* 10 and 11 January 1967); the second from Jahja Wullur, the former Drs. Oey Tjin San (if I am not mistaken, psychologist and member of the G.K.I. Calvinist in Bandung) with his articles in *S.H.* of 17 and 18 January 1967 entitled “The Integration of the Minority with the Majority According to the Law of Nature — Assimilation”; and the third from Sufwandi Mangkudilaga with an article entitled “The Law of Nature and the Minority Problem” (*S.H.* 19 January 1967).

Now, as a member of the West Java G.K.I. and as an opponent of this decision and the attitude of certain clergymen, theologians, and church offi-

cials from the aforementioned church, I ask for consideration and a hearing for my reaction to the six writings mentioned above taken as a whole. In any case, because of the limitations of space, naturally only the main issues will be dealt with and will be dealt with briefly.

Individually and as a whole, the six articles mentioned above display many positive elements. The positive aspects which they share are that they:

- (1) have provided clarification concerning the process of assimilation which had been obscured by confusing views;
- (2) have pointed towards the conditions that must be fulfilled for the growth of assimilation/integration to be successful and towards the conditions and attitudes that hamper the process, including coercion, whether in a harsh or gentle form;
- (3) are convinced that all concerned parties must work together in the general interest to make a success of the process of assimilating/integrating the Chinese minority with the *pribumi* majority, that is, a Government with a wise assimilation/integration policy based on the results of scientific research and planning accompanied by the education of the *pribumi* majority to have a "receptive" and "open" attitude and of the minority to have a "willing" and "open" attitude.

(N.B. The interpretation of the process of assimilation given by Mrs. Ihromi SH was identified by the other writers as the process of integration and this in my opinion is not quite correct.)

Nevertheless, I believe that the six articles concerned also display negative characteristics.

After analysing the meaning and connection between identity and name, Pek Hien Liang produces a theory which, apart from having no basis in fact, is very provocative. A summary of his theory is as follows: the identity of a Chinese minority hinders the process of unity of the Indonesian nation and, according to Mr. Pek, his theory shows, and I draw your attention to this: it is not because of active and conscious steps taken by the Chinese minority but because of certain views and attitudes held by the majority towards Chinese identity.

Mr. Pek does not examine either the logic or the ethnical basis of his theory; on the contrary he believes and proposes that as a positive step in the effort to help build national unity, the Chinese minority should be willing and happy to abolish the obstacle, that is, their Chinese identity, by discarding all their Chineseness, beginning with changing their Chinese names to non-Chinese ones.

In order to make these efforts successful, it would be best if the name-changing was done jointly on a large scale and was led by Church leaders as the fulfilment of their Christian calling in building national unity.

Mrs. Ihromi SH touched on the reality of "pluralism" on the *countenance* of the Indonesian nation, symbolized by the slogan *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (Unity in Diversity). But she does not analyse this principle in relation to the assimilation/integration of the Chinese minority with the *pribumi* majority.

She also does not discuss whether the process of assimilation of other groups of foreign descent (Arabs, Dutch, Indians, Pakistanis) is progressing satisfactorily and why.

Dr. Oey Yan Hong, in using the term "integration", draws attention to "the laws of nature" which determine the process of integration/assimilation but does not discuss the incidents which have hampered this process in the past.

The Rev. Lukito Handojo S. Th. wishes to solve the Chinese problem within his generation so that he won't be criticized by his "children" and "younger brothers and sisters"; and also in order not to allow an opportunity for negative influences on the process of integration such as the misuse of power, private interests, and groups who cause "anxiety and disquiet which burden life". But he has forgotten to explain the reasons for this anxiety and disquiet or to state concretely what or who has brought about these negative influences.

What is most regrettable is the fact that our theological scholars and priests do not apply their theological vision to the problem of assimilations / integration and also do not give their Christian leadership and office to the men connected with the Chinese problem which oppresses the human spirit.

Jahja Wullur has mentioned the "poison" of BAPERKI, the P.K.I., racialism, and fascism as obstacles to the process of assimilation/integration of the Chinese minority. If Mr. Wullur really is a psychologist, then in my opinion a contribution from him in the form of a sociological-psychological analysis of the Chinese problem and of the influences of Communism, fascism, racism on the process of assimilation/integration will be of greater benefit to the efforts to solve this problem than kicking defeated enemies whom perhaps he never opposed himself when they held power.

Sufwandi Mangkudilaga is a writer who in the twinkling of an eye connects moral principles, the basic brotherhood and equality of man with the solution for the Chinese minority. He does not elaborate further, however, on the connection. This is really regrettable.

II

The Chinese problem is a human problem, a problem of the relations between man and man and of the life of men together. Specifically, it is a problem of the correct relations between individuals and between groups from the Chinese minority and the *pribumi* majority and also the problem of how those individuals and groups can best live together. The relations and way of living together depend on the spiritual attitude of the two groups which is rooted in each group's view of man and in its view of their differing lives. Nevertheless, we possess and acknowledge principles which order our social and national life, that is, Pancasila Democracy, the Basic Rights of Man and the Rule of Law. And something which is above all of that: The Rule of the Will of God!!!

It is now clear that our writers did not try to analyse the Chinese problem from the point of view of the principles mentioned above.

This is the essentially negative nature of these particular articles.

Every scientific discovery is needed to understand and solve human problems. Nevertheless, Christians in general have long believed that considering human problems on a lateral basis alone is not satisfactory because the root of all human problems is to be found in the problem of communication with God. According to teaching and experience, the apostolate and pastorate — which, according to Reformation teachings are the duty both of the clergy and the laity — call for all to ask themselves “what is the will of God for me in facing this problem”; and the will of God is revealed to us by the Holy Spirit through the Bible, that is, if we have a true relationship with our God. And this true relationship is to have a humble and obedient attitude. Obedience to God means loving all human beings, including friends and enemies, people of our own race and foreigners.

Loving all human beings means also that we should protect against and oppose all falsity, injustice, oppression, and ill-treatment that strike us according to the ways willed by God. It also means looking for and approaching unfortunate people, including our enemies and foreigners, to comfort them with the word of God. It does not mean keeping ourselves apart from them or shutting our hearts to their cries of sufferings . . . * Fulfilling this command of love is more than submitting to the demands of our race or class, more than the drive and pressure of our instincts to make life safe and peaceful. We must not forget that for us Christians suffering in the Name of God — which means for all of us together — is something which has the approval of God (Peter 2:20).

With a variation on Corinthians 13:3, one can perhaps caution: Even if I change my name and can unite the Indonesian nation by assimilating/ integrating the Chinese minority with the *pribumi* majority, *If I do not love*, then surely it will be of no benefit to me whatsoever.

To be able to evaluate whether or not it is good to change one's name, Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent, especially priests and theologians, should look at the problem in the light of the socio-political situation and environment at the time when name-changing became a problem.

After taking the decision to initiate name-changing, meetings between priests and several members of the Jakarta Diocese of the West Java G.K.I. synod announced that they had held meetings and made decisions in “the situation of our country at this time (which) stimulates us . . . to discuss social and interpersonal relations in our society (*Penghubung*, 3 July 1966).

From these words alone, we can make a guess. If we can add to this what L. Handojo S. Th. meant but was not brave enough to state clearly in the words which have already been quoted above: “the anxiety and disquiet which burden life etc.”, by putting “racialism and fascism” from Jahja Wullur, then

* At this point, an incomplete sentence in the original text, has been left out in this translation.

what is actually meant by the situation and environment becomes clearer. It is none other than *Anti-Chinese (Sinophobic)* attitude and behaviour.

This Sinophobia is one element of "*zenophobia*" (hatred of foreigners) which is one of the characteristics of nationalism. In the framework of "the complete elimination of the Gestapu and the P.K.I. and their fellow-travellers", Chinese both with P.R.C. and Kuomintang citizenship (stateless) and Indonesian citizens in several parts of our country were hit at the foundations. In the meantime, long-standing feelings — hatred, jealousy (based on disappointment in the competition for trade, for example) — also played their role. Disappointment and frustration experienced in the social and political fields from recent times also had to find an opening to express itself. Fault had to be found and usually one looks for it outside of oneself, and one looks for a "scapegoat". The scapegoat figure is a universal symptom because it is inherent in human nature.

So hatred burned against the Chinese, a hatred that did not really care about distinguishing between foreign-Chinese and Indonesian-Chinese.

Pribumis who are sympathetic towards Chinese with Indonesian citizenship rekindled the idea of name-changing advocated by the assimilationist group about ten years ago. Their intentions were good, that is, to be able to distinguish between Chinese of foreign citizenship and those of Indonesian citizenship so that they could look after those with the same citizenship. This element of sympathy is perhaps also found in the gentle pressure to persuade Chinese of Indonesian citizenship to renounce together the P.R.C., to change their names, wear "indigenous" Indonesian clothes . . . also in this light that we must see the decision of the Presidium of the AMPERA Cabinet which came into effect on the date of its promulgation, 1 January 1967, and which provided a cheap and easy opportunity to change foreign (read: Chinese) names.

But this decision *Does Not Oblige* Indonesian citizens of foreign descent to change their names!!!

III

This anti-Chinese social climate and environment is the background to the passion of Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent for getting rid of their names. "Chinese Identity" (Mr. Pek) constitutes a danger to the life and possessions of Indonesian citizens of Chinese origin, a threat to the peace and tranquillity of their own lives and the lives of their families. It also forms an obstacle to trading, working, becoming a student or undergraduate, and so on. Chinese identity disturbs one's thoughts, as well as one's waking and sleeping, makes one feel uneasy at home and even more so in the streets. Each minute it feels as though the world around is reminding one of one's hated and suspected Chinese identity. Each word, each move by indigenous Indonesians, is suspected of having dubious motives. In short, being Chinese is felt to be a *Thorn in the Side*. And whenever biological instincts are aroused, the

instinct for self-preservation makes itself heard, life itself is felt to be threatened and, at that time, the words of the Apostle Paul are no longer heard.

Thus the Bible also says: the thorn must be plucked out and thrown away in order to survive. Like Peter who also wanted to survive, who didn't want to die with Christ.

In times of danger chameleons can change their colour, but man cannot. But man has the intelligence not to despair. He can avoid threats and danger by changing his clothes, changing his alliances, changing his loyalties. He can also change his Chinese name. And he can also keep himself as far away as possible from areas of danger, that is, from the Chinese, or he can revile and persecute the Chinese. And in this way, people think that they can buy peace and quiet for their lives. There are also certain Christians who think that they can calm and silence the voice of their conscience or deceive others with the slogans "to build national unity" or "to fulfil the Christian calling". But the greater the number and the emptier the arguments that are voiced to present favourably or give approval to desires or actions which are open to criticism (rationalization), the more apparent become the dubious motives. In the subconsciousness of all desires for name-changing, there is in fact the *Ego-centrism* needed by the *Self-Preservation Drive* which appears every time there is a situation of danger to one's life.

But name-changing will not satisfy racialism. It will certainly not be source of happiness and respect for the good *pribumis* who can think rationally.

In the building of national unity, name-changing has absolutely no meaning or use. It would be extremely naive to think that name-changing constitutes a positive step towards the process of national unity. Similarly, the process of assimilation/integration of the Chinese minority with the *pribumi* majority is not a condition *sine qua non* for national unity. This depends on other more numerous and more complex factors.

Then what is the use of name-changing? Name-changing is only useful for those who wish to achieve a personal, egoistic purpose: to protect their position, trade, guarantees of entry into school/university and guarantees for the future. All idealists who have changed their Chinese names can protest at these harsh words, but idealism too can be deceived by "hidden desires", can be a victim of "self-deception".

Name-changing in itself is a personal right and liberty. There is not one person or authority that can force a person to use this name or that name. But as with rights and liberties, name-changing can be abused. For example, in a critical situation, changing one's name has the purpose or the effect of drawing a dividing-line between "those who are patriotic and those who are not patriotic" or between "those who fulfil the call of Christianity and those who don't fulfil the call of Christianity". This is an attitude of "patting oneself on the back" (self-righteousness). And if the purpose and effect of changing one's Chinese name is to draw oneself apart from Chinese people because they are disapproved of, then this action is an abuse of the apostolate and the pastorate. It is also not an attitude for a person who loves his people and his

country. [A patriot should work towards] peaceful, just, and free relations between individuals and between groups in Indonesian society as a reflection of the Peace, Justice, and Liberty of God. He [the man who loves his country] fights so that shrieks and cries of hunger or of an oppressed spirit will be rarely heard in the Indonesian state and society, so that human values, "Human Rights", are acknowledged and respected not only in regard to every Indonesian but also in regard to every foreigner who seeks protection under the Indonesian government. He struggles so that the name of the Indonesian state and nation becomes renowned and respected by all nations, and so that the Indonesian state and nation is not criticized for racialism, fascism, or the violation of basic human rights or international rights. He strives to foster noble personal qualities such as loyalty to God and to religious or ideological principles and a willingness to defend those principles at any sacrifice or risk. A person who loves the Indonesian people and nation also has the courage to point out the mistakes of his people and country and to point out the ways and methods of rectifying these mistakes. All this demands the replacement of egoism with altruism, the replacement of the instinct for self-preservation with the willingness to promote the general interest and welfare. But it does not demand the changing of names.

Whoever loves his people and country in this way will also understand and respect other people's "love of their ancestral land", and will appreciate and respect other people's culture.

And love for one's people's culture and country is in fact none other than an extension of love for one's equals (*sesamanya*), for those persons whom God puts in our path in our daily lives. And this is one and the same as love of God who first loved us.

"Blessed are those who mourn, for they shall be comforted."

"Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy."

"Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called sons of God".

"Blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness' sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven."

(Matthew 5: 4, 7, 9, 10)

_____ . . . _____

6-8

Kwik Kian Gie (b. 1935) was born in Juwana, Java. He studied at the Faculty of Economics at UI, Jakarta and obtained a Drs. degree from a Dutch University in Rotterdam in 1963. In 1987 he established the Institute Business Indonesia. Kwik has been active in politics. Known as an effective speaker, he joined the PDI and participated in the 1987 parliamentary election but was defeated. Between 1987

and 1992 he was a member of MPR working committee, representing the PDI. He is the chairman of the Research and Development Body of the PDI. He has been a frequent contributor to *Kompas* and has published several books. The following is the translation of his article published in *Kompas* on 5 December 1983.

Does a Problem of Assimilation of *Pri* and Non-*Pri* Still Exist?

What has been known as the problem of "assimilation" ("*pembauran*") of non-*pri* (non-indigenous) into *pri* (indigenous) has long and too often been discussed by various parties on various occasions. The more we talk about the problem, the further we seem to be from solving it. Many attempts have been made to operationalise the assimilation of the non-*pri* into the *pri*, but the interpretation of the term "assimilation" has varied.

In my article "Implementation of the Concept of Assimilation in Reality" (*Kompas* 6 August 1982), I proposed several ways of operationalising the concept. After they had all been done, its leading proponents, while continuing to talk about it, thought that assimilation was even further from realization.

In my article, I highlighted obscurities and dilemmas in the understanding and interpretation of the concept of assimilation on the part of these proponents themselves, as being responsible for their belief that assimilation had failed, despite attempts over ten years to put it into operation.

In the present article I want to highlight some other quite important aspects which have so far never been given close scrutiny. These aspects include the question whether it is really true that the non-*pri* have not yet assimilated into the surrounding community? If they have not, who is it who feels that they have not yet assimilated? Has any assessment ever been made that *pribumi* find the presence of non-*pri* in their locality to be disturbingly exclusive? Can these questions be answered without knowing first what is meant by assimilation?

Some say such questions cannot be answered before we know the meaning of the assimilation which the wider community desires. From my article of 6 August 1982 it seems clear that the proponents of assimilation themselves are unclear about what they would regard as acceptable "assimilation". They each have their own different criteria for assessing whether or not assimilation has been achieved, such as whether name-changing has occurred, whether foreign languages no longer are spoken in the home, whether they are no longer engaged in trade, whether they have married with *pribumi*, whether they have embraced the majority religion of the place where they live, and so forth. It seems to be unproductive to keep circling around the problem before giving it further analysis.

We can take a more productive approach. My point of departure is the tension between *pri* and non-*pri* caused by the lack of assimilation of the non-*pri*. We can divide such tensions into different sectors of interaction between *pri* and non-*pri*.

- A. Interaction between *pri* and non-*pri* in the course of making a living. Their contact with one another is as buyers and sellers of goods and services. There has never been any tension felt in this sector. Garages owned by non-*pri* never refuse to repair cars owned by *pribumi* because they are *pribumi*: owners of Padang restaurants never refuse customers who come to eat in their restaurants because the customers are non-*pri*. *Pri* do not object to go shopping in shops owned by non-*pri*. In large scale business there are many joint ventures between *pri* and non-*pri*. There are also many large scale businesses owned by *pri* who employ non-*Pri* as key managers. Thus in the sector of making a living or doing business, relations between *pri* and non-*pri* are close, or, at the very least, run well and smoothly.
- B. Neighbourly interaction between *pri* and non-*pri* in the context of RT and RW (neighbourhood associations). In this sector too, we practically never hear complaints that non-*pri* are hated by their neighbours. Non-*pri* are usually regarded by their *pri* neighbours to be peaceful citizens, compliant ("*nurut*"), and even rather timid ("*takut-takut*") lest their actions disturb their neighbours. Often we see *pri* and non-*pri* children visiting one another, and playing intimately together in each other's homes. So we do not see any evidence of tension between *pri* and non-*pri* among neighbours.

Of course there are always some people whose behaviour toward their neighbours is peculiar and irritating. There will always be some non-*pri* of that kind, too. But even though there are some non-*pri* whose behaviour is peculiar, their peculiarity is not caused by their non-*pri*-ness, but because they really are peculiar people. So too it is quite possible to find a *pri* who is peculiar and always upsetting his neighbours.

- C. Interaction between *pri* and non-*pri* in the context of a shared religion or pastime. We have never heard of conflict between *pri* and non-*pri* in a church, a mosque or any other place of worship. Similarly in clubs for sport, chess and bridge, relations between *pri* and non-*pri* are very close. So in this context, too, we have never heard that non-*pri* in the midst of *pri* are disliked or experience discrimination.

In what context, then, does there exist a problem of *pri* and non-*pri*, particularly a serious one? One hears that it is serious in the context of small groups of people who are holding a discussion or a seminar. There are two such groups, as follows.

- D. Business seminars held by *pri* businessmen who demand restrictions on the business role of the non-*pri* so that the *pri* can become "masters in their own country". The strange thing is that many of these leading-*pri* businessmen have joint ventures with non-*pri* and many of them have non-*pri* key managers. My suspicion is that these voices are caught up in a current and a fashion created by another group, namely the professional assimilation group. The suspicion is stronger because

when we talk with these leading *pri* businessmen, almost all of them say that they have close non-*pri* friends who they regard as having assimilated. However, they always say that these assimilated non-*pri* friends are really exceptions, and they usually do not know the people who are not the exceptions. So the bad image which comes to them is not based on their own bitter experience (because they did not know them) but is based upon what they have heard or read. What is the source of what they have heard and read? The source is the sector of interaction between *pri* and non-*pri* which follows.

- E. The very small group of assimilation proponents themselves. This group often holds seminars to meet leaders of our country, to give interviews to various mass media. Here, what is discussed has to be about assimilation where the discussion would be less exciting if they are all convinced that in the community tension between *pri* and non-*pri* is not serious. Hence during such discussions, the problem of assimilation and the tension between *pri* and non-*pri* tend to be dramatised. The basis for the existence of this group is the existence of tension between *pri* and non-*pri*. Even if in various sectors of interaction between *pri* and non-*pri* there is no tension (as has been suggested above), in the discussion and seminar rooms there is a tendency to pretend that there is. Dramatic tension between *pri* and non-*pri* which has a living presence in the discussion and seminar rooms, is then reported by the mass media. The community reads it and then believes that it actually exists and is serious.

Usually those who take part in the discussions about the assimilation problem are leaders or semi-leaders of the community, whose opinions are noticed by the mass media. So their opinions, no matter how little they might reflect social reality, still receive considerable coverage. Their voices are quite piercing and are noticed by the community through the mass media. They are the *vocal minority* who play a part in influencing the fate of the *silent majority*. So their responsibility is weighty. If what the *vocal minority* discusses corresponds closely to reality, then their discussions are very useful. But if it does not, it is most likely that they will unconsciously slip into unrealistic premises and assumptions just to liven up the discussion and for their own sense of self-importance.

As explained above, my subjective survey showed that in the wider community, there is no longer a disturbing tension between *pri* and non-*pri*. The journal *Tempo* of 30 October 1982 published a review of the book by Claudine Salmon *Literature in Malay by the Chinese of Indonesia: A provisional annotated bibliography*. The review stated that "since the 1960s the *peranakan* community has been so assimilated that it no longer possesses special reading except for *cerita silat*". We all know that *cerita silat* have become a universal enjoyment and passion. Our government permits the circulation of *silat* videocassettes. Their language is now English with Indonesian text.

So the conclusion in the social sectors A, B and C above is that the assimilation problem and tension between *pri* and non-*pri* is no longer perceptible, while in sector D it is only caught up in a current. In fact quite a lot have become artists, married with *pribumi*, joined ABRI, become scientists, etc without their boasting about it. The pity is that those who brag that the problem is critical are the proponents of assimilation themselves, so that the problem then becomes real as a *state of mind*. The problem which is so tense and sharp exists only in the imagination of certain thinkers, and is then broadcast loudly through the mass media.

Even more tragic is that these proponents of assimilation do not recognise how successful their efforts have been. In my opinion, the fact that tension between *pri* and non-*pri* no longer exists as I have discussed above is due to the success of the work of these proponents of assimilation during the period since Indonesian independence. Yet after the community itself has assimilated so that tension no longer exists, thanks to their suggestions, advice and appeals, the proponents themselves still perceive high tension in their discussion and seminar rooms.

Then what about various government policies which still use [racial] descent as their criterion, such as the Bank of Indonesia circular, the Presidential Decision No. 14A, the special identifying sign used for the administration of population for the non-*pri*, the restrictions on the acceptance of students to state universities, etc? Doesn't this show that the government still does not want to accept non-*pri* on the same basis as the *pri*? Even more serious, what about the Semarang-Solo affair? Isn't this a manifestation of tension between *pri* and non-*pri*? I do not close my eyes to such indications and events. I am not saying that tension between *pri* and non-*pri* has been absolutely and completely eliminated.

What I want to say is that in everyday life within the wider community, tension between *pri* and non-*pri* is now almost imperceptible, whereas the mass media carry the opinions of the proponents of assimilation which convey the impression that there is a serious problem in the community. Thus there is a gap between the quite harmonious reality in the community and the quite dramatic voices of the proponents of assimilation.

Another matter which I want to advance is that there are always excesses to be found in every nation on earth. So if the community affected feels that the Bank of Indonesia circular, Presidential Decision No. 14A and so on are temporary and acceptable excesses, these excesses should be allowed to disappear by themselves. So too with the Semarang-Solo incident. Saddening as such an incident is, it is an excess which will erupt quickly from time to time and will disappear quickly too. It is more saddening if once the incident has disappeared, it is perpetuated in our *state of mind*.

If the accuracy of my view is doubted, the proponents of assimilation should for the time being focus their activities on research, investigation, and giving clear definitions of meaning which they can make a starting point for their

proposals to the government. But if my view is thought to be accurate, the proponents of assimilation should seek out more important and constructive development activities. Because to think about our national progress, together with the whole nation, constitutes true assimilation.

— Translated by Charles A. Coppel —

6-9

The following is the Indonesian translation of Kwik Kian Gie's article published in *Liberty* No. 1579 (7 January 1984). It is the continuation of his earlier article published in *Kompas* (Please see 6-8).

Once More About Assimilation (1984)

It is not that the problem of tension between *pri* and non-*pri* does not exist at all.

This article is meant as a reply to oral reactions made to me in connection with my article in *Kompas* on 5 December 1983 with the title: "Does a problem of assimilation of *pri* and non-*pri* still exist?"

Because many readers of this magazine may not have read my article. I should begin by setting out its main points. In the article I analysed various interactions between *pri* and non-*pri* in several important sectors, namely interaction in making a living or in the context of buying and selling goods and services: interaction in the context of RT and RW (neighbourhood associations) in neighbourly life: and interaction in the context of shared religious observance and pastimes. In all these sectors of social interaction I observed the existence of good and harmonious relations between *pri* and non-*pri*. But why was it that in our mass media we always seemed to read of serious tension in the community between *pri* and non-*pri*? I came to the conclusion that this tension did not in fact exist. But the mass media gave reports of a small group of people who had perhaps unconsciously become professional assimilation proponents, who were too keen on the topic of assimilation, so that they continually discussed it as if the problem was very serious just to liven up the discussion. Whereas in everyday life in the wider community, tension has become almost imperceptible. The reaction I received was that in reality there still were special identifying signs on non-*pri* KTP (identity cards), there still was a Bank of Indonesia Circular prohibiting state banks giving certain kinds of credit to non-*pri* businessmen, even if the businessmen concerned were very small, weak and poor. The reality was that there still was a policy to limit

the number of non-*pri* students accepted into state higher education institutions. So the reality was that there still was discrimination based purely on [racial] ancestry. Social explosions such as the Semarang-Solo affair, which erupted against Chinese non-*pri*, still existed in reality. As I also mentioned in my article. I was not shutting my eyes to such realities. In the article I tended to regard such policies and occurrences as excesses. Here I shall go into this more deeply.

It is not that the problem of tension between *pri* and non-*pri* does not exist at all. The problem does exist. But it is my opinion that since independence we have made rapid progress in the field of national union and unity (*persatuan dan kesatuan bangsa*). In everyday life the problem is almost imperceptible. I am concerned that this problem, which in everyday life has become almost imperceptible, is being constantly revived and worsened by a small group of assimilation proponents, who seem to be increasingly out of touch with the concrete realities of life in the community. What is important for me is whether such excesses are still within acceptable limits. No human being is perfect. So too there is no perfect national or community life. Everywhere in the world there exist phenomena of racialism which treat fellow citizens in a discriminatory way, based purely on ancestry. Or based on special features of a group. Even in Western Europe, where there is such a long tradition of independent nations, and where nations always pride themselves on being very humanitarian and opposed to racialism, there nowadays begins to develop a racialism which has taken very worrying forms. For me the important thing is not a perfect society which will never come about or a utopian society, but rather what is the most which can be achieved.

Another aspect put to me was that I overlooked the sector of interaction between non-*pri* and government institutions in the context of gaining access to *public services* [sic]. Many non-*pri* feel that, as compared with *pri*, they have more trouble in government institutions when they have to go through immigration and customs at the airport, or when they have to get a KTP (identity card) and other letters or permits from government authorities. In this connection, I would suggest that these experiences need to be assessed in proportion. Did they have trouble because they were non-*pri* or was it because the relevant officials expected to be given something which was not understood by those concerned, or which those concerned were unwilling to give? There are many *pri* who complain about the widespread use of 'lubrication money' (*uang pelicin*) and the commercialisation of government functions. Officials are certainly embarrassed to ask for it openly. Their method is to be cruel and to make difficulties, so that those affected will come to understand by themselves what is intended. It is very easy for non-*pri* to experience such treatment as discriminatory on account of their non-*pri*-ness. On the other hand, in so many cases we can see that a non-*pri* gets special treatment because he gives or offers something.

Finally, a suggestion about an institution which can calm things down considerably if the composition of its personnel and its behaviour are im-

proved. The institution is the BAKOM-PKB (Communication Body for the Appreciation of National Unity). This body was intended to be a body to advise the Minister of Home Affairs in his function to protect and strengthen national union and unity. So it is appropriate that its members should be leaders who are thinkers of substance, who periodically carry out profound research and discussions with discretion. The results form a useful input for the Minister of Home Affairs. Recently the composition of the personnel of BAKOM-PKB has no longer been satisfactory. And their behaviour has been misguided, giving various kinds of explanation here and there in a very amateurish way without adequate supporting evidence. This has happened even without prior communication with the Minister of Home Affairs. It seems that the time is ripe for the personnel of BAKOM-PKB to be tidied up and their mode of operation put in order, so that it can function seriously as an advisory body to a minister.

— Translated by Charles A. Coppel —

• •

7

The Assimilationists

BAPERKI's adversary was a smaller group which favoured "complete assimilation". This group, which was later known as the Institute for the Promotion of National Unity (Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa or L.P.K.B.), often claimed Liem Koen Hian and his P.T.I. as the "father" of the assimilationist ideas, although Liem before the war was advocating "political assimilation" rather than "total assimilation" *a la* the L.P.K.B. In 1950 Liem Koen Hian and other indigenous Indonesians established the Union of Indonesian Forces (Persatuan Tenaga Indonesia), a short-lived multi-racial party, in opposition to the ethnic Chinese party the Chinese Union (Persatuan Tionghoa) (7-1).

Only in 1952 some *peranakan* Chinese advocated dissolution of Chinese organizations/parties and joined the *pribumi*-dominated organizations/parties. One of the leaders was Lauw Chuan Tho, an economics graduate student in the Netherlands who proposed the dissolution of the Chung Hwa Hui — Netherlands and similar ethnic Chinese organizations (7-2). The assimilationist movement came to a peak when ten *peranakan* leaders declared "complete assimilation" as the solution of the Chinese minority problem in 1960 followed by the "Assimilation Charter" issued in 1961 (7-5). Lauw Chuan Tho, Ong Hok Ham (a history student, 7-3), and Tjung Tin Jan (a leading Catholic lawyer, 7-4) were some exponents of this movement.

The assimilationist movement did not develop rapidly during the Sukarno era due to the existence of BAPERKI. But soon after the 1965 coup, BAPERKI was banned, and the assimilationists began their offensive, promoting the complete assimilation of Indonesian Chinese. Jahja Wullur (alias Oey Tjin San, a university lecturer) and Pek Hien Liang (a church activist), for instance, argued the importance of assimilation and adoption of Indonesian names for Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent (7-6, 7-7). Yap Thiam Hien, a pluralist, responded to this assimilationist challenge (6-7). Junus Jahja, an assimilationist who became a Muslim in 1979, saw Chinese conversion to Islam as the only solution to the Chinese problem (7-8).

_____ . . . _____

7-1

Liem Koen Hian (1896—1952), the founder of the pre-war P.T.I., disagreed with the Persatuan Tionghoa and established the Persatuan Tenaga Indonesia (Union of Indonesian Forces). The

following was his opening speech at the meeting to establish the party held on 26 February 1950.

The Need for a New Political Party (1950)

We are establishing this party to meet the demands of our times.

The fact that, without being asked, the Federal Republic of Indonesia (R.I.S.) has decided to make all Chinese born in Indonesia citizens of the Federal Republic of Indonesia has created a situation unprecedented in the history of this country.

On the one hand, by this decision full citizenship is given to all *peranakan* Chinese who in the past were Dutch subjects but who were at the same time considered foreigners and discriminated against at every opportunity. On the other hand, by recognizing them as citizens, legal recognition is given to the existence in this country of two groups of Chinese residents which must be distinguished from each other on the basis of the essential differences that exist between them, namely, the group of *peranakan* Chinese and that of *totok* Chinese: the *peranakans* who are citizens of the Federal Republic of Indonesia and the *totoks* who remain foreigners in this country. But up to this moment both groups have been considered as constituting a single entity, namely, the Chinese minority group.

The new situation has brought with it deep and far-reaching changes, but nevertheless only a few people understand the fundamental changes which have been brought about by the new situation. Only a few people understand that there is an urgent need for them to adapt themselves to the new situation.

All the associations and organizations established before the birth of the Federal Republic of Indonesia — based on the idea that all the Chinese who live here, irrespective of whether they are *totok* or *peranakan*, form one single Chinese minority group, an idea which had its basis in Dutch colonial policy and which was hammered in by the Dutch to sow discord and make it easier for them to rule this country — are still in existence and still operating on the basis of the same idea.

For this reason no attention is paid to the interests of the citizens of Chinese descent, with the result that confusion is mounting and the misunderstanding and bad feelings that exist between them and the indigenous Indonesian citizens are growing from day to day. For example, there is the *Persatuan Tionghoa* (Chinese Union) which was established with Van Mook's blessings. Just like the defunct *Chung Hwa Hui* (Chinese Association), the *Persatuan Tionghoa* was slavishly serving the Dutch Government in the expectation of receiving all kinds of rewards from that government. The best proof that this party was established in accordance with the wishes of the Dutch colonialists is that this party has written into its constitution the aim of struggling in defence of federalism. As everybody knows, federalism was invented by Van Mook to counter the spirit of unity of the Republic, so that there will continue

to be discord in the country and there will continue to exist several groups based on racism, which, if needs be, can be incited to fight each other with the Dutch colonialists watching on the sidelines and egging them on.

In the recent past it was this party which represented the peranakan group in political matters.

Now the Dutch colonial government has ceased to exist, but the Persatuan Tionghoa is still representing the peranakan group on the basis of the same political principles it subscribed to during the time when the Dutch colonial government was still in existence. Is it surprising, then, that the Indonesian people continue to identify the peranakan Chinese with Dutch colonialism, with the result that many things have happened which were unpleasant to the peranakan?

Several peranakan Chinese took part in the subversive movement against the Federal Republic of Indonesia led by Westerling. Has the Persatuan Tionghoa ever denounced the participation of peranakan in such movements? Never!

What has the Persatuan Tionghoa done to solve the numerous problems which involve the interests of the peranakan, for instance, in solving the immigration and re-entry problems faced by the peranakans who are now stranded abroad? What has the Persatuan Tionghoa done to promote good and close relations between the peranakan Chinese and the other citizens of the Federal Republic of Indonesia who are not of Chinese descent? Nothing at all!

I believe that the leaders of the Persatuan Tionghoa are good and well-intentioned people, but they do not understand politics and are incapable of doing anything because they are bound to a party which came into being with the support of the Dutch colonialists, and which was originally established to aid the Dutch colonialists in opposing the independence movement of the Indonesian people.

There is the Chinese Lawyers' Association based in Jakarta, which, not long after the First Military Action, sent a cable to the Security Council at Lake Success, asking the United Nations not to grant independence to Indonesia under any circumstances. The cable was published in several Chinese-Indonesian newspapers.

There is also the Association of University-educated Chinese based in Jakarta, which up to now is still afraid to accept reality, to accept the fact that Dutch colonial rule has come to an end. Perhaps they are still hoping for the return of colonial rule.

For the above-mentioned reasons there is need for another party which will clearly demonstrate that not all peranakan Chinese are of the calibre of the Persatuan Tionghoa, the Chinese Lawyers' Association and the Association of University-educated Chinese.

At the same time it is necessary to set an example as to how all citizens of the Federal Republic of Indonesia, irrespective of their racial origins, can now work together in unity within one organization.

This is the reason why the Union of Indonesian Forces (Persatuan Tenaga Indonesia) is opening its doors to all citizens of the Federal Republic of Indonesia, irrespective of their racial origins, as long as they hold the same views and have the same aims.

7-2

Lauw Chuan Tho (Junus Jahja, b. 1927), born in Jakarta, received an economics degree from Rotterdam University. While in the Netherlands, he was active in the student movement, favouring complete assimilation of Indonesian Chinese students into the indigenous population. He continued his assimilation campaign after he returned to Indonesia in 1960. He was associated with the L.P.K.B. and is presently active in BAKOM P.K.B. The following is the speech he made on 2 October 1952 at the Chung Hwa Hui meeting in Rotterdam, advocating the dissolution of ethnic Chinese organizations.

Why should the Chung Hwa Hui and Similar Organizations be Dissolved? (1952)

Before answering the question, let us first ask whether the continuation of the Chung Hwa Hui (C.H.H.)* and similar organizations is still of benefit to us and whether [their] existence is right and appropriate at the present moment.

From the exchange of ideas among the various fellow Chinese, it is indeed felt by some of these Chinese that there should at least be a change in the organization status of the C.H.H. and similar organizations, but these Chinese continue to uphold the right of the Baba's organizations to exist, which is considered necessary to surpass the period of transition. What is desired and intended is that the C.H.H. and similar organizations are only intended for the well-being and needs of the specific new Indonesian citizens. These organizations should co-exist with "other" Indonesian associations (that is, Indonesian associations which are intended for just the indigenous Indone-

* The Chung Hwa Hui-Nederland or the Chinese Association (Netherlands), an Indonesian Chinese students' organization in the Netherlands was established in 1911. It was China-oriented. Towards the end of 1931, a group of peranakan students led by Tjoa Sik Ien, Tan Ling Djie and Teng Tjin Leng broke away from the C.H.H.-Nederland and founded an Indonesian-oriented rival organization: the Sarekat Peranakan Tionghoa Indonesia. After Indonesia's independence, the C.H.H.-Nederland was further weakened by an internal split.

sians). The two kinds of organizations should work together and relate to one another, until the time comes when it is necessary that both be fused and united in one organization. Is it not true that even in Indonesia the Baba groups still have their own organizations? For instance, the Partai Demokrat Tionghoa-Indonesia (P.D.T.I.), the Ta Hsüeh Hsüeh Sheng Hui (Chinese University Students' Association), the Chung Lien Hui (Chinese Secondary School Students' Association), etc.

Why should We Here [Netherlands] be at Variance

Is it not true that the above situation is still prevailing, and that it is very possible that a "vacuum" will be created when in such a situation the C.H.H. [and other Chinese associations] are dissolved and we were to join the P.P.I. (Persatuan Peladjar Indonesia),* for instance?

Do those "radicals" realize that such a radical action can confuse the situation?

Do not the "radicals" and the "extremists" remember and realize that at the moment the Babas in the Netherlands (and in Indonesia) and other Indonesian [read: indigenous] citizens still need their own associations, where in a "free" manner they can exchange ideas with their own "people" in a specific Baba or [indigenous] Indonesian atmosphere?

Do not the "radicals" know that at the moment (and even when we are members of a united organization) much discussion would cease whenever an Indonesian hangs around several new Indonesian [non-indigenous] citizens who are talking? Furthermore — that is how "the voice of the isolationist" went on to propound his idea — what are the interests of the Babas that can be best taken care of in an organization?

Other than the desire to defend the C.H.H. and Chinese organizations, there are several major and minor leaders who are campaigning to ensure that the C.H.H. and such other associations continue to exist as cultural societies in character for these reasons, among others:

- (1) The Babas still need to maintain [ties with], and understanding of, Chinese culture.
- (2) To give time to the members of the C.H.H. and similar organizations (which also have members who are non-Indonesian citizens) to organize themselves and to get their share in the allocation of the C.H.H.'s legacy.

According to its constitution the C.H.H. cannot be dissolved without unanimous approval. In that case is it not better to solve this problem [arbitrarily] so long as the property of the C.H.H. can be properly disposed of?†

* The Rukun Peladjar Indonesia (RUPI), an Indonesian student association comprising students from the then Federal Indonesia who studied in Holland, was dissolved following the transfer of sovereignty in 1950. Its members and new students (mainly from the republican areas) jointly established the Persatuan Peladjar Indonesia (P.P.I.).

† This implies that some leaders of the C.H.H. were mainly concerned with the physical assets of the C.H.H.

- (3) To prevent the occurrence of a "vacuum". Briefly: the C.H.H. as a cultural association should be included to "catch" Baba-Indonesian citizens who have not felt the necessity of, and who are still doubtful about, joining the P.P.I., for instance, for reasons of sentiment and laziness, among others. Is it not better for them to be under the patronage of an organization rather than to drift aimlessly and loaf around, and not be tied in one way or another?
- (4) To be restored as an organization for Babas who are Indonesian Citizens, when in the united organization everything has failed, for instance. These are the reasons (cultural, "practical", materialistic, and security) which are kept in confidence, and not in confidence by those whom I call "Golongan Pinter—Kebeling" (those who are not really clever).

Afer giving the above views, let us try to analyse the problems of the said opinions by way of answering the question posed in the title of this article, that is:

"Why should the C.H.H. and similar organizations be dissolved?"

Besides the reasons mentioned in the report of the "Reconstruction Commission for the C.H.H.", whose members, comprising Drs. Oey Liang Lee, Drs. Oey Beng To, Mr. Khouw Hoey Tjoe (Rotterdam), Mr. Liem Kit Siang (Leiden), and Mr. Tjoa Tjoen San (Delft), have also pressed that the C.H.H. and other such associations be dissolved, let us now explain step by step the reasons which urged us to agree with the Commission.

1. *Reason of Principle*

As long as the C.H.H. and such associations still exist, it means that we, as a Baba block, have officially and unofficially agreed with the discriminatory system now generally practised in Indonesia. This is something with which we ourselves do not agree, and this is a contradiction in itself! It would be quite enough if I make the comment here that the results and consequences of such an opinion would be far-reaching. Is it not true that if such is the state of affairs, an association like the P.P.I., for instance, can and has the right officially or otherwise to declare that in truth the P.P.I. is "for the indigenous Indonesian only" for reasons given at the beginning of this speech. Also, our brothers from the P.P.I. can say that they want "to talk freely" to "their own people" and that they need to have indigenous-Indonesians only in their organizations because the time is not yet ripe [for including non-indigenous Indonesians]. Thank God, the P.P.I. is not moving in that direction and, in my opinion, it will not relinquish the real principle and objective, that is, the P.P.I. is not mainly for indigenous-citizens only.

2. *Practical Reasons*

a. It is known that both sides have no lasting relationship yet; rather, quite a majority are still suspicious of one another. This unhealthy situation will surely worsen if the Babas have their own separate organization, even

if the statutory situation is not so and even if it is, for instance, in the form of a Cultural Association (on the assumption that smoke cannot be hidden). This is so, especially if both sides are suspicious of one another. [The discussion of] culture is really not their objective. There is also the belief that it is a disguised association; while emphasizing "sociability", its members intended to discuss also non-cultural matters [politics] related to the Chinese, or Baba. It is not that the [indigenous] Indonesians do not agree that these questions [on the Chinese and China] are to be discussed. (Remember, every Indonesian citizen and every nation would be interested in China's affairs because that country is now a major factor in the international world generally, and in Asia especially!) Isn't it possible that these questions can be discussed together whenever necessary? Maybe we want to have talks and so forth which cannot be given in public and in the association? As regards "sociability" among Babas only: do not the indigenous Indonesians need "sociability" too among themselves? And if they do not have this need in an organized way but only individually, why must the Babas be different and take the non-beneficial and rather non-profitable way?

Therefore, if indeed we intend to reduce the level of suspicion — which can be expressed openly if apartheid (disguised or otherwise) is exposed — the only way is not to continually apply "smooth" and sensitive politics, which is assumed to be clever and "always safe" but not necessarily beneficial to oneself in the end.

b. It is known that our "Chineseness" is still strong while our "Indonesianness" is still very weak and, at the same time, officially and/or in actuality (for reasons of being opportunistic, practical, idealistic, etc.), we want to be Indonesians and adapt ourselves to the new situation. The question is: When are we going to commence with our endeavour in achieving our aim? Where is a better place to begin if it is not in an organization? For instance: the use of the Indonesian language among ourselves.

Officially we* in the P.P.I., for instance, always use the Indonesian language and as much as possible endeavour to develop and advance this infant language, whereas up to now the C.H.H. and such other associations almost entirely neglect this matter. Their members do not feel the need and the necessity. [It would be different] if they joined an [Indonesian] organization. As to how important this question of language is for every citizen, especially those considered intellectuals, to understand and master, I feel it is not necessary to discuss it here.

Other than that, inevitably, the feeling of oneness and belonging to one nation will surely have a better chance of success in one united organization rather than in two or more organizations whose members meet casually and at certain times only. And because of frequent contacts in the organization, mutual understanding and mutual appreciation will develop. The members of the Indonesian society in the Netherlands will live in harmony and health.

* The author was an executive member of the P.P.I.

c. The danger of the occurrence of a "vacuum", in my opinion, is not so great. Certainly a vacuum will be created if the big and small leaders from our society (*Hsia-hwee*) merely shake their legs, after the dissolution has been achieved. But keeping in mind the sense of responsibility and "influence" of the leaders and the natural characteristics of our members, who when given encouragement are always able and adept in "adapting" themselves under stress and strain because of self and general interests, we should not be too pessimistic about the danger of the "vacuum". What would certainly be more dangerous is when our members are openly given the opportunity to remain in the C.H.H. and other such associations which are no longer suitable for them. For our own self-interest, our slogan should be: "Those who are still wavering are better without an organization than to take shelter under a flag which is no longer suitable!"

d. That in Indonesia there still exist specific Baba associations is no reason why we should do likewise. Indeed, there still exists in that country political apartheid which does not induce change, and which therefore compels us to move in the other direction.

e. The dissolution of the (C.H.H. shall be beneficial, not only to the Indonesian citizens but also to those who have become Dutch or Chinese citizens (either Nationalist or Communist) for it will bring about a solution and a healthy remedy. Is it not possible that in this way they will be encouraged to change their orientation, that the Dutch citizens of Baba descent, for instance, will better adapt themselves to the point of becoming sound and loyal [Dutch] citizens. This loyal attitude will be difficult to attain when they are always associated with people of other nationalities. To be able to reach an agreement with them, we should be frank and we should not deceive them in any indirect way — as in the proposal put out by the C.H.H. for some sort of cultural association whose intentions are, among other things, to get the money from the C.H.H. Briefly: We must not deceive one another! Remember, that with the C.H.H. it is not reward, compensation, etc., that is of primary importance but the question of principle, consistency, and nationality! Indeed, supposing non-Indonesian citizens in the C.H.H. still want their own organization, then they should dissolve the C.H.H. first so that they can act freely after that and do not have to consider any longer the interests and desires of other citizens. In short: They too must be independent!

3. *Nationalistic Reason*

In an association in which the emphasis is not on the questions and events concerning Indonesian-Chinese which are of primary importance but instead on the questions concerning Indonesia in general, we, as sound citizens, can then settle down in a situation which encourages and stimulates us to understand, study, and to put in all our efforts for Indonesia, until the nationalistic feeling gradually becomes foremost. The situation will change and we will then no longer be influenced by the C.H.H. and similar associations which, up to now, have seldom or never intensified our "Indonesianness". Rather, the

opposite has happened [in the C.H.H.]: anti-Indonesianness has come up to the fore unconsciously. For instance, only the negative sides of the Indonesian government were discussed and mentioned in their bulletin, while the government's efforts that should be praised are conveniently omitted.

And, in that sense, bearing in mind that "the environment influences the man", an Indonesian organization is the only means by which our children have the chance to record progress on the question of citizenship and national consciousness until they can become loyal, sound and normal. To avoid misunderstanding it is necessary to stress again that what has been said above does not mean that our interests will not be cared for, whenever it is necessary, but the difference is that public interest shall be of primary importance, and specific interest shall be secondary.

4. *Political Reason*

a. It is known that the need in Indonesia at the moment is to forge unity and, by dissolving the C.H.H. and by forming a united association, we can promote a sense of unity. This sense of unity needs to be increasingly strengthened and shown because we in the Netherlands are citizens at large, and indeed it is in a foreign country that we should be united, if we do not want to let Indonesia down!

b. The favourable atmosphere is more agreeable here in the Netherlands than in Indonesia, and so it is here that our responsibility lies in deciding our political course as to what actually should be done, especially on the minority question. Must we hold on firmly to a separatist politics based on mutual suspicion or should we set our course on the basis of "mutual trust" and frankness? When we apply this latter principle, then unity will inevitably come about. However, if we apply the other principle, then dissension and discord will result. It is up to us to choose.

It is also necessary to see that the Indonesian citizens include students who will at least help in running the government in the future. If while they are still young and living in a most congenial atmosphere, the feeling of belonging to a nation in unity fails to materialize, then all hopes for a better life in Indonesia in later days are lost. But if we are successful and have been able to cast away that feeling of mutual distrust so that our relationships become sound, then our hopes will be raised and our experience in the Netherlands can be made the foundation for a better living in Indonesia. At this stage, let us ask: does the other party [read: indigenous Indonesians] trust us and show its goodwill towards the political course that I have mentioned? Is it not true that if unity is to be achieved the endeavour should come from both sides? Will those P.P.I. members, for instance, show their good will? Driven by a sense of belonging to one nation and the necessity for the country at large [to unite], our indigenous citizen brothers have shown and will continue to show this goodwill. In fact discussion has taken place resulting, among other things, in the proposal to form the Indonesian Students Federation which has failed because, among other reasons, one of the Baba representatives put forward

an impractical proposal to include Chinese culture in the proposed constitution of the United Indonesian [Students'] Association. After the P.P.I. had been established, and after the dissolution of RUPI, the attitude of the native citizens remained firm. Extending their hands, they accepted us at all times unconditionally, but with the hope that the Babas will not ask for a special guarantee, as was done before by our "leaders" when negotiating with the other party, that is, the indigenous citizens.

Such are the reasons, in brief, on which my conclusions are based.

It is hoped that readers will study them calmly without prejudice or other unhealthy thoughts.

That is all.

— . . —

7-3

Ong Hok Ham (b. 1933), born in Surabaya, received a Ph.D. degree in History from Yale University. While a student in Jakarta, he wrote many articles expressing his assimilationist view. He was a signatory of the Piagam Asimilasi. Arguing that assimilation of the ethnic Chinese into indigenous Indonesian society was not new in Indonesian history, Ong maintained that racial discrimination could only be eradicated through complete assimilation. The following article was first published in *Star Weekly*, 27 February 1960.

The Assimilation of the Peranakans (1960)

In the previous articles in this magazine* the change in names of the peranakans was discussed. Some of the changes are certainly based on the tendency to emulate the custom of the upper class. From this tendency, one can see the higher social status of a group in society whose customs are emulated by the peranakans. A person would not give an inferior name to his offspring. So a member of the minority group in giving his child a Javanese, Malay, Sanskrit, or Dutch name does so to express his admiration of the group using the Javanese, Malay, or Dutch language.

A person from a minority group has a tendency to identify himself with the majority group which has a higher social status. In other words, he wishes to fuse himself into the upper class group whenever possible.

Indeed, in Indonesian history, assimilation of the minority into the Indonesian society has taken place.

Dr. de Haan in his book *Oud Batavia* writes about the great numbers of

* *Star Weekly* — a leading peranakan journal in Jakarta which ceased publication in 1960.

peranakans of Islamic faith fusing into the Indonesian society at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

Dr. Pigeaud, although he gives no details, writes in "Aantekeningen op de Oosthoek" that the people of the north coast of Java have a high proportion of Chinese blood.

A Chinese, Ong Tay Hay, giving an account of his travels in Java in the eighteenth century, writes that the "Chinese" in religion, customs, and way of life have become "natives" and have forgotten their "Chineseness". Surely Ong Tay Hay saw this with apprehension.

According to information given by a friend, in Surabaya one cannot find a peranakan family of more than eight generations; in Yogya and Surakarta one finds it difficult to meet peranakan families of more than four generations. In Jakarta itself it is also difficult to find peranakan families of more than four generations.

These instances may also show that the "people of Chinese descent", living for periods of more than those mentioned, have been entirely assimilated into the Indonesian society and have become Indonesian "natives". But in these cases it may also be possible that the majority of them could not trace their genealogy. However, many peranakans from the various strata of their society can show that their families have lived in Indonesia for four generations. This can strengthen the theory that the peranakans who have lived longer here have been assimilated, and there are now only the remnants.

Why have these remnants, which are not small in number, not been assimilated? According to the opinion of this writer, this is because of the great changes that have taken place in Indonesia and in Asia ever since the period around the year 1850. Dutch power since then began to be strengthened and organized, attaining the status that we know before and until the Second World War. The Dutch group attained a high status in the society of our country. The influence from outside the country (China) has its impact on the minority and others. In viewing the minority question, historical, political, and social changes should be considered because these factors are very significant. More often the historical changes cause the minority not to be assimilated.

The Minority-Majority Problem

When a country has a minority problem this will cause some tensions. Between members of the minority and majority groups there will be prejudices and discriminations. Both these symptoms will arise, sometimes flaring up violently and sometimes almost unnoticed. Discriminations, prejudices, and conflicts flare up between the groups and are particularly evident in a crisis. When these symptoms are not present then there is no minority problem. A minority group is a group whose way of life, economy, and other matters have yet to be integrated into the life of the main stream of the majority society. These differences cause both groups to be not familiar with one another.

Anyway the majority has a stereotype notion of the minority. For instance it is said that every *peranakan* is a trader. As a matter of fact this is entirely untrue. Certainly at the beginning there were many *peranakans* involved in trade (now there are fewer) because at first there were no other fields (like agriculture, education, etc.) open to them. Nevertheless even from the beginning many *peranakans* were engaged in other endeavours such as shoemaking, carpentering, etc., or even in farming as in Tangerang.* Even so it is still said that every *peranakan* or Chinese is a trader.

There is also another stereotype notion, that is, a "Chinese" trader is not always honest. He practises undesirable methods of trading. There is some basis for such a description. The newly arrived Chinese emigrants of this country had few scruples in practising undesirable methods of trading. Laws pertaining to newly arrived emigrants were not clear and not properly adhered to. Furthermore, China was in a situation where the government could be said to degenerate, in a situation where usually the emigration of the population takes place, corruption and the bribing of government officials such as the police, warlords, district officers, and so forth, become a way of life or become necessary to free oneself from a thousand and one regulations and authorities set at will by the officials. This in itself creates bad practices for the emigrants who arrived in a certain country.

Thus, the image associated with members of a minority with certain characteristics has some basis but is not wholly true. A *peranakan*, a descendant of an immigrant who has lived at the most for two or three generations in this country, can have characteristics which are entirely different from newly-arrived immigrants. Nevertheless, because they had not yet fused into the society of the country in which they were living, they were then associated with members of the other minority groups. Quite often, for instance, in the newspapers and other news reports, the crime committed by a member of a minority group was reported as the crime of the whole group. Thus the report regarding a Chinese contravening the law of the country would be written, for instance, as follows: "A Chinese, A, smuggled gold into the country." If it were some other person smuggling gold, his ethnic group would not be mentioned. Society would immediately say or think that it is quite usual for a Chinese to smuggle things into the country.

If the majority-minority relationship is tense and continues thus for a long time, it can change the nature of the majority and minority groups. Hence the Indonesians who have always been said to be tolerant as a nation can become intolerant. A nation which is at first not suspicious of others will become suspicious. In Indonesia the effects of the majority-minority relationship have not been apparent, except for the minority, but this is because of the previous relationship with the Dutch. An attitude is acquired by the *peranakans* (not the *totok* Chinese), possibly an attitude always ready to adapt themselves

* Tangerang — also known as Benteng — is a small district in West Java.

with the situation. But generally the minority and the majority problem or the "peranakan-indigenous" problem is a newly arisen problem concurrent with the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia, and it is still too early to judge its effects.

Sense of Superiority and Discrimination

It is quite often being said that members of the minority group have a superiority complex and are inclined to westernization, etc. Perhaps this is true for a segment in the group, but we must not also forget that quite a great number of the peranakan group live in the rural areas and have not been affected by the status system of the colonial society. The said inclination to westernization can be seen mainly in the cities and, because of this Western attitude, they feel much superior to those who are not Western-oriented. If indeed a person has been influenced by Western culture it is excusable. But if a person only knows Western culture in a cursory manner, and poses as a Westerner, this can be a source of irritation. Such an attitude of the peranakan group was particularly influenced by pre-war history, when such posturing as a Westerner showed a higher social status. So in the period before the independence of Indonesia, for instance, knowing Dutch was a condition for getting a suitable job and for assuming a good social position. This matter makes people blind to the beauty of the local language or bahasa Indonesia. This situation in the colonial period affected the peranakan group very much especially because they experienced historical events that took place in the period since 1942 in a passive manner, for instance, without taking part in the revolution or joining the revolutionary group, etc. Political events do not immediately cause any change in a society and their impact can only be felt gradually. Only then will the effect of these political changes in turn cause people's habits to be transformed.

One of the identifying marks of the minority problem is discrimination. Whenever there is a minority, and majority relationship there will always be the discrimination problem. In certain places, however, this discrimination problem can be in a different form. In the United States, for instance, it is because of racist feelings that the Negroes cannot live near the homes of the whites. In Indonesia it is because there are really not enough places in schools that the admission of the peranakan children has been limited.

But a kind of discrimination here which is being very much discussed is the matter of proving citizenship. It is required especially of the peranakan group to prove their Indonesian citizenship, but the citizenship problem of this group has indeed been in confusion since 1900. Presently there exist two categories of Chinese: those with Indonesian citizenship and those with P.R.C. citizenship. But it is often difficult to differentiate one clearly from the other.

Another questionable matter is that the loyalty of the peranakans towards Indonesia is suspect. This problem too has its historical background. Around the year 1900 national consciousness began to emerge in China and that country began to take notice of the *Hoakiau* group. China sent

Kang Yu-wei,* gunboats, education inspectors, etc., to Indonesia to look into the affairs of the *Hoakiau* group, whereas the government of the Dutch East Indies at that time neglected entirely the turmoil the peranakans were in. In fact, at times it entrusted the fate of the peranakans to events in China, for instance, when the turbulence over the issue of placing Dutch laws on a par with Chinese laws arose among the peranakans, the government of the Dutch East Indies said that this would be possible only if European laws were effective in China. The treatment by the Dutch East Indies government of the Japanese nationals here also affected the peranakans, so that in the end the enhancement of the peranakan group would only be possible with China's help.

Members of every minority group owe allegiance to their own group, just as a person is loyal to both his village and the state. But eventually, at the beginning of the century, behind the peranakan group there was always the shadow of a foreign power, that is, China. The loyalty of the minority group towards his own group has been associated with his loyalty to China.

Assimilation

The peranakan minority group will surely uphold its minority status; the peranakans can be loyal to the state. In short, they can become good Indonesian citizens but at the same time uphold their way of life such as to celebrate the Lunar New Year and to observe other customs and rituals. In such a situation, possible conflicts with the majority can be avoided. But when a state of crisis arises — who knows, it may be a crisis in the economy, in politics, or other critical situations — then conflicts will arise. Also, discrimination cannot be eliminated entirely.

The only way out, according to this writer's opinion, is assimilation or one hundred per cent fusion. Thus the peranakans become "indigenous" Indonesian. To some of the upper class of the group, assimilation sometimes is synonymous with living in the *kampung* or rural areas and having four or more wives. This is also a kind of prejudicial notion of the minority group about the majority, because not all indigenous Indonesians live in the *kampung* or rural area, embrace Islam or, especially, have more than one wife. Whereas if we observe the Chinese restaurants today, we can see many indigenous Indonesians patronizing them.

Assimilation means erasing the identification of the member with the minority group. One of the ways which is much talked about now is the changing of a person's name. This is one of the ways. After the changing of names, integration in the fields of economies, politics, and other areas should also be carried out. In short, everything which is exclusively of the minority should be done away with. This certainly cannot be done all at once and

* China did not in fact send Kang Yu-wei to Southeast Asia; instead he fled China to avoid persecution after the failure of the so-called Hundred Days Reform (1898) which he had led.

suddenly, also not by changing of names. As long as the minority-majority groups still exist, discrimination will always be there.

For the greater part, the changing of names, integration in the social and other fields, are indications that a member of the minority group has been assimilated and integrated. Changing of citizenship status or changing of names will not necessarily cause discrimination to disappear. This was the misconception the late Mr. Liem Koen Hian had thus propounded before the war for the cause of assimilation and actively struggled for the independence of Indonesia; but when he was obliged to choose between an Indonesian or P.R.C. citizenship, he chose P.R.C. citizenship on the ground that there was discrimination still. He forgot that where the problem of minority and majority is found, there will be discrimination, and that the matter cannot be settled suddenly by the change of citizenship status or by the change of names.

Also, the assimilation of a group cannot take place all at once but depends mostly on the individual members of the minority who want to be assimilated into the majority group. Gradually, the individuals in the minority group will seek assimilation willingly. Unnoticed and without much fuss, the minority is assimilated. The only thing that can be done is to create a conducive situation in which the members of the minority group can fuse themselves easily, for instance, by changing their names, educational atmosphere, having mixed schools, etc. This is the only way to solve the minority problem. A member of the minority group can improve his social position as an individual but not that of the group as a whole. It is not possible any more to uphold or improve the position of the minority as a group.

— . . —

7-4

Tjung Tin Jan (b. 1919), born in Bangka, graduated from the University of Leiden majoring in Law. Before he was appointed deputy head of the State Court in Pangkal Pinang (Bangka), he worked for a telephone company. In 1949 he founded the Persatuan Tionghoa (Bangka Branch). From 1950 to 1953 he was Member of Parliament representing the P.D.T.I. In 1953 he joined the Catholic Party and represented the party in parliament up to 1965. The following article, first published in *Star Weekly*, 25 June 1960, was a response to Yap Thiam Hien's "Therapy" (6-3).

Indonesia is not America (1960)

After reading the three articles by Mr. Yap Thiam Hien in the *Star Weekly* of the 16, 30 April and 21 May with the headings Therapy I, II, and III, I am

of the opinion that Mr. Yap is generalizing too much on the problem of the minority, as if there is only one issue at stake, and thus his conclusion is wrong.

The problem of racial minority is not always the same. The Jewish minority problem in Germany, for instance, of which a greater part of it is based on religion, is not the same as the Christian minority in Indonesia. The Chinese problem is also different from the Negro minority problem in America which was a result of the racial prejudices of the "dominant group".

Mr. Yap takes only *one* formulation for all the minority problems, that is, the formulation by Louis Wirth, which is combined with the formulation of the Sub-Commission of the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations, briefly stated as follows:

A minority is a group of citizens of a state who have been segregated, excluded, and discriminated against by their fellow citizens who have special rights and a higher social, political, and economic position so that this group erects within itself a specific set of feelings.

Mr. Yap concluded that this formulation is valid for all minority problems.

But according to the social and economic conditions of the Chinese group in independent Indonesia, it is *not* lower than that of the "dominant group". Therefore, the Louis Wirth formulation is not valid for the Chinese minority problem in Indonesia.

The Chinese group is also not excluded by the Indonesian society in regard to residence, schools, associations, etc. But, rather, there are a number of persons from the Chinese group who make themselves exclusive.

Valid for the Negro Minority in the United States

The Wirth formulation is valid for another minority problem, that is, for the Negro minority in the United States. There it is indeed true that the "dominant group" (whites) lives at a higher social, political, and economic level than the Negro minority.

The Negro minority is segregated from the whites, due to the prejudices of the whites, who believe that their lineage is superior and higher in status than that of the Negroes. The whites consider the Negroes low. They refuse to live together with the Negroes. The Negroes therefore cannot live in the white residential areas, cannot go to the white schools, cannot become members of the white associations, and cannot visit places of entertainment together with the whites.

This Wirth formulation is also valid for the minority problem of the "Vreemde Oosterlingen" (Foreign Orientals) in the *Dutch* colonial days. They were excluded from the agricultural activities, from the civil service, and from the residential areas of the Dutch.

Generally speaking, this Wirth formulation applies to white discrimination against the coloured people based on racial superiority of the "dominant group" of the whites.

The prejudice is one-sided (on the side of the whites): therefore the minority problem of this kind can be solved by one side also, that is, when the "dominant group" (which consists of the whites) wants to get rid of its racial prejudices.

For the minority problem of this kind it can definitely be said: A minority problem is a creation of the "dominant group" and as a remedy it can be suggested to "do heartcleansing, change of human attitude, do away with prejudices, do away with egoism, etc.". And the remedy is addressed to the "dominant group" which comprises the whites.

The Problem in Indonesia is Different

In relation to the minority problem of those of Chinese descent in Indonesia, this therapy is not exactly accurate. The problem in Indonesia — as discussed above — is different. And when Mr. Yap said that after Indonesia attained independence, the "dominant group" changed in composition, but the minority problem and its complexities remain, it is not true.

During the Dutch colonial days there was racial superiority of the "dominant group" whose members were whites. But the discrimination presently existing in independent Indonesia is not based on racial superiority of the dominant group (that is what is called "indigenous"). Discrimination in independent Indonesia is a consequence of the thinking of the colonial period, when the Indonesian people were divided into social and ethnic groups. These social and ethnic groups lived in clusters, felt alienated from each other, and there arose prejudices and group and ethnic loyalty, and this has resulted in discrimination.

Discrimination therefore does not stand alone. Discrimination is not the basic issue; rather it is the result of the structure of the colonial society in which Indonesian ethnic groups and Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent still live in their own clusters with their respective views which are still foreign to one another.

The way of thinking of these groups, with their activities in upholding the integrity of their groups, or in other words mutual discriminatory actions, we call "golonganism". In order to eliminate discrimination, the groups and "golonganism" should be eliminated. This requires goodwill on all sides.

Mr. Yap's Conclusion and Therapy

Mr. Yap's therapy (heartcleansing, change of attitude, the elimination of prejudices, egoism, etc.) is aimed at the *majority*. Mr. Yap expected the majority to eliminate its prejudices and its discriminations. This is true. But what are Mr. Yap's recommendations for the minority? What should the minority also do to eliminate their prejudices?

Mr. Yap drew an inference from the Negro problem in the United States. There the problem can be solved with action from one side (from the whites). But if the inference is from America and transferred to Indonesia, it is wrong. Indonesia is not America.

Solving the Chinese minority problem in Indonesia is a two-way process. Both sides must act.

Golonganism

As discrimination does not stand alone, but exists as a result of the presence of a group and "golonganism" (groupism), then the group and "golonganism" should be eliminated. With the elimination of the group, the "dominant group" and the minority will no longer exist. Discrimination and the minority problem will also disappear.

Not Uniformity but Variation

Mr. Yap is anxious that with assimilation uniformity will take place, that is, the body form, facial look, colour of the skin, etc., become the same, until dissimilarity will no longer show.

This conclusion is not true.

With assimilation the group will disappear (be careful: not the person), but differences between people will not disappear. On the contrary, there will be more and richer variations.

An orchid lover well knows that by cross-breeding two types of orchids tens of new varieties of orchids will come into existence (Mendel's Law).

And so it is with people. Perhaps in ancient times in Europe there were only two types of people, that is, people with brown hair and blue eyes and people with black hair and dark eyes.

When complete assimilation took place in Europe, the two types of people continued to exist, but beside them there appeared new people with black hair and brown eyes, black hair and blue eyes, red hair and brown eyes, brown hair and brown eyes, and so on and so forth. In facial features too there are many more variations.

So assimilation is not uniformity. It results in new varieties with many more variations.

Mr. Yap's faulty conclusion about uniformity is extended by his reminder to the "Committee of Ten" concerning guided marriage by Hitler for the creation or upholding of "Ariers van het zuiverste ras" [Aryans as the purest race].

This reminder was wrongly addressed! The Committee of Ten was pro-assimilation, whereas Hitler was against assimilation.

The reminder about Hitler's idea should be more accurately addressed to those people who are prejudiced in the superiority of descent, those who are against assimilation, and those who want to uphold their type and race, such as Hitler and his race "Ariers van het zuiverste ras".

7-5

The following is the "Assimilation Charter" (Piagam Asimilasi) issued in 1961. It was signed by a group of individuals (primarily peranakan Chinese) favouring complete assimilation of the Indonesian Chinese into the indigenous population. This English translation is based on the version published in *Asimilasi dalam Rangka Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa*, 2nd ed. (Djakarta: Departemen Penerangan RI, 1964), pp. 8-9.

Assimilation Charter (1961)

Basing ourselves on the aspirations of the entire Indonesian nation as embodied in the Youth Pledge which reads as follows:

ONE NATION,
ONE COUNTRY,
ONE LANGUAGE;

and which is indeed the absolute condition if we are to achieve our purpose of building a nation with a just and prosperous society, and a State which is so strong and dynamic that it will be able to play its normal role in the international world in accordance with the demands of our times;

We hereby reaffirm our belief that the only way that will lead to the realization of those aspirations is through a process of assimilation.

By assimilation is meant the process of integrating groups of people who have different mental attitudes, different customs, and different ways of expressing their cultures, into a single harmonious and meaningful social unit, that is, what, for the purpose of this Charter, has been referred to as the Indonesian Nation.

The participation in this social process, in an integrated manner, of all citizens and components of the Indonesian People will accelerate the attainment of our abovementioned national aspiration.

In the context of the problem of Indonesian citizens "of Chinese descent", assimilation means the entry and acceptance of individuals of Chinese descent into the single body of the Indonesian nation in such a way that the special group they have originally belonged to will eventually cease to exist.

The juridical implementation through a procedure of applying for and granting citizenship in the spirit of the Youth Pledge actually has far reaching consequences for both the party which has applied for and received citizenship and the party which grants the citizenship.

For those who have received Indonesian citizenship the consequence is that they must have a firm intention to serve their country, Indonesia, and their nation, the Indonesian nation, with body and soul; have the firm intention to become one with the entire Indonesian people and become true and patriotic Indonesians, and to reject and rid themselves of attitudes and actions which are in conflict with this intention.

For them this means dissociating themselves from the group of people of Chinese descent and having no wish to maintain the said group as a separate group.

For the State, that is, the Republic of Indonesia, which is the party that grants the citizenship, the consequence is that it must welcome assimilation, that is to say, widely encourage and promote assimilation among the entire population.

As for that part of the Indonesian people who at present are still referred to as the majority, they should accept this as something normal and with an open mind, and help promote the process of assimilation.

This Assimilation Charter was written and issued at the Seminar on National Consciousness held in Bandung (Ambarawa) on 13, 14, and 15 January 1961. Bandung (Ambarawa) 15-1-1961

Signed by:

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Be Tjong Lee (Semarang) | 16. Oei Hok Djien (Semarang) |
| 2. Bwa Tjoen Liong (Semarang) | 17. Oei Tjhing Hong (Surabaya) |
| 3. Djokosamadio (Semarang) | 18. Drs. Oei Tjin San (Bandung) |
| 4. Goh Tjing Hok (Surabaya) | 19. Ong An Kok (Kebumen) |
| 5. Jap Thiam Jong (Gombong) | 20. Ong Hok Ham (Jakarta) |
| 6. Mr. A.R. Khouw (Bandung) | 21. J. Ong Tjin Liong (Semarang) |
| 7. Kwik Hway Gwan (Semarang) | 22. Mich. Slamet (Surabaya) |
| 8. Drs. Lauwchuantho (Jakarta) | 23. Drs. R.M.A. Suryaningrat
(Surabaya) |
| 9. Nona Mr. Dora Lie Bo Tan
(Surabaya) | 24. D. Sutjiadi (Jakarta) |
| 10. Liem Keng Wien (Surabaya) | 25. Tan Pik Kwie (Semarang) |
| 11. Liem Khian An (Semarang) | 26. The Han Lim (Bandung) |
| 12. Liem Tjien Siang (Semarang) | 27. Tjoa Tjie Liang (Semarang) |
| 13. Nyonya Mr. Lo Khing Djie
(Surabaya) | 28. Mr. Tjoa Soe Tien (Surabaya) |
| 14. Mr. Liem Tjoen Ho (Semarang) | 29. Tio Hian Sioe (Surabaya) |
| 15. Mr. Oe Siang Djie (Surabaya) | 30. F. Wignjosumarsono (Semarang) |

_____ . . . _____

7-6

Pek Hien Liang is an exponent from the Jakarta Diocese leadership of the Indonesian Christian Church in West Java. The following article was published in *Sinar Harapan*, 16 and 18 July 1966. It was written after Suharto came to power but before the name-changing regulation was announced.

Name and Identity (1966)

If we read or hear the name Kromo we would immediately recognize it as being Javanese. And we would then begin to generalize, to give to the name

Kromo all the characteristics which we think hold generally for the Javanese. For example, we might label him kind, considerate, refined, humble, etc. In the end the person named Kromo with whom we are not personally acquainted would appear as a Javanese with all the characteristics that we think apply generally to the Javanese. In other words, Kromo would appear as a representative of the Javanese. This is what is meant by group identity, when we identify a person not on the basis of his personal characteristics and attributes but rather as a representative of a group.

For example, as a result of the arrival of thousands of students from outside Java to study in Jogja some stereotypes emerge which according to the people of Jogja apply generally to these students. Similarly among the students some stereotypes emerge which they would hold apply generally to the people of Jogja (Yogya). How good or bad the stereotypes depends upon how good or bad relations are between the students and the Jogja population. If relations are good then positive attributes in the stereotype increase. If relations are bad then negative elements in the stereotype increase. Negative attributes are more easily generalized than positive ones. Attributes and characteristics which are generalized for a whole group are referred to as stereotypes. And if these stereotypes are accepted by a group as the real character of another group, then we have what is referred to as group prejudice.

Group prejudice is easily strengthened by negative personal experience, but it is difficult to eliminate with positive personal experience. Negative experiences are considered as evidence for strengthening existing prejudices while positive experiences are considered exceptions. So it should be clear that group identity is mainly organized from stereotypes and from group prejudices which are strengthened or weakened by personal experience. Group identity must be differentiated from personal identity which is created as a result of inter-personal relations.

If based on further information we discover that Kromo is, for example, a former neighbour of ours, then another identity will emerge.

At first we will recall Kromo's appearance and then his friendliness, his capabilities as a *dalang* [puppeteer], then his warm relationship with our family. So we are no longer identifying Kromo as just any person. Now we are faced with his personal characteristics. What is the relationship between group identity and personal identity, and what is the relationship to an individual's name?

What's in a name? This is a sentence from Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet* which is often quoted out of context. In order to explain the relationship between name and identity let me requote the sentence in context. While embracing Romeo, Juliet says to herself:

Tis but thy name is my enemy; —
Thou art thyself though, not Montague.
What's Montague?
It is nor hand, nor foot,
Nor arm, nor face, nor any other part
Belonging to a man.

O, be some other name!
 What's in a name? that which we call a rose,
 By any other name would smell as sweet;
 So Romeo would, were he not Romeo call'd
 Retain the dear perfection which he owes
 Without that title: — Romeo, doff thy name;
 And for that name, which is no part of thee,
 Take all myself.

Many people have researched names. Some of them view names as something sacred which once given determines a person's fate. There are others who contend that a name has no relationship to the fate or life of an individual or to a person's character or behaviour. There are also some people who hold that a name is very important because it is part of our history which carries some of the past.

In the above quotation Shakespeare declares that a name has no relation to an individual's personal identity. If a rose had another name (for example, bunga tembelek) it would smell as sweet. An individual's patriotism and personal identity is not determined by his name. A name does not reveal someone's personal identity. What decides personal identity is behaviour — a person's deeds and motives. And this is only evident in personal affairs in which a person has the opportunity to become acquainted with another individual. But in a multi-ethnic society like ours, group relations have a decisive role. In inter-group relations an individual's name becomes very important because a name reveals an individual's group identity. An individual's name as well as his skin colour and appearance are the symbols which first make evident an individual's group identity. When Juliet says, "Tis but thy name is my enemy" — she is actually saying that it is only your group identity which is my enemy but you as an individual are the man of my dreams.

This shows that an individual can have very close relations with a member of another group yet maintain negative feelings and prejudice towards his group. Social-psychological research confirms that someone can at the same time hold contradictory attitudes towards another individual's personal identity and group identity.

I just read in a newspaper that 5,621 Indonesians of Chinese descent in Sukabumi have changed their names. Actually the name-changing question has been a hot issue since the signing of the dual nationality agreement in Bandung in 1955, but the events in Sukabumi have raised a new aspect to the question. This mass changing of names has focused attention on the effect of name-changing on group relations.

In the past, name-changing was usually undertaken for personal motives. Some changed their names because of patriotism, some did it because they wanted to gain material benefits, others changed their names in the interests of their children. However, there were some who refused to change their names due also, ironically, to patriotism. The central factor in name-changing,

which affects group relations, has not been realized; therefore, its influence on the process of nation-building has not been felt.

If the Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent wanted to speed up the process of "nation-building", they have to work towards the disappearance of Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent as a group. So far, the group identity of Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent has been the stumbling block for the rapid process of nation-building. Why is it so?

First, the historical position of Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent in the society has been such that it is impossible for them to be accepted as a new *suku* (ethnic group) comparable to other Indonesian *suku*.

Second, in real life, it is impossible to distinguish the Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent by any clear criteria. In reality what other Indonesian *suku* notice is the existence of a group of people who have Chinese names.

Legally speaking, we can certainly identify the existence of [the Chinese] who are Indonesian citizens, P.R.C. citizens, or stateless. But in real life within the context of group relations, all Chinese are considered as a group because of their possession of Chinese names. Although Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent have repudiated P.R.C. citizenship, in real life they are considered similar to P.R.C. citizens or stateless Chinese. Naturally this situation will create an impression among other Indonesian ethnic groups that Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent have ambiguous loyalty. Therefore, the challenge that we face in the context of nation-building is how to make the legal status of Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent meaningful in the context of group relations.

There are many ways to do this. One way is the loyal declaration rallies (*apel kesetiaan*) which have taken place in various cities recently; although it is still doubtful whether or not such declarations are really effective. One thing is certain, which is in accordance with what I said at the beginning of this article, that individual patriotism, individual heroism, and individual name-changing will not change the image of Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent, that is, in real life they are grouped together with P.R.C. nationals and stateless Chinese.

As analysed earlier, one factor that causes Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent to be grouped together with alien Chinese is their Chinese names. For this reason, [universal and simultaneous] name-changing for the Chinese as a group would be a positive step towards national unity. Name-changing for a group is different from individual name-changing. The former would abolish the identity of Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent as a group. Of course, this step has to be followed up by other steps in order to promote national unity and solidarity. Nevertheless, this is no longer the problem of Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent alone but that of the whole Indonesian nation.

Finally, there is a question as to how group name changing can be done effectively? Do we have to wait till all Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent are ready or should this be done now? Group name changing does not mean

that all Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent should change their names [immediately]. At the initial stage, it is sufficient if a group of Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent who have consciousness and pure motives change their names together. For instance, this step can be taken by a group of school teachers, priests, and church leaders.

The pioneering example of a group of individuals who have pure motives *at this stage* will be more effective than mass changing of names as undertaken in Sukabumi.

The above analysis shows that name-changing is not merely a personal matter. If it is going to be used for nation-building, name-changing should become a group decision. Whether or not name-changing will be used as a positive means towards promoting national unity is the responsibility of the leaders of Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent.

7-7

Jahja Wullur (Oei Tjin San) was the President of the L.P.K.B. (West Java), a leading member of the Indonesian Christian Church in West Java, and a senior lecturer at the Department of Psychology, the University of Padjadjaran (Bandung). The following article was first published in *Sinar Harapan*, 17–18 January 1967.

Integration of a Minority into the Majority (1967)

I agree with what was said by Dr. Oey Jan Hong in his recent article in this paper. He said that government regulations cannot compel something which is in conflict with natural law. For example, assimilation which is a natural process was opposed and resisted by the colonial government, twisted by BAPERKI and the P.K.I., and is still obstructed by racists, but, as we see, humans can slow down but cannot overcome this natural process.

In every country throughout the world, we can see events occurring which are leading towards integration through assimilation. In Europe we see that the aristocracy who used to live apart from and have no desire to mix with the common people now live among them. [The aristocracy] work like ordinary people and their children go to public schools. If their children go to university they choose a good one where students from other groups in the society also study. If they join an association they choose one that suits their taste (not one that is exclusively for aristocrats).

Inter-marriage between aristocrats and commoners is not unusual. The clearest examples of this are the marriages between Princess Beatrice and Claus van Anselberg, between Princess Margariet and Piet van Vollenhove,

and of Princess Margaret Rose, etc. (It is true that as a concession to tradition Claus was quickly made a prince because Beatrice will soon succeed her mother Juliana as Queen of Holland).

In America one is aware of the desegregation movement which aims to eliminate the barriers separating blacks and whites in schools, restaurants, etc.

From these examples it should be clear as to what is meant by assimilation. In sociology assimilation is the bringing together of two or more separate groups into a new whole in which the original distinctive characteristics of the groups are no longer present or at least no longer the monopoly of the original group.

Integration through assimilation is a natural process because the needs of modern society do not allow for the division of people on the basis of descent or ethnic group. This is true in our country as well. Look at our economic needs. The demand for rice increases each year. Whether we like it or not, we have to increase our rice production. So the central problem is how to choose people to maximize the production of rice while sacrificing the minimum possible manpower capital.

We will not give priority to a Javanese or a Sundanese. The main question is whether the selected person can maximize rice production. We will of course be on the lookout so that no one who would make use of this opportunity for his personal interests gets the job. In this matter we would certainly be suspicious of foreigners. They feel attached to their homeland and therefore would give priority to their national interests rather than ours. Also as foreigners they generally have a desire to return to their homeland and will try to take their profits with them out of the country. It is the same with the demand for office workers (typists, bookkeepers), factory workers, managers, salesmen, teachers, research workers, doctors, etc.: each year it increases. And it is a life-or-death matter for our nation to find the best people for each position.

One condition of great importance is that the chosen people should love their nation and its people and have a desire to contribute something to the welfare of the land and its people, because a doctor, no matter how capable, is of no use to our country if he supports P.K.I. subversion or if he runs away overseas. And this is true for every other occupation as well.

The process of assimilation is also occurring among the group usually referred to as Indonesian citizens of "Chinese descent". This is true even though the process has been checked by the Dutch government, poisoned by BAPERKI-P.K.I. and obstructed by racists. In connection with this we greatly appreciate the instruction of the cabinet presidium, to eliminate the colonial division of the Indonesian people into "Europeans", "Foreign Orientals", and Natives and to differentiate only between Indonesian citizens and foreigners.

We feel the same way with regard to the wise decision of the cabinet presidium about changing names which is in accordance with a natural process that is going on in Indonesia and throughout the world.

Of course the instruction and decision of the cabinet presidium is not liked by certain elements and certain groups, for example, the Communists, the fascist-racists, and those who feel threatened by these regulations. It is also disliked by those who are still shackled by a colonial pattern of thinking. But it is the duty of all of us to facilitate healthy developments that will move our nation in the direction of a modernity in which the only division of people is on the basis of their function in society or their place of residence and not on the basis of descent or of ethnic group.

Based on these two very important decisions we can organize a new Indonesian society free from an inappropriate division of its people which originated in the colonial era.

Although it was not made explicit I got the impression that according to Dr. Oey Jan Hong there are many Indonesian citizens of "Chinese descent" who feel threatened. Because of their fear they look for protection from anyone who will promise it. This is in accordance with a natural tendency in man to form associations.

Actually it is more in accordance with natural law to analyse where the source of the threat, who it is directed at, and what steps should be taken to face the threat.

We know that in our society there are immoral, irresponsible elements like thieves and robbers. It would be illogical and immoral to try to find protection against crime for only one certain group in the society. These crimes can only be controlled by building a legal foundation, sharpening the sense of justice in the population, and improving the whole economy. It is a pity that there are still elements (in every society) who are like an ostrich: as long as they are safe from robbery or coercion it does not matter to them that others suffer. Therefore their efforts are aimed at protecting only themselves or at most their clique. They do not consider cooperating with others to fight crime at its roots.

What is worse is that some of these elements are willing to make alliances with crooks. Justice and legal certainty can only be upheld if there are enough elements in the society who truly desire to struggle for them.

Struggle always requires a willingness to sacrifice. Justice and legal certainty are not something which can be purchased, nor are they something which is awarded by the king. Justice and legal certainty are the fruits of struggle and this struggle is the duty of all of us as citizens of the Republic of Indonesia.

7-8

Junus Jahja (Lauw Chuan Tho, b. 1927), born in Jakarta, received an economics degree from Rotterdam University. First active in the

assimilationist movement, he was one of the leaders of the LPKB and the Bakom-PKB. In 1979 he repudiated Protestantism and became a Muslim. In the following year he went to Mecca and became a *hadji*. Soon after that he established a Muslim foundation and began advocating Chinese conversion to Islam as the solution to the so-called Indonesian Chinese problem. The following article is taken from his 1992 paper entitled "Ethnic Chinese Assimilation in Indonesia: A Personal Experience" (1992), pp. 25–32.

Conversion to Islam (1992)

On 23 June 1979 I was converted to Islam. Previously I was a Protestant-Christian, more or less a "nominal" one.

My conversion was heartily welcomed by the Muslim-community. *Tempo*, the country's leading magazine even wrote a feature on the occasion about "Chinese Muslims in Indonesia". I further received letters of congratulations from Muslim and non-Muslim friends. I even received a de luxe edition of The Holy Quran from my dear friend Prof. Dr. P. Sidharta (Sie Pek Giok), now a famous neurologist. And with my "Islamisation" I am experiencing many "most unforgettable" happenings in life.

Spreading Islam among ethnic Chinese

Not only the Muslim-community (the *ummah*) but also friends from other religions insisted that I should be active in giving proper information on Islam to fellow-ethnic Chinese who have not made any firm choice yet with respect to religion. President Suharto has also been very encouraging. In 1982 our Head of State said he was happy with the conversions of ethnic Chinese, since this means "*automatically assimilating within the majority of the people*" (*Berita Buana* newspaper 26 May 1982). And my comrade-in-arms in the assimilation movement K. Sindhunatha (Ong Tjong Hay), who is a devout Catholic, has given me his support whenever possible. Just after my conversion in 1979 he wrote in a brochure: "... Before the Dutch appeared in Indonesia, the immigrants from the Asian Continent looking for a place in the sun in our Archipelago, were definitely and spontaneously assimilated with the local communities. They did it among others through Islam!" He further stated that assimilation also means adapting to the religion embraced by the local people on the basis of personal conviction about the truth taught by that religion. He welcomed Islam as one of the alternatives that ethnic Chinese can embrace when choosing a religion.

Also the *Panji Masyarakat*, an Islamic magazine with the biggest circulation, gave an analysis on ethnic Chinese turning Muslim (15 April 1980). It stated that in the teachings of Islam the obligations of a Muslim are clearly stipulated, and how he should protect and love his religion and his country as well. By becoming Muslim and so joining the Islamic world in Indonesia (90 percent of the population), all doubts about the credibility

and loyalty of the Chinese disappear. Therefore, they are now fully accepted as true brothers, sisters and compatriots having the same commitments towards Indonesia.

Muslim leaders were apparently very happy with my conversion and spontaneously appointed me in 1980 a member of the prestigious Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI = Indonesian Council of Ulama, an assembly representing nationwide Muslim organisations). Through this body I came into close contact with many Muslim leaders who have access to the entire population at grassroots-level. Indeed, we now belong to the "*in-group*". It is therefore not surprising that we, ethnic Chinese turned Muslim, could sometimes be instrumental in bringing *pribumi* and *non-pribumi* closer to each other. As an example during the first quarter of 1980 anti-Chinese riots happened in Ujung Pandang. Some non-Muslim friends asked me to approach Buya Hamka, President of MUI requesting him to ease the tension.

During the beginning of December of the same year there were again anti-Chinese riots, this time in Central Java. Without further ado, the MUI issued a statement on 10th December 1980. The conclusion was that the "Chinese problem" easily gave way to movements of an explosive nature, without disclosing the true background of the outbursts or the main aims behind them. Thus, as long as this sensitive problem is unsolved, such racial disturbances might occur again and again. The more so during socio-economic, or socio-psychological situations, when people's aspirations strive for an outlet. The problem should be solved definitely as soon as possible, by both the government and the community in line with the State's policy of assimilation. The MUI stressed that this would be nothing new, inasmuch as assimilation is something quite natural for Muslims. Islam does not recognise differences of race or tribe or colour. And in daily life Muslims of Chinese descent are fully accepted by indigenous Indonesians, since they are regarded as equals. Buya Hamka's statement on 12 December 1980 was published by *Kompas*, the daily with the biggest circulation in the country.

In this context I am reminded of an event on June 5th, 1988 at the Press Club in Jakarta attended by the Deputy Governor of the City, Mr. Basofi Sudirman. The meeting commenced with the reading of a Quran-verse. This was performed by Surya Madya (former name: Lie Sin Tiong), a young university-educated engineer who has turned Muslim a few years ago but well-versed in Quran reading. The Governor was much impressed and said:

"If anything happened in my village against the Chinese, I will bring Surya to my place, and for sure, everything will return to order."

He then put the question how the State could make good use of ethnic Chinese turned Muslim like Surya Lie Sin Tiong.

On August 22, 1981 I met Mr. Alamsyah Ratuperwiranegara, Minister of Religious Affairs. He told me that President Suharto had been most enthusiastic on hearing that many citizens of Chinese descent had become Muslims.

In doing so assimilation with the common people happens automatically. A few days later I met Dr. K.H.E.Z. Muttaqien, a well-known Muslim preacher and also a chairman of MUI. He disclosed to me, having met President Suharto a while ago, and that the Head of State has said to him what he has already said to the Minister for Religious Affairs.

Based on this information, from a high-ranking functionary and a highly respected Muslim leader, my friends and I embark on a serious *dakwah Islamiyah* (preaching of Islam) among ethnic Chinese in this country.

Before the second World War this was already done by one of our pioneers Mr. Oei Tjeng Hien, later known as Haji Abdulkarim or shortened Haji Karim Oei. He was born in 1905 and died in 1988. He was a close friend of President Sukarno and particularly famous for his statement given to *Tempo* (February 3rd, 1973). When asked about his views on the *pribumi* or indigenous Indonesians, he said: "*True muslims should love his country and the pribumi population!*" But how is it now?

During the last 10–15 years quite a number of ethnic Chinese have converted to Islam. About 1–2 percent or 50,000 to 100,000 people. This is not too many, but there is an interesting feature. Previously, those entering Islam were usually economically poor, but the converts now are young people and intellectuals including some businessmen.

This process of Chinese conversion to Islam is the logical result of assimilation i.e. the increasing social intercourse between ethnic Chinese and their indigenous compatriots. This caused among others intermarriage. Since 90 percent of the indigenous group is Muslim, many Chinese marrying into the indigenous group convert to Islam. Besides that, many new citizens especially the young generation due to increasing social contacts, would like to know what Islam is, the religion of his indigenous friends. This makes some of them studying Islam seriously and convert. Indeed, the young generation of ethnic Chinese is now also aware that Islam is not as bad as pictured by the colonial powers for many centuries. This new environment helps a lot in convincing them that Islam is a universal belief for all races including the Chinese. And it is now more and more disclosed that Islam has many followers in China and even introduced there (since 652 AD) before arriving in our region.

As pointed out, Dutch colonialism has systematically cultivated the idea that "Islam is inferior" and therefore unfit for Chinese. Recently Dr. Karel Steenbrink (a Dutch scholar) in his book "*Beberapa aspek tentang Islam di Indonesia abad ke-19*" (= "Some aspects on Islam in Indonesia in the XIXth century" published in 1984, page 87), stated that in the 18th century the VOC (Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie or Dutch East India Company) several times "issued prohibitive regulations for Chinese to embrace Islam or assimilate into the indigenous population".

To counter all these we have been trying to disclose that in history the relationship between China and Islam has been very close. As an example we bring forward the figure of Admiral Cheng Ho of the Ming dynasty who as a Muslim had visited our Asia-Pacific region from 1405–33 AD spreading

Islam including in our archipelago. In this context we always refer to the famous Cheng Ho or Sam Po Kong-temple in Semarang, Central Java, daily visited by ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians as well.

Information on Islam for ethnic Chinese is indeed urgent to counter the propaganda of the colonial powers during many centuries. Among these are that a Muslim usually has four wives, inclined to frequently marry and divorce etc. But fortunately our Muslim-community has made remarkable progress during some decades so that we are now more able to provide proper information. Therefore, ethnic Chinese do not swallow any more all those nonsense since they see with their own eyes that in daily life only a relative small number among Muslims practise polygamy or are fond of divorces.

Other religions have made huge investments to attract ethnic Chinese in this country. Among others by providing attractive educational facilities (from kindergartens to universities of high quality), scholarships and other financial support in many forms. Of course our dakwah movement cannot compete in this respect since in general the Muslim-community is not so rich. But fortunately, Islam has some other features which are very interesting for ethnic Chinese here. Besides being a religion which is not inferior to others, by embracing Islam young ethnic Chinese experienced that immediately they are fully accepted as fellow-Muslims and compatriots by the people at large who are 90 percent Muslims. All kinds of hostility and controversy as an inheritance of the past disappear. They are heartily welcomed now and totally integrated within the community. So they have at last a permanent "place in the sun". This is exactly what ethnic Chinese are so long looking and longing for. In my opinion, attraction to Islam for ethnic Chinese will go upwards since its followers here are also making progress in the economic field. And this reminds me of Mr. The Siauw Giap, now working at the Institute for Sinology in Leiden, Netherlands. When writing in *Revue du Sud-Est Asiatique II* in 1965 (page 67–83) he put forward this futuristic analysis:

"When the legacies from the colonial past, which still tend to impair group relations in contemporary Indonesia will be wholly removed, and an economic development takes place which affords a fair share to both ethnic Chinese and Indonesians, it is not impossible that Islam will again attract Chinese converts, and the parallel in the history of religions in Thailand and Java be restored".

I am therefore very optimistic. The negative image created by enemies of Islam will slowly but surely evaporate. Turning to Islam by ethnic Chinese will be a normal phenomenon in our country.

PART III

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS



Semar

8

Ethnicity and Nation-building

Like most newly independent countries in Southeast Asia, the Republic of Indonesia which emerged after the end of the Second World War has also faced two common problems: ethnicity and nation-building.

Initially, the Indonesian republican government in Yogyakarta only controlled part of the Indonesian territories, the rest was still in the hands of the Dutch. This resulted in an armed struggle against the Dutch. However, ethnic conflicts occurred not only between the indigenous Indonesians and the Dutch but also between ethnic Chinese and Indonesians, due largely to mutual prejudice and the confused situation. Despite Chinese-Indonesian conflicts, some Chinese leaders still supported the republican government; others were critical of Indonesian leaders. Tjoa Sik Ien, a left-wing *peranakan* physician who was once the President of the pre-war P.T.I., identified himself with the Indonesian Government urging the Chinese to become Indonesian citizens (8-1). Goh Tjing Hok, a journalist, was also sympathetic to Indonesians. He commented that while the Chinese were celebrating their national day in Indonesia where the people were still under colonial rule, ethnic Chinese should also make efforts to help the Indonesians (8-2). However, Kwee Kek Beng, the former Editor-in-Chief of *Sin Po*, was extremely critical of Indonesians, calling them terrorists, and was no longer sympathetic to the Indonesian nationalist goal (8-3).

The Dutch eventually transferred sovereignty to the Indonesians at the end of 1949, and the process of nation-building was intensified. Tjoa Sik Ien and Siauwi Giok Tjhan, in a joint paper on the education of *peranakan* children in an independent Indonesia, favoured national education for *peranakan* children and suggested the introduction of a curriculum with Indonesian national content into the existing Chinese-medium schools (8-4). Tjoa Tjie Liang, a former P.T.I. leader, analysed the problem of nation-building in Indonesia, maintaining that changing Chinese names was one of the ways to achieve a homogeneous nation (8-5). However, he admitted that the process could not be completed in a short period of time.

Defining the Indonesian nation in political and legal terms, and considering local Chinese as members of the newly-born Indonesian nation, Siauwi Giok Tjhan criticized the government policy favouring indigenous Indonesians after Indonesia became a sovereign state. He re-emphasized cooperation between indigenous and non-indigenous populations and contended that only through national economic development in which Indonesian nationals of Chinese descent were included could Indonesia abolish the colonial economic structure and achieve prosperity (8-6). Soe Hok Djien, a younger generation

peranakan who became a well-known writer and intellectual, proposed cultural assimilation rather than political assimilation as the tool for building national unity, a concept different from that of Siau-w Giok Tjhan (8-7).

Totok Chinese leaders, especially those who were aliens, did not talk about nation-building but racial harmony through a change in the patterns of Chinese economic activities. They urged the Chinese to shift from the commercial sector to the industrial sector to help Indonesia develop economically (8-8). *Shenghuo Zhoubao*, a left-wing Chinese weekly newspaper, proposed the "revolutionization of Chinese enterprises" and urged the overseas Chinese to be humble towards Indonesians and to be sensitive towards Indonesian national feelings. At the same time, the weekly urged the overseas Chinese to participate in the Indonesian revolution (8-9).

The shift from commerce to industry apparently was not entirely successful. Those foreign-owned commercial firms (particularly those owned by alien Chinese) became the target of Indonesian economic nationalism again after the 1965 abortive coup. Lo SH Ginting, the secretary of the Communicating Body for Appreciation of National Unity (BAKOM P.K.B.), discussed the smooth transition of commercial firms from foreigners to Indonesian nationals at the end of 1977 and its implications for the Indonesian economy (8-10).

— . . —

8-1

Tjoa Sik len, a Surabaya-born physician, was the President of the P.T.I. central board and director of *Sin Tit Po* (1939). During the Indonesian revolution he sided with the Indonesians against the Dutch. In 1949 he was an Indonesian delegate to the United Nations. The following is an excerpt from his booklet, *Masa'alah Warga Negara Indonesia* (Yogyakarta, 1946), pp. 20—26. Tjoa urged the peranakan Chinese to become Indonesian citizens for both cultural and political reasons.

The Peranakan Chinese and Indonesian Citizenship (1947)

What is the position of the peranakan Chinese towards Indonesian citizenship? In the short analysis and the examples above an answer to that question can be found.

The difference between race and nationality has been explained above. Nationality does not always depend upon race. In this way Chinese in the Dutch East Indies were considered to be Dutch subjects.

A study of minorities teaches us that every state has small groups which are called minorities. These minorities have one or more of the following characteristics:

a different race (kebangsaan),
 a different language,
 a different religion,
 a different set of customs, etc.

Thus as I have said the *peranakan* Chinese in this country during the Dutch colonial period were a minority with Dutch citizenship.

The status of the *peranakan* Chinese as a minority in this country is actually somewhat different from the status of minorities in other countries. For example, the Sudeten-German which is a minority in Czechoslovakia uses the German language while the Hungarians, a minority in Rumania, also use their own language.

On the contrary, the *peranakan* Chinese in Indonesia for the most part no longer speak Chinese but rather Indonesian. The Chinese which is used by some of the *peranakan* Chinese here cannot be understood because it is not actually Chinese but the Chinese language with Indonesian (Javanese, Sundanese, and Malay) syntaxes. For this reason *totok* Chinese deride the language of the *peranakan* Chinese as *Kuoyu Chiaohsing* [*Qiaosheng Guoyu* — meaning: *peranakan* Mandarin]. Almost no one can read or write high Chinese literature let alone translate it like, for example, Richard Wilhelm. Furthermore many old customary laws and institutions have blended with those from Indonesia, for example, from the *slametan*,* the marriage ceremony, with the sprinkling of flowers, the everyday clothes of Chinese women, to taboo. For example, *peranakan* Chinese in East and Central Java are more familiar with and enjoy more the gamelan Javanese musical instrument than the *pat-im* (pa-yin)† which has become strange to their ears. In the same way the fondness of the *peranakan* Chinese in West Java for the *gambang-keromong* is well known.

It may also be added that there are many *peranakan* Chinese whose features are difficult to distinguish from those of natives. Thus if we define race as in the general language they could be said to be Indonesian.

Thus, without knowing it, the *peranakan* Chinese here are actually in practice the same as citizens because their government agencies are the same, the language is the same, the customary institutions are the same, many of them have the same features. In other words more characteristics are similar to, rather than different from, those of Indonesians.

But, although this is so the citizenship regulations of the Republic do not force everyone to accept citizenship. The regulations concerning citizenship and residence in Indonesia which were announced in April of last year affirm in Article 1, among other things, that Indonesian citizens are (a) people who are native to the territory of the Indonesian nation; (b) people not included in the above group but who descended from someone in that group and who

* Ritual holy meal aimed at securing "slamet" (peace and safety). It is observed by many Javanese.

† Eight kinds of musical sounds, here it is used to refer to Chinese musical instruments.

were born and reside in the territory of the Indonesian state; and people not descended from the aforementioned group but who were born and have resided there for at least the last five consecutive years who are at least twenty-one years of age or married, unless they have declared their objection to becoming an Indonesian citizen because they are a citizen of another country.

Furthermore Article 4 among other things states:

The aforementioned declaration (declaration of objection) in article 1 paragraph b must be forwarded in writing on stamped paper to the Ministry of Justice within one year after the aforementioned article goes into effect. This means that *peranakan* Chinese according to Article 1 of the Indonesian citizenship regulations are included as Indonesian citizens. However they have the right according to Article 4 to refuse that citizenship within one year after the above regulations are implemented. This is what is known as the right of repudiation.

This is very different from the Dutch-Indies government which made all *peranakan* Chinese Dutch citizens without asking whether or not they wanted citizenship. The attitude of the Chinese government was like the Dutch when in the agreement between the Dutch and the Chinese in Beijing in 1911 they affirmed nationality for all overseas Chinese here without first asking the opinion of those concerned.

As stated earlier the citizenship regulations of the Republic of Indonesia do not compel anyone to accept citizenship who does not desire to. On the other hand it is understandable if among the overseas Chinese there are some who worry that even if they accept citizenship they will be discriminated against by the majority, for example, not given equal rights, etc.

In short, there is a fear that they will be treated like step-children. And that fear has a basis.

However, if this occurs, as explained above, it becomes our responsibility as a minority, to struggle together with other small groups, not just with other races like Arabs and Indians but also with Indonesian ethnic minorities. For among the *asli* Indonesians minorities can be found which have different languages, religions, and cultures, for example, Ambonese, Menadonese, Timorese, Balinese, etc.

With them, with other minorities and with parties which take a broader perspective, we must struggle together to eliminate discrimination and injustice. We must struggle until we receive our full rights, until every citizen regardless of his origin or race receives the same treatment. This might occur through something like Article 123 of the constitution of the U.S.S.R. which reads:

Equal rights for all citizens of the U.S.S.R. regardless of their race in every field of the economy, administration, culture, society, and politics may not be infringed.

Any infringement of those rights, direct or indirect, or any limitation direct or indirect which is based upon race or the exclusion of a race encourages racial hatred and prejudice and will be punished according to the law.

This is one example of how a minority can be protected from arbitrary action by the majority. What was achieved there can also be achieved in any democratic country including this one. What can happen in one country can happen in others.

It should be clear now from what has been said above that there is no real basis for fear and concern for peranakan Chinese who desire to become Indonesian citizens.

On the contrary it can be seen that reasons which have led some peranakan Chinese to accept Indonesian citizenship are many and solid. It is therefore natural that they accept Indonesian citizenship.

Also the situation in which the majority of the overseas Chinese here live has determined that they will live and die in this country. Economics and education are among these factors. Without capital or skills which could be used as capital, those who desire to begin a new life in another country (for example, China) cannot hope to do so.

Therefore if a person were to consider the citizenship question as we have above, honestly and objectively, they could not help but arrive at this conclusion. This is a conclusion which is based on honest consideration and clear thinking, which is only possible if we first eliminate what has been called our inferiority complex.

— • • —

8-2

Kwee Kek Beng (1900—75), the Editor-in-Chief of *Sin Po*, held a Chinese nationalist view. Initially sympathetic to Indonesian nationalism, he became critical of the republican government during the Indonesian revolution. The following is an excerpt from his memoirs, *Doea Poeloe Lima Tahun Sebagai Wartawan* (Batavia, 1948), pp. 97—101.

Terror Replaces Terror (1948)

The end of the Japanese terror did not bring peace and freedom to the supporters of the Allies here, but on the contrary, the Chinese who were completely unarmed became the most vulnerable victims.

The Japanese terror was replaced by an Indonesian extremist terror, as if a demon were replaced by the devil; and actually it is incorrect to say that the Japanese terror had ended because many Japanese associated themselves with the trouble-makers whom they continually incited to take provocative action.

More and more often people have been hearing about robberies, kidnapping, and other irresponsible acts against the Chinese, so that more than a

few can stand it no longer and have become soldiers or policemen. Not because they are pro-English or Dutch but because they wanted weapons more effective than a consul. With a "consul [read: weapon] that they shoulder", they can defend themselves under any circumstances.

At first the Chinese pilots who worked for the Dutch armed forces in opposition to the Japanese asked to resign when they were to be used in Indonesia. They were reluctant to fight against Indonesians who were struggling for independence.

But seeing their race attacked again and again without reason, not because their sins were the greatest but because they were the weakest, many Chinese youths rushed to sign up as soldiers.

In one editorial in *Sin Po*, I mentioned the above as a barometer of our feelings — because many of us became infuriated when we heard that on Gang Kantjil [in Jakarta] Indonesian youth tore Chinese flags from bicycles or committed other unnecessary, insulting acts.

When the Allies ordered all Indonesians to leave North Bandung the city was split into two, with North Bandung under English control and South Bandung under Republican control. The railway line became the boundary. Because they could not stand living in the Republican area many Chinese moved to North Bandung where it was safer but quieter and difficult to obtain necessities.

The price of food was very high and, because the Republic forbade people from bringing food into the North, everything had to be smuggled in. In Republican-controlled South Bandung various Indonesian youth groups fought for control and influence. Besides this they often fought with the English so that ordinary citizens were frequently in danger of being hit by stray bullets.

In March 1946 NICA [Netherlands Indies Civil Administration] currency began to circulate, and this was a source of new difficulties because Chinese who used NICA money were considered pro-Dutch and "Dutch running dogs".

Chinese property in South Bandung was not safe and even a Chinese Red Cross vehicle was seized, although the Republican officials must have known that the Chinese Red Cross also gave considerable assistance to Indonesians who were wounded in fighting with the Allies.

Lim Shui Chuan who tried, unsuccessfully, to have the vehicle returned, drew in his breath and said: "What Bung Karno has tried for years to cultivate has been shattered by trouble-makers in an instant" (that is, Chinese-Indonesian friendship).

At the end of the march south, Bandung too was occupied by the Allies, but the English again displayed their stupidity by letting the extremists know beforehand when they were coming. This gave them adequate time to burn Chinese houses. If the Allies had launched a surprise attack nothing would have happened because there would have only been enough time for the extremists to run as quickly as they could.

Many times the English advanced to a place and then retreated again. Although they retreated slowly their retreat, as one would expect, resulted

in the robbing of Chinese property along with accusations that the Chinese were conspirators with the English or enemy spies. This absurd tactic of advancing and retreating confused the Chinese. Stranger still, the Dutch troops seem to be infected by the same method of operation which greatly endangers Chinese property and Chinese lives.

On 28 May 1946 Tangerang was occupied by the Dutch army. Since that time there have been more and more reports of Indonesian attacks on Chinese in the Tangerang area.

One day I was in a truck which carried canned food with a label stating: "The Netherlands Assists the Indies." These things were sent to Tangerang through the Jang Seng Ie Red Cross. In Tangerang we came to the Chung Hui* and were astonished by a continuous stream of reports of robberies and murders of Chinese around the city. The situation was much worse than I had thought, so we felt compelled to report what had happened in Neraka [Hell] Tangerang† in the next day's edition of *Sin Po*.

This really awakened the sleeping Chinese community in Batavia.

Many Chinese youths in Batavia became "volunteers". They were willing to go to dangerous places to help the Chinese there if they were given weapons.

Mr. Oey Kim Seng (recently the head of Pao An Tui)‡ and many other young people went to save what could be saved. In this matter they were greatly assisted by Captain Van Dijk who, unfortunately, died in an auto accident in 1948.

On 11 June 1946 the Chinese in Batavia held a day of mourning in memory of the events in Tangerang. But not long after the murders and robberies of Chinese were repeated in Bagan Si Api-Api, Palembang, and several other places which are not to be mentioned here because they are recorded in the Memorandum circulated by *Chung Hwa Chung [Tsung] Hui* in Batavia at the end of 1947.

It must be said that although the Memorandum is actually far from complete it is more than sufficient to outrage the civilized world.

The anger of the Chinese was reflected in the Chinese press — though the Chinese in Republican-controlled areas repeatedly asked us not to write too critically because they were worried that extremist groups would seek revenge against them.

Chinese newspapers such as *Sin Po* and several others as well were forbidden entry into many Republican-controlled areas. When the Republican Minister of Information was asked who issued this prohibition he could not

* Should be Chung-hua Tsung-hui — the general associations of the Chinese, usually abbreviated as Tsung Hui (Zong Hui).

† During the revolution, there was a Chinese massacre in Tangerang (West Java). Therefore, the place was considered as a hell by the Chinese.

‡ Or Poh An Tui, the Security Defence Force, established during the Indonesian-Chinese conflict aimed to protect Chinese life and property. Initiated by the K.M.T. and armed by the Dutch, it was unpopular among pro-Indonesian Chinese and Indonesian nationalists.

say. He also did not know by whose authority the order banning the posting of Chinese language letters was made.

On his visit to Tangerang the Minister of Information was once searched and treated in an unfitting manner by youths of his own race in front of several reporters. The Minister asked them not to report this because it would embarrass him.

Although the Indonesian press liked to mock or insult other groups it would jump up and down if its people were scolded. Also, most of the Indonesian reporters (more than a few of whom were legacies of the Japanese era) were easily upset.

They have sensitive feelings like the Indonesian youth who hit a young Chinese man because he was insulting the Republic when he put Republican money in his back pocket.

Of course this "holy" money was transferred to the pocket of the youth himself.

In an article in *Sin Po* it was reported that the Indonesians were actually very lucky because, like winning first prize in a lottery without buying a ticket, they did nothing to help the Allies during the war but after the Allies won they were granted independence.

This made many Indonesian newspapers angry indeed, so that the Chung [Tsong] Hui Jogja sent letters to Batavia asking people in the "free areas" to be careful what they wrote.

When the American army landed in Korea on 8 September 1945 they met a provisional Korean government under the leadership of Lyuh Wun Hyung, but the commander of the American forces, Lieutenant-General John R. Hodge did not want to recognize this "independent" Korean government which was founded without Allied knowledge. He ordered this government disbanded and in its place the Allies established a new military government.

How can it be wrong to label the Indonesian Republic lucky when it did not receive harsh treatment like its counterpart in Korea.

We called it [the Republic] lucky and we were accused of insulting it, if we called it unlucky they would have been even more outraged.

Thus the Chinese are always in the wrong. In many places people were forbidden to sell things to the Allies, but if a fully armed Allied soldier comes to a *warung* (grocery store) to buy something by force, the [Republican] youth runs away to hide. When the enemy soldier has gone, this dashing youth reappears again to glare at and scold the shopkeeper who dares to sell things to the "enemy". One shopkeeper finally said to one of these "patriots", "It's like this, bung, stay here in my shop and if an Allied soldier comes, bung, you can help throw him out, because you have pistols and I have no weapons at all and certainly can't resist."

The youth left and I do not know if he has been seen again

8-3

Goh Tjing Hok (pen-name: Abiturient, 1919—90), born in Semarang, received a Dutch education. He served as deputy Editor-in-Chief of *Sin Min* (Semarang) from 1947 to 1949, Editor-in-Chief of *Java Post* (Surabaya) from 1953 to 1959, and Editor-in-Chief of *Liberty* (Surabaya) from 1959 to 1990. He was active in the assimilationist movement. The following was first published in *Sin Ming Wuchang Nummer*, 10 October 1948.

Chinese National Day and Indonesia's Independence (1948)

October 10th . . .

a famous date in China's history which will continue to be celebrated every year by every Chinese throughout the world.

This time the overseas Chinese are celebrating this public holiday for the thirty-seventh time.

To the Chinese, October 10th or Wuchang Day* means their liberation from domination by the cruel and ruthless Manchus.

To the Chinese, October 10th means the advent of an era of independence after having suffered slavery for about 250 years.

About ten years ago, when the overseas Chinese were exuberantly celebrating Wuchang Day, at that time, if my memory serves me right, an Indonesian newspaper in Surabaya was so touched that it wrote an article to tell us how the Indonesian people wished that they too were able to organize a similar celebration every year.

The article concluded with the hope that the Chinese, who that day were celebrating the anniversary of their independence, would think of the fate of their mother-country, Indonesia, which at the time was still bound hand and foot and, unlike their fatherland, China, was still not free!

In other words, the writer wished to describe how crushed and sad the Indonesian people felt in the past, during the period of Dutch rule, when they could only wistfully and longingly watch the joy of the Chinese celebrating their independence day while they themselves were still in the shackles of Dutch colonial rule.

The situation could be likened to a family having a big feast in somebody else's house, while the owner of the house happened to be bound hand and foot

Today, we are again celebrating Wuchang Day.

But now the overseas Chinese are celebrating in an atmosphere and in circumstances different from those during the pre-war period.

This time we are celebrating it in the same country, but in a society which has changed vastly from what it was in the past.

* The armed uprising in Wu-ch'ang which led to the overthrow of Manchu took place on 10 October 1911.

We are no longer in a house with all the occupants in shackles, but in a big mansion whose inhabitants have freed themselves, or are in the process of freeing themselves, from those shackles.

So this time the overseas Chinese are celebrating the thirty-seventh anniversary of their independence in a society which is in a situation comparable to the one the Chinese were in thirty-seven years ago

What the Chinese people were fighting for thirty-seven years ago is now also being fought for by the Indonesian people.

The aims and objectives of the revolution started by the Chinese people at Wuchang in 1911 are now being pursued by the Indonesian people.

A struggle for independence will inevitably advantage one side and put the other side at a disadvantage.

Dr. Sun Yat Sen's struggle brought happiness to the Chinese people but, at the same time, put at a disadvantage the Manchus and the foreigners who, with their extra-territorial rights, at that time were used to lording it over in China.

In a similar way the struggle of the Indonesian people is bound to bring happiness to the Indonesians, but conversely it will put at a disadvantage the other population groups (including the Chinese population group) who in the past, during the period of Dutch rule, in comparison with the Indonesians, were living in a golden age.

It was indeed hard for the Manchus and the foreigners in China, all of a sudden, to have to respect a former subject people as their equals.

It was indeed hard for the Manchus and the foreigners to face the Chinese — whom they had been able to treat as slaves for more than 250 years — and at the same time accept them as their rulers.

The Chinese, however, did not care about their embarrassment and persevered, and stood up for their rights when they felt they were not being given their due or were offended.

The revolutionary process that took place in China can also be seen taking place during the present transition period in Indonesia.

For the other groups (including the Chinese population group) it is indeed hard to have to adjust themselves to being ruled by the Indonesians, because to them, for 350 years, the Indonesians have been nothing more than a subject people.

Such a view, which is purely based on sentiments, cannot be but short-sighted, it is not surprising, therefore, that up to now there are still groups of people who prefer to dream or to wait for the return of colonial rule instead of doing their best to adapt themselves to the changing times.

When we celebrate this year's Wuchang Day, let us think about the situation in China and that of the Chinese people thirty-seven years ago, and having done so let us use our common sense (and do away with our spurious sentiments) and compare them with the present ideals and struggle of the Indonesian people.

Having shaken off the chains of slavery, the Chinese nation demands just treatment and respect from other nations.

The Chinese would not like it, and even hate it, if in China there were people of other nationalities who ignored them and who were there only to make money while isolating themselves from the Chinese people.

Nor would the Chinese like it if people of other nationalities behaved in an arrogant or insolent manner towards them.

It is inevitable that in their present struggle the Indonesian people are making the same demands made by the Chinese people

The Indonesian people would not like it if they do not get just treatment and respect. The Indonesian people would not like the presence here of a group which does nothing else but make money, and which isolates itself from the Indonesian people, or does not take much notice of the Indonesian people.

Similarly, the Indonesian people would not like the presence here of a group which behaves arrogantly or insolently towards them, in spite of the fact that they have lived in slavery and subjugation for 350 years.

If we Chinese can accept the idea that what we expect from the Western nations we can also offer and give to the Indonesian people, it will not be difficult for us, overseas Chinese, to adapt ourselves to a free Indonesian society.

If we Chinese who hate the superior attitude of the white man so much can behave courteously and abandon our superior attitude towards the Indonesians, we believe that it will be possible to remove the mistrust or mutual suspicion that now exists.

Therefore, when we celebrate this year's Wuchang Day, let us realize that we are no longer living in Dutch colonial times, but in a New Indonesian Society, among people who are struggling for the same aims and objectives the attainment of which we are celebrating today.

There is no day more proper than this year's National Day to rouse the handful of Chinese who suffer from a colonial mentality, so that they will quickly awaken from their colonial dream.

It would be very wrong of us to celebrate this public holiday by just raising the flag, singing the Chinese National Anthem, or strutting about wearing badges showing the White Sun against the Blue Sky, while forgetting the essence, the underlying principle, and the significance of Wuchang Day.

After the birth of Free China we have forced the Westerners to abandon their superior attitude toward us; therefore, let us, now that Indonesia has become Independent, force ourselves to get rid of our superiority complex *vis-a-vis* the Indonesian people.

There is no difference whatsoever between us shouting "Long Live the Great Republic of China" or singing the Chinese National Anthem without knowing what a Great China means or without ever having read Dr. Sun Yat Sen's Testament, and Bung Tomo shouting "Merdeka" (Freedom) in front of the microphone without knowing the scope and meaning of the word!

In order to be able to appreciate the present struggle of the Indonesian people, there is no easier way than to study the history of China's struggle for independence.

For our own good and for the sake of the future of the children and grandchildren of the overseas Chinese, we must show the same appreciation for the struggle of the Indonesian people as for our own struggle.

In order to be able to win an honourable place in Independent Indonesia, the proper thing for us to do is to change our attitude and behaviour towards the Indonesian people in such a way that they are consonant with what the Chinese in China expect from the foreigners there.

Only if we are willing to admit that there is a parallel between the two dates of October 10th and August 17th, are willing to realize that the aims of the Chinese Revolution tally with those of the struggle of the Indonesian people, are willing to understand that the ideals of the Chinese nationalists are similar to those of the Indonesian nationalists, are willing to realize that the Indonesian people are not willing to return to life under Dutch rule, just as the Chinese people are not willing to return to life under Manchu rule, and only if we Chinese are willing to realize that the word "inlander" (native) or "hoanna" (southern barbarian) is as insulting as the expression "tjina koentjir" (pigtailed Chinese), then, and only then, can there be mutual understanding and close, permanent, and lasting co-operation between the Chinese and Indonesian people.

In conclusion, while celebrating this year's Wuchang Day, let us all think about the struggle being waged by our brothers, the Indonesians, as was hoped for by the nationalist newspaper mentioned above.

This is necessary if we are not to persist in our indifferent attitude and if we are able to face, intrepidly and with common sense, our future, which will be very different from the life we had in the past, during the period of Dutch colonial rule.

To study the San Min Chu I (The Three Principles of the People of Dr. Sun Yat-sen) with a clear mind is a thousand times better than to shout about the Great Republic of China with an air of self-importance!

— . . —

8-4

Tjoa Sik Ien and Siauwi Giok Tjhan who sided with the Indonesian nationalists during the independence movement, presented a joint paper at the Inter-Indonesian Educational Congress held between 15 and 20 October 1949 in Yogyakarta. The paper was published in *Adjar dan Dasar*, ed. Abito Marto Hardjono (Jakarta, 1951), pp. 68—75. Both authors argued that the ethnic Chinese placed high

value on education and that the Dutch were able to draw the ethnic Chinese to their side by providing Chinese children with education. The similar treatment of the Republican Government would result in winning the Chinese to its side. None the less, they argued that in the past Chinese schools had nationalist content which made the *peranakan* Chinese often nationalistic. It is therefore desirable to instil Indonesian nationalism in Chinese schools.

Educational Problems for Children of *Peranakan* Chinese who are Indonesian Citizens (1949)

1. It is known that during the colonial period the government made available to the Chinese in Indonesia separate schools which were called Dutch Chinese Schools (H.C.S.). These schools were "status schools" because only the children of those with an income of over Rp. 900 per year were allowed to study there. The history of these H.C.S. schools shows that the Dutch colonial government decided to establish them because, due to the efforts of Chinese residents in Indonesia which were supported by the Chinese government (Ch'ing Dynasty), schools were founded at the end of the nineteenth century to educate Chinese children in Indonesia to become Chinese nationalists. These schools were called T.H.H.K. schools.* Later these schools faced stiff competition from H.C.S. because:
 - a. School fees were lower and the opportunity to continue one's studies was greater and less expensive.
 - b. H.C.S. graduates found employment more easily than T.H.H.K. students because they understood Dutch.
 - c. The T.H.H.K.'s difficulties in finding teaching personnel — they had to be imported which resulted in high fees — compelled the T.H.H.K. directors to use unqualified teachers to give lessons.
2. The textbooks used in the T.H.H.K. schools were aimed at educating the pupils to become Chinese nationalists. These books were generally imported from China or Singapore and the contents did not suit conditions in Indonesia.

As a result, T.H.H.K. students, though they had lived for generations in Indonesia and were actually sons of Indonesia, came to feel alien to their society and homeland.

H.C.S. was a colonial school and of course the contents of its textbooks were aimed at preserving colonial power. The contents of the books gave rise to an inferiority complex towards the colonizers and a superiority complex towards the colonized. This situation resulted in malicious and dangerous racial prejudices.

* This is incorrect. The first T.H.H.K. school was established in 1901 in Batavia (Jakarta) by the local Chinese without the help of the Chinese Government.

3. In the Japanese period no special schools were set up for *peranakans*. Moreover, *peranakan* children were not allowed to study in the existing public schools. Evidently this was not a general regulation for, in a few places, primary schools did accept *peranakan* children. This was exceptional however. Through a regulation requiring the registration of foreigners, Japanese occupation policy determined that everyone who used a Chinese name, regardless of how many generations they had lived in Indonesia, was an "*Alien*". As a result of this policy *peranakan* and *totok* Chinese were forced to unite to find a way to educate their children, and later opened their own schools using ex-H.C.S. and T.H.H.K. teachers. The textbooks used were mostly books which had been used by the T.H.H.K., so they educated Chinese children to become Chinese nationalists. However, some special contents were added by the Japanese military government. China's position within a Greater Asia led by Japan had to be accepted and Japanese language was taught as a compulsory subject. This kind of education automatically resulted in unhealthy racial prejudices and complexes.
4. At the time of the proclamation, no one in the government apparatus considered the problem of education for Indonesian children of Chinese descent in particular and for children of foreign descent in general. It is true that there was a vague declaration — never widely publicized — that public schools were also open to Chinese children. However there was no firm attitude or concrete effort on the part of the government to make its educational programme attractive to the group of Chinese descent which as a result of colonial policy has been living under the influence of various psychological complexes and racial prejudices. These insufficiently noticed psychological factors made it appear that the foreign descended population was not interested in the government schools. These factors include:
 - a. As a result of colonial policy there were various superiority and inferiority complexes and racial prejudices.
 - b. Colonial policy and Japanese occupation policy has resulted in the foreign descended population feeling like "*aliens*".
 - c. China had become one of the "*Big Five*" and this encouraged the Chinese descended population to become "*China-minded*" and "*Chinese language-minded*". Also, because most Chinese children had studied in schools which they were forced to build because of Japanese occupation policy and which had used Chinese as the language of instruction, there was a desire to continue in these schools.
 - d. Some who had started studying in Dutch colonial schools did not finish their course, but as soon as they were reopened, they continued their studies so as to graduate within the shortest period.
 - e. The public schools used local languages for the lower grades.
 - f. As a result of the independence struggle, the government schools did not seem to have a standard organization or curriculum and

- gave the impression that teaching was paid inadequate attention. Also, many teachers were active in the struggle and, as a result, unqualified teachers had to be used. This led people to believe that the quality of education was not being maintained.
- g. As soon as the Dutch colonial government occupied an area, for example, Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya, and Semarang, they opened schools with an emergency education system so that those students whose education had been interrupted could finish as quickly as possible. This resulted in a large-scale evacuation of Chinese children whose education was interrupted and who found that in the Republican areas no effort was made by the government to assist them to finish their education quickly.
 - h. The Dutch colonial government seems to have continually used the education problem to gain support. The changed situation in China caused the Dutch-led University of Indonesia to open its doors to *peranakan* Chinese graduates of T.H.H.K. schools who did not understand Dutch. Exams were carried out in English and made easier. For them [T.H.H.K. graduates] special colleges were established where they could study Dutch and shortly enter a Dutch language college.
5. When the Republic of Indonesia was proclaimed the citizenship problem caused various misunderstandings. These were aggravated by the Dutch propaganda war. The situation is better now, especially with the various inter-Indonesian Conferences and with the certainty that the Federal Republic of Indonesia [R.I.S.] will be formed. Because of this if the Indonesian government adopts wise measures in the field of education, it will certainly be able to capture greater *peranakan* support. Three proposals are presented here. These are actions which need to be taken during the transition period to ease the job of educating all *peranakans* so that they feel equal as citizens and sons of this country.
- a. Give subsidies to existing Chinese schools with the condition that the Republic can control the curriculum and the government can provide books in Chinese but with Indonesian content, that is, with contents that encourage an independent and Republican spirit, free from prejudice, free from inferiority or superiority complexes, and which teaches its students to be useful citizens both for the progress of their society and their country generally. Furthermore, subsidized schools could be obligated to make Indonesian language a required subject.
 - b. Open schools for children from the age of five years up to Grade III with the language used in the home as the language of instruction. (This is the same system that is used for elementary schools which use [Indonesian] regional languages.) At the beginning of Grade IV students would be transferred to public schools where the language of instruction was Indonesian and the curriculum the same.

- c. Provide special opportunities for graduates of Chinese schools to continue their education in state secondary schools and universities. This could be done by making the exams easier and providing opportunities to study the Indonesian language rapidly so that the students could enter colleges or do studies in Indonesian.
6. Changes in international politics necessitate a review of the foreign languages needed in secondary schools in Indonesia. The Dutch government in Indonesia has preceded it with its enactment of the "primary teacher's certificate for Chinese", and it would be best if the Republic would consider this. This effort could be continued by the Federal Republic of Indonesia and expanded to make the Chinese language a subject in secondary schools. This would certainly please those who are still "Chinese minded" and encourage them to study in government schools.

— . . —

8-5

Tjoa Tjie Liang (Anang Satyawardaya, b. 1913), born in Banjarmasin, moved to Java and became interested in journalism. Although receiving no formal education, he managed to become an editor of *Sin Tit Po* (1932–33). In 1933 he was elected secretary of the P.T.I. He also served as Editor-in-Chief of the following Indonesian dailies: *Soeara Oemoem* (1933–34), *Mata Hari* (1935, 1937–42), *Sin Min* (1951–53), *Kuang Po/Sinar Indonesia* (1953–65). He was active in the assimilationist movement. The following article was published in *Nusaputra* 1, no. 1 (25 September 1951), pp. 8–9, 25.

A Homogeneous Nation (1951)

Most people still believe that even though Indonesians of Chinese descent may have Indonesian citizenship, they are still "Chinese". They are still considered as "foreigners". If a Chinese opens a business, that business is still referred to as a "foreign enterprise".

This sort of belief is found not only among the common people who are mostly confused (if we do not want to say that they have no understanding at all) about the concept of Indonesian citizenship (after all this concept is rather modern) but also among educated Indonesians and even civil servants. It is not impossible that this understanding exists as well in government agencies. For example, in one district in Jakarta a totok Chinese became the government's "Chinese *lurah*" [village head] and handled the affairs of totok and peranakan Chinese. Although he knew much more about his responsibilities and was far more approachable to the public than his

peranakan predecessor, his skilled handling of the position could not eliminate the absurdity that a totok Chinese could become *lurah*. This could only occur because of confusion about the concept of Indonesian citizenship.

I once went to a police office to ask for an identity card for travel. In the identity card I was referred to as being of Chinese nationality. I asked why I was not said to be of Indonesian nationality, since according to Indonesian Nationality Law (U.U.W.) as a person of Chinese descent born in this country was I not categorized as Indonesian?

The response was that what was recorded in the U.U.W. was still uncertain . . . and furthermore if I called myself Indonesian where was the official evidence? Of course I could not provide proof, because in those statutes nothing is mentioned about providing a letter/certificate of proof.

Regarding the belief among ordinary Indonesians that an Indonesian citizen of Chinese descent is still Chinese and foreign, there are too many examples to mention here.

Government economic regulations that divide importers, middlemen and inter-island traders into those who are native Indonesians on the one hand, and those who are "foreign" on the other, place Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent in the latter category. Categorizing Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent with foreigners clearly does not help to eliminate the general view that they are still foreign.

This view certainly does not have a good influence on efforts to create a united homogeneous Indonesian nation, nor does it encourage the attainment of the ideal of making everyone, regardless of ethnic group or descent, a true Indonesian patriot.

The government would be acting wisely were it to provide an example by showing a firm attitude in helping to eliminate this belief about the Chinese which could bring negative consequences.

It is well that among the general population a consciousness has arisen to do something to help eliminate this false impression about citizenship. Efforts in that direction include, for example, mixed social gatherings, sporting events, and artistic endeavours. The founding of Indonesian political parties which do not discriminate on the basis of descent and the good response to this by Indonesian citizens of Chinese, Arab, and Dutch descent also represent a step in the right direction.

Also, name-changing is a radical step to help eliminate the belief that Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent are foreigners.

The most well-known step in this direction, among the Indonesian Chinese community, was taken by Ko Kwat Tiong who changed his name to Mohamed Saleh.

But, to the best of my knowledge, not many people have followed his example.

Just recently, on 28 August 1951, *Sin Min* reported that Lauw Sing Djay, the President-Director of Columbia Motors Company Limited in Semarang, has changed his name to L. Tedjakusuma.

In a few comments on the matter of name-changing, that daily newspaper declared that "hopefully, changing names is done with no other intention than serving Indonesia".

Here I will not discuss whether people have any "other motives" when they Indonesianize their names. I only want to deal with the problem of name-changing on its own, apart from the mere possibility of other motives.

It is an idealistic action when someone with status changes his name. In the present situation such an action requires moral courage. This is so because the person who changes his name could possibly become the subject of laughter and derision by those who have not examined the problem closely. Certainly this kind of action is not normal or customary. And any thing which is not normal or customary runs the risk of being misunderstood by others. This is so even though the act of changing one's name is common in Europe, America, the Philippines, Siam, Burma, and even in China. There may be "other motives" hidden in the act of changing names, but what is evident is the desire not to be considered different, not to be considered "foreign" by the majority.

If by simply changing names one can wipe away people's attitude that we are foreigners, why not do it? Remember what Shakespeare said: "What's in a name!" A name is a small matter he said. If people call a water lily a rose, in due time it will be known as a rose and the reverse is also true.

Shakespeare was both right and wrong. Of course a water lily can be called a rose if there were no roses. But if a person knows that a water lily is one kind of flower and a rose another kind, although both are red, how can the feeling that there is a difference between the two be eliminated? It would be a different matter if there were only water lilies and no roses. Only then could a water lily pass for a rose.

Imagine — and this is just imagination — if every Indonesian citizen of Chinese descent suddenly changed his name and took an "Indonesian" name (Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, Malay, Buginese, or whatever else is Indonesian) would that mean that they would no longer be labelled foreign?

I think not. Those whose profile is more Chinese, even if their name is Amat or Amin, will not be able to pass for native Indonesians. This is even more true if the people they associate with are fellow Chinese, they celebrate the Chinese New Year, their customs are Chinese, their religion is Chinese, and their dress and adornment (especially of women) is Chinese or a little different from the natives of their region.

Name-changing does not quickly result in changes in all the other things that make us different. It must be acknowledged, however, that it does help us to move in that direction.

All those other changes can only be achieved through assimilation, and name-changing can be viewed as a step towards assimilation.

Although this is so, not every person can assimilate. I will discuss this on another occasion.

As far as I can see, all paths towards the formation of a homogeneous nation are evolutionary. The journey is a slow one but it can be speeded up if each citizen directs his attention towards doing that and if the government is continually alert to give incentives and provide an example where necessary.

8-6

Soon after Indonesia became a sovereign state, Siauw Giok Tjhan (1914–81), who was then a member of parliament, discussed the position of Indonesian Chinese in national economic development. He criticized the government policy which favoured indigenous and Western elements excluding the Indonesians of Chinese descent from the national economy. The article was published in *Sin Po*, 23 and 24 November 1953.

National Economic Development (1953)

From interpellators' explanations and government responses it is clear that the main problem we face now is this: what form should our national economy take and how can we make it a reality in the shortest possible time? The national economic system for which we aim must be able to release the people from poverty through the implementation of provisions of our Constitution, for instance, paragraphs 38 and 27.

While cabinet follows cabinet, this vital question continually reappears. The reason for this is that, up to the present, we have had no opportunity to formulate a blueprint (integrated and definitive plan) for the national economy, which must be based on the provisions of paragraphs 27 and 38 of our Constitution. Former Prime Minister Wilopo once said in this very meeting-room that we had "overplanned", were suffering from an excess of plans, yet had not been able to work out an integrated and definitive plan for national economic development, one which could arouse in every Indonesian citizen joy and the will to work to realize it as quickly as possible, because the implementation of the plan would guarantee to each citizen a life free from fear and poverty.

The lack of such an integrated and definitive plan has meant that we have been experiencing only a piece meal abolition of the colonial economy. This piecemeal approach clearly gives rise to jealousies and ill-feeling because it opens up possibilities for a system of favourites which aims at benefiting members of parties which happen to be in power; changes of government lead to fear and worry, amongst the favourites of parties which are no longer in

power. From this angle we can see that whenever there is a change of cabinet, there must be questions, interpellation, or motions concerning the methods for restructuring the economy.

For this reason the hope arises that the Ali Sastroamidjojo-Wongsonegoro cabinet will now free itself from this slur and also do away with the piecemeal approach to the economy, being able in a short time to present to the D.P.R. (Parliament) a complete and firm national economic plan which could stimulate happiness and a desire to work for its implementation among all citizens, so that all national experience, ability, and capital could be used as efficiently as possible. It would be good if the government is able to announce its intention to present a complete national economic plan in the near future. The National Planning Board, with its staff strengthened and the use of Indonesian experts, is certainly capable of formulating such a plan in a short time.

The piecemeal approach to liquidation of the colonial economy which has been applied up to now clearly has not led to progress in this endeavour; the government itself admits that our economy still has the structure of a colonial economy. Indeed every regulation implemented and every move taken, though the cabinet of the time said that they were all truly aimed at liquidation of the colonial economy, in fact strengthened the position of foreign monopoly capital, so that it could continue to exert a negative influence on freedom of choice in our national policies. The most important conditions for achieving our own national economy are the courage and capacity to organize foreign investment so that foreign capital cannot again achieve monopoly power, for monopolies can damage freedom of choice in our state policies which means damaging our national independence and sovereignty.

It is worth mentioning here the peculiar fact that while we desire the abolition of the colonial economy, in our efforts to achieve this we clearly still adhere to and leave in force the legacy of colonial regulations, which were instituted by the colonial authorities to secure their power in Indonesia.

The 1940 foreign exchange ordinance was intended to bring into existence a wartime colonial economy. When the Dutch colonizers returned, they revised this foreign exchange regulation to speed up the restoration of Dutch monopoly capital power, which was the basis of colonial power over Indonesia.

It certainly sounds very odd that this foreign exchange regulation, which was used by the colonizers to prepare the colonial economy for war and then to re-establish the power of Dutch monopoly capital, should be maintained by the Republic of Indonesia to build a peacetime national economy and to liquidate the power of foreign monopoly capital in Indonesia.

Thus, for the present cabinet to prove its sincerity in emphasizing the interests of the masses in its development efforts, it is most necessary for it to review the policies of previous cabinets, which continued to use the old foreign exchange ordinance, that is, a colonial legacy.

It should also be noted that with the assistance of the colonial power at the time of the surrender of sovereignty, foreign monopoly capital in Indonesia

was freed from the control of the foreign exchange generated by its profits; this release took the form of a "let alone agreement", which is still in effect for B.P.M. [Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij] and means a reduction in the amount of foreign exchange controlled by the government. The shortage of foreign exchange resulting from this "let alone agreement" led to the government instituting restrictions, which gave rise to quarrelling and fighting amongst Indonesians.

Instead of taking action to abolish the "let alone agreement" which reduced the state's control over foreign exchange, previous cabinets have taken steps to set us against each other by such means as the implementation of what is called the "native policy", dividing our citizens into two classes of people, indigenous and non-indigenous.

Previous governments appeared to take no notice of the provision of Article 25 of the Constitution which clearly states that "the authorities shall not attach any advantages or disadvantages to the fact that citizens belong to a particular group of the population". The stance of ignoring this provision of the Constitution is an unwise one and an impossible one for the government of a democratic constitutional state.

As this "native policy" is still in effect when the Ministry of Economic Affairs issued its circular number P 41, differentiating between foreign and national enterprises, things happened which, to those Indonesian citizens who were labelled "non-native", seemed very odd indeed. A number of importers and entrepreneurs — Indonesian citizens — whose capital was one hundred per cent Indonesian, received letters informing them that their businesses could not be recognized or treated as domestic enterprises, as fifty per cent of the capital was not owned by "native" citizens.

This was an extremely peculiar state of affairs as businesses whose capital was genuinely one hundred per cent Indonesian, but in which fifty per cent of the capital was not held by those citizens called "native", were placed in the category of foreign enterprises.

No one who wished to acclaim the Republic of Indonesia's record as a democratic constitutional state could justify the categorization of businesses whose capital is one hundred per cent held by Indonesian citizens as foreign enterprises. Such an action violates the fact that, according to the provisions of the Constitution, citizens of Indonesia are not restricted to those labelled "native", but include all those who are proven to have been born and raised in this country and feel themselves to be no different from other sons of Indonesia in their obligations and rights as fellow Indonesians.

Even more unfortunately, this native policy, implemented in the business field, spread to other fields, even as far as admission of children into school. Regions such as South Sulawesi, Minahasa, Flores, Timor, and so on, where previously there had been no differentiation between native and non-native as intermarriage is so common there, began to experience such divisions, which broke up many families.

Such a situation was in complete contradiction to government statements, which placed value on the creation of a homogeneous society of citizens. Efforts to create such a society were thrown into disorder by the undemocratic "native policy" which resembled Malanism* in South Africa which the Indonesian spokesman in the U.N. General Assembly condemned.

Cabinets preceding the present one did not succeed in having the "native policy" abolished, though it is contrary to the Constitution and justice. With the formation of the new cabinet, however, it is hoped that the policy will be done away with, and even more so as in the present cabinet there are two Indonesian citizens from the group called "non-native". This hope is based on two considerations:

- a. It is difficult to understand how a citizen called Ong Eng Die or Lie Kiat Teng can be trusted to participate in carrying out state policies, yet if he were a businessman he could not be recognized as a national businessman should he not desire to surrender fifty per cent of his capital to people of the so-called native group.
- b. One would think that two cabinet members from the group categorized as non-native would not allow the native policy to be continued by their colleagues, because these two ministers are certainly men with backbone and, for them, the abolition of racial discrimination which so injures the feelings of the so-called non-natives is of major importance.

This hope and conviction is not just the conviction of one person, but rather of many from the so-called non-native group. For this reason I am setting it forth here with the hope that the government will be able to confirm that it is different from past cabinets and will truly do away with the native policy, a legacy of previous cabinets, and henceforth any company owned one hundred per cent by Indonesian citizens will be regarded as a national company.

It is not possible for companies whose stock is entirely owned by Indonesian nationals to be categorized as foreign, as is the case now, according to information I have obtained.

I hope for resoluteness so as to avoid the spread of misunderstandings which give rise to inopportune provocations.

It is quite likely that there are still those who would try to defend the native policy as one which could help efforts to dismantle the colonial economy and support national interests. Proof should therefore be presented that this native policy is damaging to the national interests and highly detrimental to efforts to overturn the colonial economy. With this purpose in mind I shall briefly put forward the following:

From the legal point of view, the native policy is in conflict with Article 25 of the Constitution. Thus it is illegal and may not be implemented by any government of a democratic constitutional state. The existence of the policy severely damages the standing of the Republic as a democratic constitutional

* Malanism — derived from the National party leader Dr. Malan who was sympathetic to Nazism.

state. So it cannot possibly aid the national interest and, rather, is extremely damaging to it.

From an economic point of view, the native policy has effects such as the following:

1. To obtain recognition as a national enterprise with the condition of fifty per cent of the stock being owned by people categorized as "native", efforts have been made to set up small companies using (renting or buying) the names of such people. Thus the policy promotes a system of "figure-head".

I might mention here that, according to a person who is usually reliable and who never exaggerates, there is a Dutch monopoly capital entrepreneur who has succeeded in maintaining eight companies whose capital fulfilled the conditions for recognition as national importers.

Thus although this "native policy" was intended to help abolish the colonial economic system, it is not possible for this aim to be achieved as the policy has given rise to a "figurehead" system. In fact with this system Dutch monopoly capitalists, who can still buy or hire native personnel and names, become even stronger. One can envisage the added strength of the position of this foreign monopoly capital if one realizes that the "native" people chosen as "figureheads" usually belong to prominent and influential families whose word or whisper can influence the stand of many political parties.

In this way not only is the goal of restructuring the economy not achieved, but our freedom to decide our own future is adversely affected, because foreign capital, through the families or relatives of the "figurehead", can influence the direction of national policies.

2. The "native policy" encourages the existence of so-called hot money, due to the fact that it is difficult to find indigenous people who are willing to have 50 per cent of their capital in the hands of a non-native, and at the same time be in debt to him. They would have more freedom working alone. As a result, there is a lot of capital circulating in the commercial sector outside government control, and the import sector is experiencing a shortage of capital. This has led the government to provide credit, which in turn has reduced the possibility of providing money for other development needs. Many importers end up in the grip of money-lenders with high interest rates. This results in price increases which harms consumers, the common people. Thus, on the one hand, the government tries to withdraw the "hot money" so that it can be used for productive purposes and, on the other hand, the government's native policy defeats its own efforts. Increasing quantities of "hot money" means increasing quantities of uncontrolled capital, which cannot be used to speed up useful development in the national interest. So the native policy which promotes "hot money" is damaging to the national interest.

3. The "native policy" reduces the will to work, hinders the drive, and kills the initiative of citizens from the "non-native" group which has the capital and work experience. The policy alienates them, whereas their energy, experience, and capital should be made use of and indeed could certainly improve the strength of the nation to attack the colonial economic system and build a new healthy national economy.

Seen from this point of view, the "native policy" clearly cannot help in efforts to demolish the colonial economy and in fact hinders them.

The greatest damage, however, is moral. This damage is incalculable — the feeling of alienation of a group called "non-native" in their native land, their birth-place, because of the way they are treated. In actual fact, when we proclaimed our independence we promised in the political manifesto of 1 November 1945 to make them true patriots and democrats. To achieve this, we cannot leave them to feel alienated and become isolated, but must arouse and foster in them a sense of one destiny and love for their native land and for their fellow Indonesians who treat them also as fellow countrymen and in accordance with democratic principles which guarantee the application of basic human rights.

No matter how you twist it, the native policy cannot benefit the Republic of Indonesia as a democratic legal state, but must damage it.

For these reasons, I hope that the present cabinet will be firm. It is the first time since the Federal Republic of Indonesia that so-called non-natives have been given the opportunity to participate in taking responsibility for the direction of state policy. I feel sure that a firm stand will indeed be taken rather than attempts being made to avoid the question as has happened with previous cabinets.

In this connection, I should mention my appreciation of the statement of the Minister for Economic Affairs, who recognized that the present system of distributing foreign exchange is still unsatisfactory; he has stated his willingness to listen to proposals. A foreign exchange system which incorporates elements of the "native policy" of previous cabinets cannot possibly be satisfactory. It is not even democratic in spirit, for it does not guarantee the interests of the common people, as the present system opens up possibilities for trading in licences and promotes the figurehead system, which is an instrument of foreign monopoly capitalists for keeping their position as pillars of a colonial economic system.

The present apportioning system needs to be reviewed so as to guarantee the interest of the small or the new businessmen with small capital, so that they can function, and further guarantee them the opportunity to grow, without the need to lower themselves by becoming figureheads for foreign capitalists, or dealers in licences.

In closing, I would like to repeat what I suggested at the beginning of this statement: the necessity for the present cabinet to do away with the piecemeal approach to restructuring the economy and to put forward as soon as possible an integrated and definitive national economic plan which will regulate the

utilization of all manpower, experience, and capital available in Indonesia in the most efficient and appropriate way.

8-7

Soe Hok Djin (Arief Budiman, b. 1941), born in Jakarta, obtained a degree in Psychology from the University of Indonesia, and Ph.D. in Sociology from Harvard in 1980. He wrote essays and was active in the cultural and political movement. The following article was published in *Djaja*, no. 62 (30 March 1963).

Culture as the Tool for Building National Unity (1963)

BAPERKI is a political party representing a group in Indonesia, that is, the Chinese who have become Indonesian citizens. In its political programme, BAPERKI intends to retain the Chinese group as one of the Indonesian *suku*, pointing to the *bhinneka* (diversity) of our national motto [as its justification]. Concerning the aspect of *tunggal ika* (unity), which is the other part of the motto, it [BAPERKI] intends to fulfil this through integration in the political and cultural fields.

In peranakan Chinese society, there is another view on the Chinese problem. They have introduced the concept of assimilation in every field, both psychological and physical, in order to eliminate the exclusiveness of the Chinese group. BAPERKI is opposed to this concept, particularly the aspect of physical assimilation, that is, intermarriage, because they have said that "marriage is a personal affair which cannot be forced".

This statement is very correct. Marriage is [indeed] a personal affair which cannot be forced. To [use] force in principle is against humanitarianism, which in turn is a principle of our Pancasila. This [use of force] is impossible, it is therefore absurd to discuss it here.

From the foregoing analysis it is clear what the problems faced by these two groups are. Both views are concerned with the elimination of exclusivism in the context of the Indonesian nation. It is of course very clear that the best way [in theory?] is through total assimilation, both psychological and physical. BAPERKI, however, is against this because they *feel* there is an element of "force" in assimilation. The term "force" here implicitly indicates the presence of conflicting desires, in which one element is more dominant than the other. Before we reject [the idea of] force, let us look at the factors which cause them to reject [assimilation]. [This rejection is the result of] conflicting desires. Probably by investigating this aspect [of the problem], we will be able to unify these two views. It is true that this is better than sharpening the differences between these two extreme views.

Human activities are always directed towards values. Man will always move towards and attempt to pursue these values, and make them his. To become a nation means to appreciate these national values collectively. Culture is a complex thing. It is almost impossible for an individual to appreciate that culture if he is not surrounded to the same extent as an Indonesian is. Actual physical differences will always affect him psychologically so that he is different [that is, to make him believe he is different], although in theory this can be stated differently. [Thus] only an "Indonesian" can become a member of the Indonesian nation. Because of this, assimilation is the only effective way. In order to become a member of an Indonesian nation, he has first to become [that is, to be made] an Indonesian.

Should this be achieved through force? I do not think so. As stated earlier, man always directs his activities according to certain values. Everybody who can appreciate the Indonesian culture, arts, literature, and so forth would immediately realize how fortunate he is to be able to appreciate them [for their true worth]. To love the [national] culture makes us love the nation. These two [that is, nation and culture cannot be separated. Those who have known and cherished the culture of the Indonesian nation would dream about entering the body of the Indonesian nation, just like a prospective university student dreaming of entering the faculty that he desires, in order to obtain what he values. In general, people who do not want to enter the body of the Indonesian nation are those who do not know the Indonesian culture because they are concerned with themselves, for instance, with their economic problems. They have generally been influenced by the Dutch policy of "divide and rule" and still consider the Indonesian nation as a nation of "less value".

[Even] to these people, "force" cannot be applied, because force is in contradiction with the principle of humanitarianism. This is indeed very true. We as the people who are conscious of Indonesian cultural values have to introduce these values [to other people]. We have to make their "personality" perfect. This is the function of a mass organization, that is, *to temper and to improve the personal quality of individuals who are rather backward in their development*. An organization which feels the great spirit of the Indonesian nation would undoubtedly practise this policy. With these [conditions], there will not be an element of force, because there is no longer the presence of conflicting desires. [No doubt] marriage is still a personal affair, but now the personality is mature and is able to appreciate the reality.

We are the less fortunate generation because our parents did not make us members of the Indonesian nation. But Bung Karno is the one who really knows the feelings of this group. He stated that *bhinneka* is "das Sein" (reality), while *tunggal ika* is "das Sollen" (necessity). The peranakan Chinese group is recognized as a reality, he even considers it as a *suku*, which is in fact going a bit too far. However, we should not misinterpret his *kindness* and become so spoilt that we forget "das Sollen". "Das Sein" is a process in implementing "das Sollen". He even encourages intermarriage between various [indigenous] *suku*. And all of us know that if these *suku* remain as

they are, they are already Indonesians. This means that no matter how great a Javanese or a Minangkabau's ethnic or regional feeling is, he will not escape from the united feeling of an Indonesian nation. The Chinese group is the group which is far less "Indonesian" than any other Indonesian *suku*. [This is] because they do not have a historical right over any region in Indonesia. They are descendants of immigrants.

. . . .

As I stated earlier, a mass organization which loves and feels the great spirit of Indonesia should carry out a project to improve individuals who still hold the narrow and regional outlook. Because these matters are more sentimental and emotional than rational and intellectual, the most suitable approach is in the field of the arts.

The arts are the most effective tool for personal communication. The arts are created by individuals with sincerity and are the expression of the whole personality. Through the arts man can know the inner world of a person, the actuality of a person. To love and appreciate the arts of a nation will make us love the great spirit of that nation.

In my view, the most positive thing of the BAPERKI Congress activities was the sponsorship of the "Mutual Help Musical Night" (Malam Irama Gotong-Rojong) which was held under the auspices of the Permusjawaratan Pemuda Indonesia and BAPERKI University students.* The show took place in the Sin Hua School in Pasar Baru last 18th and 19th March.

The programme was filled with songs, dances, and tableaux covering Indonesia, the U.S.S.R., Mongolia, Vietnam, Korea, Japan, and Thailand. After watching the whole show, the impression was clearly that it was a "friendly" show. They performed dances and sang songs of those countries as a means to express their friendship towards them.

One disappointment was the absence of authenticity. They performed Indonesian dances emphasizing their acrobatic nature [rather than the deeper cultural aspect]. They performed Indonesian dances with an attitude similar to those other dances such as Soviet dances, Korean dances, or Japanese dances which they had just learned from the Shin-Seizaku Za, a dance group which arrived two and a half months ago. [In my view] the arts should be a matter of sympathy which would lead two persons to meet in one unity. But for them dancing is a technical problem which would attract the audience, just like a [sensational] trapeze artiste who astonishes the audience. With this kind of attitude towards the arts, it is difficult for them to appreciate the great spirit of Indonesia. It is hoped that young men of BAPERKI will explore the Indonesian arts in depth, not just take the external elements which are only its skin.

* The Permusjawaratan Pemuda Indonesia, also known as the P.P.I., the youth organization of BAPERKI, was banned in 1965.

BAPERKI University was also known as Universitas Res Publica (URECA). After 1965 it was taken over by the authorities and the name was changed to Universitas Trisakti.

One thing which one can be proud of is that the BAPERKI youth has been directed towards the activities which are far more useful than the emerging groups. If they receive good and correct guidance, they will be a solid foundation for the [Indonesian] national greatness that we are working towards.

To BAPERKI youth, I would like to say this: Search every corner of the greatness of the Indonesian culture, you will find that your generation has the greatest potential to become Indonesian in totality.



8-8

Shenghuo Zhoubao was the weekly edition of *Shenghuo Bao* in Jakarta, which was run by left-wing totok Chinese. The following article was published as an editorial in the weekly on 21 April 1964, under the title "Jianjie Bufan Daguo Shawen Zhuyi".

Avoid with Determination Big Country Chauvinism (1964)

Recently Indonesian journalists have returned to Indonesia after visiting China. They have published a number of articles introducing the situation in China to their readers. In one of the articles they described their conversations with Peking Mayor Peng Zhen. One point made by Mayor Peng that they remembered very clearly was the following: "If China adopts Big Country Chauvinism the Indonesian people should oppose it." This point really interested the journalists who were in turn convinced that the Chinese leadership did not want Chinese people to have chauvinist thinking or to make China a chauvinist state.

We are touched to read this report made by the Indonesian journalists. At the same time, we have also learned a lesson from them. Everybody knows that Big Country Chauvinism is also a form of narrow nationalism. Those who have been "infected" with this idea are usually people who look down upon other races. They believe that their race is superior to others and therefore expect to enjoy special privileges as well as special respect. They refuse to consider themselves equal with other races. Their behaviour also reflects this disgusting racial superiority. They are only aware of their own existence but not that of others. They know only to harm others. Not only can they not establish a genuine friendship but, on the contrary, they will become an obstacle for genuine friendship, affecting the good relationship between races as well as between states.

Overseas Chinese live among the peoples of other countries day and night. Their movements, their words, and even their laughter are considered as representing the nationals of Socialist China. Their progressive ideas, humble

attitude, decent behaviour, and contribution to the local people and country will be welcomed by the people concerned. In turn, all these contribute to the development of friendly relations. On the other hand, if they are ideologically backward, arrogant in attitude, behave indecently, and do nothing positive for the local population but rather create problems and difficulties, they can only cause grievances among the local population and hence jeopardize good relationships. Therefore, we feel that overseas Chinese in all walks of life ought to avoid the emergence of this chauvinist attitude and behaviour. When they witness the achievements of our ancestral land in both the revolution and socialist construction, its development in the agricultural and industrial sectors, its development of the national economy, success in testing the first atomic bomb, and the gradually increasing status of China in the international community, overseas Chinese, especially in their happiness and acclaim, must try to prevent the rise of Chinese chauvinist feelings.

We ought to take heed of the instruction of our leaders. We should understand the danger of becoming chauvinistic when overseas Chinese deal with other races. We should avoid chauvinistic attitudes with determination. The stronger China is, the humbler we should be. We should be stricter with ourselves but more flexible towards others. Beware of falling into the trap of chauvinism, because this will bring notoriety to our ancestral land and our people, at the same time it will also jeopardize the friendship between the overseas Chinese and the local population.

— . . —

8-9

The following was published as an editorial in *Shenghou Zhoubao* (Jakarta), 10 April 1965, under the title "Guanyu Shiyong Qiye Keminghua Wenti".

On the Revolutionization of Private Enterprises (1965)

Recently, President Sukarno and the First Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Subandrio have made a number of speeches discussing the problem of revolutionization of private enterprises. The speeches have received great attention from the people who are in private enterprise. The major point of the President's speech was on the direction of private enterprises. He clearly pointed out that from next year onwards, all private enterprises will no longer be permitted to engage in import business. Also, private enterprises can only export Indonesian agricultural products under the direct guidance of the government. [The existing private enterprises] are to be encouraged to move into the industrial sector. The First Deputy Prime Minister in his speeches

urged private enterprises to be progressive, honest, and to serve the majority of the people. They should not engage in sabotage but make themselves tools of the revolution by joining forces with workers and peasants, and by participating in the struggle against "Malaysia". They should not betray the revolution or do things which do not coincide with [the principles of] independence and guided economy.

After listening to the important instructions of the national leaders, the majority of people in private enterprise know the condition of their survival as well as direction of their endeavours. In other words, they understand what to do in order to become tools of revolution and to be beneficial to production and development. They know that only through this will they obtain respect from the state and the people and receive reasonable status and protection. They will not be perceived as if they are obstructing economic development. Therefore the people concerned now have to think carefully of the problem of running their enterprises. They can no longer hesitate or just pay lip service. As for the overseas Chinese, those in private enterprise should also examine carefully what road they should take so that they will serve the revolution and the interest of the majority of the people. In return, they will receive reasonable protection and legal status [in Indonesia].

The majority of overseas Chinese businessmen residing in Indonesia engage in private enterprise. In recent years due to the impact of the local revolutionary situation and the instructions of our leaders in the P.R.C., they have understood rather clearly the correctness of taking the road towards economic independence. They have gradually taken this way by shifting commercial activities to industrial ones and by improving the method of running their businesses. However, there are some Chinese who cannot think clearly or are short-sighted. They only see the immediate profit but not the long-term benefit. They are concerned only with individual interest rather than that of their group. They still live in the past and do not want to better their conduct. These people, after listening to the speeches and instructions of the Indonesian national leaders, should be conscious of the situation. Otherwise, they will be driven away by the current of revolution. The First Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Subandrio said: "Whether or not private enterprises have a place in the revolution will be decided by private enterprises themselves". Overseas Chinese as the nationals of Socialist China who are good friends of Indonesia and support Indonesian revolution and development should think over these words and act accordingly.

————— • • —————

8-10

Lo S.H. Ginting (Lo Siang Hien, b. 1921), born in Yogyakarta, received a Drs. degree from a Dutch university. From 1966 to 1971

he was appointed a member of Indonesian parliament representing the Indonesian Catholic Party. Before joining the private sector, he worked for the Ministry of Labour until 1967. He is now the secretary of Bakom-P.K.B. The following article was published in *Kompas*, 22 July 1977.

The Transfer of Commercial Firms from Foreigners to Indonesian Nationals (1977)

Two bases of judgement can be used in the transfer of commercial enterprises from foreign to domestic hands, which will be carried out at the end of this year. The first is economic-rational, to guarantee the continuity and the flow of distribution. The second is social-political, for a widening of the opportunity to do business in the movement towards a healthier balance in national business circles. This could be done by returning to a socialist economy by appointing state-owned commercial companies to take the place of foreign enterprises which must be closed.

Use of the first basis of judgement will lead, in practice, to transfer from foreign hands to national enterprises which are strong in capital, organization, and experience, that is, mostly non-pribumi; while holding to the second principle will bring a transfer to pribumi-owned businesses — old and new — which generally are not sufficiently capable. Returning to a socialist economy is probably not desirable because it could lead to a kind of "BULOG-ization" of various commodities.*

These three possibilities can probably be merged into one new form, New Style Joint Enterprises, which have the potential of linking the positive aspects of each of the alternatives: guaranteeing continuity and the flow of goods, widening the opportunity to engage in business for those who have been left behind, and overcoming the shortage of capital and skills.

The fundamentals of these joint-venture companies are as follows:

A fusion between the business-like dimension and the national aspirations dimension which is projected in government policy to give a greater role to private enterprise in economic development while providing for a wider opportunity to participate in domestic business circles.

The participants consist of two groups:

- I. National trading companies together with private pribumi elements;
- II. The private non-pribumi group, which if necessary can invite the participation of foreign private enterprise on a limited and selective basis. This applies especially to domestic foreign entrepreneurs who now own commercial enterprises and have applied to become naturalized Indonesian citizens. According to the Department of Commerce,

* "BULOG-ization" — BULOG is the abbreviation of the Badan Urusan Logistik which was established by the Suharto Government to oversee the demand and supply of basic commodities (especially rice). It has a monopoly on rice and other basic food items.

they are permitted to continue their business operation while awaiting the completion of their naturalization process.

The balance of shares between the first and second group should be fixed in accordance with their relative capability.

There should be a stipulation that the shares in the first group should be transferred in stages from the national trading company to private pribumi elements. This means that the role of the national trading company, as a "big brother" will slowly phase out so that pribumi businessmen will be in control. For a fixed period of time the transfer of shares from the first group to the second, either directly, or through a surrender of voting rights, is not permitted.

If it is considered necessary, a representative of the government can be appointed to the board of directors as a *Komisaris Utusan* to function as an adviser and/or guardian.

As much as possible the financial structure should be reflected in the composition of the board of directors, the management, and the staff without straying from the principle of "the right man in the right place" and holding to minimum responsible conditions.

The business world and especially monetary institutions and production companies will probably find it easier to give support to these new-style joint ventures. With this credibility the joint-businesses will receive good credit facilities and conditions from, for example, government banks, private domestic and private foreign banks, and supply firms.

These joint-venture companies can be made fertile places for the growth of commercial skills and the development of new entrepreneurs, especially from what is now called the economically weak group.

Ideally the enterprise will promote mutual understanding, mutual respect, and trust between all of the participants so that a principle of sharing of property, skills, opportunity and joint sharing of the fruits of the enterprise will emerge: in other words, a form of assimilation in the movement towards the fostering of a harmonious national unity in the economic field.

These aspects of strength and functions of these joint-venture companies will only come about if several preconditions and conditions are fulfilled. These positive and negative conditions include:

- a. Although they are founded on the principle of equality they cannot be allowed to become places for the channelling and distribution of "fortune" by choosing personnel on the basis that they are friends or relatives.
- b. There has to be a basis for honesty and mutual trust on all sides.
- c. There needs to be a "give and take spirit" which is reasonable and appropriate for the value of the contribution and the results of each participant.
- d. There has to be a desire and clear incentive to learn by each participant.
- e. It is essential that there is a real input from each participant, either monetary or work effort, which is oriented towards results and achieve-

ment and not towards symbolic results or status. Difficulties in raising capital for those who are not wealthy can be overcome by using the services of P.T. Danareksa.

- f. Although the original potential or the sources of strength of the individuals will vary in field and quality the freezing of contributions on the basis of traditional prejudices must be avoided, for example, the assumption that non-pribumi are by definition strong in finance and marketing while pribumi are only strong and capable in politics, public relations matters, and employee affairs. There must be an open attitude and a willingness to fill in for and supplement each other's skills if everyone is to become a more perfect entrepreneur.
- g. Rules of the game need to be fixed for every field of activity so as to avoid nepotism and improper dealing with relatives or "connections" in such areas as the issuing of licences, and the payment and promotion of staff. This can be prevented by development of professional management by stages.

These conditions are mentioned at length so that we might learn something from earlier failures like the "Ali-Baba" affairs etc.*

The question now arises of whether joint-venture companies like those explained above are feasible. There are some who say that they are not feasible because pribumi who are strong will not enter into partnership with non-pribumi. On the other hand, it is said that non-pribumi only want to join with pribumi who are weak. These opinions need to be examined and sounded out. What is clear is that these new-style joint-venture companies are viable. "Is not the proof of the pudding in the eating", or the value of something only known after it has been tested?

As a final note about joint-venture companies they were actually first mentioned by the author in a KADIN (Kamar Dagang dan Industri Indonesia) [Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry] meeting which was attended by powerful business leaders. In the above meeting the Director-General of Domestic Trade advanced his views which comprised, among other things, an affirmation that participation in the economy absolutely requires certainty of the right to do business as an integral part of legal certainty. He went on to say that development will open new fields and perspectives in which the government hopes for a willingness on the part of the powerful to restrain themselves and voluntarily assist in every way those who have not had adequate opportunity. This is to be done through mutually beneficial co-operation in support of idealistic goals.

* "Ali-Baba" — a term used to refer to a Chinese enterprise using indigenous Indonesians as front men. It prevailed in the 1950s, and early 1960s.

The Indonesian Chinese Problem and Its Solution

The problem of identification has been mentioned by both totok and peranakan Chinese leaders as a major problem for the Chinese in Indonesia. A totok writer, Qiu Zhengou, who was a K.M.T. man, saw the problem from the K.M.T.'s point of view. He urged the Indonesian Chinese to retain their "totok identity" and even Chinese nationality whenever possible because Chinese culture was superior, and China (more properly, Taiwan) needed them (9-1). Many totok leaders who were pro-Peking also advocated an overseas Chinese identity. As for peranakans, previous discussions (chapters 6 and 7) show that one group wanted to remain peranakan Chinese within an Indonesian nation and the other group insisted on assimilation or complete identification with indigenous Indonesians as the only solution for the peranakan Chinese.

After the 1965 Coup, however, the Chinese problem still remained. Old arguments still prevailed although there were some new points. Lie Tek Tjeng, the former Director of the National Institute for Cultural Research (L.R.K.N.—LIPI), maintained that the exclusiveness of the Indonesian Chinese was partly the result of Dutch colonial policy. In an independent Indonesia, assimilation of the Chinese into the indigenous population was more likely (9-3). He then made a number of suggestions for the solution of the Chinese problem in Indonesia (9-2).

K. Sindhunatha, the Chairman of the defunct L.P.K.B. and the former President of Bakom-P.K.B., saw complete assimilation as the only solution to the Chinese problem. He also suggested that the Indonesian Government introduce a policy to foster co-operation between indigenous and non-indigenous Indonesians so that complete assimilation of non-indigenous Indonesians would occur in the economic field (9-4).

A left-wing group in exile, which published the journal *Na Han*, had a different solution for the Chinese minority problem. It urged that "Yinhua" (the Chinese in Indonesia) should maintain and further develop their identity. It also suggested that the Chinese carry out the struggle with other Indonesian minorities against the domination of the Javanese in order to achieve "national liberation" (9-5). Lo S.H. Ginting, a peranakan sociologist who was the former secretary of Bakom-P.K.B., contended that the Chinese problem which is now better known as *pribumi* and non-*pribumi* problem, should be studied and understood properly. Within the context of nation-building, he suggested that the Chinese, the Indonesian public, and the government jointly seek proper solutions (9-6). Christianto Wibisono, a former journalist and a consultant, argued that nation-building process is a long-term endeavour and political and economic democracy are the answer to the Chinese problem (9-7).

A leader of the assimilation movement, Harry Tjan Silalahi, adjusted his view (9-8) in his essay, advocating integration rather than total assimilation for the Chinese in Indonesia to move towards the 21st century, while another leader, Junus Jahja, who was converted to Islam, began to advocate business cooperation between ethnic Chinese and Muslim businessmen in order to achieve national solidarity (9-9). Increasingly, the economic factor has become conspicuous in the Chinese problem and some Chinese tycoons, upon the pressure from the government, issued the Bali Declaration (9-10), pledging assistance to the weaker economic groups and better equitable distribution of economic development as the answer to the ethnic problem, although the term ethnic Chinese does not appear in the document.

9-1

Ch'iu Cheng-ou (Qiu Zhengou alias Ch'iu Han-hsing) was born in Guangdong. He received a university education in China. From 1950 to 1958 he served as the Editor-in-Chief of *Tiansheng Ribao*, a Kuomintang daily in Jakarta. He left for Taiwan in 1959. The following article is an excerpt from his book, *Huaqiao Wenti Yenjiu* (Taipei, 1965), pp. 6—10.

The Overseas Chinese Problem and Its Solution (1965)

The overseas Chinese presently face various complex and difficult problems, but we can group these problems into the following:

1. Political problem,
2. Economic problem,
3. Cultural problem, and
4. Social problem.

Now let us briefly analyse these problems:

1. *Political Problem*

The overseas Chinese now face two major political problems. One is the pressure from local governments which forces the Chinese to become local citizens but confines their political activities. The local governments are eradicating our K.M.T, and arresting our members as the government wishes. The other pressure comes from the Communist bandits. They co-operated with the military authorities to oppress good and anti-Communist overseas Chinese. These Communists split the overseas Chinese along ideological lines and attempted to make the overseas Chinese society a red society. They used those red overseas Chinese and some pro-Communist elements to engage in

subversive activities. This has made the local governments and people resentful of the overseas Chinese in general.

2. *Economic Problem*

The economic status of the overseas Chinese is extremely important. Their economic strength is extremely great. The survival and development of the overseas Chinese depends largely on the support of the overseas Chinese economy. However, in recent years, all governments in Southeast Asia have introduced anti-Chinese policies in financial and economic fields. For instance, they have prohibited the overseas Chinese from running a number of enterprises; besides, they promulgated nationalization decrees in commercial and industrial sectors to curtail the economic strength of the overseas Chinese. Worse still, they have taken over the enterprises of the overseas Chinese and confiscated their property. This has posed a major threat to the overseas Chinese economy.

3. *Cultural Problem*

The emergence of the overseas Chinese cultural problem was a result of shaking the foundation of the Chinese culture within overseas Chinese society. A segment of overseas Chinese has abandoned Chinese cultural tradition to pursue a materialistic and luxurious life. The younger generation of overseas Chinese has also been influenced by the local environment and refuses to receive a Chinese education. They have abandoned the study of the Chinese language. At the same time, the local governments have adopted anti-overseas Chinese policies in the sense that they closely supervise schools for the overseas Chinese and limit the teaching of Chinese courses, so that the spread of Chinese culture and intercultural understanding have not been possible. The present generation of overseas Chinese youth and its descendants, due to lack of Chinese education and culture, will definitely have a bad impact on the Chinese society in general.

4. *Social Problem*

In the past, members of the overseas Chinese community generally observed Chinese tradition and customs. These Chinese were highly ethical and they honoured their commitments. They also emphasized harmonious social relationships and family life. However, overseas Chinese society today is chaotic. It is characterized by hypocrisy, rupture, conflict, and other strange phenomena. As for the family life of the overseas Chinese, in the past the Chinese were calm and happy but today most young men and women are outward-looking, and many even intermarried with foreigners; as a result, harmonious overseas Chinese life has been destroyed. The impact on their children has also been undesirable. This has created a new problem for the overseas Chinese society.

The above are the four major problems faced by the overseas Chinese.

To further illustrate, let me comment on the following concrete and unique examples.

Nationality Problem. In the past, the overseas Chinese could maintain two nationalities. Since mainland China has turned red and colonial countries in Southeast Asia have achieved independence, these newly independent countries only allow the overseas Chinese to have a single nationality: either Chinese or local citizenship. This has given rise to the nationality problem; many people are not certain whether to retain the nationality of the Republic of China (or in some instances, the nationality of Communist China), or to obtain local nationality. There were people who wanted to remain Chinese nationals, but others intended to take local citizenship. In my opinion, each has its gains and losses. With foreign [non-Chinese] citizenship, the individual concerned naturally has more freedom to move around, but at the same time he is also tied down by the national status of that country. He is obliged to join national service and receive a national education. Eventually, he has to be assimilated into the local population. In fact, the losses are much more than the gains. Therefore, I am of the view that unless one cannot survive one should not take local citizenship. Whenever possible, he has to retain the nationality of the Republic of China, but he has to reject the nationality of Communist China.

Overseas Chinese Education. There are two problems concerning overseas Chinese education. The first problem is related to the kind of education overseas Chinese should receive, that is, Chinese or foreign education. The second problem is connected with *ch'iao-sheng* (Qiaosheng) coming to their ancestral land (read: Taiwan) to continue their education, so that national consciousness and anti-Communist determination can be instilled into these overseas Chinese, while at the same time they can be trained in technology. Regarding the second problem, I am of the opinion that we are now in the period of intensifying the anti-Communist movement. In order to achieve this political aim, we should not be too rigid about educational regulations. We should encourage overseas Chinese to return to China (read: Taiwan) to win their hearts. As for the first problem, my view is as follows: they have to receive Chinese but not foreign education, so that these Chinese youths and their descendants will not be assimilated and forget their ancestors. They should not become foreigners who are no longer concerned with China.

Problem of Protection for the Overseas Chinese. At the moment, mainland China has not yet recovered. The ancestral land is not yet strong. As a result, the lives and property of the overseas Chinese have been under attack. Although diplomatic and other means (through a third country when the Republic of China does not have diplomatic ties with the country) have been applied, our government has not been able to protect the legitimate rights of the overseas Chinese satisfactorily. Therefore, protection over the overseas Chinese is still a major problem among the overseas Chinese problems. In my opinion, we have not been able to protect our overseas Chinese effectively in

the past, apart from the limitation of our national strength, it had something to do with our efforts. We did not try our best to apply more effective means. Therefore, from now on, our government should employ better means as well as greater endeavour to gain the best result.

Intensification of the Anti-Communist Struggle. This is the most important overseas Chinese problem, which is also the topic of our continuing research. There are already a lot of valuable proposals. Nevertheless, in reality, they are not really effective. On the one hand, the central government should supervise and guide the activities, so that the anti-Communist struggle can be staged overseas. On the other hand, those who are in charge overseas should do their job seriously. Therefore, I am of the view that we should have a central supervisory body to supervise and guide the struggle of the overseas Chinese against Communist bandits. At the same time, we should also select loyal and capable cadres overseas. The anti-Communist campaign abroad needs the sympathy and understanding of the local government and people. We have to try our best not to violate local regulations and laws to prevent unhappiness on the part of local authorities. If we can do this, our anti-Communist struggle among the overseas Chinese will achieve great victory.

The Problem of K.M.T. Organizations and Activities Abroad. The organization of the K.M.T. abroad has a long history. It had also been recognized by many local (read: Southeast Asian) governments as a legitimate organization of the overseas Chinese. Apart from being the centre for the revolutionary and patriotic leadership, the K.M.T. had sponsored various welfare programmes and cultural as well as educational activities. It had not done anything harmful to others. However, at the present time, there are places where conditions [for the K.M.T.] are difficult there is a problem of having open or secret activities for the K.M.T. Some people suggest that the K.M.T. should be open, others hold the opposite view. However, it is my view that this should depend on the conditions in a particular place. We should not have one rule for all places.

Ways to Solve the Overseas Chinese Problem

To solve the abovementioned problems, we have the following ways:

The first way — the revival of China, which means the success of the Republic of China in reconquering the mainland, so China will be unified again under the Republic of China. If this happens, other countries would change their anti-Chinese policies and establish friendly relations with us. Our government can adopt an active policy to protect the interest of the overseas Chinese, so that the overseas Chinese problem can be solved reasonably. This is the basic and most effective way to solve the overseas Chinese problem.

The second way — apart from the first way, we should also try to approach various countries so that they will sympathize with our country [Taiwan] and understand the overseas Chinese. As a result, these countries would change

their anti-overseas Chinese policies, and would then utilize the manpower and capital of the overseas Chinese. The local population and the overseas Chinese will work hand in hand to develop the country to prevent Communist aggression in order to preserve freedom. This is the most practical way to solve the overseas Chinese problem at this moment.

The third way — the adaptation of the overseas Chinese. At the moment, the overseas Chinese who are in a difficult situation should remain calm and tolerant. They should not cause the local population to be resentful towards them. They have to tighten their ties with the local population and participate in local construction and development, so that they and the local population would like each other and live in harmony. This will lead to genuine co-operation.

The abovementioned are the ways to solve the overseas Chinese problem. We should work harder to achieve the first and the second goal. As for the third goal, this depends on the wisdom and efforts of the overseas Chinese in various places.

The details are still to be studied cautiously.

 . . .

9-2

Lie Tek Tjeng (b. 1931), born in Padang, received a Ph.D. degree in History and Far Eastern Languages from Harvard University. He is currently Director of the National Institute for Cultural Research (Jakarta) and consultant/lecturer on East Asia at the Indonesian Defence Institute. The following paper was presented in the second Army Seminar, Army Staff and Command College, Bandung, 1966. It was first published in bahasa Indonesia in his book, *Masalah WNI dan Masalah Huakiau di Indonesia* (Djakarta, 1970).

“The Chinese Problem” within the Framework of Political Stabilization (1966)

I

Introduction

An important problem nowadays, within the framework of political stabilization, is the so-called Chinese Problem which can be said to be a legacy from the colonial past.

The biggest accusation levelled at the ethnic Chinese group is that it is exclusive, and refuses to assimilate itself with the indigenous Indonesians,

and that members of the group unconsciously identify themselves with their mother country, even though most of them neither speak the Chinese language nor approve of the Communist ideology in China.

The Chinese problem is very *intricate* because of:

- (1) the relative large number of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia;
- (2) the important role the ethnic Chinese play in the social structure, especially in the economic sector;
- (3) the existence of the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) that has a very militant ideology and has openly sided with the abortive 30 September movement.*

The objectives of this article are as follows:

- (1) to observe this problem scientifically by using a historical/psychological approach;
- (2) to give suggestions which could be used in the formation of a national policy concerning this problem;
- (3) to give directives which can be immediately implemented as a step towards the elimination of the "Chinese Problem" which is a very delicate issue, both internally and externally.

II

A Historical Outline of the Chinese Problem

A. The emigration of Chinese in earlier times was in principle caused by economic and political motives. By economic motive is meant that China, which is also known as the "country of the perpetual hunger", has a large population, which it could not sustain adequately, especially in times of upheaval such as war, famine, overthrow of dynasties, etc.; whereas by political motive is meant that Chinese patriots had to leave their mother country or did not want to stay under foreign rule, as at the time of the Mongol dynasty in the fourteenth century, and particularly the Manchu dynasty which ruled China from 1644 till it was overthrown in 1911 following the revolution under the leadership of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

This emigration is primarily towards the south, that is, the Malay region which has an immense appeal because of its abundance of natural resources, and not in other directions because in the east lies the Pacific Ocean, and in the north and west are the unattractive regions of the Siberian ice-fields, and the Himalayan mountain range beyond which lies overcrowded India.

The differences between the Chinese immigrants, better known by the term *Hoakiao* (overseas Chinese), and the indigenous Indonesians in particular are as follows:

1. The overseas Chinese belong to the Mongol race that is physically discernible from the indigenous group that belongs to the Malay race.

* It is also known as G-30-S/P.K.I., Gestok or Gestapu. This coup led to the liquidation of the P.K.I., the downfall of Sukarno and the rise of Suharto.

2. The overseas Chinese are Confucianists or Buddhists while members of the indigenous group are primarily Muslims. This difference is accentuated by the use of pork in Chinese cooking which is taboo to Islam.
3. The overseas Chinese belong to the Yellow River or Chinese civilization, whereas the indigenous Malay race is influenced by Indian culture and Islam. Chinese culture is quite different from other cultures (like the cultures of the River Nile, Tigris and Euphrates, and Indus), and this is physically very evident in Chinese writing, names, their way of eating with chopsticks, etc.

The examples mentioned above form the *natural barriers* between the overseas Chinese and the indigenous Malay race; but it is necessary to mention here that the Colonial Dutch East Indies Government has also erected *artificial barriers* which, consciously or not, were meant to maintain the barriers between the Chinese immigrants and the indigenous Indonesians.

B. As with the case of other colonial governments, the Dutch colonial governments also used the principle of *divide et impera* to rule their colonies. The number of Dutch people was too small, both relatively and absolutely, in comparison with the indigenous inhabitants. Hence the colonial government used certain groups, like the upper layer or the feudal aristocracy of the indigenous group, and the foreign minorities like Indians, Arabs, and Chinese in their efforts to manage the majority of the indigenous group and stay in power. The feudal indigenous aristocracy was used or was allowed to occupy certain primary functions in government, including the armed forces, whereas the foreign minorities were *only* allowed in sectors which in those times were considered secondary, for example, the economic sector (see further the economic motive). The colonial policy strengthened the difference between the Chinese and the indigenous Indonesians as mentioned above, so that there was little assimilation between the two groups, causing the growth of exclusiveness as is shown in the following examples:

1. *Classification of society*, with first-class citizens comprising the Dutch in particular and white people in general, including the Japanese who at the end of the last century were accepted as equals by the white man who at that time practically ruled the world; second-class citizens comprising *Vreemde Oosterlingen* or foreign Orientals — Indians, Arabs, and Chinese; and third-class citizens comprising the indigenous group that formed the majority.

Generally and psychologically speaking, it can be said that *upward assimilation* is a much easier process than downward assimilation. In other words, the social values in the colonial society — resulting from the classification as mentioned above — did not stimulate but, on the contrary, acted as a *psychological block* on the assimilation process between the ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians in colonial Indonesia.

2. The policy of the colonial government was to treat the Chinese as a group that stood apart from the indigenous community, and this fact is evident in the existence of *kampung Cina* (Chinatowns), and the existence of Chinese organizations that take charge of Chinese affairs — this is also shown in the appointments of Major and Captain of the Chinese.
3. The establishment of schools which were primarily attended by ethnic Chinese children (H.C.S.), resulted in a generation whose social contact was mostly restricted to members of their own group, which in turn strengthens “exclusivism”, hence preventing social intercourse with the indigenous group.
4. The existence of certain positions which were practically, closed to the Chinese, for instance, government officials and army officers. but were open to hand-picked descendants of the indigenous feudal aristocracy. On the other hand, with the pretext of defending the rights of the indigenous group, the activities of the Chinese were curbed in agriculture, for instance, the Chinese were not allowed to buy [farm] land. Thus, the only area left formally open for the Chinese was the economic sector, and this was stimulated by the colonial government so as to keep the colonial economy going. Hence it is not surprising that after three and a half centuries of colonial rule, the vital sector of economic activities was dominated by the Chinese.

C. It is important to mention that the policy of the colonial government coincided with the economic motives of the Chinese in leaving their mother-country, and it is necessary to stress here that, in earlier times when the important role of economics was not yet recognized, a merchant was not highly regarded, and could not compare with a government official or an army officer.

Allowing the Chinese to move in the economic sector probably can be compared with allowing the Jews to move in the economic sector during the Middle Ages in Europe. At that time, the popular idea was that “money has the devil’s touch”, resulting in the reluctance of good Christians to work in this sector. Thus it was left to the Jews who were at that time not highly regarded. However, it turned out, when Europe entered the modern age, that capital — which by that time had already accumulated in the hands of the Jews who were held in contempt — was a *sine quo non* for industrial and economic development.

D. Besides being urged by economic motives, there were also Chinese who left their mother-country because of political motives. As mentioned above, many Chinese patriots fled because they did not want to live in a China ruled by a foreign dynasty, as in the case of the Manchu dynasty since the middle of the seventeenth century. But because they left their mother-country for patriotic reasons, their nostalgia for China grew with the passing of time, especially when they suffered humiliations from the white people, who at that time dominated the world.

While, on the one hand, the Chinese were considered *privileged* compared with the indigenous group, on the other hand they were *discriminated* against by the white people and the Japanese who since the end of the last century were treated as equals by the white man. And, as a *human reaction*, the Chinese fell back on the glorious past of China.

Falling back on one's glorious past is not novel in human history. As an example, we can mention the United States. Before the Second World War many Americans were proud of their English or German origin. This was because at that time England and Germany were the major powers that played an important role in international politics, while the United States was relatively unimportant.

Only after the First and Second World Wars and, with the emergence of the United States as a major power and later as a superpower, did Americans stop making an issue of their country of origin because U.S. citizenship is now something to be proud of.

III

Summary

With the recognition of Indonesian independence and Indonesia's sovereignty, the Dutch government also handed us as a legacy the multi-complex Chinese problem.

This problem has the following psychological and economic aspects:

1. As a result of the colonial policy, we still often use the term "Chinese", using race and not citizenship as a criterion, as is often heard in "He is a Chinese" or "My friend is a Chinese", etc.
2. It is necessary to mention a significant improvement, namely, that after independence the race criterion as mentioned above is being replaced by the terms "asli" (indigenous) and "tidak asli" (non-indigenous), while nowadays people talk about W.N.I. (Indonesian citizens, *including both indigenous and non-indigenous*) and W.N.A. (foreign citizens) who have to be treated according to existing international treaties. This endeavour has to be intensified by showing, in a concrete way, the difference in rights for a W.N.I. regardless of whether one is indigenous or non-indigenous on one side, and W.N.A. on the other.
3. Exclusiveness and assimilation must in the first place be overcome by education, meaning that all W.N.I. children must enter national schools where they get national-oriented education, thus automatically fostering their national consciousness. Admittance to W.N.A. schools have to be restricted to W.N.A. children only and, in principle, should not be open to W.N.I. children. Under no circumstance must schools like the H.C.S. or BAPERKI schools be allowed, because this will result in the continuation of exclusiveness and non-assimilation for at least another generation. This matter must be thought of within the framework of education.

4. It's necessary in the economic sector to emphasize that, as a result of past colonial policy, many vital companies and industries were dominated by ethnic Chinese who, after the Proclamation of Indonesian Independence, had chosen Chinese citizenship (P.R.C. or Taiwan). Steps must immediately be taken to secure the transfer of these industries from the hands of these foreign citizens into the hands of either the government or the W.N.I. (either indigenous or non-indigenous). This is important because a free and independent country cannot allow its economy to be controlled by foreigners. We must make adjustments more in accordance with post-colonial realities, using as criteria humanity and our ideal to build a just and prosperous society, besides respecting the existing international treaties.
5. Particularly, in facing the Chinese government, it is suggested here to use the terminology "*Huakiao*" and "*Hua-i*". "*Huakiao*" is a Chinese term for overseas Chinese, that is, people who were still automatically considered Chinese citizens, while the term "*hua-i*" means person of Chinese origin and does not automatically mean Chinese citizen. This is very important because if the term "*huakiao*" is used *indiscriminately*, this can cause difficulties in diplomatic negotiations. The *Huakiao* are Chinese citizens who have to be treated according to existing international treaties, while the *Hua-i* is a country's domestic problem in which the Chinese government is not allowed to meddle.

IV

Conclusion

As analysed above, the Chinese problem is a historical/psychological problem; hence the historical/psychological method, with the stress on education of the younger generation, seems to be the best method to solve it.

This problem that has grown through the ages, cannot be solved with radical measures, but we can hasten its solution as suggested above while steadfastly sticking to our ideal of building a *just* and *prosperous* society.

————— • • —————

9-3

The following article was written in 1967 by Dr. Lie Tek Tjeng, the Director of the National Institute for Cultural Research. It was first published in his book, *Masalah W.N.I. dan Masalah Huakiau di Indonesia* (Djakarta, 1970).

On Assimilation (1967)

Oh, *Asli* is *Asli* and *Keturunan Asing* is *Keturunan Asing*, and never the twain shall meet,
Till Earth and Sky stand presently at God's great Judgement Seat;
But there is neither *Asli* nor *Keturunan Asing*, Border, nor Breed, nor Birth
When two strong men stand face to face, though they come from the ends of the earth!

[With apologies to Rudyard Kipling, the terms "East" and "West" being replaced with *Asli* (indigenous Indonesian) and *Keturunan Asing* (Indonesian of Foreign Descent)]

I

The colonial Dutch East Indies Government left us the legacy of the Chinese Problem which may be compared with cancer in the body of the Indonesian nation, and which up till now prevented the realization of our ideal of nationhood, that is, the unity of the nation as characterized by *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* based on *Pancasila*.

By using the race criterion consciously or unconsciously, the colonial government of the Dutch East Indies classified all ethnic Chinese (first generation overseas Chinese as well as those born from unions between Chinese and indigenous Indonesians) as *Foreign Orientals* (*Vreemde Oosterlingen*) who were put above indigenous Indonesians. The wisdom of the AMPERA Cabinet in emphatically and consequently changing the criterion of race to the criterion of citizenship is correct; hence recognizing, as in other countries, only two kinds of citizens: its own citizens — regardless of their origin — and foreign citizens. But we must be aware that the issuing of laws and relations concerning nationality cannot immediately realize our ideals of nationhood.

Without discussing foreign citizens, whose treatment is regulated by international treaties and are probably more or less influenced by the relationship of their country with Indonesia, this article will focus on the problem of the assimilation of the ethnic Chinese which, frankly speaking, has not been going as smoothly as we would wish.

Why is it that after more than twenty years of Independence we still have a Chinese Problem that, as shown recently, can cause explosions which, if not immediately and effectively counteracted, can produce racialism that is harmful to the nation?

The conclusion that must be drawn is that *whether we like it or not*, there is still a latent *anti-Chinese sentiment* among the indigenous Indonesians which can be provoked and/or ignited to reach proportions dangerous for the nation, and it seems that this latent anti-Chinese sentiment is primarily the result of the interaction between *colonialism* and the phenomenon known as *Chinese culturalism*.

II

A. Colonialism

As is already well-known and acknowledged, colonial policy has among other things:

- (1) placed the ethnic Chinese above the indigenous group and given them different treatment — besides effectively separating these two groups, this policy also made the ethnic Chinese look down on the indigenous group, thus planting the seed of distrust, if not hatred, in the breast of the indigenous Indonesians;
- (2) instituted separate living sections for the Chinese, known as Chinatowns, allowed separate organizations as shown by the existence of the function of major, captain, or lieutenant of the Chinese, issued regulations limited to this group, allowed the establishment of social organizations (including schools, like the H.C.S., which were mostly attended by ethnic-Chinese children);
- (3) closed certain areas to this group, like the government and military sectors (the positions of government officials and army officers were only open for the ruling Dutch and some hand-picked descendants of the indigenous aristocracy), and agriculture: to protect the rights of the indigenous group, ethnic Chinese were not allowed to buy land, and freedom of movement for the Chinese was more or less limited to the economic sector which was allowed and stimulated by the colonial government;
- (4) the fact that they move in the economic sector, among others, resulted in their ability to send their children to schools so that many of the intelligentsia in colonial times come from this group.

Thus it can be said that the economic and intellectual sector or in popular terms *money* and *brains*, which are the important sections of modern society, were relatively “dominated” by the ethnic Chinese out of proportion to their size in the population.

B. Chinese Culturalism

With the classification of the ethnic Chinese as “Foreign Orientals” and by placing them above the indigenous group, the colonial government strengthened their sense of Chinese culturalism, their link with Chinese culture which has a glorious tradition of more than three thousand years and which, till the seventeenth century, was acknowledged as the equal of Western civilization. In opposing white domination — in this case Dutch domination — that treated the coloured people as inferior, the Chinese automatically fell back on Chinese civilization with its glorious tradition and which, at the beginning of the twentieth century, showed through Japan its vitality to modernize and defeat the major white Western power of Russia.

The regrettable thing is that if, on the one hand, Chinese culture performed a positive role in the struggle for independence of the Eastern, coloured

nations against white domination — in the sense of giving inspiration, hope and faith in their ability to equal the *achievements of the West* — on the other hand it also performed a negative role in the sense of preventing the growth of identification of the ethnic Chinese with the land and people of their new settlement.

C. *Interaction*

It must be admitted that as a result of the interaction between colonialism and Chinese culturalism many Chinese, who after 1945 became Indonesian citizens, have developed *split personalities*, in the sense that they do not have a definite orientation towards and identification with Indonesia. Many among the intelligentsia became Western (specifically, Dutch) oriented because of their education, while the nationalists were often oriented towards their mother-country which has shown a heroic resistance against Japanese imperialism. Besides, they often showed, consciously or not, a superiority complex towards the indigenous Indonesians. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that not a few of the indigenous group continue to have an inferiority complex towards the ethnic Chinese after the Dutch left Indonesia. This attitude is sharpened by the identification of the Chinese with the *haves* while the indigenes identify themselves with the *have-nots*.

The result is that indigenous Indonesians are often reluctant to accept the Indonesian Chinese as full partners because they doubt or distrust their sincerity, whereas the Indonesian Chinese also cannot fully identify themselves with the indigenous Indonesians who, they feel, doubted them and treated them as *less than equal partners*.

It seems that here lies the crucial obstacle in the assimilation process of the Indonesian Chinese into the Indonesian nation.

III

If the abovementioned is true, then the following efforts to smooth the path of assimilation have to be made:

1. Both the Indonesian Chinese and the indigenous Indonesians must fully realize that the colonial frame of reference, as well as the set of colonial values in all its manifestations, has become outdated and has been replaced with a different frame of reference and a different set of values, that is, the *Pancasila* frame of reference and values, where not race or descendance but citizenship, good intentions, and loyalty form the criteria of judging a good citizen. The sooner this is realized by both the Indonesian Chinese and the indigenous Indonesians, the sooner too our ideals of nationhood will be realized.
2. It must be stressed here that the Indonesian Chinese must discard their superiority complex which is *completely without grounds* nowadays, and which forms the psychological source of the distrust and hate of the indigenous Indonesians; on the other hand, the indigenous Indonesians

must also discard their inferiority complex which is not in accordance with their status in an independent nation, and which has resulted in their considering the Chinese as a dangerous rival to be destroyed, and not as a valuable partner — because of their ability and potential — in building a just and prosperous society.

3. In particular, the Indonesian Chinese must be made aware of the fact that their tendency to fall back on their mother-country as a reaction to their treatment by the colonial Dutch East Indies government is *a thing of the past* that is no longer in accordance with the reality of the world after 1945. This attitude can only harm them! As Indonesian citizens they must exert themselves and try to overcome their split-personality, and become true Indonesian citizens who identify themselves fully with the people and the land of Indonesia.

Thus they can play a positive role between Indonesia and their mother-country in the sense of acting as a bridge between the two nations within the framework of solidarity of the Asian-African nations, whereas they are now considered expendable by their mother-country and distrusted by Indonesia as a potential Fifth Column.

4. The indigenous Indonesians must especially be made aware of their task to help their fellow citizens to overcome their split-personality. The process of nation-building will not be helped by only pointing out the negative aspects and features of the Indonesian Chinese who do not fully identify themselves with Indonesia, which is actually not surprising considering their foreign descent and historical background.
5. Assimilation is a two-way traffic where an effort must be made to find points of similarity rather than points of difference, and we must keep in mind that this is a psychological process since it means, essentially, replacing the old mental frame of reference and values with new ones. We must always take into account the psychological impact of all the future actions, regulations, and changes.
6. Finally the government must immediately try to systematically change the social structure, regulations, treatment, etc., which form the legacy of the colonial government and which, up till now, have obstructed assimilation.

9-4

Kristoforus Sindhunatha (Ong Tjong Hai, b. 1933). Born in Jakarta, he graduated from the Faculty of Law, University of Indonesia in 1961. In the same year he entered active service in the Indonesian Navy. In 1963 when the L.P.K.B. was instituted, he was appointed

as its chairman, the position he held until its dissolution in 1967. He left the Navy in 1971 and established a consulting firm. He was Chairman of Bakom-P.K.B. (1977—95). The following article, "Beberapa Aspek Sejarah Perkembangan Penduduk Keturunan Cina di Indonesia", was first published in *Kompas*, 9 August 1975. The article has been re-titled by the editor. Reviewing historical developments, the author argues that the assimilationist movement in the Chinese community emerged before the Second World War. He reviews past government policies which contributed to or impeded the assimilation process of the non-pribumi, suggesting the cultivation of a more favourable condition for such a process. Special attention has been given to the problem of "pribumi" *vis-a-vis* "non-pribumi".

A Dynamic and Consistent Way to Solve the Chinese Problem in Indonesia through the Historical Perspective (1975)

The idea of politically assimilating the peranakan Chinese in Indonesia has been kindled by the Partai Tionghoa Indonesia [P.T.I., Indonesian Chinese Party] since 1932. Its leaders included Liem Koen Hian and Ko Kwat Tiong. The formation of the Partai Tionghoa Indonesia can be regarded, however, as proof of the fact that the presence of the peranakan Chinese in the nationalist movement was still not accepted, because suspicion and distrust were still felt towards them.

For example, in PARINDRA which was composed of moderates, M. Husni Thamrin could not accept non-pribumis/peranakans because of the belief that it would only increase problems. The P.N.I. too did not want to accept peranakans as members at that time. This matter, amongst others, caused Dr. Tjipto to leave the P.N.I. This is understandable because from the time of the birth of the Indische Partij in 1912, Dr. Tjipto, together with Dr. [E.F.E.] Douwes Dekker (who was later called Dr. Danudirdjo Setiabudi)* and Suwardi Suryaningrat (or Ki Hadjar Dewantoro) had struggled for a sovereign and Free Indonesia† based on democracy and social justice and on modern citizenship disregarding people's racial origin as long as they acknowledged Indonesia as their country and nation. After the Indische Partij and then its replacement, the Nationale Indische Partij, were banned, the central leadership of these parties decided that its members should join one of the people's parties (Budi Utomo, Sarikat Islam, P.K.I., and so on) or should participate in endeavours of a nationalist nature.

* For a useful discussion on Douwes Dekker (1879—1952), see Paul W. van der Veur, "E.F.E. Douwes Dekker, Evangelist for Indonesian Political Nationalism", *Journal of Asian Studies*, 17, no. 4 (1958): 551—66. Prof. van der Veur discovered that Douwes Dekker passed the qualifying examination in Political Economy at the University of Zurich but never submitted a dissertation, therefore the doctorate degree was never conferred.

† Then the term used was "Indië" (Indies) rather than "Indonesia".

After that, the youth organizations Jong Java, Jong Ambon, Jong Sumatranen-Bond, Jong Islamieten Bond came into being and were ultimately united to become Indonesia Muda* after the Youth Pledge in 1928 in which they pledged that they belonged to one country and one people and had one language.

As a "Buffer"

It was the policy of the Dutch colonial government to use the Chinese as a "buffer" between the Europeans and the pribumis. This policy brought about the national solidarity of the Chinese and a dissatisfaction with the Netherlands Indies Government. Chinese nationalism, which had taken shape in the educational, trading, cultural, and political fields, became even stronger.

This was also strengthened by the rise of modern nationalism under the leadership of [Dr.] Sun Yat Sen in China.

From 1903, the Dutch Colonial Government began to take steps to attract the sympathy of the Chinese, because it felt threatened by the nationalist movements which were increasing in Chinese circles.

H.C.S. schools were set up, police dockets (politierol) and systems of racial discrimination were gradually abolished.

From 1919 for Java, and from 1926 for the outer islands, restrictions on place of abode were abolished. In 1917, a regulation was issued which allowed an overseas Chinese to be treated equally before the law with a Dutch person. Furthermore, they could send representatives to sit in Municipal Councils and the Volksraad. At that time there were two attitudes: to co-operate or not to co-operate. The voice for "non-cooperation" finally won, pushed by high feelings of Chinese nationalism. This atmosphere became increasingly impassioned between 1920 and 1930.

Besides the growth of a nationalist group which was oriented one hundred per cent towards China, the influence of Dutch education finally produced a group of Chinese who accepted the Dutch political invitation to sit in the Municipal Councils and the Volksraad. In 1932† the Chung Hua Hui was set up. Nevertheless this group continued to have the nationalist characteristics of Chinese culture.

Yet in 1932 we also witnessed the birth of the P.T.I. which was established on the basis of the view that the peranakan Chinese must be oriented only towards Indonesia. The P.T.I. was anti-Dutch in character and rejected Chinese nationalist movements and co-operated with the Indonesian nationalist movement. In the years 1935–39, the P.T.I. obtained a seat in the Volksraad. The P.T.I. group constituted the smallest group. In the political sphere Indonesian nationalism was always opposed by the Chung Hwa Hui group which

* Evidence suggests that the Jong Islamieten Bond (The Young Islamic Association) did not join the Indonesia Muda. See Leo Suryadinata, "Indonesian Nationalism and the Pre-War Youth Movement: A Reexamination", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 9, no. 1 (1978): 111.

† The C.H.H. was actually set up in 1928.

made up the majority of the Chinese, while the P.T.I. always supported Indonesian nationalism.

In the business field, although the overseas Chinese were clever at winning the hearts of Indonesians, a latent discontent continued to grow. Especially amongst the Indonesian middle-class which was made up of educated people, religious leaders, and businessmen. The situation outside the big cities was somewhat better.

The policy of the Japanese colonizers did not improve the situation. The Chinese feeling of solidarity became stronger because the Japanese overlords united the *peranakans* and the *totoks* into one group, the overseas Chinese.

The Period of the Independence War

The period of the independence war aggravated the situation.

A number of *Hoa Kiau* took advantage of the confused situation to enrich themselves, they became O.K.B., or newly rich people (*nouveau riche*).

There were some intellectuals and big merchants who were sincerely pro-Dutch.

There were those who were pro-Republic. A small but sufficiently meaningful number, they were prepared to sacrifice their souls and possessions to help the Indonesian Republican guerilla forces.

A large number of small traders and stauholders suffered and only wished for personal security and for the security to do their trading. Because at that time colonial government was relatively more stable, they hoped for the return of Dutch authority.

But in practice they tried to have a neutral attitude.

There were also those who sought the protection of China and it was apparent that the interest of Nationalist China was considerable at that time.

Indonesian Government Action

During the physical revolution, the government resolutely criticized all the acts of force that had occurred and gave assistance to all the victims of harsh treatment and of military operations.

The Government of the Republic of Indonesia, taking a realistic and practical attitude, tried to secure the loyalty of as many as possible of the *Hoa Kiau* and to make them into a useful section of Indonesian society (Political Manifesto, 1 November 1945).

The 1946 citizenship regulations were aimed at attracting the *Hoa Kiau*. This policy, however, was not always carried out, especially by the lower government officials. The *peranakan* Chinese were often treated the same as the *totoks* (foreign Chinese). This was against government policy.

From 27 December 1949 (Round Table Conference) we can follow one by one the steps and efforts to clarify the citizenship status of the *peranakan* group. The initial policy of making them Indonesian citizens (Reg. 1946, Round Table Conference, 1949 up to the end of 1951) finally changed to a policy of active choice of citizenship (1962).

Once the position of citizenship had been made clear, the melting-pot theory or assimilation became the official policy of the Indonesian Government thereafter.

But how to carry this out in practice? The Government had initiated several attempts. Among these were:

A. Close supervision of all foreigners through the Immigration Law, P.P. 45, the Alien Supervision Bureau of the State Police (1950–54), and by restricting the activities of foreign Chinese (Presidential Reg. 10, 1959 also known as the P.P. 10).

B. Efforts concerning Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent were made through the office of Peranakan Affairs of the Department of the Interior (1954). This apparently was the principal mistake from the psychological point of view.

1. Voluntary registration with the issuing of Indonesian Citizenship Identity Cards. (This was protested against by BAPERKI in Parliament):

In practice, many irregularities occurred with the result that many Indonesian citizens were treated the same as the alien Chinese.

This was only corrected when BAPERKI protested.

2. The field of education also received attention with attempts to get all the Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent to move from the experimental elementary schools, especially those Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent who were ex-pupils of the Chinese schools (1954).

Indonesian citizens were prohibited from entering foreign schools. The attitude and reaction of the Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent themselves still varied. There were those who wanted Chinese education; there were those who only wanted a better education and did not mind whether it was Dutch, Chinese, or Indonesian. But the majority still wanted an education that was oriented towards Indonesia, but with the addition of information on Chinese culture, history, philosophy, language, and literature.

BAPERKI (1955) wanted the freedom to choose education in accordance with the [Indonesian] Constitution, to abolish discrimination against the acceptance of pupils in schools and to increase the number of schools; also to set up their own schools — which gave rise to exclusive schools. At that time the Department of Education and Culture was still making mistakes by placing experimental schools under the inspectors of foreign education.

Principal psychological errors of this kind continued to be made in all fields.

3. The economic sphere: A great many of the actions of the Minister Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo in the past had been directed towards setting up an Indonesian pribumi entrepreneurial class by means of forcing the Chinese, both Indonesian citizens and overseas Chinese, to co-operate harmoniously with the Indonesian pribumi entrepreneurs.

The Chinese business world was invited to assist the government programme to create an Indonesian "middle class". Here again no distinction was made between Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent and alien Chinese.

4. The Agrarian Law of 1870 forbade people of foreign origin to buy [farm] land. This was strongly opposed because it was considered discriminatory. The Agrarian Law of 1960 has, however, changed this.
5. The opportunity to change one's Chinese name to an Indonesian name became available with Reg. No. 4 1960. Then on the initiative of the L.P.K.B. another regulation was made in 1966 through an instruction of the Cabinet Presidium to speed up the procedure to a two-year period.

From 1966 onwards, the New Order Cabinet Presidium issued many regulations which made a clear distinction between foreign Chinese and Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent. In this way the basic outline of the policy to speed up the process of integration and assimilation in the fields of education, culture, social affairs, politics, law, and the economy had already been dealt with in the instructions of this Cabinet Presidium. This was the result of the ideas of the staff of G-V KOTI,* the University of Indonesia Seminar [on "alien and stateless Chinese"], and the L.P.K.B.

6. The attempts to bring about intermingling in schools which were recently recommended by the regional military commanders in Sumatra and West Kalimantan must be seen only as a continuation of the implementation of the government policy outlined above.

It should be noted, however, that in practice many problems and excesses still occur.

Moves, Attitudes, and Efforts by Society

We have briefly described that society itself has moved, has opinions, and has made several efforts in facing situations and policies of former governments (Colonial — Japanese — Republic of Indonesia). The policy of the Chinese Government towards the *Hoa Kiau* or "Overseas Chinese" must also not be forgotten.

In the years before the end of the nineteenth century, whenever the Chinese were in a confused and weak situation, the nationalism and modernization which grew after the end of the nineteenth century had a very great influence upon the attitude and outlook of all the *Hoa Kiau* in Indonesia. At that time it could be said that the process of integration and assimilation which had in actual fact been going on for tens of years in Indonesia, practically came to a halt.

* G-V KOTI is the abbreviation of the Supreme Operational Command Group V, a committee in charge of socioeconomic and political affairs.

There were two main things which caused this: first, the influence of modernist and nationalist Chinese figures and, second, disappointment with the policies of the Dutch government.

We see then on the one hand, the development of feelings of suspicion, jealousy, and discontent towards the *Hoa Kiau* population on the part of the indigenous Indonesian community who at that time had also begun to develop as a national community. On the other hand, *Hoa Kiau* were drawn by three strong currents: the current of Chinese nationalism, the current of the gentle persuasion of Dutch colonial policies; and the current of Indonesian nationalism; and this resulted in the emergence of three focal groups: (1) the Chinese nationalist group: Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan (education-culture), Siang Hwee (business), and Soe Po Sia (politics);* (2) the Dutch-educated intellectual group: Chung Hwa Hui; (3) the Indonesian nationalist group: Partai Tionghoa Indonesia.

It can be said that the *Hoa Kiau* community was fragmented by three kinds of nationalism (political nationalism, cultural nationalism, and racial nationalism) and the majority confused in their minds these three elements with three kinds of orientation: Chinese, Dutch, and Indonesian. Here lies the problem and, at the same time, the tragedy of the overseas Chinese in Indonesia and the background to the history of the assimilation struggle.

We can and must see the assimilation movement — pioneered by the Partai Tionghoa Indonesia† and which has been growing again since the sixties and has been transformed into the L.P.K.B. — as the attempt by the younger generation to batter down the walls of Dutch/Chinese nationalism, culture, and racialism in a radical way. These two types of nationalism have shackled the *peranakan* Chinese in Indonesia who consciously wish to free themselves from Chinese/Dutch political nationalism and to choose to become Indonesian political nationalists in unconditionally choosing citizenship of the Republic of Indonesia.

BAPERKI, on the other hand, intentionally or not, still defended Chinese nationalism, culture, and race along with developing Indonesian political nationalism.

This effort was a giant one which could not be carried out only by the younger generation of *peranakan* Chinese or the younger generation of non-*pribumis* of Chinese descent by themselves. Continual and consistent assistance, approval and open acceptance from the *pribumi* community and the Indonesian government were vitally necessary. The [members of] non-*pribumi* *peranakan* Chinese community, like everyone else, need “a place in the sun”. Each person desires a “sense of belonging” in a state and nation.

* The Chinese nationalist group was represented by *Sin Po* and the group was known as the *Sin Po* Group. For a detailed discussion on this group and other *peranakan* political organisation, see Leo Suryadinata, *Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java, 1917–42* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1976).

† For other interpretations of the P.T.I., see 3-1 and 3-2 of this volume.

Each person, including Indonesians who are still called non-pribumi, want to be able to say along with the late Bung Karno: "For me Indonesia is a totality". It is not only, as Otto Bauer said, "Eine aus schicksal wachsende charaktergemeinschaft" (A community which grows out of a common sense of destiny). And it is not sufficient to add: Patriotism, love, and . . . [omission in text] are rooted in the land of Indonesia. "The land which feeds you is the land that you should love", said Douwes Dekker. But rather, as he said, "Whenever I see the light in the eyes of children at the side of the road, that is Indonesia and that is Indonesia's future. Whenever I see white clouds sailing past Tangkuban Perahu,* I see the clouds of Indonesia which are different, for example, from the clouds of Switzerland".

"Whenever I hear the turtle-dove singing in the trees, I hear Indonesia".

"Whenever I stand on the southern shore and close my eyes while listening to the sea pounding and beating against the shore, I hear Indonesia".

Our Duty

This is the duty of all of us. Firstly, it is the duty of all educators, parents, and teachers. So that our children who are still at school do not experience what was experienced by the generation before them. So that together we can create new men who possess one attitude, orientation, and loyalty — people who no longer drift and whose *spirits aren't broken* because of divided political, cultural, and racial nationalism, people who possess Indonesian political and cultural nationalism.

Once again we would like to emphasize that it is vital that the entry and acceptance of Indonesians of Chinese descent on an individual basis into the body of the Indonesian nation be a two-way process in such a way that this initially "specific group" ceases to exist.

We must be brave enough to face the consequences in order to be able to carry out this effort in all fields. To achieve this, a dialogue is necessary. It is necessary to create and foster opportunity in all fields, in schools, in the field of industry and business, in everyday life, so that people, both non-pribumi and pribumi, can meet — in the soul, in a spiritual manner, that is, in dialogue.

The field of education must immediately, consistently, and continually make efforts at integration, efforts to find a system of education which accelerates the process of integration and assimilation. This is for the next generation and constitutes a "long-term programme" for Indonesian nation-building.

The economic sphere must immediately begin to look for and implement a consistent system and effort to get rid of the impression or reality that the economically strong and the economically weak correspond to the non-pribumi group and the pribumi group respectively.

* Tangkuban Perahu — a mountain in West Java.

It is obvious that we still greatly lack a skilful and active Indonesian entrepreneurial class which is capable of developing a strong private business world as a partner in development.

The Problem: Is the *pribumi* identical with a weak economy? Is the non-*pribumi* identical with a strong economy?

Is this an economic, psychological, racial or cultural problem, or a combination of all four, together with the problem of security and nation-building?

What approach, what angle must we use in looking for the wisest solution in facing such a complex problem?

A Dynamic and Consistent Policy is Necessary

In looking for a solution to these problems in the economic field, the guide that we must constantly adhere to is certainly the Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution and the Broad Outlines for the Direction of the State, with special focus on the principles of Nationalism and Social Justice.

It also should not be forgotten that we continue to develop in a dynamic fashion and that we must harness and direct this development in a positive way. The older generation, the present leaders in the political, economic, and educational fields must ensure that they too do not inherit the characteristics of a way of thinking which does not suit and which perhaps is not known to the younger generation who are growing up and developing in a way of life that is very different from theirs.

We already have the doctrines, the broad outlines of decision-making strategy and general policy, and they were explained further by the President in his speech at the last National Seminar on the Strategy for Promoting National Entrepreneurship.

It is now hoped that the leaders of the Indonesian business world will think about how to implement this policy in practice.

Does it accord with principles of social justice and nationalism that the implementation of a policy of solution-finding is based only on the differences between *pribumi* and non-*pribumi*. I believe that this criteria is not adequate and must be expanded with the criteria of the economically strong and the economically weak. Both must be used as a stepping stone.

The *pribumi* business community clearly must be enlarged and strengthened. But on the other hand, the non-*pribumi* community must not be "forced" to be active only in business. The spheres of politics, government, the Armed Forces (ABRI), education, social affairs, and so on, must also be wide open. Perhaps it is even necessary to have encouragements, inducements, and incentives, rather than obstacles and obstructions in the way of the non-*pribumi* group, which is still often the case in those fields. This would be more consistent with a policy of assimilation and integration. Why, for example, have assimilation and integration been successfully, favourably, and genuinely fostered in the fields of sports, literature, and culture?

The "security approach" to these problems on the part of government instruments and officials had up to now always had the effect of hindering

and preventing the process of assimilation and integration, because it has always been based on the assumption that all people of Chinese descent are to be suspected, and that those who are loyal and *bona fide* are the exception. Isn't the opposite assumption more honest, fair, and consistent with the policy we mentioned above?

How can we implement recommendations for *pribumi* and non-*pribumi* co-operation in the field of capital and the fields of management/labour? What efforts can be made by the strong businessmen (*pribumi* and non-*pribumi*) to help the weak business group (*pribumi* and non-*pribumi*) in order to prevent development which conflicts with social justice, that is, the strong becoming stronger and the weak becoming weaker.

We hope to be able to solve the problems mentioned above, as responsible and adult people who want to establish something positive for the future of our grandchildren.

— • • —

9-5

Na Han was a journal published by a group of left-wing Indonesian Chinese in the Netherlands. The subtitle of the journal was "Majalah Kebangunan Bangsa Yinhua" [Journal of the Rise of the Yinhua Nation]. The following is the preface to vol. 1, no. 1 (May 1976).

Why do We Publish *Na-Han*? (1976)

Dear readers,

The publication of this journal requires some explanation.

1. The 1945 August revolution within the former territory of the Dutch East Indies had failed to solve a series of fundamental problems of the Indonesian revolution. This was natural because the 1945 August revolution was led by the new *bourgeoisie* who had feudal ties in Java and former ties with colonial governments during Dutch rule and the Japanese occupation.

The seizure of power by Suharto marked the total failure of the 1945 August revolution. During the process of the revolution, especially after Suharto was in full power, the workers and peasants had merely been used as tools of the landlords and other feudal elements. The various nations and minorities have witnessed changes of the suppressive regimes, one after another.* Neo-colonial economic relation-

* The *Na Han* group maintains that Nusantara [Indonesia] consists of various nations and minorities (*bangsa-bangsa dan minoritas*), rather than ethnic groups (*suku bangsa*).

ships and the Javanese feudal political system are being developed by the generals who are familiar with the use of the language of technocrats.

The fundamental problems pertaining to the goals, the tasks, and the moving force of the revolution, as well as the nature and the perspectives of the revolution were all not stated clearly in 1945.

To understand properly the history and cultures of various nations and minorities who live in the territory of the former Dutch East Indies is the first requirement needed to formulate the strategy for revolution in that area. An analysis of a society which is still neo-colonial and semi-feudal, and for the time being still ruled by General Suharto, would give us an in-depth understanding about the various contradictions which are developing in that country.

2. The military régime of Suharto in Java has now been launching extraordinarily cruel and massive suppression against the political and economic rights of various ethnic groups and minorities who live in Nusantara and now in the former Portuguese East Timor as well. The fundamental democratic rights to express oneself freely has been threatened by the bayonet, followed by the magic formula of "Pancasila Democracy", "Pancasila Man", and "Pancasila State" which have a mystical flavour and are based on the fascist ideology.

The ten-year fascist rule of General Suharto has generated resistance among the people of various ethnic groups and minorities. The courageous struggle of the people in East Timor under the leadership of the Fretilin against the armed aggression of Suharto's troops sent from Java has greatly encouraged various nations in Kalimantan, Maluku, and Irian to take up arms, to rely on the support of the people, and to follow the correct political line in order to fight for their respective national liberation. Other national groups and minorities on other islands will also sooner or later stand up to regain their genuine freedom, because the law of history shows that all suppression will gradually generate just resistance.

3. A scientific understanding of the development of a nation cannot be separated from the in-depth understanding about the history of the ethnic groups or minorities which are the component parts of that nation.

The generals from Java continue their adventurous plan to annex more territories which are rich in raw materials in order to pawn them to two superpowers and other imperialist states. To oppose seriously the annexation policy of the generals from Java towards the neighbouring states automatically means unconditional support for the idea of "national self-determination". This also means agreement with the revolutionary struggle staged by various nations and minorities against aggression, looting, and all forms of suppression committed by the fascist and chauvinistic generals from Java.

4. The Yinhua minority has a long recorded history in Southeast Asia.* More than 2,000 years ago, Chinese sailors were familiar with Kalimantan, Indochina, and other places. Prior to the beginning of the first century, Chinese sailors had visited Sumatra, Java, and Kalimantan; they came to Southeast Asia in groups from southern China in the last two thousand years.

With courage, determination, and a hardworking spirit, they overcame numerous natural and social difficulties and participated in developing Southeast Asia with their blood, sweat, and tears. Their contribution to the development of the area, seen either from the political or cultural point of view, cannot be eradicated,

The fascist generals in Java have tried to eliminate the existence of the Yinhua minority. Initially they took a number of steps to eradicate the ethnic identity of the Yinhua minority. They would then be completely prohibited from operating in the economic field. To frighten the Yinhua ethnic minority which is now practically defenceless, each new regulation has been followed by guided [organized?] terrorist acts.

Nowadays the imperialists are supporting the efforts of the generals in assimilating the Yinhua national minority by force [into the indigenous population with the hope that they can open the way for the capitalist bureaucrats and indigenous compradors, especially those from Java, so that a neo-colonial system centred in Java can be developed.

Soviet social-imperialism which has tried very hard to establish its influence in the neo-colonial state under the rule of Suharto (which itself is now in serious political and economic crisis) does not hesitate to instigate anti-Yinhua minority feelings.

5. In the last thirty years, the Yinhua national minority has been considered by the authorities in Java as the competitor to the capitalist [class] which has the feudal background. To the efforts of these authorities, the Yinhua national minority has shown three [?] kinds of reaction:

Some [Chinese] have adopted an apathetic attitude and a readiness to accept all sorts of ridicule and restrictions imposed on them. Others have tried to find the way from back doors while accepting the habits and behaviour of those who are in power.

Those who want to accept assimilation by force are often more "indigenous" than those [indigenes who are] in power. They even feel lucky if they can get rid of the biological features inherited from their ancestors. These people hope to sit beside the indigenous rulers. They are frequently offended if they are reminded of their ethnic origin. They show their great hatred towards people of their own ethnic group. Those who are less ambitious are usually, satisfied with the hope that the livelihood of their children in future will be guaranteed by adopting

* Yin-hua is considered by the *Na Han* group as "a more appropriate term referring to the W.N.I., W.N.A., and Stateless Chinese".

“indigenous” characteristics, ranging from changing their names, ignoring all matters related to the Yinhua minority, and wearing [indigenous] dress to decorating their homes in the [native] style. Even while living an assimilated life among the indigenous population, a person who submits to assimilation by force will have to “swallow” his disappointment when terrorist acts affect his Yinhua neighbours. As long as he is protected by the persons in power, his family can escape catastrophe. But if he is unlucky, who can guarantee that he will not suffer from the same terrorist act as well?

Those who want to adapt themselves [to the situation] naturally wish to retain their own customs, to have cultural pluralism. They want integration but refuse assimilation by force; that is, they refuse to change their [Chinese] names or to marry a “compulsory marriage partner” (*jodoh mutlak*) from the “indigenous” group.

Recently, more people have been awakened by the reality and the facts. Suppression cannot be accepted; just because it instils fear, injustice cannot simply be tolerated, and falsification of history cannot be left unchallenged. More people have now been awakened. They have opposed the efforts of integration, let alone assimilation. More people are convinced that their future lies in their present efforts to recover their own self-confidence, that is, to develop their own identity which is based on a long tradition, and to study the history of their struggle against tyrannical rulers in various [historical] periods.

In fact, the ethnic struggle to achieve democracy and freedom is an important trend in the historical development of the revolution against imperialism, social-imperialism, neocolonialism, and feudalism among various nations and minorities in Southeast Asia.

6. The name of this journal *Na-Han* (Battle Cry) is taken from the title of the collection of short stories of a great Chinese writer, Lu Hsun (1881–1936). The preface of this collection of short stories in [Indonesian] translation is included in this issue because it also explains the present need for the publication of such a journal, when there is an emergence of a new consciousness about the Yinhua national minority [and an interest] to restudy their history, identity, and their important role in the political and economic development of Southeast Asia, particularly in the context of the struggle to determine their future in this region.

The inclusion of the article on the theory of “national self-determination” would enrich our theoretical knowledge which would in turn guide our extremely difficult political struggle.

[We are] fully aware that the struggle of the Yinhua minority, in the Southeast Asian region is an inseparable part of the revolutionary wave of the local people against the local reactionary regimes, who are the faithful assistants of imperialists and social-imperialists.

[We] believe that every Yinhua minority reader would be pushed to develop his ideas on how to face the future more seriously, and later he would see a certain way to participate in the just struggle for democracy and "national self-determination".

9-6

Lo S.H. Ginting (Lo Siang Hien), a Yogyakarta-born *peranakan*, was a member of parliament from 1966 to 1971. He was the Secretary of Bakom-P.K.B. The following article was published in *Kompas*, 18 July 1977, in connection with the Communication Week which resulted in the emergence of BAKOM P.K.B.

Paving the Way for a Solution to the Indonesian Chinese Problem (1977)

On 18 July [1977] a five-day Communications Week will be opened at the Hotel Sahid Jaya. The originator and organizer of the conference is the Department of Internal Affairs which was given the duties of the Institute for Development of National Unity (L.P.K.B.) after the Institute was abolished in 1967. The participants consisted of Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent who were appointed by Governors from all over Indonesia. From the list of participants it is clear that they were chosen from various groups and professions, for example, businessmen, reporters, religious leaders, educators, scholars, sportsmen, artists, and politicians. The participants were all from one [ethnic] group. This invited comment by H. Mahbub Djunaedi (*Kompas*, 24 June 1977) who pointed out the peculiarity that exclusivism in the above group is to be eradicated through a meeting which is also exclusive.* Actually this paradox makes sense and is, I think, an appropriate step. The government intends to in succession:

- (a) bring about a preliminary dialogue with the minority group in order to find out and understand what is alive within them: their feelings, concerns, proposals, etc., so that these can be merged with the aspirations and concepts of the government;
- (b) this will be followed up with a meeting between the government and representatives of the majority — Indonesian citizens from the *pribumi* group or directly with a three-sided meeting including representatives of the minority for dialogue and a harmonizing of views;
- (c) after obtaining sufficient data the government will formulate its policy for solving nation-building problems.

* Djunaedi — a leading Jakarta journalist and Islamic Party leader.

These plans of the government including the Communications Week should be well received — especially since it is the first forum in which a face-to-face meeting and dialogue between representatives of the minorities from the twenty-six provinces and high government officials has occurred. Indeed we are obliged to help it to achieve optimal success for our joint welfare and interests. By “we” I mean all Indonesian citizens who are aware of the problem of national unity and feel a responsibility to solve the problem for our mutual benefit.

For a long time we have felt that there is something unhealthy and unbalanced about the relations between the majority who are now called pribumi and the non-pribumi minority — that the situation and developments are not as good as they ought to be. This feeling is reflected in various uncertainties, concerns, and irregularities. This sometimes breaks out in racist incidents most of which occur as a result of actions which the person involved views as insignificant.

This lack of harmony in relations between ethnic groups, which is reflected in defects in various arenas of our life together, is viewed as a problem because it gives rise to various worries, difficulties, risks, and dangers for the group concerned and for the society, government, nation, and state. This even represents a latent threat to national aspirations, interests, and needs as well as national unity, national resilience, and smooth development.

The living source of the disharmony in relations between the two groups can be found in two related facts. On one side is found a feeling, a belief, that “those Chinese” are suspect as citizens. This blends with a feeling of jealousy about their economic success. These conclusions are reached from an evaluation of the attitude, actions, and status of certain elements of the minority who are said to have insufficient national consciousness, solidarity, etc. The National Committee for Formulating a Policy for Solving the Chinese Problem (1967) said: “First of all we are aware that the historical background and developments in the political, economic, and sociocultural process of the two groups (Chinese and pribumi) have caused Indonesians to be suspicious of the Chinese population in general”. On the other hand a feeling and belief among the minority exist that they do not receive the recognition and treatment appropriate for each and every citizen. In other words, they are discriminated against even though they have Indonesian citizenship or at least accept Indonesia as their homeland and desire that they and their descendants live their lives there. The beliefs and feelings of the two sides have influenced and sharpened those of each other to the point that it is no longer possible to say what is cause and what is effect.

Deeper study of the formation of emotions and beliefs leads me to say that in addition to objective factors or facts in many matters a generalization has been made. That is, from an individual's vision and experience of individuals and cases a conclusion is reached which is thought to hold for an entire group, so that finally it becomes a prejudice against a group. It is more dangerous still if this prejudice willingly or unwillingly is passed on to the younger

generation of each ethnic group. This has resulted in the formation and perpetuation of the derogatory stories of one ethnic group about another as are shown in the statement "those Chinese" or "those pribumi".

Most of the mass media unintentionally play a part in the formation of negative stories about the minority. Observe that news coverage of charges, criminal sentences, crimes, or other disgraceful acts which deal with a member of the minority are written as follows: "The criminal/(or) the accused A. alias LTK, an Indonesian citizen of Chinese descent" On the other hand, news coverage of the accomplishments of a member of the minority is not embellished with "an [Indonesian of Chinese descent]" It is interesting to compare this with the news coverage which reads: "an individual from" which appears to indicate that the "individual's" ethnic group is not in any way involved.

To return to the core of the problem, it can be said that at its base the problem of the Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent is a sociological or social-structural problem besides being a social-psychological or humanitarian problem in our joint existence.

The structural problem is that of a small group which in the colonial period was restricted to the field of commerce — to acting as middlemen. And as is the case with minorities everywhere, there then developed special identifiable characteristics: perseverance, a tendency to work hard, thriftiness, flexibility, creativity, and a tendency towards "opportunism" for survival and progress. These factors resulted in economic success and then led to entrance into other fields which had not yet been closed to them, for example, science, liberal professions (such as physicians, lawyers, craftsmen, etc.), the arts and sports. This economic success had to be paid for with a negative evaluation, a dislike and jealousy from the majority population and the rulers. These feelings were reinforced by the behaviour of the minority who, following the business principles appropriate for middle merchants, purchased things from the producers — the majority — as cheaply as possible and sold those things for as much as possible to the big businessmen who, in that colonial period, were the Dutch.

There is also the social-psychological problem of a small group whose position is being attacked and which feels that it is insufficiently protected and less than acceptable to the majority. This forces it to stick close to those who are strong or powerful and heightens racial solidarity (exclusivism) as a mechanism for self-defence and self-respect, even resulting in a feeling of superiority.

In order to have a deeper understanding of the problem it is necessary to study the historical background. There is not sufficient space here to deal with the problem, so I refer the reader to *Masalah Cina di Indonesia* [The China-man Problem in Indonesia], a book by Drs. Soekisman which provides a clear and objective picture from the time of the Indonesian kingdoms through the Dutch colonial period up to 1967.

As Soekisman so aptly puts it:

The historical, background of the Chinese problem is full of blood and tears. This can be widened to include blood, sweat, and tears and I mean by this the needless sacrifice of so much psychological, emotional, and material well-being on both sides, Because of this the problem demands a fundamental solution, one that does not allow it to be drawn out and aggravated. In a discussion of the problem one needs to take two factors into account. First of all one has to differentiate between non-*pribumi* Indonesian citizens and Chinese residents who are foreign citizens or stateless.

Although those three elements of the population do interact it is desirable within the framework of developing the Indonesian nation to limit ourselves to the first element. Furthermore, an examination of the non-*pribumi* Indonesian citizens will reveal that they are not homogeneous or monolithic but rather extremely varied. Within this community there are groups with various identifying characteristics. There are some oriented to Western culture; others are oriented towards Chinese or Indonesian culture. Other groups are organized around various mixtures of languages, values, and world views. Various distinctions are based upon differences in occupation, profession, or age, difference in residence, in or outside of Java, in or out of the city, etc. Awareness of this variation will prevent us from imprecisely and unfairly generalizing about "those Chinese" or "those Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent".

Understanding this variation in attitude and in living conditions will lead us to look for the most appropriate approach towards each group. It is important as well to be aware that within that minority there is a "silent majority" who suffer the most — the poor. These are well-meaning Indonesian citizens who simply have inadequate skills or capabilities. They are labourers, small traders, low level clerks, and craftsmen who are included among the economically weak. They are the ones who are the victims when an "excess" occurs in the condemnation of certain elements of their group.

Placed in a national framework the problem of the non-*pribumi* Indonesian citizens is one facet and one part of the problem of nation-building. Although it is more intensive the problem is of the same kind as that involving differences and conflicts between *pribumi* ethnic groups. The solution of the problems of nation-building can be found in a reasonable, consistent, and continuous effort to strengthen the factors of togetherness as a people, to reinforce the feeling of Indonesian-ness on top of a spirit of belonging to an ethnic community, for example, a feeling of Javanese-ness, Batak-ness, Chinese-ness, Timorese-ness, etc. Although it takes a long time, the most effective way to do this is through education at school or at home.

Our aspirations are affirmed in the *Sumpah Pemuda* (the Youth Pledge).^{*} They are to grow together, to become one nation, one totality, with social

* The Youth Pledge, made in 1928 at the Indonesian youth congress, in which secular Indonesian youth representatives declared solemnly that they have one country, one unifying language, and one nation, namely, Indonesia.

cohesion between all elements moving towards a national harmony and solidarity because every element is in beautiful and tranquil harmony.

These aspirations as they apply to Indonesians of Chinese descent have been repeatedly reaffirmed by President Suharto in, for example, his address of 16 August 1967 and his opening address to the Seminar on the Strategy for Promoting National Entrepreneurship on 29 May 1975. In the address on 16 August 1967, he said:

We must draw a clear line between Chinese who are foreign citizens and Chinese who are Indonesian citizens. Citizens of Chinese descent, although they are [ethnic] Chinese but Indonesian citizens, have the same responsibilities and rights. Because of that we have to avoid discriminatory behaviour towards these Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent both in regard to their rights and obligations.

We suggest to Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent that they should no longer postpone their assimilation and integration into Indonesian society To integrate and to assimilate means to participate together in all aspects, joys and sorrows, of Indonesian society.

In another speech, President Suharto maintained: In the mobilization of domestic skills and capital I need once again to touch upon a problem which is actually very sensitive — the problem of relations between pribumi and non-pribumi — so that we all share one viewpoint and a unity of thought We must view this problem in a proper perspective by having all sides throw away their prejudices and their racist attitudes If the non-pribumi have voluntarily chosen Indonesia as their homeland and nation, and if the pribumi have accepted them as a part of their nation, then co-operation between the two groups is a necessity.

It is a pity that neither groups in the Government nor the majority and the minority have accepted, these ideals or put this advice into practice. The problem, besides being sensitive and emotional, is also very difficult and complex. It is a problem which can only be solved successfully over a long period of time. The problem is all the more complicated by its political implications: the problem with the People's Republic of China and the increasing demand for Indonesianization, pribumi-ization, or a widening of opportunity and of access to luxury goods as part of the economic development effort. It cannot be denied that the most apparent and pressing aspect of the problem is in the economic field.

How good it would be if the fundamentals of the government's nation-building policy could be formulated and placed in the next G.B.H.N. (Broad Outline of State Policy) and include, among other things, the following points: that all members of the nation have and must be given the task of carrying out obligations, responsibility, and rights which are the same; that the non-pribumi group is an integral part of the nation and of the Indonesian family; that all sides need to implement and support the nation-building process including solution of the above citizenship problem; that the positive potential found in the non-pribumi Indonesian citizen group is part of the total national

potential which has to participate and be used in a reasonable and just manner in national development; that all obstacles to the achievement of national integration need to be eliminated. All of this should be incorporated later into legislation and placed in such nation-building programmes as information, education, consultation, and communication, a once and for all solution to the legal status of Indonesian citizens, joint work programmes, and integration in all fields of endeavour.

In order to implement the nation-building policy there needs to be formed: a tripartite institution for consultation and for a communications forum, an operational institution consisting of an interdepartmental government apparatus including military elements and social institutions for fostering co-operation in various fields. Of course this is conditional on there being interaction between the three institutions.

Although the problem of non-pribumi Indonesian citizens is complex, emotional, and sensitive, it is solvable in a national framework as long as there is the political will and consciousness and good intentions on all sides.

In this regard it is hoped that the Communications Week for experiencing National Unity can work as a first step. It is essential to expand and develop dialogue during that week. Don't let it become a gathering to seek praises. There are about eleven lectures to be given; hopefully they will not contain general matters like a civics lesson but will be directed towards and connected to matters which are relevant to the main problem, and hopefully they will receive a fitting response from the participants.

— Translated by Jim Schiller —

_____ . . . _____

9-7

Chistianito Wibisono (Huang Jianguo, b. 1945) graduated from the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, the University of Indonesia, in 1977. He began writing during the student demonstration in 1966 and was a member of the editorial board of *Harian Kami* and the president of Indonesian University Students Press Federation. He was a founder and the deputy director of *Express* in 1970 and *Tempo* from 1970–74. Between 1977 and 1985 he served as an executive member of the Bakom-PKB Pusat. In 1980 together with Adam Malik and Njoo Han Siang he established the Indonesian Business Data Centre. He has been the president-director of that centre until today. The following article was published in *Sinar Harapan*, 21 November 1984.

Nation-Building is a Long-term Effort (1984)

About five years ago, on 19 December 1979 to be precise, a few big businessmen of Chinese descent made a contribution towards the victims of the Galunggung Mountain natural disaster to Governor Aang Kunaefi.

The informal group, which was initiated by two giant financiers Soedono Salim and William Suryadjaya and two politicians Harry Tjan Silalahi SH and Jusuf Wanandi SH from the CSIS, later launched a spiritual movement known as P-4 in Hotel Indonesia between February and March 1980.

The group was later upgraded and transformed into a social foundation aimed at assisting those who are in need and poor, as a result of natural disaster or "environmental conditions". The foundation has a contribution of 6 billion rupiahs and was named Yayasan Prasetija Mulya on 19 May 1980. On 7 November 1984, the foundation made a donation to the victims of the ammunition factory in Cilandak through a programme of the Indonesian Arms Forces Commander-in-Chief.

The donation was around Rp 780 million, in addition to the donation from the younger entrepreneurs who were usually from the indigenous group, amounting to Rp 350 million. On 8 November 1984 YPM and YPPI held a one-day panel discussion with the following theme: "The stabilization of nationalism and nation-building to preserve the existence of nation-state". Two days before the discussion, i.e. 6 November 1984, a "bombshell" appeared on the second page of *Sinar Harapan*: "The legalization of IC does not apply to Indonesian citizens of foreign descent".

Between Intention and Reality

Since President Suharto served as the chairman of Ampera Cabinet, his intention has been clear in the Presidential Instruction No. 3/U/TN/12/1966 dated 27 December 1966. In that instruction, it mentioned the Youth Pledge of 1928 and the Assimilation Instruction of Bung Karno on 15 July 1963, both considered to be historical hallmarks and therefore deserving our attention.

The instruction ordered the Minister of Law and Civil Registration Offices all over Indonesia to observe that:

1. While waiting for the promulgation of the national Civil Registration Law, Civil Registration Offices throughout the country will no longer use the classification based on Clauses 131 and 153 of I.S. (Dutch Colonial Law Book), i.e. to divide the population between Europeans, Foreign Orientalists and Indigenes.
2. From that time onwards, Civil Registration Offices in Indonesia will be open to the Indonesian population and will only be divided into Indonesian citizens and foreigners. In point 4, it also stated that the Minister of Law and Home Affairs Minister will further issue regulations regarding the implementation of the instruction in accordance with their own condition.

Soepardjo Roestam, then Home Affairs Minister, stated clearly and repeatedly that differential treatment and administrative decision based on ethnic descent was not allowed regardless of any excuse. In the discussion on 8 November 1984, the Home Affairs Minister repeated his explanation regarding the spirit of the policy and the government's intention to end the dogmatic structural division developed by the past colonial government.

When we read the report in *Sinar Harapan* based on the explanation given by the Head of the Jakarta Population Office, Drs H. Maskup Ustianto, we felt that the head of the office had in fact implemented the colonial policy of the Dutch East Indies in the centre of the Republic of Indonesia. If the Central Government and the National Government of Indonesia were to be consistent with the Instruction of the Cabinet and both Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, it seems that there is no other way for the Jakarta Population office but to review its pattern of thinking and action on such a fundamental issue such as a person's identity card.

Mutual Concession

The problem of Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent is indeed very difficult and complex. It cannot be solved by a one-day seminar or an article. A lot of problems should be analysed and researched. However, the most basic thing is to create a condition conducive for the social solidarity of the Indonesian nation free from ethnic prejudice arising from economic gaps.

Perceptions of economic domination and political discrimination has accumulated for hundreds of years. How do we find a satisfactory solution for both sides under this kind of condition for their sake of our common interests and national interest of our beloved motherland Nusantara!

A peaceful political solution should contain mutual concession, the "give and take" by both parties voluntarily. This voluntariness is not necessarily due to "love for each other" but the consciousness and understanding that the alternative to mutual concession is self-destruction. The destruction or shortcomings of one party will only reduce our national potential and weaken our national resilience. The nature of mutual concession has been put forward in detail by Kwik Kian Gie. This includes forms of cooperation between big and strong business and small and weak business without hindering national economic growth, which is the common interest of our nation (both indigenous and non-indigenous Indonesians) — Because the group of foreign descent has been seen to be relatively more successful in the economic and business field, this group is expected to be willing "to teach" and to pass on the productive and commercial values to the indigenous population.

I use the term relatively because business talent and commercial characteristics are not the monopoly of one race or ethnic group. Every race or ethnic group in the world has a potential to become an entrepreneur, whether he is a Jew in Wall Street, an Arab, a Dutchman or a Chinese. Even an indigenous Indonesian has the same opportunity and the talent given by God.

Since the Dutch period for example, we have known the names of Haji Abdul Ghany Azis (founder of Masayu), A.M. Dasaad, Rahman Tamin, Djohan Djohor, H.M. Sulchan (in Semarang). Prior to Dutch colonialism, Bugis and Minangkabau ethnic groups had travelled overseas to trade skilfully. Later, however, the Dutch colonial policy seduced the indigenous population to become farmers in villages in order to produce commercial crops through plantations and which indirectly enabled the Dutch to exercise autocratic rule.

Since then, entrepreneurship of the indigenous population has been eroded and replaced by the priyayi (civil servants) attitude of salary dependence.

Political and Economic-Democracy

Political democracy entitles each individual to have political rights. Economic democracy demands a social harmony where economic inequality exists through a kind of mechanism. The taxing system is one mechanism employed by the State to regulate social-economic inequality among the population. Therefore the characteristic of economic democracy does not imply that each person has to pay one rupiah of tax, but that every person is required to pay proportional to his ability/income.

Political democracy guarantees that each citizen can perform without hinderance created [by the State or group] due to his ethnic or racial origins or religion. From Liem Sioe Liong who is reported to be the richest banker to si Dadap or si Waru in the village . . . each will be guaranteed to have the same rights to be listened to.

Economic democracy, on the other hand, [guarantees fairness among citizens]. As people are born unequal, equity in political rights does not automatically endow the same economic obligation in the form of "one man one rupiah". Because if everybody is required to pay tax of one rupiah or a thousand rupiahs, there would only be 160 million rupiahs collected from a one-man-one-rupiah tax principle.

The tax reform is therefore introduced. Each person is supposed to pay tax in proportion to one's performance, wealth and income in a country where he is a citizen and works and performs a social function. If Liem Sioe Liong is only required to pay a tax similar to a small businessman, that means that there is no economic democracy. There will be no social justice as the gap between the rich and the poor will widen.

This is the reason that the tax system examines the accounting, balance sheets of gains or losses, and social performance. It is not based on racial criterion. If it is true that the ethnic Chinese as a whole are rich, the authority which has the right to levy more taxes is the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia, not the Population Office of Jakarta which uses classic, old excuses such as "security" etc.

The department which balances the economic life is the revenue department. Any person who has performed and any company which has increased

income has a duty to pay tax in accordance with its proportional income. This is economic democracy and the nature of mutual concession that I put forward earlier.

A Long-term Effort

What I put forward above is easy to say, easy to write about but is extremely difficult to implement, especially in a developing country such as Indonesia. Therefore from the beginning, every fighter of nation-building has been conscious that the struggle cannot be completed within one or two days or one or two years.

Even one or two generations may not guarantee that the objective of nation-building will be achieved totally. However, since this nation has accepted the Pancasila ideology and the principle of equal rights and obligations under a legal system which guarantees the unity and solidarity of its population, those of ethnic Chinese descent should also be treated equally as other Indonesians.

If the group of foreign descent is considered stronger economically, it should be managed in accordance with economic democracy, in which everybody is required to pay tax in accordance with one's own capability. Using this method, the economically rich and strong will automatically become the target of equity by the tax authority.

However, if economic equity is achieved through the "buying and selling" of political rights such as the differentiation of identity cards, passports etc., this would be a setback.

— . . —

9-8

Harry Tjan Silalahi alias Tjan Tjoen Hok (born 1934) joined the FHUI and graduated in 1962. During his student years he was active in the PMKRI and was elected as its chairman in 1961–62. In June 1965 he joined Partai Katholik and between 1967 and 1971 he was appointed member of the DPR. He later resigned from the Catholic Party and joined the CSIS. In 1989 he was appointed as the chairman of Bakom-P.K.B. Harry Tjan is one of the forerunners of the assimilationist movement, advocating assimilation of the ethnic Chinese into the indigenous population. However, in recent years, it appears that he has modified his position, beginning to advocate "integration" rather than "assimilation". Below is taken from his unpublished paper entitled "*Peranan WNRI Keturunan Cina Dalam Masyarakat Indonesia Modern Menyongsong Abad XXI*" presented in 1991 at the University of Brawijaya.

Facing the 21st Century (1991)

The world today is in the midst of globalization and modernization. Globalization is manifested in the world becoming increasingly one. Modernization is reflected in a civilization that has become more successful. All states, including Indonesia which is a member of the international community, will experience these global and modern trends. To confront this new era, we need to anticipate and prepare for a number of issues and problems.

Strengthening National Integration*

To achieve this, it is necessary to cultivate and raise the consciousness of both Indonesian nationalism and the Nusantara† outlook. Such consciousness will underpin the Indonesian nation which, while being heterogeneous and diverse, would also be one entity. The aim is to ensure that oneness permeates everyday life. It is here that Indonesians of Chinese descent can become part of the integration process to shape a strong and unified nation. Prof Juwono Sudarsono believes that Indonesia needs to resolve its Chinese minority problem so that Chinese Indonesians‡ can be part of society. Others like Prof Selo Soemardjan has proposed increasing activities that foster national integration.

One way of integrating Chinese Indonesians, who are often viewed as the country's "conglomerates" and the economic elite, is to give them a bigger role in public life. Here commitment will be real, open and transparent. For example, they can help finance private and public education of young Indonesians in universities and other advanced institutes by being members of various charity organizations or councils.

Strengthening Pancasila Democracy, Especially Economic Democracy

An effort must be made to eliminate or at least narrow differences in economic and social inequality. There is a need to distribute the benefits of economic development and social justice. One way of achieving this is to implement a progressive taxation system. This will widen the scope for job opportunities especially for those in the lower economic category. There is also a need to redress the gap between big, medium and small enterprises accompanied by an integration of "*pribumi*" and "*non-pribumi*" groups. But this must be done without any racial discrimination.

* The original words are "*integrasi nasional*" not "*pembauran bangsa*".

† Nusantara is another name for Indonesia.

‡ The original words are "*WNI Keturunan Cina*" which mean Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent.

Raising National Resilience

The thoughts and activities outlined above function as a means to strengthen national resilience in Indonesia. National resilience, according to Defence Minister L.B. Moerdani, is a condition where every citizen will be part of the nation and will not engage in acts detrimental to state interests. It covers all aspects of life including ideology, politics, economics, social, culture and defence. To be resilient, certain subjective criteria like nationalism and patriotism have to be attained. But objective conditions cannot be neglected. At minimum is the foundation of Indonesia as a law-abiding country. This coincides with the nation's 1945 constitution. Pancasila norms underlie this particular characteristic.

Confronting the Asia-Pacific Era

In 1970, the late Ali Moertopo remarked that in the future world attention would focus on the Pacific ocean area. This fact has now become a reality. The Atlantic ocean area has now become a thing of the past. A lot of analysis and political activities are taking place in the Asia-Pacific at this point in time. The Pacific region is dynamic and influential. Indonesia will have to play an active role in this region if it does not want to be left out.

The western Pacific region has eight tiger economies. Three more tiger economies will be added to this list, one of which could be Indonesia. Indonesia will have to prepare itself for this changed role. The late Prof Panglaykim and Dr Arifin Siregar believed that Indonesia had to have a kind of "Indonsian Incorporated" and to be unified in the face of meeting the challenges and needs of the Pacific region. We can utilize Chinese Indonesians because of their business acumen and historical ties [with other countries]. All the states that fall in the category of tiger-economies are "chopstick" countries with the exception of Indonesia and Malaysia. Chinese Indonesians can play a role in this respect. It is important to note that this historical relationship in no way signifies cultural links (such as Confucianism) or blood ties (race) primarily because of the changed world political map following the end of the Second World War. There is no longer "overseas Chinese as such". Most Chinese have moved into new nations especially in South-east Asia. As a result, they have adhered to national interests and identities which are different from mainland China. The Chinese Indonesian is one who possess an Indonesian interest and an Indonesian identity.

— Translated by Derwin Pereira —

9-9

Junus Jahja (Lauw Chuan Tho, b. 1927), born in Jakarta, received an economic degree from Rotterdam University. First active in the

assimilationist movement, he was one of the leaders of the LPKB and the Bakom-PKB. In 1979 he repudiated Protestantism and became a Muslim. In the following year he went to Mecca and became a hadji. Soon after that he established a Muslim foundation and began advocating Chinese conversion to Islam as the solution to the so-called Indonesian Chinese problem. The following article is taken from his 1992 paper entitled "Ethnic Chinese Assimilation in Indonesia: A Personal Experience" (1992), pp. 39–41.

To Promote Cooperation between Muslim and Chinese Businessmen

The government is very concerned about the widening economic gaps linked with the indigenous and non-indigenous controversy. No less than President Suharto himself was taking serious actions. On March 4, 1990, he invited 31 big businessmen of whom 25 were ethnic Chinese. The Head of State explained that something substantial must be done to narrow the economic and social gaps. According to the President, the success of those businessmen was not just their personal achievement, but the fruit of the Indonesian people's efforts as well. It is therefore proper and just that they contribute in the efforts to diminish the wealth-inequalities in the country. Moreover "you could not take all your wealth with you" when one was lying in one's grave. He therefore strongly proposed that big business should offer 25 percent of their company shares to cooperatives at very lenient conditions. The audience agreed to start at the figure of 1 percent and the realization is now in process.

On 1st March 1991 in Yogya, the President stated that the economic development had indeed brought progress. But there were people more experienced and ready to make use of the development with its various new opportunities, besides those who were not that ready. We should not stop the progress of the more advanced groups since this progress would also push forward others. On the other hand, those who were not yet so successful must be stimulated to come to the fore. The differences in capabilities to make use of existing opportunities should be tackled with a sense of responsibility by all parties involved. This was a common struggle to create a sense of solidarity towards a strong unity as a nation, said the President.

I am now (with full support from friends in Bakom-P.K.B. like Sindhunatha, Jakob Oetama and others) involved in an "experiment" bringing ethnic Chinese businessmen to the "grassroots" so that mutual understanding and economic cooperation between various groups could emerge and flourish. This is being done through the Economic Council of Muhammadiyah, one of the largest Muslim organizations having about 30 million sympathizers.

The council set up a programme called "Amicable meetings of Muhammadiyah with ethnic Chinese businessmen" (= *Silatu-rahmi Muhammadiyah dengan pengusaha etnik Cina*) initiated by my friends Lukman Harun, Rahimi Sutan, Amir MS and others of the above organization. The aim is to lift the economic well-being of the people. It is hoped that through this programme, economic cooperation could emerge on the basis of mutual benefit i.e. poverty

at lower levels diminishing progressively and Indonesians of Chinese descent gradually being perceived as beneficial by the people at large. At the meetings the subject of assimilation is not an issue at all, since "we are already one people". Only business in general and business-opportunities leading to cooperations between indigenous and non-indigenous Indonesians will be the topics. So we are moving forward together!

At about the same time another Muslim organization having its base in rural areas viz. the Nahdlatul Ulama, has also met with ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs and engaged in various cooperations in the economic sector. One of the others is that Bank Summa owned by the [ethnic Chinese] giant Astra-group set up BPR's (Bank Perkreditan Rakyat or People's Credit Banks — a kind of rural bank). As for the Muhammadiyah, a cooperation emerged with the LIPPO-group of bank and companies resulting in the establishment of a joint company in agro-business.

Hopefully, these cooperations in the economic sector between the Muslim-community (= the "grassroots") and ethnic Chinese Indonesians will move us forward together and — if time permits — ease the tension and animosity between those groups created by the colonial past.

— . . —

9-10

Between 25–27 August 1995 the owners of 100 Indonesian conglomerates, mainly ethnic Chinese, met in Bali, to attend a three-day refresher course on Pancasila, the state ideology and other aspects of economic development. The Chinese tycoons realized that their superior economic position and the widening economic gap between the haves and the have-nots along racial lines were detrimental to their security and well-being in Indonesia. On 27 August 1995 the tycoons came out with the so-called Bali Declaration consisting of seven points. In this declaration, it was clear that the whole focus is the equitable distribution of economic pies among ethnic groups, as if this is the solution to the "Chinese problem", although there is no explicit mention of ethnic Chinese in the document. (The following declaration is based on the one published in *Republika*, 28 August 1995).

The Bali Declaration 27 August 1995

The implementation of national development is the common responsibility of the whole Indonesian people, including the government and the national business world.

The success of national development and the attainment of various objectives . . . will depend on active participation of all elements of the nation. All national forces, therefore, should be united in implementing the national development programme, without making any differentiation between [ethnic] origins and groups.

Democratic principles must be the basis of economic development. This should be done through the promotion of solidarity among economic actors, that is, state enterprises, cooperatives and private national enterprises — including big-sized, medium-sized and small-sized businesses.

On the other hand, the government is also required to be proactive and responsive. It should also be more open in serving society and the business world in order to increase the efficiency of the national economy and competitiveness so that it can enter the global economy which is rigid and tough. The unity between the government and the business world and other social classes is needed to realise "Indonesia Inc."

The implementation of national economic development should continue to be guided by and based on the 1945 Constitution, especially Clause 33, in order to achieve harmony and prosperity of the people of Indonesia as a whole. Therefore the attempts to eradicate poverty and narrow the economic gap should be the common priority.

To face various challenges in national development, there should be a forum of dialogue between the government and business community. This forum . . . is the anticipative step in making economic policy more realistic and responsible for the sake of the business world and the Indonesian people as a whole.

Therefore big businesses are responsible for the creation of more enduring and healthier medium-sized and small-sized businesses. This is one way of providing equitable business opportunities and narrowing the development gap. In this context, the pattern of cooperation for mutual benefit and mutual strengthening should be established. This is meant to avoid behaviour which only focuses on benefit.

To promote enduring and healthy medium-sized and small-sized businesses, it is necessary to provide them with sound support — in the fields of human resources, capital, market access and information — but pampering them will conversely make them weak.

Glossary

Asing. An Indonesian term which means “alien” or “foreign”.

Asli. See *Indonesia asli*.

AMPERA (Amanat Penderitaan Rakyat). The Message of the People’s Suffering — an acronym used by Sukarno to indicate his concern with the welfare of the Indonesian people during the “Guided Democracy” period.

A.M.S. (Algemeene Middelbare School). Dutch-medium secondary school in colonial Indonesia.

Bakom-P.K.B. (Badan Komunikasi Penghayatan Kesatuan Bangsa). Body for the Communication of the Appreciation of National Unity, a semi-official body sponsored by the Ministry of Internal Affairs aimed at promoting assimilation of the Chinese. The organization was formally established on 31 December 1977.

Bangsa. An Indonesian term used to refer to “nation” or “race”.

BAPERKI (Badan Permusjawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia). Indonesian Citizens Consultative Body, a major socio-political organization formed in March of 1954 aimed at protecting Chinese minorities who were Indonesian citizens. Banned after the 1965 Coup.

Benteng. “Castle”, an economic policy introduced in the early 1950s aimed at curtailing Chinese economic power, especially in the field of import-export. Those indigenous businessmen who benefited by this policy were called the *benteng* group.

Bhinneka Tunggal Ika. Unity in diversity, the Indonesian national motto.

B.P.K.B.—D.K.I. (Badan Pembina Kesatuan Bangsa dalam Wilayah D.K.I. Jakarta). Body for the Development of National Unity in the National Capital Jakarta, established by Ali Sadikin in August 1974.

B.P.K.I. (Badan Penyelidik Kemerdekaan Indonesia). Investigating Committee for Indonesian Independence, initiated by the Japanese. Sukarno and Hatta were two leading figures on the Committee.

Bumiputra/boemipoetra. Indigenous Indonesia (lit. “son of the soil”). Used interchangeably with “pribumi”.

C.H.H. (Chung Hwa Hui). Chinese Association, a political organization set up in 1928 by Dutch-educated peranakan intellectuals and businessmen. Dissolved in 1942.

C.H.H. – Netherlands (Chung Hwa Hui – Netherlands) a China-oriented peranakan student association in Holland, first established in 1911. Some of the ex-leaders later founded the Chung Hwa Hui in Java in 1928.

Chung-hua ch'iao-t'uan tsung-hui. See *Qiao Zong*.

Chung Hwa Congress. The congress held in 1927 in Semarang which led to the emergence of the Chung Hwa Hui.

Chung-hua Shang-hui. See *Siang Hwee*.

Chung Hsioh / Zhongxue. A secondary school students' association consisting of Dutch-educated peranakan Chinese before Indonesia's independence.

Cina / Tjina. A derogatory term used in Indonesia to refer to the Chinese and China.

Cukong / Tjukong. A Chinese term (meaning: boss or master) which has been commonly used in Indonesia to refer to a wealthy Chinese businessman who collaborates with the Indonesian power elite.

Demokrasi Liberal. Liberal Democracy, a term used to refer to the period 1950–58 in Indonesian political history.

Demokrasi Terpimpin. Guided Democracy, a term introduced by President Sukarno to refer to the period 1959–65 in Indonesian political history.

D.P.R. (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat). People's Representative Council, or Indonesian parliament.

D.P.R.D. (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah). Regional People's Representative Council.

Drs. (Doctorandus). A Dutch university degree, equivalent to either M.A. or Ph.D. preliminary. Its Indonesian equivalent is Sarjana.

Dwikora (Dwikomando Rakjat). People's Twofold Command — Sukarno's speech in 1963 proclaiming the Indonesian objective in "crushing Malaysia".

E.L.S. (Europeesche Largere School). European Primary School, a school specially designed for Dutch children in the Dutch East Indies.

G-30-S (*Gerakan Tigapuluh September*). "30th September Movement" also known as "Gestok" or "Gestapu", a coup which took place on 1 October 1965, leading to the fall of Sukarno, the liquidation of the P.K.I., and the emergence of the military-dominated New Order.

GERINDO (*Gerahan Rakjat Indonesia*). The Indonesian People's Movement, formed in 1937. The first pre-World War II nationalist party opening its membership to *peranakans*; left-wing.

Gestapu / Gestok. See G-30-S.

GESURI (*Genta Suara Revolusi Indonesia*). The Resounding Echo of the Indonesian Revolution, the title of Sukarno's Independence Day address of 1963.

G.K.I. (*Gereja Kristen Indonesia*). Indonesian Christian Church.

GOLKAR (*Golongan Karya*). The Functional Groups, the largest political group consists of military and civil servants under the New Order.

Gotong Royong. Mutual help, believed to be an Indonesian tradition.

Guoyü. The (Chinese) National Language, also known as *Mandarin* or *Putonghua*.

Hadji / haji. One who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca.

Harian Rakjat. People's Daily, the P.K.I.'s daily newspaper, banned in 1965.

H.B.S. (*Hoogere Burger School*). Dutch Secondary School, established by the Dutch Indies Government. Although open to all ethnic groups, its clientele was overwhelmingly Dutch. It had two types: the H.B.S. III (three years) and H.B.S. V (five years).

H.C.K. (*Hollandsch Chineesche Kweekschool*). Dutch-Chinese Teachers' College for H.C.S. school-teachers.

H.C.S. (*Hollandsch Chineesche School*). Dutch Elementary School for the Chinese, first established in 1908, aimed at counterbalancing the T.H.H.K.

H.C.T.H. (*Hua-ch'iao tsung-hui or Huaqiao Zonghui*). General Association of the Overseas Chinese, an organization sponsored by the authorities during the Japanese occupation.

H.I.S. (Hollandsch Inheemsche School). Dutch Elementary School for indigenous Indonesians.

Hoakiao, See *Huakiau.*

Hoan nah / Hoanna. A Hokkien term (meaning: Southern Barbarian), used by some Chinese in Indonesia to refer to an indigenous Indonesian or a Malay.

Hokkien School. Chinese private school established before the 20th century. *Hokkien* was used as a teaching medium instead of *Kuo-yu* and Confucian classics were its main curriculum.

Huaqiao. Overseas Chinese, usually used to refer to Chinese nationals who live abroad.

Huakiau / hoakiao. Hokkien variants of *huaqiao*.

I.E.V. (Indo-Europeesch Verbond). Indo-European Association, a Dutch Eurasian organization established in pre-war Indonesia.

Indonesia asli. Indigenous Indonesian.

I.S.D.V. (Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging). Indies Social Democratic Organization, formed in 1914, changed its name to the P.K.I. in 1920.

Javanese. The largest Indonesian ethnic group which lives mainly in Central and East Java. It constitutes approximately fifty per cent of the Indonesian population.

Jus sanguinis. Nationality based on blood.

Jus soli. Nationality based on birth-place.

K.M.B. (Konperensi Medja Bundar). The Round Table Conference, a conference between the Dutch and Indonesians which led to the transfer of sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Indonesia towards the end of 1949.

K.M.T. (Kuo Min Tang). The (Chinese) Nationalist Party.

K.N.I. (Komité Nasional Indonesia). Indonesian National Committee.

K.N.I.P. (*Komit  Nasional Indonesia Pusat*). Indonesian Central National Committee, formed shortly after Indonesia's independence in 1945.

L.P.K.B. (*Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa*). Institute for the Development of National Unity, a government organization dominated by *peranakans*, supported by the army, and rival of BAPERKI. Advocated assimilation of the Indonesian Chinese. Consisted of anti-Communist elements, both Chinese and non-Chinese. Formed in 1963 and dissolved in 1967.

MANIPOL (*Manifesto Politik*). The Political Manifesto — originally in Independence Day speech of Sukarno delivered on 17 August 1959. It served as the political philosophy and programme of the "Guided Democracy" period.

Marhaenisme. Indonesian proletarianism advocated by Sukarno.

MASJUMI (*Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia*). Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations, a modernist Muslim party founded in 1945, banned in 1960 during the period of "Guided Democracy".

M.P.R. (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*). The People's Consultative Assembly, the highest organ of state and the body to which the president is responsible under the 1945 Constitution. Members of D.P.R. are also members of M.P.R.

M.P.R.S. (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara*). Provisional People's Consultative Assembly, the interim body appointed in 1960 to function as the highest organ of the state pending the formation of an elected M.P.R.

Mr. (*Meester in de Rechten*). A Dutch law degree. F.H.U.I. now offers *Sarjana Hukum* (S.H.) instead of "Mr."

MULO (*Meer Uitgebried Lager Onderwijs*). Junior High School (lit.: More Comprehensive Elementary Education).

NASAKOM (*Nasionalisme, Agama, Komunisme*). Nationalism, Religion, and Communism, a concept advocated by Sukarno during the "Guided Democracy" period.

Nederlandsch Onderaanschap. Dutch Nationality Law or Dutch "subjectship", first introduced in 1910 which made the Indies-born Chinese Dutch subjects.

Non-pri. (non-pribumi). Non-indigenous (Indonesians).

N.U. (Nahdatul Ulama). Muslim *ulama* party, formed in 1926 as a non-political party, became a political party in August 1952, fused with three other Muslim parties in 1973 and formed the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (Development Unity Party).

N.V. (Naamloze Vennootschap). Limited Liability Company.

Orde Baru. New Order, a term introduced by anti-Sukarno groups after the 1965 coup to refer to the post-Sukarno era.

Pancasila/Pantjasila. Five Principles, the state ideology of Indonesia formulated by Sukarno in 1945. These five principles are belief in one god, national consciousness, humanism, social justice, and democracy.

PARTINDO (Partai Indonesia). Indonesian left-wing party, first formed in 1931, banned by the Dutch authorities in 1936, revived in the 1950s(?), banned again after the 1965 Coup.

P.D.T.I. (Partai Demokrat Tionghoa Indonesia). Democratic Party for the Indonesian Chinese, a continuation of the P.T., formed in March of 1950. Dissolved in 1954 upon the formation of BAPERKI.

Peranakan (Peranakan Tionghoa). Term used to refer to the Indonesia-born Chinese who use Malay or one of the indigenous dialects as their medium of communication. Culturally they were partly adapted to the indigenous community.

PERTI (Pergerakan Tarbijah Islamijah). Islamic Education Movement, a moderate Muslim organization.

P.K.I. (Partai Komunis Indonesia). Indonesian Communist Party, formed in May 1920, suppressed in 1927, re-emerged after Indonesia's independence, banned after the 1965 coup.

P.N.I. (Partai Nasional Indonesia). Indonesian Nationalist Party, formed by Sukarno in July 1927, dissolved in 1930. Revived after Indonesia's independence. Merged with the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (P.D.I.) in 1973.

PP-10 (Peraturan Presiden No. 10). Presidential Regulation No. 10, issued in 1959 prohibiting aliens from engaging in retail trade in Indonesia. It was reported that 102,000 Chinese were affected by this regulation and left Indonesia for China.

P.R.C. (People's Republic of China).

Pri. (pribumi). Indigenous Indonesian.

P.R.R.I. (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia). The Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia, proclaimed in 1958 by a rebel group associated with the Permesta (Total Struggle Movement Council) in Sulawesi. Officially ended in 1961.

P.S.I. (Partai Sosialis Indonesia). Indonesian Socialist Party first formed in 1948 by Sjahrir. Banned in 1960 by Sukarno.

P.T. (Persatuan Tionghoa). The Chinese Union, a political party formed in 1948. It changed its name to the P.D.T.I. in 1950.

P.T.I. (Partai Tionghoa Indonesia). The Indonesian Chinese Party, a peranakan political party formed in Surabaya in 1932. It supported Indonesia's independence and advocated Indonesian nationalism among the peranakan Chinese. Dissolved during the Japanese occupation.

Qiao Lian (Yinni Huaqiao Lianhehui). Federation of Indonesian Chinese Associations, formed in Jakarta by pro-K.M.T. totok Chinese in the 1950s. Banned in 1958.

Qiao Zong/Zhonghua Qiaotuan Zonghui. Federation of Chinese Associations, established in the early 1950s in Jakarta. It consisted of pro-Peking organizations, closely connected with the consulate of the P.R.C. Dissolved after the 1965 Coup.

R.I. (Republik Indonesia). Republic of Indonesia.

R.I.S. (Republik Indonesia Serikat). United States of Republic of Indonesia, a form of government in accordance with the *Hague* agreement, abolished in 1950.

S.H. (Sarjana Hukum). Master of Law, Indonesian equivalent for Meester in de Rechten (Mr.).

S.H. (Sinar Harapan). A large Jakarta newspaper first published in the 1960s.

Shang Lian (Yinni Zhonghua Shanghui Lianhehui). Federation of Chinese Chambers of Commerce in Indonesia in the late 1940s and the 1950s. Dominated by pro-K.M.T. businessmen.

S.I. (Sarekat Islam). Islamic Union, a political organization established in 1912. The organization originated as an association of Muslim merchants who wanted to advance their economic interests in relation to Chinese merchants in Java, but it quickly gained mass support and started working for the self-government of the Dutch East Indies.

Siang Hwee (Tiong Hoa Siang Hwee / Zhonghua Shanghui). Chinese Chamber of Commerce, established in Java in the early 20th century at the time of the Chinese nationalist awakening. Most well known were Siang Hwee in Jakarta (1908), Siang Boe in Semarang (1907), and Siang Hwee in Surabaya (1909).

Sin Po. A daily newspaper published by the peranakan Chinese in Jakarta (1910–59). It held a Chinese nationalist point of view and constituted a major stream in peranakan Chinese politics before World War II. It changed its name to *Warta Bhakti* in 1959 and was banned in 1965.

S.M.A. (Sekolah Menengah Atas). Indonesian Senior Middle School.

S.M.P. (Sekolah Menengah Pertama). Indonesian Junior Middle School.

Suku. Indonesian ethnic group.

Suku bangsa. Indonesian ethnic group.

T.H.H.K. (Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan). The Chinese Association, the first pan-Chinese organization in Java, formed in Jakarta in 1900. Initially involved in social, religious, and educational reforms of the Chinese, it gradually became an educational organization with branches throughout Indonesia. Declined and eventually disappeared after 1965.

T.H.H.T. (Tiong Hoa Hak Tong). The Chinese School. The name of early Chinese schools established by the T.H.H.K.

Tiansheng Ribao / Thien Sung Yit Po. The largest pro-K.M.T. Chinese daily published in Jakarta (1921–58). A major rival of *Xin Pao*.

Tiong Hoa Kie Tok Kauw Hwee. The Chinese Christian Church, a peranakan organization.

Tiong Hoa Siang Hwee. See *Siang Hwee*.

Tjuo Sangi In. Central Advisory Council, created by the Japanese in 1943, in many respects resembling the Volksraad, except that it was not even allowed to criticize the regime.

Totok (Totok Tionghoa). Term used to refer to China-born Chinese residing in Indonesia. Totoks still speak a Chinese dialect or Mandarin. Their immediate descendants, though Indonesia-born, are considered totoks if the mother-tongue is still Chinese.

TRIKORA (Trikomando Rakjat). People's Threefold Command — Sukarno's Speech in 1961 proclaiming the Indonesian objective of liberating West Irian (Irian Jaya).

USDEK (Undang-Undang Dasar '45, Sosialisme ala Indonesia, Demokrasi Terpimpin, Ekonomi Terpimpin, dan Kepribadian Indonesia). The 1945 Constitution, Indonesian Style Socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy, and Indonesian Characteristic — the main features of MANIPOL.

Volksraad. People's Council, an advisory body (later also assuming semi-legislative functions) established in 1918 by the Dutch.

Warta Bhakti. An influential left-wing Indonesian daily before 1965. The continuation of *Sin Po*.

W.N.I. (Warganegara Indonesia). Indonesian citizen. The term has often been used to refer to a Chinese who is an Indonesian citizen.

Xin Bao. Chinese edition of *Sin Po*, the largest Chinese-language newspaper before 1959. First published in Jakarta in 1921, its Malay edition was the champion of Chinese nationalism before World War II.

Yinni Zhonghua Shanghui Lianhehui. See *Shang Lian*.

Yinni Huaqiao Lianhehui. See *Qiao Lian*.

Zhonghua Qiaotuan Zonghui. See *Qiao Zong*.

List of Chinese Names and Publications

Chang Hsi-che (Zhang Xizhe) 張希哲

“Jianjie bufan daguo shayen zhuyi” 「堅決不犯大國沙文主義」

Ch'iu Cheng-ou (Qiu Zhengou) 丘正歐

Zhongcheng bao 忠誠報

Zhonghua Zonghui 中華總會

Chung Yung (Zhong Yong) 〔中庸〕

Djip Hoan 入番

Fa Hsien (Fa Xian) 法顯

Huaqiao shi lunji 〔華僑史論集〕

Huaqiao wenti yenjiu 〔華僑問題研究〕

Huaqiao tuan jie cujinhui 華僑團結促進會

Hua-i (Huayi) 華裔

Hua Kiau (Huaqiao) 華僑

Kan Hok Hoei 簡福輝

Kang Yu-wei (Kang Youwei) 康有為

Kao Hsin (Gao Xin) 高信

Khoe Woen Sioe 丘文秀

Ku Hung-ming (Gu Hongming) 辜鴻銘

“Guanyu shiying Qiye geminghua wenti” 〔關於私營企業革命化問題〕

Kwee Hing Tjiat 郭恆節

Kwee Kek Beng 郭克明

Kwee Tek Hoay 郭德懷

- Kwik Kian Gie 郭建義
 Lie Tek Tjeng 李德清
 Liem Koen Hian 林羣賢
Na Han [吶喊]
 Nio Joe Lan 梁友蘭
 Oei Tiang Tjoei 黃長水
 Oei Tjong Hauw 黃忠孝
 Ong Tay Hay 王大海
 Pat-im 八音
 Phoa Keng Hek 潘景赫
 Phoa Liong Gie 潘良義
 Pingan Yiyuan 平安醫院
 Pu-tsu (Buzu) 部族
 San Min Chu I (Sanmin Zhuyi) 三民主義
Shenghuo Zhoubao [生活週報]
 Sia (Hsia) Hwee 社會
 Siauw Giok Tjhan 蕭玉燦
Sin Min [新民] (報)
 Sin Ming Hui 新明會
Sin Po (印尼文) [新報]
 Song Zhongquan 宋中銓
 Sun Yat Sen 孫逸仙
Ta Hsüeh (Daxue) [大學]
 Thio Thaim Tjong 張添聰

Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan 中華會館

Tjoe Bou San 朱茂山

Tjung Tin Jan 鍾鼎遠

Tongsan (Tongshan) 唐山

Wuchang 武昌

Yap Thiam Hien 葉添興

Yinhua 印華

Yindunixiya yu xuexi [印度尼西亞語學習]

Index

- Abdulgani, Ruslan, 113
 Abiturient, *See* Goh Tjing Hok
 ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia), 228, 239
 Afro-Asian Conference, 126
 Agrarian Law (1870 & 1960), 225
 "Ali-Baba" system, 105, 205
 Ambonese, xvii, 19, 51, 176
 AMPERA, 113, 120, 131, 217
 Ang Sioe Tjiang, 8
 Arabs, 129, 213
 Assaat movement, 119–20
 Assimilation Charter (Piagam Asimilasi), 150, 159–60
 Astra Group 246
 Auwjong Peng Koen, 101n
- Baars, 14
 Baba, *See* Peranakan Chinese
 Bagan Si Api-Api, 35, 178
 Bahagia, 63
 BAKOM P.K.B., 140, 167, 174, 203, 206, 221, 233, 242, 245
 Banda, 34
 Bandung, 58, 74, 121, 128, 164, 166, 178
 Bandungan, 160
 Bangka, 154
 Banjarmasin, 50, 188
 Bantam, 34
 BAPERKI (Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia), 91, 98–99, 109–133, 116, 141, 164–65, 197–200, 215, 224, 226
 BAPERKI University, *See* URECA
 Basic human rights, 99, 101, 105, 110, 116, 129, 133, 196
 Batavia, 4, 9–10, 34–35, 58, 179; *See also* Jakarta
 Bekasi, 56
 Benteng Group, 119
 Be Tjong Lee, 160
 Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, 101, 106, 128, 197, 199, 217
 Bogor (Buitenzorg), 4, 56, 58, 122
 Borneo (Kalimantan), 63
 Boxer Rebellion, 79
 B.P.M. (Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij), 193
- Broad Outline of State Policy (G.B.H.N.), 228, 237
 Brouwer, G.G., 35
 Buddhists, 213
 Budi Utomo, 221
 Buginese, 190
 Buitenzorg, *See* Bogor
 BULOG-ization, 203
 Bung Karno, *See* Sukarno
 Bung Tomo, 183
 Burma, 84, 190
 Bwa Tjoen Liong, 160
- Catholic Party (Partai Katholik), 242
 Centre for International and Strategic Studies (CSIS), 239, 242
 Chan Kok Cheng (K.C. Chan), 50, 64
 Chang Tso Lin, 46
 Chen Yi, 86
 Che Kiang, 46
 Chen, Eugene, 46
 Cheng Ho (Zeng He), 169–70
 C.H.H. (Chung Hwa Hui), 33, 42, 50, 53n, 54–56, 58–62, 64–65, 70, 75, 92, 141, 144–48, 222, 226
 Chiang Kai-shek, 57
 Ch'iao-sheng (Qiaosheng), 209
 Ch'ing Dynasty, 185; *See also* Manchu
 Ch'iu Cheng-ou (Qiu Zhengou, Ch'iu Han-hsing), 206–207
 Ch'iu Han-hsing, *See* Ch'iu Cheng-ou
 Chinese "Officiers System", 8n
 Christian, 100, 103, 127, 129
 C.H.T.H. (Chung Hua Tsung Hui, Zhonghua Zonghui), 93, 95
 Chung Hwa Congress, 33
 Chung Hwa Hui-Netherlands, 30, 144–50
 Chung Lien Hui, 145
Chung Yung, 4
 Chuuo Sangiin, *See* Tjoo Sangi In
 Cirebon (Tjirebon), 15, 121
 Coen, Governor-General, 34
 Communications Week, 233–34
 Communism/Communist, 120, 129
 Communist society, 101
 Confucius/Confucianism/Confucianist, 3–7, 213, 244
 Cornelis, Mr., *See* Jatinegara

CSIS, *See* Centre for Strategic and International Studies

Danareksa, P.T., 205
 Darsono, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16
 Dasaad, A.M., 241
 de Haan, Dr., 150
 De Indië, 16
 De Lanessan, 5
 De Nieuwe Courant, 15
 Dewantara, K.H. (Soewardi Soerjadinigrat), 75, 241
 Digul, 74
 Diponegoro, 63
Djawa Tengah, 29
Djawa Tengah Review, 63, 64–65
 Djip-hoan, 59
 Djokosamadio, 160
 Djunaedi, H. Mahbub, 233
 Douwes Dekker, E.F.E. (Danudirdjo Setiabudi), 221, 228
 D.P.A., 110
 D.P.R., 192, 242

 East Timor, 230
 E.L.S. (Europeesch Lagere School), 4, 25

 Fa Hsien (Fa Xian), 85
 Fascism, 129–31
 Federal Republic of Indonesia (R.I.S.), 83n, 92–94, 96, 119, 187–88
 Fifth Column, 220
 Flores, 193
 Foreign Orientals, *See* Vreemde Oosterlingen
 Fretilin, 230
 Fromberg, P.H., 3, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 24, 30, 37, 62

 G-30-S/P.K.I., *See* Gestapu
 GANEFO, 123, 126
 Gang Kantjil (in Jakarta), 178
 Garut, 121
 G.B.H.N., *See* Broad Outline of State Policy
 Germany, 97, 102
 Gestapu/Gestok (the 1965 coup), 22n, 141, 212n
 GESURI, 116, 117
 Ginting, Lo SH (Drs. Lo Siang Hien), 101n, 202, 233
 G.K.I. (Gereja Kristen Indonesia), 127–28, 131
 Glodok, 42n

Goh Tjing Hok (Abiturient), 160, 173, 181
 Golongism, 157–58
 Gotong-royong, 113–15
 Grisse (Gresik), 34
 Groeneveldt, W.P., 34

Hakka, 7
 Hamka, Buya, 168
 Handojo, Lukito (Lie King Han), 127, 130
 Han Tiau Tjong, 42
 Hardjono, Abito Marto, 184
Harian Rakjat, 91, 109, 134
 Harun, Lukman, 245
 Hatta, 63, 119
 Hawaii, 106
 H.C.S. (Hollandsch Chineesch School), 27, 42–43, 59–60, 185, 214, 218
 H.H. Kan, *See* Kan Hok Hoei
 Hindu/Hindu-Balinese, 100, 103
 H.I.S. (Hollandsch-Inlandsch School), 27
 Hitler, A., 158
 “Hoa Djien”, *See* Phoa Keng Hek
 Hoa Kiauw (Huaqiao/Hua Kiao), 44–49, 83–84, 216, 225–26
 Hoanna, 184
 Hodge, John R. Lt-Gen., 180
 Hoetink, B., 36
 Hokkien, 7
Hong Po, 78
 Hsia-hwee (Shehui), 148
 Hua-i (Huayi), 216
 Hua Kiao, *See* Hoa Kiauw
 Huaqiao, *See* Hoa Kiauw
 Huaqiao Zonghui, 78
 Huaqiao tuan jie cujinhui, 88
 Huaren, 83
 Huazu, 83

Ihromi SH (Mrs.), 127–29
 India, 84, 97
 Indians, 213
 Indigenous capitalists, 16
 Indische Partij, 212
 Indonesian *suku*, 91, 124
 Indonesian Women’s Congress, 121
 Indonesiër (Indonesian), 51–52, 54
 Irian, 230
 I.S.D.V. (Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging), 14n

Jahja, Junus, *See* Lauw Chuan Tho
 Jakarta, 9–10, 112; *See also* Batavia
 Jalan Braga, 122
 Jang Seng le Red Cross, 179

- Jap Thiam Jong, 160
 Jatinegara (Mr. Cornelis), 56
 Javanese, 51, 161, 165, 170, 190, 199, 230
Java Post, 181
 Jews, 106
 Jong Ambon, 222
 Jong Islamieten Bond, 222
 Jong Java, 222
 Jong Sumatranen Bond, 222
 Junus Jahja, *See* Lauw Chuan Tho
- KADIN** (Kamar Dagang dan Industri Indonesia), 205
 Kalimantan, 230—31
 Kampung Cina (Chinatowns), 214
 Kan Hok Hoei (H.H. Kan), 33
 Kang Yu Wei (Kang Youwei), 62, 64, 154
Keng Po, 95
 Khoe A. Fan, 8
 Khoe Hiong Pin, 8
 Khoe Siau Eng, 8
 Khoe Woen Sioe, 94
 Khouw, A.R., 160
 Khouw Kim An, 8
 Khouw Lam Tjiang, 8
 Kleintjes, 69
 K.M.B., *See* Round Table Conference
 K.M.T. (Kuomintang), 88, 98, 206—07, 210
 Ko Kwat Tiong (Mohamed Saleh), 66, 67, 189, 221
Kompas, 134, 138, 221, 233
 Kong Koan, *See* Raad Tjina
 KOTI, 225
 Ko Tjay Sing, 41
 Ku Hung Ming (Gu Hongming), 62
Kuang Po, 178
 Kudus, 3, 10—14
 Kwa Tjoan Sioe, 53
 Kwee Hing Tjiat, 29, 50, 61, 64—66
 Kwee Hwat Djien, 101n
 Kwee Kek Beng, 4, 29, 177
 Kwee Tek Hoay, 33, 40, 44, 55
 Kwik Hway Gwan, 153
 Kwik Kian Gie, 91, 133, 138, 240
- Lau Kung Hui, 93
 Lauw Chuan Tho (Lauwchuantho/Junus Jahja), 104, 106, 108, 141, 144, 147, 160, 207, 244
 Lauw Sing Djay (L. Tedjakusuma), 189
 Lee Teng Hui (Lie Teng Hwi/Li Teng-hui), 10
Liberty, 181
 Lie Bo Tan, Nona Mr. Dora, 160
 Lie Hin Liam, 8, 44
 Lie Kiat Teng, 194
 Lie Kim Hok, 8
 Lie King Han, *See* Handojo, Lukito
 Lie Tek Tjeng, 206, 211, 216
 Liem Boen Keng (Lin Wen-ch'ing), 9, 62
 Liem Keng Wien, 160
 Liem Khian An, 160
 Liem Kit Siang, 146
 Liem Koen Hian, 50, 55, 56, 57, 59, 64, 70, 141, 155, 221
 Liem Koe Nio, 98
 Liem Sioe Liong (Soedono Salim), 239, 241
 Liem Tieng Kiang, 123
 Liem Tjien Siang, 160
 Liem Tjoen Ho, 160
 Lim Shui Chuan, 178
 Lippo, 246
 Lo Khing Djie, 160
 Lo Siang Hien, *See* Ginting, Lo SH
 Low Koei Hong (Lu Kui-fang), 9
 L.P.K.B. (Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa), 124, 141, 164, 167, 206, 220, 225—26, 233
 Lu Hsun (Lu Xun), 232
 Lu Kui-fang, *See* Low Koei Hong
- Mao Zedong, 90
Madjallah Panorama, 44
 Madurese, 51, 190
 Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), 168—69
 Malang, 75
 Malanism, 194
 Malaysia, 132, 244
 Malik, Adam, 238
 Maluku, 230
 Manchu, 181—82, 184
 Mandarin (Guoyu, Kuoyu), 9
 Mangkudilaga, Sufwandi, 128—29
 Mangoenkoesoemo, Tjipto, 63, 221
 MANIPOL, *See* Political Manifesto
 Marx, 118, 122
Mata Hari, 61, 63, 188
 Minahasa, 193
 Minahasans, 19
 Minangkabau, 199
 Mixed marriage, 120—22, 125—26
 Moerdani, L.B., 244
 Moertopo, Ali, 244
Moestika Romans, 8
 M.P.R.S. (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara), 126, 134
 Muhammadiyah, 245—46
 Muslim, 100, 103

- Nabi, 4
Na Han, 219, 222
 Name-changing, 120–21, 125, 132, 141, 160–64, 173, 190
 NASAKOM, 113, 114, 115, 122
 National Institute for Cultural Research, 212, 216
 “National self-determination”, 230, 233
 National Indische Partij, 221
 Nation-building, 107, 120, 173–74
 “Native policy”, 193–96
 Nederlandsch Onderdaanschap (Dutch “subjectship”/Dutch Nationality Law), 17–20, 22–24, 28, 30
 Netherlands, 84, 145–47
 Negro, 156–57
 NICA, 178
 Nio Hoeij Oen, 8
 Nio Joe Lan, 4
 Njoo Han Siang, 238
 Njoto, 124
 Notosoetarso, 68
 N.U. (Nahdatul Ulama), 111
 Nusantara, 229n, 230
Nusaputra, 188

 Oe Siang Djie, 160
 Oei Hok Djien, 160
 Oei Tiang Tjoei, 70, 78
 Oei Tiong Ham, 45, 75
 Oei Tjeng Hien, 169
 Oei Tjhing Hong, 160
 Oei Tjin San, *See* Wullur, Jahja
 Oei Tjoe Tat, 122–23
 Oei Tiong Hauw, 70, 75
 Oen A Tjoeng, 8
 Oetama, Jakob, 245
 Oey Giok Ie, 8
 Oey Giok Koen, 8
 Oey Jan Hong, *See* Oey Yan Hong
 Oey Beng To, 139
 Oey Kim Seng, 169
 Oey Liang Lee, 139
 Oey Tjiang Shin, 21
 Oey Tjin San, *See* Wullur, Jahja
 Oey Tjoe, 45
 Oey Yan Hong, 127, 129, 164, 166
 Ong An Kok, 160
 Ong Eng Die, 194
 Ong Hok Ham, 101n, 150, 160
 Ong Tay Hay, 151
 Ong Tiong Hai, *See* Sindhunatha, Kristoforus
 Ouw Sian Tjeng, 8
 Ouw Tiauw Soeij, 8

 Pakistani, 129
 Palembang, 179
 Pancasila (Pantja Sila), 99, 101, 113–14, 116, 123, 219, 228, 230, 243, 246
 Panglaykim, Prof., 244
 Pao An Tui, 179
 Parindra, 221
 PARKINDO, 110, 111n, 121
 PARMUSI, 111n
 Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI), 134
 Partai Katholik, 110, 111n, 203, 242; *See also* Catholic Party
 Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), 110n
 PARTINDO, 121
 Pasar Baru (Jakarta), 199
 Pass system, xii, 10, 105
 P.D.T.I. (Partai Demokrat Tionghoa Indonesia), 91, 92, 112, 155
 Pek Hien Liang, 127, 128, 141, 160
 Peng Bin Hak Hauw, 58
 Peng Zhen, 200
 People’s Republic of China (PRC), 83, 85, 89, 155, 163, 202, 216
 Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katholik Republik Indonesia (PMKRI), 242
 Permesta, 117, 120
Perniagaan, 8
 Persatuan Peladjar Indonesia (P.P.I.), 148–50
 Persatuan Tenaga Indonesia, 141–44
 Persatuan Tionghoa (P.T.), xv, 92, 95, 96, 141–43, 155
 PERTI, 111, 121
 PERWANITT, 113
 PERWITT, 113
 Philippines, 63, 84, 97, 98, 190
 Phoa Keng Hek (Hoa Djien), 3–4, 8
 Phoa Liong Gie, 51
 Phoa Lip Tjay, 8
 Piagam Asimilasi, *See* Assimilation Charter
 Pigeaud, 144
 Pingan Yiyuan, 89
 P.K.I. (Partai Komunis Indonesia), 11, 14n, 81, 109, 120–21, 164–65, 221
 P.N.I. (Partai Nasional Indonesia), 221
 Political Manifesto (MANIPOL), 110, 113, 115, 118–19, 125
 Politierol, 222
 P.P.I. (Permusjawaratan Pemuda Indonesia), 199
 P.P.I. (Persatuan Pelajar Indonesia), 145–47
 Priangan Syuu Kakyo Sokai, 75
 P.R.R.I. (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia), 117, 120

- P.S.I.I. (Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia), 110
P.T.I. (Partai Tionghoa Indonesia), 50–51, 53n, 54–57, 59, 62, 66–67, 70–71, 73, 141, 173–74, 221–23
- Qiao Zong (Zhonghua Qiaotuan Zonghui), 83, 85–89
Qiu Zhengou, *See* Ch'iu Cheng-ou
- Raad Tjina (Kong-Koan/Gong Guan), 9
Ratuperwira, Alamsyah, 168
Republic of China (Taiwan), 57, 117, 184, 207, 210
R.I.S., *See* Federal Republic of Indonesia
Roestam, Soebardjo, 240
Round Table Conference (K.M.B.), 83, 119, 223
R.R.T., *See* People's Republic of China
RUPI (Rukun Peladjar Indonesia), 145n, 150
Russia, *See* U.S.S.R.
- Salmon, Claudine, 136
Saleh, Mohammed, *See* Ko Kwat Tiong
Salim, Soedono, *See* Liem Sioe Liong
San Min Chu I, 184
Sarikat Islam (S.I.), 11, 12, 13, 14, 221
Sartono, 63
Sastroamidjojo, Ali, 192
Satiman, 63
Satyawardaya, Anang, *See* Tjoa Tjie Liang
Semaoen, 11, 13, 14, 16
Semarang, 29, 181
Setiabudi, Danudirdjo, *See* Douwes Dekker
Shenghuo Zhoubao, 174, 200–01
Siang Boe, 92
Siang Hwee, 226; *See also* Zhonghua Shanghai
Siauw Giok Tjhan, 99–101, 123, 173–74
Sidharta, P., 167
Sisilahi, Harry Tjan, 207, 239, 242
Sin Hua School, 199
Sin Min, 181
Sin Ming Hui, 93, 95
Sin Po, 3, 10–11, 16, 24, 29, 55, 59, 83, 177–78, 180; *See also* Sin Po group
Sin Po group, 33, 50, 226n
Sin Tit Po, 51, 174, 188
Sinar, 92–94
Sinar Harapan, 127
Sinar Indonesia, 188
Sindhunatha, Kristoforus (Ong Tjong Hai), 167, 206, 220, 245
Singapore, 9, 10, 117, 125
Singgih, 63
Siregar, Arifin, 244
Slamat, Mich, 160
Socialist revolution, 91
Soeara Oemoen, 188
Soeara Rahajat, 14
Soebandrio, *See* Subandrio
Soe Hok Djin (Arief Budiman), 173, 197
Soekarno, *See* Sukarno
Soekisman, Drs., 235
Soe Po Sia, 226
Soerabaja, *See* Surabaya
Soerabajaasch Handelsblad, 12
Soeroso, 67
Soetardjo Petition, 67, 96
Soetomo, 63
Song Zhongquan, 83, 85, 87
Sosrohadikoesoemo, 67–69
South Africa, 104, 106, 194
Star Weekly (Jakarta), 95, 99, 101–10, 150, 155
Straits Chinese Association, 9
Subandrio (Soebandrio), 201–02
Sudarsono, Juwono, 243
Sudirman, Basofi, 168
Sugriwa, 121
Suharto, President, 160, 167–68, 237–39, 245
Sukabumi, 121–22, 162–63
Sukarno (Soekarno/Bung Karno), 63, 70, 86, 90, 98, 110–12, 116–24, 168, 178–79, 189, 192, 198, 217
Sulawesi, South, 193
Sumatra, 231
Sumatrans, 18–19
Sumpah Pemuda (Youth Pledge), 159, 222, 236, 239
Sundanese, 165, 175, 190
Sun Yat Sen, 54, 70, 71, 182, 184, 212, 222
Surabaya (Soerabaja), 34, 73–75, 113
Surakarta (Solo), 151
Suryadjaya, William, 239
Suryaningrat, R.M.A., 153
Suryaningrat, Suwadi, *See* Dewantara
Sutan, Rahimi, 245
Sutjiadi, D., 160
Switzerland, 106, 227
- Ta Hsüeh, 4
Ta Hsueh Hsueh Sheng Hui, 145
Taiwan, *See* Republic of China
Tan Bian Seng, 101n
Tangerang, 56, 152, 179–80
Tangkuban Perahu, 227
Tan Kim San, 8

- Tan Kong Tiat, 8
 Tan Ling Djie, 144n
 Tan Pik Kwie, 160
 Tante Khian, 101n
 Tan Tiang Seng, 8
 Tan Yoe Hock, 123
 Tedjakusuma, L., *See* Lauw Sing Djay
 Tegal, 121
Tempo, 136, 167, 169
 Teng Tjin Leng, 144n
 Thamrin, M. Husni, 221
 The Han Lim, 160
 T.H.H.K. (Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan), 3–6, 8–10, 41, 56, 58, 60, 65, 85, 185–87, 226
 Thio Thiam Tjong, 91, 92
Tiansheng Ribao, 207
 Timer, 193
 Tio Hian Sioe, 160
 Tio Tek Ho, 7
 Tjia Dji Siong, 101
 Tjiandjur, 121
 Tjibinong, 56
 Tjipto, *See* Mangoenkoesoemo, Tjipto
 Tjoa Sik Ien, 137n, 173–74, 184
 Tjoa Soe Tien, 160
 Tjoa Tjie Liang (Anang Sastrawardaya), 160, 188
 Tjoa Tjoen San, 146
 Tjoa Yoe Tek, 8
 Tjoe Bou San, 3, 16, 24
 Tjokrohadisurjo, Iskaq, 224
 Tjokrosisworo, Soedarjo, 63
 Tjung Tin Jan, 141, 156
 Tjuo Sangi In (Chuuoo Sangiin), 75–76, 78

 United Nations (UN), 136, 143, 194
 United States (USA), 98, 104, 106, 153, 157, 215
 URECA (BAPERKI University), 199n
 USDEK, 118
 U.S.S.R.(Russia), 97, 106, 176, 199, 218

 Valentjin, Francis, 34
 van der Veur, Paul W., 221n
 van Heutz, 37
 Van Hoogstraten, 119
 van Limburg Stirum, Graaf, 40
 Van Mook, 92, 142

 Verwoerd, 106
 Volksraad (People's Council), 4, 21–22, 27–33, 41–43, 57, 96, 222
 Vreemde Oosterlingen (Foreign Orientals), 34, 73, 105, 156, 165, 213, 217–18

 Wanandi, Jusuf, 239
 Wang Ching-wei, 57, 58
Warna Warta, 14
Warta Bhakti, 124
 West Irian, 85, 90
 Wibisono, Christianto, 206, 238
 Wignjosumarsono, F., 160
 Wilopo, 191
 Wirjopranoto, 69
 Wirth, Louis, 102–104, 106, 156
 W.N.A. (Foreign Citizens), 215, 231n
 W.N.I. (Indonesian Citizens [of Chinese Descent]), 99, 108, 159, 162–64, 174–77, 185, 211, 215–17, 224, 231n, 233–37
 Wongsonegoro, 192
 World Revolution, 124
 Wuchang Day, 181–84
 Wullur, Jahja (Oei/Oey Tjin San), 127–28, 141, 164

Xin Bao (Chinese edition of *Sin Po*), 83, 85

 Yamin, Muhammad, 70, 75, 78
 Yap Thiam Hien, 91, 98, 110, 127, 141, 155–58
 Yap Tjwan Bing, 77
 Yayasan Prasetija Mulja, 239
 Yinhua (Yin-hua), 229–33
 Yi Yung Thoan (Voluntary Brigade), 44
 Yogyakarta (Yogya), 83, 151, 161, 154, 174, 202, 245
 Youth Pledge, *See* Sumpah Pemuda

 Zeng He, *See* Cheng Ho
 Zhang Guoji, 88
Zhongcheng bao, 123–24
 Zhonghua Shanghui, 93; *See also* Siang Hwee
 Zhonghua Zonghui (Chung Hua Tsung Hui), 179–80
 Zionism, 26
 Zoning system, 10, 38, 105



PANCASILA



KETUHANAN YANG MAHA ESA

KEMANUSIAAN YANG ADIL DAN BERADAB

PERSATUAN INDONESIA

KERAKYATAN YANG DIPIMPIN OLEH HIKMAT KEBIJAK -
SANAAN DALAM PERMUSYAWARATAN / PERWAKILAN

KEADILAN SOSIAL BAGI SELURUH RAKYAT INDONESIA



NUS

National University
of Singapore

This sourcebook aims to introduce to English readers the political thinking of the Chinese minority in Indonesia from 1900-1995.

Comprising the writings, speeches, letters, Chinese leaders or individuals who have development of Chinese minority thinking in peranakan Malay, Indonesian, Chinese or Dutch the voices of eminent Indonesian Chinese as a resource for students of Indonesian or ethnic studies.

Almost two decades since its first publication in 1979, the continued demand for such a volume has resulted in this updated and expanded edition which includes several new articles of material bringing post-1977 developments up to date, significantly till 1995 which is the year of the Bali Declaration when the Chinese tycoons were asked to help solve the Indonesian economic problem.

Other titles published by Singapore University Press:

Chinese Adaptation and Diversity:
Essays on Society and Literature in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore
LEO SURYADINATA (Ed.)

The Chinese Economy in Transition
CHEN KANG

The Memoirs of Tan Kah Kee
AHC WARD, RAYMOND W CHU & JANET SALAFF (Trans.)



SINGAPORE UNIVERSITY PRESS
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE